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ABSTRACT

Transfigurations of the News:
True Fictions, Strange Thresholds
by
Jeffrey Peer

Advisor: John Brenkman
Abstract:
This dissertation compares twentieth-century literary journalism from the U.S. and Mexico,
with a focus on the nonfiction novel and the Mexican chronicle. The dissertation considers the
two genres both historically and theoretically, in order to distinguish the borders between
literature and unscrupulous journalism. North American journalism is at the heart of a crisis
over the epistemological status of facts and their place in our political discourse. Some have
argued that works of literary nonfiction can damage social norms like journalistic objectivity.
Others argue that forms like the chronicle and the nonfiction novel can describe experience
better than news reports. This dissertation engages with debates in and between the disciplines
of history and theory of the novel, rhetorical and narrative studies of literature, philosophy of
art and of literature, Latin American studies, Mexican studies and more, in order to investigate
the boundaries of literature and journalism, art and representation, and fiction and fact.
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Preface
Many excellent works of literary journalism did not find their way into this dissertation,
simply because there were far too many for me to consider. Some of the books discussed here
are quite famous, others deserve more attention, but there were certainly many more which I
might also have included. I have preferred to read closely rather than widely. I have not done a
quantitative analysis of literary journalism, so I cannot summon numerical statistics proving
that these examples are representative of the genre, but I would like to think they are.
I also have not posited a definition of literary journalism. Defining literary genres is
always a tricky business and the boundaries of this one seemed too expansive and nebulous.
Even the name is contentious. Though other critics prefer to call it literary nonfiction,
documentary fiction, etc., I use the term literary journalism, unless I am referring to examples
that seem to me to borrow the form of the novel. In those cases, I will use another confusing –
but now canonical – term: the nonfiction novel.
Beginning by defining the form would be more typical procedure in a work of analytic
philosophy and this dissertation is certainly not that, though I am deeply indebted to the works
of several analytic philosophers whom I very much admire. I engage with many arguments
across a number of disciplines, ranging from: novel studies, rhetorical studies and narratology;
to philosophy of art and philosophy of literature; to Latin American and Mexican studies. I do
not claim to analyze any of these arguments conclusively, but I do hope that my analysis sheds
some light on them, their subjects and on the field in general.
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This dissertation, you will find, is divided into two parts and four sections. Though these
divisions may appear somewhat capricious, they follow a plan which, whether or not I have
managed to follow it, made good sense at the outset of the project.
The first division I made was between works of literary journalism written in English and
published in the U.S.A. (Part One) and works written in Spanish published in Mexico (Part Two).
I have kept these parts separate because I feel strongly that, despite some Mexican readers of
the U.S. literary journalists, the two traditions are essentially distinct and need to be considered
on their own merits. I see this as respecting the histories of the two traditions and cultures. But
my hope is that the conclusions I draw in the two sections will reverberate across the division,
and that a more expansive sense of what these literary journalisms have in common will result
from my respecting their differences. The second division readers of this study will encounter is
between historiographical (Sections One and Three) and analytical (Sections Two and Four)
critical approaches. It seemed important in each case to consider these works first
diachronically, that is, as a history to be elucidated and explored. In Section One, I have
investigated the precedents for what would come to be known in the U.S.A., in 1965, as the
nonfiction novel. This required sketching a general history of twentieth-century literary
journalism in the U.S.A. and some discussion of what has been called the objectivity norm. In
Section Three, I have linked three texts and three writers spanning nearly a century of Mexican
literary history, revealing a literary genealogy while also outlining a tiny bit of the long history of
a classic Mexican literary form.
Sections Two and Four approach literary journalism as a question rather than as a
history. In Section Two, I arrive at what might be described as something resembling a theory –
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though I doubt it deserves to be called one. In simplified terms, it is an argument for the value
of employing skepticism when reading certain genres. Readers will find much of the theoretical
part of my discussion in this section, especially in the chapter “The Nonfiction Novel and the
Debates on Fictionality.” Readers interested in the importance of journalism as a social
institution will find the problem outlined in “John Hersey’s Reversal: Fake News and Mimesis.”
Section Four turns to one of the central works of contemporary Mexican literature,
Elena Poniatowska’s Massacre in Mexico (1971). This section considers that book skeptically,
while analyzing some assumptions about its genre that previous readers have made. But after
considering literary and cultural studies of the 1968 Student Movement in Mexico, and after
referring to a famous, perhaps analogous veracity debate in Latin American literature, I arrive at
a surprising conclusion. Rather than simply reinforcing the conclusions reached in Section Two
about the need for skeptical reading, this investigation suggests that skepticism should be used
responsibly, with a nuanced understanding of genre and context helping to determine which
texts deserve our belief, and which our admiration.
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Part One
Section One
Reporters-at-Large:
John Hersey, Lillian Ross, Truman Capote and the Novel of Facts
1. The New Yorker and the Origins of Contemporary American Literary Journalism
Joseph Mitchell might be regarded as the finest writer of nonfiction ever to publish in
the pages of the New Yorker magazine, which would be no small praise, among that company,
except for the shrill voice and the raised hand in the back of the room intruding upon our
ceremonies with an unforeseen objection: that Mitchell’s work was not nonfiction. Secretly,
Mitchell was writing something more like fiction.
The controversy began in 1944 at the height of Mitchell’s success. Among his most
popular New Yorker pieces were a series of profiles of Hugh G. Flood, an elderly gentleman,
retired owner of a house-wrecking company, who was spending his golden years down at the
Fulton Fish Market. Mitchell’s profiles of Flood revealed the ninety-three-year-old’s odd habits
and curious character. Flood was convinced that an all-seafood diet was the key to realize his
only remaining ambition, “‘I don’t ask much here below,’ he says. ‘I just want to hit a hundred
and fifteen. That’ll hold me’” (2008: 375). Mr. Flood’s last remaining ambition would become
the great theme of Mitchell’s finest writing: the will to live, the defiance of death even in the
face of the constant evanescence of the present into the past. “Many aged people reconcile
themselves to the certainty of death and become tranquil; Mr. Flood is unreconcilable,”
Mitchell writes (ibid.: 375). Flood’s obstinacy takes the particular form of an obsession with
eating seafood, and he spends so much time at the Fulton Fish Market buying and eating fish
that the fishmongers there nickname him the Mayor.
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Flood is a wonderful literary character, appealing to the reader’s imagination with all the
power of the hero of a novel. His speech is idiosyncratic and revelatory; his quirks are endearing
and comical; everything he does or says derives from his one organizing principle, survival by
seafood, making him uniform and coherent; and something about him is archetypal, as if he
were the likeness of some spirited, uninhibited, raunchy, vigorous and smelly old man whom
we have all imagined. The only problem is that Mr. Hugh G. Flood never lived.
In a recent biography of Joseph Mitchell, Thomas Kunkel describes the problematic
success of the Old Mr. Flood profiles. As a former journalist and professor of journalism, Kunkel
is torn between the creed of accuracy to the facts upon which professional journalism relies,
and his intense admiration for Mitchell, supposedly one of the brightest lights of the profession,
whom he has caught cheating:
Mitchell’s stories turned Mr. Flood into a minor celebrity. But he was an elusive one.
Newspaper reporters and New Yorker readers would come by the Hartford Hotel in
hopes of visiting with him, to no avail. After “The Black Clams” appeared, publisher M.
Lincoln Schuster was so inspired that he sent Mitchell a telegram with a proposal.
(2015:149)
Mitchell was forced to reject Schuster’s offer to publish Mr. Flood’s autobiography. He claimed
that he himself was at work on a biography of Flood, but in fact he could not possibly introduce
the famous publisher or his editors to a man who did not exist. When Mitchell republished his
profiles as a book, he fessed up in an author’s note, “Mr. Flood is not one man; combined in
him are aspects of several old men who work or hang out in Fulton Fish Market, or who did in
the past. I wanted these stories to be truthful rather than factual, but they are solidly based on
facts” (2008:374). The truth and the facts are not necessarily the same, Mitchell suggests. His
Mr. Flood is an example of what has come to be called a composite character: an invention
2

based upon real figures, or, in Kunkel’s words, on “several long-established figures at the Fulton
Fish Market – with a large dollop of Mitchell himself thrown in for good measure” (2015: 150).
Skeptical critics may wonder, at this juncture, how exactly such a creation is any different from
a character in a novel, remembering that fiction writers also often base their inventions on
living people, with a large dollop of themselves thrown in for measure.
Mr. Schuster’s offer was not the only time Mitchell found his inventions uncomfortably
exposed. In his journeys through the New Yorker archives, Kunkel unearths a letter that
Mitchell wrote in 1961 to the magazine’s attorney, explaining why the rights to the story of
“Cockeye Johnny Nikanov,” the subject of Mitchell’s 1941 profile, “The King of the Gypsies,”
were his and his alone. Mitchell was then developing a musical based on the profile and had
heard rumors about a rival script, and so was forced to explain, “‘No matter how true to life
Cockeye Johnny happens to be, he is a fictional character, and I invented him, and he is not in
‘the public domain,’ he is mine” (qtd in Kunkel 2015: 153). Again, Mitchell calls his invention
“true” though it is not factual. While working as a reporter at the New York World-Telegram,
before coming to the New Yorker, Mitchell had not achieved that sort of truth, he said:
I had written about a great variety of people, and, working for an afternoon newspaper,
I had had to work very fast ... But there was this anomaly: you can write something and
every sentence in it will be a fact, you can pile up facts, but it won’t be true. Inside a fact
is another fact, and inside that is another fact. You’ve got to get to the true facts. (my
ellipsis, qtd in Yagoda 2000: 142)
An incipient philosophy of art may hide in Mitchell’s anomaly: the writer who can leap the gap
between writing mere facts to writing true facts does not express the sort of truth that implies
veridical reliability, or correspondence with reality, but rather, some artistic sort of truth.
Therefore Nikanov may be “true to life,” even if he never actually lived. Mitchell’s writing is
3

filled with esoteric facts about old New York, but such details do not make it credible reporting.
The artist expressing deeper human truths may also be, to more skeptical readers, merely a
dishonest reporter. Literary journalism exists at the threshold of these distinct epistemologies
and must navigate between different varieties of truth.
Mitchell only “invented” Nikanov after discussing the story with Harold Ross, the New
Yorker’s founding editor. The surreptitious fiction about a gypsy king was written “with [Ross’s]
knowledge and approval,” if not at his suggestion (Kunkel 2015: 153). The same is true of the
Mr. Flood profiles, it turns out. After a decade of frequenting the Fulton Fish Market, Mitchell
had several potential profile subjects, but none of the old men would consent to be the subject
of an article. Ross solved the problem for Mitchell, Kunkel says:
Mitchell said that one day he was talking with New Yorker editor Harold Ross about the
dilemma, when Ross offered a potential solution. “There had been a number of
composite profiles [in the magazine],” Mitchell said, “a composite profile of a
policeman, for example, that McKelway had written. So [Ross] said, ‘Why don’t you
write a composite?’” (ibid.: 151)
Ross is usually remembered for his delight in mundane and esoteric facts, and for his
excessively detailed editorial notes. It was this zeal for accuracy that inspired him to found the
world’s first fact-checking department. But the magazine he ran from 1925 until 1951 was also
a home and hotbed of creativity for experimental works of literary journalism, and for writers
who bent the facts as it suited them. Mitchell’s two exposed composite characters were not the
only times he strayed from writing real facts into the realm of “true facts.” Janet Malcolm,
reviewing Kunkel’s biography, points out that Mitchell’s reporting notes show that another of
his most famous pieces, “Mr. Hunter’s Grave,” contains “tamperings with actuality” which
Kunkel struggles to explain (2015: 9). Though Mr. Hunter seems to have existed, Mitchell did
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not meet him as it happens in the story. However, for Malcolm, whose New Yorker nonfiction is
also among the magazine’s finest, such “tamperings” are not necessarily a shortcoming:
Few of us have gone as far as Mitchell in bending actuality to our artistic will. This is not
because we are more virtuous than Mitchell. It is because we are less gifted than
Mitchell. The idea that reporters are constantly resisting the temptation to invent is a
laughable one. Reporters don’t invent because they don’t know how to …They couldn’t
create a character like Mr. Flood or Cockeye Johnny if you held a gun to their heads.
Mitchell’s travels across the line that separates fiction and nonfiction are his singular
feat. (my ellipsis ibid.: 10)
However we may judge the aesthetic merits of Mitchell’s writing, we must also recognize that if
he were to publish such works today, he would be excoriated for broaching professional
journalistic standards of objectivity and veridical reliability which have become sacrosanct.
Malcolm, herself the subject of a libel suit that reached the Supreme Court in 1991, knew this
better than anyone. But genres are dynamic. Our current understanding of journalism and the
concept of objectivity that undergirds it are historical phenomena. When Mitchell revealed the
truth about Mr. Flood, “not a single brow was raised in publishing or journalistic circles,” Kathy
Roberts Forde writes (2008: 42). Roberts Forde suggests this was due to the era’s “more fluid
understanding of the genres of fiction and nonfiction ... and an appreciation of the borderland
that exists between the two” (my ellipsis ibid.:42). To understand the literary journalism of
Mitchell’s era we must first consider the genre’s historical development and the role that the
New Yorker magazine played in it. Only then will we be able to approach the theoretical and
aesthetic questions raised by literary journalism.
In an essay entitled “The Problem of Journalism History,” James Carey prescribes a new
perspective for critics writing about the press: rather than a single-minded focus on
publications, editors and editorial policies, he suggests “developing the cultural history of
5

journalism” (1997: 88). Carey, a media studies and communications theorist who taught at the
Columbia School of Journalism and served as its dean, laments the lack of attention paid to
journalism history in the academy. He criticizes a simplistic, “whig interpretation of journalism
history” that describes its development as a gradual expansion of freedoms of speech and
knowledge, marching in step with the expansion of individual social freedoms, overcoming
occasional “setbacks into sensationalism and yellow journalism,” always determined by “large
impersonal forces” like urbanization, modernity and mass democracy organizing contemporary
society (ibid.: 88). Such approaches to the subject, Carey argues, tend to put students to sleep.
His notion of a “cultural history” of journalism is more flexible. When we begin to
consider journalism as creative cultural production, we can read in it the “expression of a
certain ethos, temper, or imagination,” rather than merely a footnote or first-draft of history
(ibid.: 93). We can read journalism history as the story of the development of “consciousness,”
the development of “structures of feeling” that find their equivalents in the forms of journalism
(ibid.: 93). Carey tells us:
When we study changes in journalism over time, we are grasping a significant portion of
the changes that have taken place in modern consciousness since the Enlightenment.
But to do this we must temporarily put aside our received views of what journalism is
and examine it afresh as a cultural form, a literary act, parallel to the novel, the essay,
and the scientific report. Like these other works, journalism is a creative and imaginative
work, a symbolic strategy; journalism sizes up situations, names their elements, and
names them in a way that contains an attitude toward them. (ibid.: 90)
Journalism is imaginative, Carey argues, but contains a different attitude toward the
“situations” or realities it represents than, for example, the novel does. So what are the
“symbolic strateg[ies]” by which journalism refers to lived experience? One strategy may be the
objective journalistic report, which, Carey claims, is the product of a cultural history that we
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understand poorly, “Stylistic devices such as, for example, the inverted pyramid, the five-W
(who, what, when, where, and why) lead, and associated techniques are as much a product of
industrialization as tin cans” (ibid.: 90). These stylistic devices are crucial because they comprise
the “symbolic” approach of the form and thus reveal its “structure of imagination” (ibid.: 91).
Objectivity is the key precept of North American journalistic practice, but the notion
that a journalistic report should be an entirely disinterested reflection of a fixed and immutable
set of empirical facts is a cultural phenomenon with a history. In an essay entitled, “The
Emergence of the Objectivity Norm in American Journalism,” Michael Schudson argues that
norms like journalist objectivity are fundamentally moral, and that it is the moral principle that
distinguishes objectivity from simple neutrality. Schudson’s work reveals some of the historical
dimensions to contemporary notions of ‘nonfiction’; for example, interviewing and directly
quoting the subjects of news stories did not begin until the 1870s. “Abraham Lincoln often
spoke with reporters informally, but no reporter ever quoted him,” Schudson writes (2001:
171). The development of standard practices like direct quotation was part of a historical
process of the professionalization of the press. Newspapers were openly partisan for most of
the nineteenth century, often owned and operated by political parties; but as circulations grew,
as materials and production became cheaper and the business became more profitable, many
more journalists were able to make a living at it. Interviewing “was one of the growing number
of practices that identified journalists as a distinct occupational group with distinct patterns of
behavior” (ibid.: 173).1 Journalism became an occupation, and journalists no longer saw
themselves as simply (or at least, openly) serving the interests of political parties and causes.
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Objectivity as a “self-conscious ethic” would not be fully articulated by American
journalists until the 1920s. It developed in this new “occupational group” in response to a
“demand both for social cohesion and occupational pride, on the one hand, and internal
control, on the other,” Schudson writes, relying on Durkheim and Weber for his description of
the social mechanisms at work (ibid.:173).2 As newspapers became an independent industry,
partisanship did not disappear, but American politics was also changing:
Voting came to be seen as an activity in which voters make choices among programs
and candidates, not one in which they loyally turn out in ritual solidarity to their party.
This new understanding of politics helped transform a rabidly partisan press into an
institution differentiated from the parties, with journalists more likely to see themselves
as journalists, or as writers, rather than as political hangers-on. (ibid.: 176)
Positivist admiration for scientific ideals also played a role in the articulation of this new
standard of objectivity, along with the rise of another new occupation: the publicity agent.
Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to control the American media’s coverage of World War I helped
give birth to the public relations industry, and journalists and editors needed to distinguish
themselves from the paid publicity agents, many of whom had also written for newspapers
(Daly 2017). Fending off the threats of government and business propaganda, as well as
regulating who benefited from a new industry, were some uses of the objectivity norm; but
they do not fully explain “the structure of feeling” it embodied or the “attitude toward” events
objectivity expressed.3 “Far more than a set of craft rules to fend off libel suits or a set of
constraints to help editors keep tabs on their underlings, objectivity was finally a moral code,”
Schudson writes (2001: 178). He explains the moral aspect of journalism’s guiding ideology in a
chapter of his Discovering the News which sets out to describe “Two Journalisms in the 1890s.”
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During the last decade of the nineteenth-century, many editors disdainfully referred to
newspapers like Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph Hearst’s New York
Morning Journal as ‘the new journalism.’ These original ‘new journalists’ appealed to a wide
readership by emphasizing the entertainment value and enjoyability of their newspapers. They
sought out new audiences of women, urban, immigrant and newly literate readers, using
innovations like political cartoons and wider headlines, and they were dogged self-promoters.
In 1896, when Adolph Ochs bought the New York Times, it had a daily circulation of 9,000; the
circulation of Hearst’s Journal was 430,000, and that of Pulitzer’s World was 600,000 (Schudson
1978: 111). Readership largely split along class lines. The Times prided itself on reporting
financial news and was preferred by business elites and the wealthy. It was “the organ of the
investing class,” one of its earliest historians, Elmer Davis, reluctantly admitted (qtd in Schudson
ibid.: 108). The wealthy preferred the Times not only because it was useful for business; it also
reflected their conservative politics. Schudson’s comparison of some front pages of the Journal
and the Times from 1902 reveals how the Times’s conservatism extended beyond editorial
content to the “presentation of political news” itself; for example, while Pulitzer’s paper was
vehemently decrying the corruption scandal surrounding a conservative gubernatorial
candidate and ex-senator, Benjamin Odell, the Times maintained a detached tone, with
disinterested headlines such as, “Reports Flying of More Charges Against Odell” (ibid.: 109).
Thus, a presentation style we might now describe as more ‘objective’ also expressed the
Times’s politics. Emphasizing the accuracy and reliability of an ‘informational model’ of news,
while denigrating the entertainment or story model practiced by rival papers like the World and
Journal, became a marketing strategy. This strategy included an emphasis on “decency” and a
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class-oriented attack on the sensationalism of the ‘yellow press.’ The Times’s famous motto,
which first appeared in 1896, “All the News That’s Fit to Print,” suggests the paper’s views
about its rivals. “The moral war between information journalism and story journalism in New
York in the 1890s was ... a cover for class conflict,” Schudson writes (ibid.: 118). Nevertheless,
when the Times lowered its price, its circulation began to rise, and not only among the wealthy.
Following a critic from the 1920s named Benjamin Stolberg, Schudson conjectures that the lesseducated and less-wealthy “read the Times to emulate those above them in social standing ...
with pride, [while] more educated and more wealthy people read not only the Times but the
‘story’ newspapers and magazines ... with a feeling of shame” (ibid.: 117). Schudson’s history
thus recalls “perennial questions” more often considered in the context of debates around
distinctions between ‘mass’ (or ‘popular’) and ‘elite’ culture (ibid.: 117). Twentieth-century
literary journalism, we will see, was attacked within the context of these debates over high-art
and mass-art, by critics whose views might be called moralistic. During the last decade of the
nineteenth century, practitioners of the informational model of journalism had not yet
articulated objectivity as a professional norm, but their emphasis on facts and fairness was
already morally charged. The conflation of accuracy with moral superiority is evident in Och’s
announcement of the Times’s new policies in 1896, in which he set out to run “a high-standard
newspaper, clean, dignified and trustworthy” (ibid.: 110).
Harold Ross founded the New Yorker in this context, on the side of the publications
emphasizing entertainment over information. Ross had envisioned it as a local circulation
weekly in the style of the New York World under editor Herbert Bayard Swope, only glossier,
more sophisticated, with more drawings and an appeal to the upper class (Yagoda 2000: 37).
10

When he appointed St. Clair McKelway managing editor in 1936, it was with the instructions,
“We’ve got to have more journalism” (qtd in Yagoda 2000: 137). At that point, the Fact and
Fiction departments became separated and the emphasis changed from high-society gossip and
humor to a focus on more serious reporting. Several important literary forms had been
developed at the magazine by then, Ben Yagoda writes, in About Town:
As for the long fact pieces, they came in two kinds. [Morris] Markey continued to
be the principal proprietor of A Reporter at Large until 1936 (when the rubric became
open to any of the magazine’s writers), and his tended to be what Ross called “color”
pieces - impressionistic, sometimes technically daring, inherently serious. A later term
for Reporters was the “long visit” story, and the key to them was that the reader
experienced everything through the reporter, who commonly made himself a presence
in the story and set down the events he witnessed and impressions he arrived at with
little apparent artifice.
The other category was the Profile. The term now appears in the dictionary with
the definition “concise biographical sketch” and is universally used in journalism to refer
to any article about a person, so it is easy to overlook that the early New Yorker staffer
James Kevin McGuinness coined it. (ibid.: 132)
On the subject of the profile form, Harold Ross would claim that his magazine had been the first
to discover “it was possible, notwithstanding libel laws, personal taste, etc., to write history
about living people, or to write at it” (qtd in Yagoda 2000: 133). It would be more appropriate
to say that the New Yorker reinvented and popularized two older forms – which we now call the
feature article and the profile – and played a central role in their development and
modernization in twentieth-century literary journalism. The “concise biographical sketch” is at
least as old as Plutarch’s Lives, for example. Neither of these two forms, which we now
associate with nonfiction, were at first entirely beholden to the standard of objectivity just then
being articulated as an occupational norm. They were developed for their humor and
entertainment value, not to convey accurate information. For example, St. Clair McKelway’s
story of a policeman, “Average Cop” from February 10th, 1934, was another composite and
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much closer to short fiction than to reporting (Kunkel 2015: 151). When two of the finest
writers of the era arrived in 1933, the so-called ‘two Joes,’ Joseph Mitchell and A.J. Liebling, the
magazine had not yet separated the Fact from the Fiction department and was still torn
between its ambitions toward journalism and entertainment.
The two Joes shared more than a name. “They both militantly believed that journalism
could be just as creative and artful as fiction [and] both were devoted to lowlife and its
chroniclers - Villon, Rabelais, Sterne, Dostoyevsky,” Yagoda writes (2000: 139). Together, they
transformed the profile form – as it had been developed by New Yorker predecessors like
Meyer Berger and Alva Johnston – into a form capable of subtlety, seriousness, profound
investigation and reflection, even as they turned away from the New Yorker’s original subject –
high-society – to write about the urban poor, the down-and-outs and other strange figures of
the metropolis. They were inspired by classic novels and by the classics of literary journalism.
Stephen Crane’s writings about New York, especially, Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1893) and
An Experiment in Misery (1894), became their model for writing about city life during the Great
Depression (Yagoda 2000: 142). Liebling’s portraits of boxers and their trainers, urban shysters
and the “petty nomads of Broadway,” and Mitchell’s stories about shady Bowery figures,
Downtown drinking establishments, freak shows, fishmongers and old men, became a category
in their own right (ibid.: 142). In the New Yorker’s classist terminology, these pieces became
known as lowlife profiles. They recalled the works of the Naturalists of the 1890s, not just
Crane, but also Theodore Dreiser, Frank Norris and Upton Sinclair, who wrote about urban
alienation and industrialization, often in the pages of so-called yellow press papers like the New
York World, the same newspaper that had inspired Ross to found his magazine.
12

In his History of American Literary Journalism, John C. Hartsock finds in the 1890s the
crystallization of the modern tradition of the genre. “Narrative literary journalism,” he claims,
had “come of age by the 1890s” (2000: 21). But Hartsock makes an important qualification: that
the period he considers in his study is that “of modern narrative literary journalism in the
United States. To do so anticipates the criticism, and a justifiable one, that there has long
existed some form of narrative literary journalism” (ibid.: 22). Hartsock has written one of the
most comprehensive and convincing histories on the subject so far, but must give it the subtitle,
The Emergence of a Modern Narrative Form, equivocating about whether this was the true
emergence or just the “modern” emergence. The pursuit of an original historical precedent
might lead us all the way back to the subject of Lennard J. Davis’s study on the origins of the
novel, which describes the divergence of two discourses in the sixteenth century from one
source, the supposedly Factual Fictions often called popular ballads, which Davis calls
“News/Novels” and describes as an “undifferentiated matrix” (1983: 42).
Whether or not narrative literary journalism emerged during the nineteenth or
twentieth century, it repeatedly clashed over the decades with the informational model of
journalism and the increasingly dominant objectivity norm. Hartsock sees literary journalism’s
rise in the 1890s as related to “a fundamental epistemological crisis” faced by journalists (2000:
42). He quotes Stephen Crane, who, while covering the Spanish-American War for Pulitzer’s
World in 1898, pointed out that the regular soldiers dying overseas would “appear to the casual
reader mainly as a part of a total, a unit in the interesting sum of men slain” (2000: 41). That a
lost life should be reduced to a mere part of a sum or a statistic suggests the “ethos, temper or
imagination” that objective, informational journalism expressed. Crane’s anger is palpable and
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expansive, mostly directed toward readers more interested in society news and celebrity
soldiers than ordinary ones like a (probably fictional) regular soldier, Michael Nolan. “The public
doesn’t seem to care very much for the regular soldier,” Crane writes (1971: 171). But the
epistemological crisis that Crane’s anger points toward, evident in these two methods for
describing a lost life, would continue to haunt literary journalists throughout the twentieth
century. Crane was writing and theorizing a form that would later become known as the
‘human-interest article,’ which saw its purpose as ‘humanizing’ its subjects or telling the
‘human’ side of their stories.
What is lost when we write about the world in purely ‘informational’ terms? What does
it do to our view of the world when supposedly ‘objective’ facts like numbers are separated
from supposedly ‘subjective’ values like human lives? Is this sort of objective report always, in
Carey’s words, “a desirable form of rendering reality?” (1997: 91) For Crane, doing justice to a
lost life required telling a story, rather than just adding a number to a sum or statistic. The
question can seem dramatic: journalism can change public opinions about a war, and doing that
can change government policy. Reminding readers that Michael Nolan was a real human being
and not just a number might have seemed like a way to save regular soldiers’ lives.
2. John Hersey and the Fog of War
In 1942, another young American journalist covering a different war in a different
hemisphere would confront the same problem in similar terms. John Hersey’s Into the Valley
(1943) describes “a small skirmish” during the Guadalcanal Campaign. It was “just an episode in
an insignificant battle,” he begins the narrative by telling us (1943: 3). The book is an account of
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several days during which Hersey followed a Captain Charles Rigaud and his company of regular
soldiers into combat, in a battle that was perhaps insignificant. However:
The battle, and especially the skirmish with Rigaud, illustrated how war feels to
men everywhere. The terrain, the weapons and the races of war vary, but certainly
never the sensations, except in degree, for they are as universal as those of love.
This book is an attempt to recapture the feelings of Rigaud, his men, and myself,
when we went into that jungle valley. If people in the homes could feel those feelings
for an hour, or even just know about them, I think we would be an inch or two closer to
winning the war and trying like hell to make the peace permanent. (1943: 4)
Hersey’s emphasis on how war “feels” recalls what Hartsock saw in Crane’s war reporting: the
rejection of a journalistic approach in which “the reader’s subjectivity is excluded from
imaginative participation” (2000: 57). Both Crane and Hersey make moral arguments against
the informational model of journalism; it leaves the reading public indifferent to the suffering
of those who actually “feel those feelings” in battle, or who die there. Walter Benjamin
described this epistemological divide as “the isolation of information from experience” in his
essay, “Motifs on Baudelaire” (1969: 159). Alan Trachtenberg, writing about the urbanization of
American cities, calls it the “paradox of metropolitan life itself: the more knowable the world
came to seem as information, the more remote and opaque it came to seem as experience”
(1982: 124). Yet these arguments emphasizing a conflict between information and experience
can lead us to forget that the sort of “experience” in question is specifically literary experience;
any “sensations” Hersey’s readers might have felt while sitting at home thousands of miles
away from that jungle valley in the pacific were a response to words on a page, not to battle.
Two different varieties of knowledge may be in conflict, but this supposed
epistemological crisis is also a clash in literary styles and their effects. We might compare the
passage of Hersey’s account quoted above with a traditional “objective” news lead. The
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discursive device of the lead is a key technique in informational journalistic practice, the base of
the ‘inverted pyramid’ and the main tool for organizing the structure of an ‘objective’ news
article. The point of the objective lead is to convey all of the critical information immediately,
allowing the remainder of the article to expand upon the details and elaborate background
information. But a cursory reading of the lead alone should reveal all the relevant facts.
Hartsock writes, “The aspiration then of what is called the ‘summary lead’ is to attempt to leave
no questions - meaning contingencies - unanswered” (2000: 56). Any questions that remain can
only be answered by subsequent reports. Hersey attempts a different literary effect: his book
sets out to “recapture” certain feelings. Rather than denying “contingencies,” this approach
asks for the reader’s “imaginative participation.” Hersey attempts to “illustrate” those feelings
the reader does not know by means of narrative. He does not simply describe the “sensations”
of war as he experienced them or as the soldiers with whom he went into battle may have
experienced them; rather, he attempts to “recapture” or represent them in his narrative.
Take for example Hersey’s description of Rigaud’s platoon marching towards an enemy
position - into an ambush, as it happens:
Our column moved in absolute silence. It is impossible to describe the creepy
sensation of walking through that empty-looking but crowded-seeming jungle.
What made it eerie was that the jungle was far from silent. The birds whose cries
had sounded so cheerful from the heights were terrifying now. Parakeets and macaws
screeched from nowhere. There was one bird with an altogether unmusical call which
sounded exactly like a man whistling shrilly through his fingers three times - and
another, far off in Japanese territory, would answer. The stream made a constant noise,
and an annoying one. It seemed terribly important to listen for the enemy (as if the Japs
would be so stupid as to crackle through the underbrush), but the stream’s continuous
chatter, maddeningly cheerful, made that impossible in any case. Off and on we could
hear the noises of our own power - planes and artillery - far above the jungle roof. These
should have been encouraging noises: up on the ridge they had been. But down here
the noises were merely weird - the eccentric whirr of the strafing P-39s, sounding as if
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some big cog in an engine were unlubricated; the soft, fluttery sound of shells in flight,
like the noise a man would make if he were to blow through a keyhole.
Tiny noises became exaggerated in our minds. Drops of accumulated drizzle
would crash onto fallen leaves like heavy footfalls. The click of a canteen cover
belonging to one of our own men at some point where the trail doubled back beyond a
screen of jungle sounded like a whole machine gun being set up. And then when some
really big noise would break out - a dead tree falling over at this of all times - our whole
column would jump with caricatured vigilance. (1943: 52-54)
Hersey represents the subtle creeping fear felt by men going into battle by describing one sense
in particular: what they heard. The overall “creepy sensation” may be “impossible” to convey,
but he has a strategy for attempting it. He describes noises, bird sounds, running water, their
equipment, airplanes, a falling tree; and the feelings those sounds inspired; “cheerful” sounds
turned “terrifying” now; “annoying” or “maddening” sounds; “terribly important” sounds;
formerly “encouraging” sounds now simply “weird” or “eccentric.” Simple adjectives give way
to similes; “as if some big cog in an engine were unlubricated”; “like the noise a man would
make were he to blow through a keyhole.” But to whom were these noises so “terrifying” or
“annoying?” In whom did they inspire thoughts of broken machines and wheezy keyholes?
Perhaps no one. It makes more sense to phrase the question in narrative terms: from whose
perspective are we hearing and feeling? Hersey often uses the first-person “I” to describe his
own observations, thoughts and questions, so, in Gérard Genette’s terms, Into the Valley might
be said to have an internal focalization (1980: 189). The passage quoted above might then be
read as an example of “variable” focalization, as the thoughts and feelings it describes are
ascribed to the group rather than to any individual, or perhaps as “nonfocalized” (1980: 189).
The passage does not so much describe noises in the jungle as the absorption or dissolution of
the individual into the group in a moment of existential crisis. Individuals do not appear in the
scene, only, from the very first words, “our column.” Everything is in the third-person, even
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thoughts and sensations: “we could hear”; “in our minds.” The experience of facing the enemy
reduces each soldier to his fundamental characteristic: he is “one of our own men,” - with us
and against them. The psychology being “illustrated” is more complex than just heightened
attention to sounds of possible danger: the verb-form itself has become a signifier. The
company has become one entity rather than a collection of individuals. Hersey seems to point
toward the artifice of his own technique in the final line of the passage, which is also the end of
a section, when he describes “our whole column” flinching in unison at the sound of a falling
tree as a sort of “caricatured vigilance.” This recognition of something exaggerated, ludicrous or
“caricatured” in the group’s collective behavior reveals the submerged individual - or, in
Genette’s terms, the internal focalization - pushing back: it is a moment of wry apprehension,
of gallows’ humor in the midst of fear, when the frightened soldier manages a brief smirk.
The passage begins in the narrative mode that Genette describes with the rather
unpleasant neologism of “singulative” (1980: 114). That is to say, it describes an event that
happened a single time. The company is marching through a particular stretch of jungle,
towards a particular point, at a specific moment during Hersey’s two days alongside them.
However, the details seem strangely vague. The stream might be any stream; the valley, ridge,
and jungle might be any on earth. The singulative verb tense is also repeatedly undermined by
the sense of repetition; a bird “would answer”; drops of drizzle “would crash”; “when some
really big noise would break out - a dead tree falling over at this of all times - our whole column
would jump.” Genette calls this mode iterative, or rather, a combination of the two; “the
singulative scene itself is not immune to a sort of contamination by the iterative,” he writes
(1980: 121). Multiple dead trees are not falling over “at this of all times.” Rather, it is “a figure
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of narrative rhetoric that is not required to be taken literally, but just the reverse” (1980: 122).
What does this rhetorical figure signify here? It expresses the sense of atemporality
experienced during moments of extreme tension or fear. The march through this particular
stretch of jungle may have lasted only five or ten minutes, but for those marching, they were
the longest five minutes of their lives – as the cliché puts it. Rendering this specific moment as
though it were outside of ordinary time and describing the setting as though it were nonspecific
– calling it “the stream,” not a tributary of the Matanikau River; “the valley,” not a jungle valley
about five miles west of Henderson Field on the island of Guadalcanal - are attempts to connect
specific sensations to the “universal” experience Hersey has set out to describe.
These ambiguities of tense and perspective are narrative strategies. Earlier in the book,
Hersey describes when he “first came to understand the expression ‘the fog of war.’ We
thought we knew where we were, then found we didn’t, then found it wasn’t too easy to find
out” (1943: 15). This notion of the ‘fog of war’ is not very different from the “universal” feeling
of war. When the company goes “into the valley,” Hersey avoids pinpointing the specific
location of any action. Even the specific crossing of the Matanikau where the enemy has set
their ambush is merely “one of three or four natural crossings” (1943: 78). This is not the case
throughout the entire book, however. The company’s descent into the valley and Hersey’s
escape from it later on during the retreat, while helping to carry a wounded soldier toward a
field hospital, are book-ended by detailed descriptions. On the way into battle:
I was glad that the path climbed to the top of the ridge at a spot where the ridge
itself took a little rise: it gave me one last chance to see the view before going down into
the valley. It was like a last deep breath of good air before diving into a dark, stagnant
pool.
The drizzle gave the view a mysterious softness. The sea, which in the sunlight
had looked as brittle as a blue plate, was now just a great vapor. Florida and Tulagi,
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across the channel, seemed merely immobilized low-lying smoke. To the northwest on
Guadal, Cape Esperance melted into the overcast above it. Nearer, jungle fought with
bare ridges all along the curve of the bay. (1943: 47-48)
Hersey’s description of the view from the ridge continues, with names of places and bearings,
as though we might use it to triangulate his exact location. Nevertheless, each of the distinct
locations he mentions are disappearing, figuratively, in the “mysterious softness” of the air. The
sea is “a great vapor”; the opposite coastline has become “low-lying smoke”; the cape is
“melt[ing].” It is as though the landscape were suddenly lost in a literal fog. Hersey takes this
same description back up where he left off at the very moment, toward the end of the book,
when he finally leaves the valley behind:
Heaven, if it looks anything like the view that greeted us when we regained the
top of the ridge, will be a welcome sight. I have never seen anything so beautiful. It was
dusk. The air had gone immaculately clean, and all that had been so soft and mysterious
in the morning was now hard purple fact. Florida, Tulagi and Savo stood up out of the
crystalline sea positively, and the heights of Point Esperance, uncovered now, were
perfectly defined. Point Cruz, Lunga Point, every feature of the landscape was clean and
definite - an assurance of reality. I guess that is why the scene seemed so beautiful: it
was so real, it was a quiet wakening after a bad dream. (1943: 112)
What was hazy before is now “perfectly defined.” The fog of war has lifted and Hersey can
again see where he stands in the “hard purple fact” of the landscape. These are nuanced
narrative devices utilized strategically to impart to the reader the sense (or sensations) of a very
particular kind of experience; this sort of writing cannot be explained simply as subjective
rather than objective, or as story rather than facts. Hersey’s story is composed entirely of facts he invents nothing in it. But what sort of facts are these that can disappear and reappear so
easily? What is Hersey suggesting or revealing about the reality he experienced that day, if the
beauty of this particular moment can be ascribed to the sense that it “was so real,” much more
real than the “bad dream” he had just experienced down in the valley?
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Narrative literary journalism is often linked to nineteenth century Realism, itself a
deeply problematic literary category, or to the most extreme examples of it, Naturalism.
However, one of Hersey’s great talents as a writer is the description of moments of lived
experience - moments he does not invent - that nevertheless somehow exceed or escape what
might be called “real.” Such is the figurative character of the “dark, stagnant” valley: the
descent in Into the Valley is a descent into an unusual realm of phenomenological experience.
The fog of war is a sort of confusion in which reality - or whatever configuration of
consciousness and direct experience we mean when we use the word reality - is altered.
Hersey’s “symbolic approach” to this difficult subject turns out to be quite complex: he reveals
ambiguous states of consciousness with complex narrative strategies that blur and distort
perspective and plot sequence. His account seems to be merely the story of what happened
and what he thought and felt. Nevertheless, the valley into which he leads us is a place of
ambiguous subjectivity which most of us are lucky never to experience in life. This text is thus
quite far from the “structure of imagination” expressed by informational news focused on facts,
which might have described the entire sequence of events in terms of the numbers of men
killed and the strategic value of the battle in the scope of the larger war effort.
John Hersey had been serving as a foreign correspondent for Time and Life since 1936.
“Survival” (1944), his report for the New Yorker on the sinking of Lt. John F. Kennedy’s PT boat
by a Japanese destroyer, helped create the personal mythology that propelled Kennedy to the
House of Representatives in 1946. A piece for Life, “Joe is Home Now” (1944), created a
composite, fictional veteran suffering from war fatigue, based on forty-three interview subjects.
Hersey had already published a book on the war in the Pacific, Men on Bataan (1942), the story
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of some fighting in the Philippines. His journalistic works did not win critical literary attention,
until he published a novel based on reporting that he had done in Sicily during the U.S. invasion,
A Bell for Adano (1944), and won the Pulitzer Prize. This was his first work of fiction and it
became one of the most successful novels about the American experience in World War II.
Hersey’s next major work, Hiroshima (1946), remains his best known. This 31,000-word
narrative was originally published in the New Yorker magazine in a single issue, on August 31st,
1946, an issue that included nothing else. It sold out of newsstands. It was read in its entirety
over the radio. It has remained in print in book form ever since. “With the publication of
Hiroshima in 1946, John Hersey returned to straight reporting,” an early critic wrote (Guilfoil
1950: 357). Though Hersey’s process certainly involved a great deal of “straight reporting,” the
narrative of Hiroshima exceeds the information produced by Hersey’s reporting. There are also
dramatic differences between Hiroshima and Hersey’s previous war writing: the author does
not figure in the narrative at all; there are no authorial interventions outlining what the book
“attempts” to do or its relevance to the war effort in general, as one finds in Into the Valley and
A Bell for Adano. Instead, Hiroshima merely describes the experiences of six survivors of the
atomic bombing of August 6th, 1945 and of the weeks that followed. The narrative is
conspicuous for not making any moral arguments about the atrocity or any appeal to the
sentiments of readers. The same early reviewer, calling the book (perhaps disparagingly) a
masterpiece of journalism, wrote:
There is almost nothing touching the moral question of the bombing. The Japanese are
made to appear as though they regarded it almost as one would a natural calamity, such
as an earthquake or a tidal wave ... [giving the book] a curious sense of detachment. (my
ellipsis, Guilfoil 1950: 358)
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The complaint suggests that this emotional “detachment” was a sort of omission, as though
Hersey had left some part of the story untold or had refused to consider “the moral question.”
Yet it is far from just a “curious” accident. In Hiroshima, Hersey employs a complex narrative
strategy in order to recapture a sensation of horror that supersedes all of the perspectives and
philosophies suggested by the glib, simplistic notion of a “moral question” – as if any other sort
of question might be possible when writing about one of history’s most atrocious crimes.
The stories of Hersey’s six survivors radiate outwards from the central event of the
narrative, with which the book begins. The first section, “A Noiseless Flash,” opens with a
description of exactly where each of them was at one specific moment in time - a moment that
would seem to be the most certain, definite “fact” of all:
At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning, on August 6, 1945, Japanese time,
at the moment when the atomic bomb flashed above Hiroshima, Miss Toshiko Sasaki, a
clerk in the personnel department of the East Asia Tin Works, had just sat down at her
place in the plant office and was turning her head to speak to the girl at the next desk.
(1985: 1)
It is not just a “curious” detail that the subject of the first sentence of the narrative is not the
exploding atomic bomb itself. The sentence is an ingenious rhetorical trick: readers assume
they know what happened at “exactly fifteen minutes past eight” on the day in question; they
expect, after the first dramatic clause, that Hersey intends to begin his narrative with the
explosion itself. However, the dramatic beginning we expect, the moment of historical “fact,”
the explosion, is relegated to the subordinate clause, like an aside, merely something that
happened at the same “exact” moment as the main action of the sentence. The reader certainly
will not know just where Miss Toshiko Sasaki was at fifteen past eight. We are led into
uncharted territory. Hersey’s opening sentence has at least two effects. The first is to turn our
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attention to the world of facts that cannot be reduced to sums or quantities, that is to say, to
the “human-interest,” the “story model” of journalism, the Michael Nolans, the “experience”
side of the news. The second effect of Hersey’s opening is no less important: it removes the
explosion itself from the realm of certainty. The point seems subtle, but in purely grammatical
terms it becomes something that takes place in the background. It is secondary, indefinite and
less “exact” than the specifics of where Miss Toshiko found herself.
The atomic bomb does not even necessarily explode, it merely flashes. The first section,
which describes the morning of this “noiseless flash” and its immediate aftermath, abstracts
the event through the perspectives of each of the survivors who witnessed it. The narrative
thus has a “multiple” internal focalization with what Genette describes as a “restriction of
field”: at first, none of the characters understand what has happened (1980: 189). This is
historically accurate. None of the citizens of Hiroshima had any knowledge of atomic weapons though one of Hersey’s characters, Reverend Kiyoshi Tanimoto, recalled that “a rumor was
going around that the Americans were saving something special for the city” (1985: 3).
Sophisticated readers will immediately recognize that the strange distance or “detachment”
with which Hersey confronts the bombing itself emphasizes the victims confused perspectives.
Their stories approximate historical testimony: just as Americans of a certain age remember
“exactly” where they were when they heard President Kennedy had been assassinated, or that
the World Trade Center had been attacked, so too do the survivors of Hiroshima remember
exactly where they were at a quarter past eight on the morning of August the 6 th. However,
when we consider their descriptions of the event itself, that “curious sense of detachment” that
the critic noticed only seems to grow stronger.4
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Attempting to render moments of intensity or trauma in prose reveals the degree to
which memory abstracts experience. Milan Kundera has shown how some twentieth century
authors set out “to resist the loss of the fleeting reality of the present” by means of artistry and
experiment (1996: 129). Kundera reminds us that narratives can only “recapture,” as Hersey
admits, the sense of lived experience. Reality, the present, the point where consciousness
touches sensation, escapes:
And not only is it lost but we do not even wonder at this loss. We are resigned to
losing the concreteness of the present. We immediately transform the present moment
into its abstraction. We need only recount an episode we experienced a few hours ago:
the dialogue contracts to a brief summary, the setting to a few general features. This
applies even to the strongest memories, which affect the mind so deeply, like a trauma:
we are so dazzled by their potency that we don’t realize how schematic and meager
their content is.
When we study, discuss, analyze a reality, we analyze it as it appears in our
mind, in our memory. We know reality only in the past tense. (Kundera 1996: 128)
Hersey’s narrative is built upon similarly “schematic” memories. The six interwoven stories all
begin with the moment of “the flash.” This is the crucial instant of direct experience they all
share; yet each account of the explosion seems, somehow, “meager.” As in Into the Valley,
Hersey attempts to illustrate the trauma of altered phenomenological experience with
narrative ploys and the tricks of fiction.
Each survivor clings to a few details or impressions of which he or she is certain.
Reverend Tanimoto was one of the few survivors who happened to be outside when the atomic
bomb “flashed.’ He saw it and his description of it is the most complete:
There was no sound of planes. The morning was still; the place was cool and pleasant.
Then a tremendous flash of light cut across the sky. Mr. Tanimoto has a distinct
recollection that it travelled from east to west, from the city toward the hills. It seemed
a sheet of sun. Both he and Mr. Matsuo reacted in terror – and both had time to react
(for they were 3,500 yards, or two miles, from the center of the explosion). (1985: 5)
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The description seems quite definite: a clear, quiet sky and a sudden flash of light. But these
particulars are suspiciously banal and the explosion is eerily abstract. While Mr. Tanimoto’s
“distinct recollection” of the traveling flash seems plausible, his simile, that it was like “a sheet
of sun,” requires an imaginative leap. A sheet of sun is not the same thing as a flash of light. 5
We might also wonder if the phrase was really Mr. Tanimoto’s; his English, judging from a letter
included in the text, lacked poetry. Kundera writes, the “abstract sense remains ... perhaps a
detail or two, but the acousticovisual concreteness of the situation in all its continuity is lost”
(1996: 128). None of the other survivors can offer even this much description of the explosion
itself. They were closer to the center of the blast and had less perspective on it. Their accounts
follow the same pattern, but emphasize the physical shock and destruction more than the
“flash” itself. The instant the bomb goes off, Mrs. Nakamura turns to find her children:
She had taken a single step (the house was 1,350 yards, or three-quarters of a mile,
from the center of the explosion) when something picked her up and she seemed to fly
into the next room over the raised sleeping platform, pursued by parts of her house.
(Hersey 1985: 8)
Dr. Fuji is sitting on his porch over the river, reading a newspaper:
He saw the flash. To him – faced away from the center and looking at his paper – it
seemed a brilliant yellow. Startled, he began to rise to his feet. In that moment (he was
1,550 yards from the center), the hospital leaned behind his rising and, with a terrible
ripping noise, toppled into the river. The Doctor, still in the act of getting to his feet, was
thrown forward and around and over; he was buffeted and gripped; he lost track of
everything, because things were so speeded up; he felt the water. (Ibid.: 10)
Father Kleinsorge, a German Jesuit, is inside his room lying on his cot. At the moment of the
flash, he thinks of “something he had read as a boy about a large meteor striking the earth”
(ibid.: 12). In each narrative, the perception of the flash is followed by a period of chaos, terror
or confusion. This is most pronounced in Father Kleinsorge’s case, where it becomes a serious
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lapse in consciousness, “For a few seconds or minutes, he went out of his mind. Father
Kleinsorge never knew how he got out of the house. The next things he was conscious of were
that he was wandering around in the mission’s vegetable garden in his underwear” (Ibid.: 13).
All the narratives have a similar lapse (except for that of Dr. Sasaki, who was mostly sheltered
from the blast). After the “flash,” Mr. Tanimoto pressed his face against a stone and saw
nothing until he emerged into “a sort of twilight” (ibid.: 6); Mrs. Nakamura was buried in her
collapsed house where “everything became dark” (ibid.: 9); Dr. Fuji lost his glasses, then found
himself caught between debris and partially submerged in the river; Miss Sasaki “lost
consciousness” as the factory collapsed around her (ibid.: 16). The explosion remains somehow
outside the realm of narrative possibility; it is a moment of lost time, a lacuna in consciousness,
the impetus for the entire story and yet the one part of the story that cannot be told.
The narratives of Hiroshima spiral outward from this empty center. Hersey has
organized them so as to recapture the sense of an inenarrable experience as palpably as
possible. His “symbolic approach” is more complicated than just repeating the same schema
(flash; lapse; return to consciousness), however. Hersey also inserts one crucial detail, which
seems to belong to the world of objective facts: the survivor’s distance from “the center” of the
explosion. This detail is always in parenthesis, symbolizing the intrusion of the author/reporter
into the story, thus expressing the structure of the narrative in the grammar of the sentence.
Readers understand that it is not Mr. Tanimoto telling us his distance from the center, just as
we understand that, though his story is told from an exterior point of view, the sentence “Mr.
Tanimoto has a distinct recollection” is a figurative abstraction. Rendered completely, the
sentence would read, ‘Mr. Tanimoto told me, the author, that he has a distinct recollection.’
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Though it is not free-indirect discourse, Hersey’s sentence elides the reporting that provided
the information. We recognize that by telling us Mr. Tanimoto’s distance from the center, the
author is sharing a crucial detail we need in order to understand why Mr. Tanimoto perceived
the explosion as he did, why he had time to react before being struck by what assume was a
shockwave, and perhaps, why he survived at all - though distance from the center alone seems
not to have determined one’s chances for survival. Hersey inserts a longer parenthesis into Mr.
Tanimoto’s account to explain the eerie silence of the blast:
(Almost no one in Hiroshima recalls hearing any noise of the bomb. But a fisherman in
his sampan on the Inland Sea near Tsuzu … saw the flash and heard a tremendous
explosion; he was nearly twenty miles from Hiroshima, but the thunder was greater
than when the B-29s hit Iwakuni, only five miles away.) (my ellipsis ibid.: 6)
The suggestion is that the proximity of Hersey’s survivors to the explosion warped their
perceptions of it. The sound was so “tremendous” and so close that their hearing ceased to
function. With just the most basic point of orientation, Hersey charts his survivors onto a
hypothetical map. Their stories are told in relation to each other in time and space. They have
specific locations– though it is not the city of Hiroshima itself but “the center” of the blast that
organizes this map. The city of Hiroshima figures only slightly in Hersey’s book; the title,
Hiroshima, refers metonymically to the events that began at quarter past eight on August 6 th,
not to the city that was there in the days before.
Hersey’s original title had been “Some Events at Hiroshima.” But this was changed
during the intense editing the story underwent at the hands of New Yorker editor-in-chief
Harold Ross and then assistant editor William Shawn (Chase 2000). Apparently, Ross also
insisted Hersey “tuck up on the time - give the hour and minute, exactly or roughly ... The
reader loses all sense of the passing of time in the episodes and never knows what time of day
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it is” (Weingarten 2005: 23). Ross was frustrated with Hersey’s approach to describing a
moment outside of ordinary phenomenological experience, or perhaps with Hersey’s reticence
in regards to the “moral question.” He wrote:
All the way through I wondered about what killed these people, the burns, falling debris,
the concussion - what? For a year I’ve been wondering about this and I eagerly hoped
this piece would tell me. It doesn’t. Nearly a hundred thousand dead people are around
and Hersey doesn’t tell how they died. (qtd in Weingarten 2005: 23)
Though many readers probably shared Ross’s morbid curiosity, Hersey’s interest is in the
impressions and sensations of his six characters, what they perceived and felt, and why they
survived. His interest is in survival and in the strangeness of survival, not the causes of death.
The first paragraph of his book ends with a question that seems more suited to a novel than to
a journalistic report:
A hundred thousand people were killed by the atomic bomb, and these six were among
the survivors. They still wonder why they lived when so many others died. Each of them
counts many items of chance or volition - a step taken in time, a decision to go indoors,
catching one streetcar instead of the next - that spared him. And now each knows that
in the act of survival he lived a dozen lives and saw more death than he ever thought he
would see. At the time, none of them knew anything. (1985: 2)
Fate, chance, the small “items” of luck that spare one person and doom another, whether an
individual is the author of his own life story or at the mercy of history: these ‘what-if’ questions
do not normally appear in an objective report. To say someone has lived “a dozen lives” is to
engage in metaphor, a life, in this case, standing for some unit of experience or transformation.
These six stories are stories of how these characters underwent a profoundly transformative
experience. What knowledge were they so totally lacking before that day, according to Hersey?
Knowing (or in this case, knowing nothing) is also a metaphor, expressing an epistemological
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problem, a before and an after, a descent into another dark valley from which the survivor, and
by extension the reader, cannot emerge unchanged. This is the territory of fiction.
Rather than explaining the facts of why and how so many thousands of dead and dying
expired (if that were even possible), Hersey’s narrative emphasizes moments of irony,
psychology and what we might call the eerie, the uncanny or the lyrical. An example comes at
the end of the first chapter, “A Noiseless Flash”:
Everything fell, and Miss Sasaki lost consciousness. The ceiling dropped suddenly and
the wooden floor above collapsed in splinters and the people up there came down and
the roof above them gave way; but principally and first of all, the bookcases right behind
her swooped forward and the contents threw her down, with her left leg horribly
twisted and breaking underneath her. There, in the tin factory, in the first moment of
the atomic age, a human being was crushed by books. (ibid.: 16)
Why does it matter so much just what, among the debris of the collapsing building, has crushed
Miss Sasaki? The factory has fallen down on top of her. She has lost consciousness already and
so presumably she herself is not aware of any irony. The “restriction of field” of the narrative’s
focalization has given way and Hersey has interjected his own aperçu on the sly, without any
parenthesis to signal to readers that Miss Sasaki herself is no longer the one telling the story.
Hersey’s intervention dramatizes the final sentence: the emphasis on a specific location,
“there,” set off from what follows; the determinative article - not a tin factory but “the tin
factory”; and then the extraneous and not entirely accurate interjection, that this instant can be
read as a snapshot taken “in the first moment of the atomic age.” Shouldn’t we date the atomic
age to the first detonation of an atomic bomb, on July 16th of 1945, in Socorro, New Mexico, the
so-called Trinity Test (named by Oppenheimer after Donne’s Holy Sonnet XIV)? Or perhaps to
the first nuclear chain reactions, created at the Chicago Pile-1 reactor at the University of
Chicago football field in 1942? Miss Sasaki no longer seems to be a specific individual, she is just
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“a human being,” she might be any human being, and she has become the representative
victim of Hersey’s new “atomic age.” And what are we to make of the strange irony of her being
“crushed by books?” Hersey did not invent the detail of the books, but he has selected it and
emphasized it because of its suggestiveness: it suggests perhaps that knowledge has crushed
Miss Sasaki, or history, science, or technical expertise, something other than what it in fact was.
The moment has become a metaphor.
Hersey created novelistic moments like this deliberately. It was a narrative strategy.
Writing in the Atlantic Monthly in 1949, he made an argument for a genre he called, in an essay
with the same title, “The Novel of Contemporary History” (1949: 5). He would probably not
have included Hiroshima in this category, and was more likely thinking of A Bell for Adano, or
the novel he would publish the following year, The Wall (1950), a fiction set in the Warsaw
ghetto between 1939 and 1943. Hersey himself had visited what was left of the Warsaw ghetto
in 1945 and his story is based on a number of factual sources and diaries. The Wall begins with
an “Editor’s Prologue,” which describes the supposed discovery of a caché of documents dug up
from the rubble in Warsaw, out of which the contents of the novel were supposedly drawn. But
the first edition bears the subtitle, A Novel, and the editor of the prologue and the supposed
source documents are clearly fictitious. Nevertheless, Hersey’s idea of a “novel of
contemporary history” is undoubtedly also relevant for Hiroshima. He writes:
Truth is said to be stranger than fiction; fiction can be stronger than truth.
Palpable “facts” are mortal. Like certain moths and flying ants, they lay their eggs
and die overnight. The important “flashes” and “bulletins” are already forgotten by the
time yesterday morning’s paper is used to line the trash can to receive this morning’s
coffee grounds. The things we remember for longer periods are emotions and
impressions and illusions and images and characters: the elements of fiction.
What do we know of wars from the history books we once read in school,
nodding sleepily but impelled from page to page by the specter of a failing mark in our
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next term paper? Most of us know what little we do of the Napoleonic wars, not from
histories, but from Tolstoy’s War and Peace; of the American Civil War not from the
voluminous military commentaries on that so “military war,” but from Crane’s The Red
Badge of Courage. (1949: 5)
In telling the story of the bombing of Hiroshima, Hersey eschews evanescent, “mortal” facts in
favor of “emotions and impressions and illusions and images and characters.” His purpose is to
make the story live in his readers’ memories, so that our knowledge of the events at Hiroshima
will not “die overnight” along with the bulletins and the news flashes. Hiroshima is often called
a masterpiece of journalism. Ben Yagoda, in his history of the New Yorker, called it, “the most
influential magazine article in the history of journalism” (2000: 184). But Hiroshima is only this
impressive and influential because in it Hersey uses, in his own words, “the elements of fiction.”
To make things even more ambiguous, the overall narrative structure of Hiroshima, six stories
describing the same event, was inspired by Thornton Wilder’s Pulitzer Prize winning novel, The
Bridge of San Luis Rey (1927). When read beside the first line of Wilder’s novel - “On Friday
noon, July the twentieth, 1714, the finest bridge in all Peru broke and precipitated five travelers
into the gulf below” - Hiroshima’s debt to the earlier novel becomes crystal clear (2003: 5). The
story has often been told how Hersey read Wilder’s book en route to Japan while he was
confined to his ship’s sick bay with flu, but few critics hesitate to label Hiroshima journalism,
though it uses “the elements of fiction” and its form was inspired by that of a famous novel.
When the New Yorker republished all of Hiroshima on its website as the culmination of
its celebration of eighty-five years in print, Jon Michaud described Hersey’s technique in terms
similar to those often used in regards to Hersey’s work, “Perhaps the most notable feature of
‘Hiroshima’ is Hersey’s precise and unadorned style, which simply records the facts and places
the moral and interpretive onus on the reader” (Michaud 2010). However, when Hersey
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describes his own technique he says exactly the opposite: that he rejects “palpable facts” in
favor of “emotions and impressions and illusions and images and characters.” Hiroshima, the
most revered classic in “the history of journalism” is, in fact, an experimental work that pushes
across genre boundaries toward other forms; it is journalism written as a novel. In the same
1949 article, Hersey writes:
It is an ironical fact that the great industries of mass communications, built at the cost of
millions of dollars, and profitable, too, in the millions - newspapers, magazines, radio,
television - these marvelously intricate industries have somehow failed to communicate
clearly one thing: human truth. Novelists have often failed in this task, of course, but
usually they have come a great deal closer than the huge businesses which profess that
very task. All alone at their desks, thinking back and trying to recapture impressions and
feelings, dealing with the baffling, shadowy components of human character,
advantaged only in the wonderful, flexible form they use, these individuals have
frequently been able to do what the powerful organs of ‘fact’ could not do: make reality
seem real. (1949: 5)
Hiroshima is an attempt to “recapture impressions and feelings” and to investigate “the
baffling, shadowy components of human character,” much more than to simply record the facts
and events of a particular day. An obvious objection might be raised here: that Hiroshima is not
a novel because it does not call itself one. Readers find no subtitle on the cover marking it to be
A Novel. The license bears a different legend – to borrow the metaphor that Hersey himself
would use to attack nonfiction novelists thirty-four years later. But that argument would reduce
the genre of the novel to a paratextual marker, an advertising sign, and ignore the “wonderful,
flexible form” of the novel entirely. Hersey’s description of “the task” of the novel in his article
happens to be a wonderful description of just what he attempts to do in Hiroshima, “The task
of this kind of novel is not to illuminate events: it is to illuminate human beings who are caught
up in events” (1949: 5). The genre that Hersey called “The Novel of Contemporary History”
blurred the boundaries between fiction and journalism in order to illuminate real human beings
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who were caught up in history and to reveal the “human truth” behind facts and events. To get
a better sense of how Hersey meant to “illuminate” these human beings and their stories, we
should consider a few of the passages from Hiroshima we have called novelistic.
The indefatigable Reverend Tanimoto is one of the book’s most memorable characters.
On August 6th and in the days after, Mr. Tanimoto did not rest in his efforts to help the
wounded and dying. Thousands of injured attempted to flee from raging fires consuming the
remains of the city, but were stopped by Hiroshima’s seven estuarial rivers. Hersey writes:
Then he decided to try to get back to his church. He went into Nobori-Cho by the way
the priests had taken as they escaped, but he did not get far; the fire along the streets
was so fierce that he had to turn back. He walked to the riverbank and began to look for
a boat in which he might carry some of the most severely injured across the river from
Asano Park and away from the spreading fire. Soon he found a good-sized pleasure punt
drawn up on the bank, but in and around it was an awful tableau - five dead mean,
nearly naked, badly burned, who must have expired more or less at once, for they were
in attitudes which suggested that they had been working together to push the boat
down into the river. Mr. Tanimoto lifted them away from the boat, and as he did so, he
experienced such horror at disturbing the dead - preventing them, he momentarily felt,
from launching their craft and going on their ghostly way - that he said out loud, “Please
forgive me for taking this boat. I must use it for others, who are alive.” The punt was
heavy, but he managed to slide it into the water. (1985: 35-36)
The moment resounds with literary echoes, recalling, without requiring any obvious references,
the rivers of the underworld in classical mythology. Hersey’s passage is novelistic not for that,
however, but for the delicate balance it achieves: how it preserves the mysterious uncanniness
of the scene, Mr. Tanimoto’s grisly discovery, while also revealing something of Mr. Tanimoto’s
inner experience in that moment, the “emotions and impressions and illusions and images” of
lived human experience. We find much more than just the horror of the event: we find a
human being confronting that horror. When Mr. Tanimoto apologizes aloud to the dead men,
we see the existential predicament of the survivor. We feel his horror, and also his sense of the
34

necessity of helping those “others, who are alive.” The “moral question” is right here: thanks to
some trick of fate, some survived while others did not, and those who survived had to face all
the horrors of death for the sake of the “others” still living. They had to cross over dark waters
in order to return to life, as Robert J. Lifton describes in his classic study of the psychology of
atomic bomb survivors, Death In Life (1967). Not everyone had Mr. Tanimoto’s perseverance.
Mr. Fukai is rescued against his will, unhurt, from Father Kleinsorge’s mission house, insisting,
“Leave me here to die,” before he runs back toward the burning neighborhood, never to be
seen again (1985: 27). Survival was not just a matter of chance, of where a person happened to
be when the bomb exploded, of distance from “the center”; it was also a question of character,
of something inside those who chose to survive. Hersey’s survivors determine their own fates,
to a degree. They are not just the unlucky citizens of an unlucky city, upon whom a horrendous
atrocity has been perpetrated. They also have their share of free will, of agency.
When human beings face the problem of choosing between life and death, “the moral
question” is most certainly in play. What disturbed some critics was that Hersey had not solved
it for his readers, but merely presented it. Dwight MacDonald, already a strident critic of atomic
weapons, reviewed Hiroshima in the October 1946 issue of Politics. MacDonald claimed to have
“found it so dull that I stopped reading halfway through,” disturbed by what he called:
a moral deficiency: the dead-pan, keyed-down approach is so detached from the
persons Hersey is writing about that they become objects of clinical description; the
author appears like a specialist lecturing on some disease, with "interesting” cases on
the platform. The "little people” of Hiroshima whose sufferings Hersey records in
antiseptic New Yorker prose might just as well be white mice, for all the pity, horror or
indignation the reader—or at least this reader—is made to feel for them. (1946: 308)
MacDonald might have been more satisfied by an avant-garde literary style. He would describe
his dislike of Hiroshima by writing, “perhaps my feeling is simply that naturalism is no longer
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adequate, either esthetically or morally, to cope with the modern horrors” (1946: 308). His
review can thus be considered part of the critical marginalization of literary journalism by those
whose artistic sensibilities preferred the “high” art of avant-garde modernism to “naturalism.”
However, his emphasis on Hiroshima’s “moral deficiency” suggests that, even as journalism,
Hersey’s work was not sufficiently editorial or denunciatory for his taste. But Hersey’s “deadpan, keyed down approach” was not simply an effect of the New Yorker prose style; it was a
question of literary form. In his book on novel theory, Milan Kundera begins by defining the
novel as “a realm where moral judgement is suspended” (not my emphasis 1996: 7). In the
novel, withholding outright denunciations of Rastignac, Emma Bovary, Anna Karenina, etc., is
not moral deficiency; it “is not the immorality of the novel: it is its morality” (Kundera 1996: 7).
The creation of an imaginary “realm” where moral judgement is suspended was, according to
Kundera, a fundamental step in the development of the novel: only there, according to him,
could independent characters come into existence, characters who did not simply represent the
author’s views, but who have their own moralities, world-views and particular humanity. The
secret of their individuality is that the novelist doesn’t answer “the moral question” for them.
What MacDonald failed to perceive - perhaps he did not read far enough – was how
Hersey allows his characters to develop their own moral perspectives, deeply perplexing and
surprising though their views may be. For example, it seems the fact that the emperor deigned
to speak over the radio in his own voice evoked sincere gratitude among the survivors in
Hiroshima. Nine days after the bombing, Mr. Tanimoto listened to the radio broadcast with a
crowd of wounded outside the Hiroshima railway station. Hersey ends the second section of his
book with a letter, written in English by Mr. Tanimoto himself, describing the moment:
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Many civilians, all of them were in boundage, some being helped by shoulder of their
daughters, some sustaining their injured feet by sticks, they listened to the broadcast
and when they came to realize the fact that it was the Emperor, they cried with full
tears in their eyes, ‘What a wonderful blessing it is that Tenno himself call on us and we
can hear his own voice in person. We are thoroughly satisfied in such a great sacrifice.’
(1985: 65)
There is room in Hiroshima for the ambiguous and idiosyncratic views of its characters because
Hersey has not prejudged things for them. Of course, they are not all so “thoroughly satisfied”
in their “sacrifice” as Mr. Tanimoto felt. About a month after the bombing, while many are
suffering from the terrible effects of radiation sickness:
an unpleasant rumor began to move around, and eventually made its way to the house
in Kabe where Mrs. Nakamura lay bald and ill. It was that the atomic bomb had
deposited some sort of poison on Hiroshima which would give off deadly emanations for
seven years; nobody could go there all that time. This especially upset Mrs. Nakamura,
who remembered that in a moment of confusion on the morning of the explosion she
had literally sunk her entire means of livelihood, her Sankoku sewing machine, in the
small cement water tank in front of what was left of her house. (ibid.: 72)
Japanese physicists entered the city in mid-August to begin testing for radioactivity. They used
various signs, including the “permanent shadows” cast upon the rubble (among these were a
few “vague human silhouettes”) to triangulate the exact center of the explosion and to begin
testing for radiation (ibid.: 72). They soon announced that people could return to Hiroshima
without any danger, and “as soon as this reassurance reached the household in which Mrs.
Nakamura was concealing herself ... her whole family relaxed their extreme hatred of America”
(ibid.: 74). Mrs. Nakamura sends her brother in law in search of her lost sewing machine, which,
alas, has rusted. Rather than any of the horrors she has experienced or the illness she is
suffering, for her, the moral question is tied to the question of the fate of her sewing machine
and her ability to scrape out a meager living as a seamstress.
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Each of Hersey’s six survivors reacts differently to the shock of the bombing, and as
Hersey describes their lives in the months that followed, we see their various characters coming
into focus. After the explosion, Dr. Sasaki found himself the only uninjured surgeon at a hospital
with 600 beds, where at least 10,000 wounded patients had converged. In the weeks that
followed, he and the doctors who joined him not only treated burn victims, but also many
afflicted with mysterious illnesses that they had to diagnose and invent treatments for. Hersey’s
Hiroshima was one of the first publications to report in detail about these radiological illnesses,
which, according to Hersey and estimates by the U.S. military’s own Strategic Bombing Survey,
were responsible for around twenty percent of the casualties.6 The point was particularly
contentious and at odds with official narratives put forward by U.S. government spokespeople,
anxious to avoid any correlation between the atomic bombing and the use of “poison gas”
(Lifton and Mitchell 1995: 51) But Dr. Sasaki, affected by illness himself, was far too busy to
parse the finer points of the “moral question” – he did not leave the hospital for months. Father
Kleinsorge and Mr. Tanimoto both redoubled their religious efforts, searching for their
congregations among the survivors. Dr. Fuji rebuilt his medical practice, became successful, and
“was delighted, in the evenings, to receive members of the occupying forces, on whom he
lavished whiskey and practiced English” (1985: 78). Hersey neither invents moral outrage
against the occupying forces where there seems to have been none, nor condemns Dr. Fuji for
his lack of it. Only Miss Sasaki, crushed by books, whose leg was never set and who remains
permanently disabled, expresses the kind of existential bitterness MacDonald likely expected.
When Father Kleinsorge came to her hospital bed, “She asked bluntly, ‘If your god is so good
and kind, how can he let people suffer like this?’ She made a gesture which took in her
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shrunken leg, the other patients in her room, and Hiroshima as a whole” (ibid.: 83). Hersey
gives Father Kleinsorge the last word, a Jesuitical response. (Hersey’s own parents were
missionaries in China, where he spent the first ten years of his life). The attentive reader can’t
miss the note of irony in the Jesuit’s answer, “‘My child,’ Father Kleinsorge said, ‘man is not
now in the condition god intended. He has fallen from grace through sin.’ And he went on to
explain all the reasons for everything” (1985: 83). Explaining “all the reasons for everything” is
exactly what Hersey himself refuses to do, and what Kundera says novelists must not do. The
novelist does not make moral justifications or defend theodicies; he laughs at them with a sort
of irony or humor that “renders ambiguous everything it touches” (1996: 6). Hersey cannot
explain why these survivors reacted the way that they did to the bombing. Characters in good
novels are strange, unique and unpredictable, like people in life.
Some of Hiroshima’s novelistic passages are not explorations of psychology. Early in the
final section, Hersey describes the ruins of the city, which Miss Sasaki first sees while being
transported between hospitals just weeks after the bombing:
The sight horrified and amazed her, and there was something she noticed about it that
particularly gave her the creeps. Over everything - up through the wreckage of the city,
in gutters, along the riverbanks, tangled among tiles and tin roofing, climbing on charred
tree trunks - was a blanket of fresh, vivid, lush, optimistic green: the verdancy rose even
from the foundations of ruined houses. Weeds already hid the ashes, and wild flowers
were in bloom among the city’s bones. The bomb had not only left the underground
organs of plants intact; it had stimulated them. Everywhere were bluets and Spanish
bayonets, goosefoot, morning glories and day lilies, the hairy-fruited bean, purslane and
clotbur and sesame and panic grass and feverfew ... It actually seemed as if a load of
sickle-senna had been dropped along with the bomb. (my ellipsis 1985: 69)
Hersey’s “dead-pan, keyed down” tone gives way to lyricism. His sentences grow long and ring
with the poeticized names of wild flowers, and he indulges in metaphors that are not to be
found elsewhere in the book, like calling the wreckage “the city’s bones.” Certainly, the
39

uncanniness of finding overgrowth in the ruins, which gives Miss Sasaki “the creeps,” is part of
what draws Hersey to this imagery. It might also be read metaphorically: his true subject is not
the bombing itself but how the survivors, some of whom had quite literally been buried by it,
returned to life, how life grew back in the ruins, often with surprising twists and startling colors.
Miss Sasaki, after hearing the explanations of Father Kleinsorge, for example, became Catholic.
The clergymen survivors proselytize tirelessly; the doctors labor with Herculean strength; they
all seem to have been energized, despite their illnesses. They redouble their efforts at life.
Hersey says the survivors shared “a curious kind of elated community spirit, something like that
of Londoners after their blitz,” inspiring feats of rebuilding the city (ibid.: 71). Flowers growing
in the ruins, “stimulated” by the bomb, are a metaphor for their will to survive and to recover.
Eighteen years later, Hersey would include Hiroshima in a collection of journalism he
published under the title Here To Stay. It included several pieces written during World War II.
He subtitled the book, “Studies in Human Tenacity.” Hersey was explicit about what he thought
connected the pieces collected in it:
The great themes are love and death; their synthesis is the will to live, and that is what
this book is about. I believe that man is here to stay in spite of the appalling tools he
invents to destroy himself, for it seems to me that he loves this seamy world more than
he desires, as he dreads and flirts with, an end to it. (1963: vii)
Hersey gave his introduction to the reprint of Hiroshima the title, “The big IF,” and left no doubt
about his views on atomic warfare: he saw it as the greatest threat to the survival of humanity.
Activists campaigning against nuclear weapons have long seen the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki as foreshadowing of the possible fate of much of humankind, should the worst-case
scenarios of military planners occur.7 Though Hersey never reveals his own answer to the moral
question – at least not so as to satisfy MacDonald – he does point toward interpretations of the
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bombing as somehow prophetic. Hiroshima ends by considering “the ethics of the bombing,”
but Hersey merely collects the opinions of the survivors, without inserting his own (1985: 89).
“A surprising number of the people of Hiroshima remained more or less indifferent about the
ethics of using the bomb. Possibly they were too terrified by it to want to think about it at all,”
he writes (1985: 89). Some “feel a hatred for Americans which nothing could possibly erase”;
others, like Dr. Fuji, express a nothing-to-be-done-about-it sort of equanimity; while others call
it a war crime and say those who are responsible deserve to be hung (ibid.: 89). John Siemes, a
German Jesuit who survived the bombing of Hiroshima, published an account in Time magazine
that Hersey includes. In it, Siemes considers the justifications for a “total war” and asks, “When
will our moralists give us a clear answer to this question?”(ibid.: 90). Hersey is no moralist and
the final paragraph of his book seems almost like a non sequitur: the suggestion is that the
answer doesn’t lie with Jesuit “moralists” like Siemes, or any of the others either, so much as
with the future. “It would be impossible to say what horrors were embedded in the minds of
the children ... On the surface, their recollections, months after the disaster, were of an
exhilarating adventure,” Hersey writes (my ellipsis ibid.: 90). MacDonald probably did not read
far enough to appreciate the delicacy of this answer to the moral question of Hiroshima.
The perspectives of children have appeared several times during the course of the book,
always as a discordant, bathetic note, where we might expect to hear a tragic chord. On the
night after the bombing, Mrs. Nakamura’s ten-year-old son excitedly watched a gas tank
burning across a river, recalling the moment with pleasure many times. Several months after
the bombing, he still raced outside at the sound of an airplane “and identified it with a
professional eye as a B-29. ‘There goes Mr. B!’ he shouted. One of his relatives called out to
41

him, ‘Haven’t you had enough of Mr. B?’” (ibid.: 90) The memory, at least for this young boy, is
still of “an exhilarating adventure.” And it is with this child’s voice that Hersey ends his
narrative. He quotes an essay young Toshio wrote to commemorate the anniversary of the
bombing. Of all the survivors’ perspectives that Hersey has taken up, he ends with the simplest,
“the day before the bomb, I went for a swim. In the morning, I was eating peanuts. I saw a light.
I was knocked to little sister’s sleeping place” (ibid.: 90). What does Hersey mean to suggest by
ending with this, the most unsophisticated narrative of all? Toshio’s voice does not resound
with tragic solemnity, only youth. It forces us to consider the uncertain future of the frightening
new world that will be his.
There is a tendency in novels constructed out of so-called facts, testimony or nonfiction,
to turn to a new voice in the concluding pages, the voice of someone whose experience seems
somehow more connected to the central event. In practice, because so many nonfiction novels
are true-crime stories, the final voice is often that of the killer or criminal narrating the crime.
The new perspective offers a conclusion in a formal sense, despite any unresolved questions.
Hersey does something similar when he lets the most artless, unaffected voice speak last.
Giorgio Agamben, in The Remnants of Auschwitz, describes what he calls “a lacuna” at the core
of testimony, “which calls into question the very meaning of testimony and, along with it, the
identity and reliability of the witnesses” (1999: 33). Agamben draws upon a passage in Primo
Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved in which Levi claims that those who survived in order to bear
witness, the lucky or able few, cannot be the true witnesses, because they did not touch
bottom or experience the absolute depths of horror. Only “the drowned” could possibly tell the
whole story, Agamben says; but unfortunately the survivors must “speak in their stead, by
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proxy, as pseudo-witnesses: they bear witness to a missing testimony ... in the name of the
impossibility of bearing witness” (my ellipses ibid.: 34). The closest that Levi approaches to this
missing, unspeakable testimony in Survival in Auschwitz is the story of a three-year old boy,
paralyzed from the waist down. He is called Hurbinek, though his real name is unknown. He has
no family and has not been taught to speak. He dies not long after the liberation of the camp.
But in his last days, Levi hears him repeating a single mysterious word, or perhaps a name. The
survivors all wonder what it means, but, “despite the presence of all the languages of Europe in
the camp,” they cannot decipher it (qtd in Agamben ibid.: 38). The essential testimony cannot
speak: it signifies outside of language, in the failure of language. In young Toshio’s artless prose,
we find echoes of Hurbinek’s mysterious word, the trace of “that which does not have language
... of that to which no one has borne witness” (ibid.: 39). This makes the end of Hersey’s book
more profound than pathetic. When Toshio writes that, “Murakami’s mother, alas was dead,”
his clichéd, childish expression does not fail so much as suggest the impossibility of expressing
the true horror (Hersey 1985: 90).
When Mary McCarthy published a letter to the editor in the issue of Politics immediately
following Dwight MacDonald’s cutting review of Hiroshima, she was even more caustic than he.
McCarthy decried Hersey’s interest in the survivors of Hiroshima, writing:
The existence of any survivors is an irrelevancy, and the interview with survivors is an
insipid falsification of the truth of atomic warfare. To have done the atomic bomb
justice, Mr. Hersey would have had to interview the dead. (1946: 367)
Certainly, in one sense, she is right. Primo Levi suggests more or less the same thing when he
says, “we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses” (2017: 70). MacDonald and McCarthy
seem, in retrospect, two of the most lucid contemporary voices on the atomic bombings.
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McCarthy put her finger on exactly what Levi and Agamben would describe, decades later;
MacDonald wrote presciently about the horrors of radiological illness and the arms race to
come.8 So why were both so disappointed by Hersey’s Hiroshima? Their qualms were not with
Hersey’s failure to take up the moral question, but with the morality of the form of Hersey’s
narrative, with the “structure of imagination” that Hersey brought to organizing the stories of
his six survivors. Neither McCarthy nor MacDonald seems to have considered Hersey’s narrative
as though it were a novel, though McCarthy herself was a novelist. But each did mention,
disparagingly, the publication in which they found Hersey’s text. MacDonald mentions the
“dead-pan, keyed down approach” that he suggests is an element of “New Yorker prose.”
McCarthy ends her review pointing out reasons why she thinks “the New Yorker cannot be
against the atom bomb” and calling Hersey, ironically, the magazine’s “reporter at large,”
echoing the subtitle under the original publication of Hiroshima (1946: 367). MacDonald and
McCarthy’s reservations arise from a confusion of genres, and from their ambivalence about
the New Yorker itself. They were not prepared to find, in a section of the magazine billed as the
work of a “reporter,” a very different sort of narrative.
Genres are different symbolic approaches to writing about the events of the world: an
author might refer to reality with an inverted pyramid of answered questions and positive facts;
or with a narrative that recaptures experience with “feelings” and “sensations” rather than
information; or by creating characters that seem to make their own decisions and live their own
lives. Hersey’s innovation was to use the literary form of the novel to approach a particularly
divisive, confusing and problematic historical event – without inventing anything himself.
Hiroshima attempts “to make” an especially atrocious “reality seem real” by means of this
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formal innovation, and it remains one of the few attempts that have succeeded at directing our
national attention towards this glaring blind spot in the American historical memory.9
Historians who confront the legacy of Hiroshima and the decades of denial and obfuscation
swirling around it are often called, derisively, revisionists – but only because most Americans
have not wanted to contemplate this grim episode as it happened with any sort of clarity. The
truth of it has for the most part been denied or ignored for seven decades, and those historians
who rely on palpable facts rather than “the baffling, shadowy components of the human
character” in their attempts to correct the official, fallacious version find that their stories
usually fall on deaf ears. Yet John Hersey, “advantaged only in the wonderful, flexible form”
that he used to tell the story, managed to recapture some of its “human truth.”
3. Lillian Ross and the Problem of the Art Industry
Impartial historical and moral consideration of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
may have been rare in America, but one media has not shied away from the drama of the
nuclear age. Hundreds of films have drawn upon the dangers and fears of life in a world with
nuclear weapons. According to Lifton and Mitchell, “the nuclear genre spawned subgenres:
survivalist fantasies, irradiated monster films, post-apocalypse thrillers … What is most striking,
however, is that few of these films say anything directly about Hiroshima” (1995: 361). Only a
handful of feature films have told the story of the Manhattan Program or the atomic bombings.
The earliest of them, M-G-M’s The Beginning or the End, appeared in 1947. Donna Reed,
an actress, wrote a letter thanking her high school chemistry teacher after she discovered he
had worked on the Manhattan Project; the teacher, whose name was Dr. Edward R. Tompkins,
suggested making a movie about the Manhattan Project scientists. Reed’s husband, a producer
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at Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, told the head of the studio, Louis B. Mayer, who later called it “‘the
most important story’ he would ever film” (Lifton and Mitchell 1995: 73) The project was born
from the experiences and misgivings of the atomic scientists, and early versions of the script
reflected their concerns. But producers from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer went to Washington early
in the process to get the approval of the Federation of Atomic Scientists and the White House.
Harry Truman himself, supposedly, came up with the film’s title (ibid.: 73) Without telling the
scientists, M-G-M officials gave veto power over the script to the Truman White House and to
General Leslie Groves, the officer who oversaw the Manhattan project and the atomic
bombings. Groves also received $10,000 from M-G-M (ibid.: 74). “The scientists had suddenly
lost control of what they thought was their picture,” and editorial changes to the script ended
up “transforming the scientists’ cautionary tale into a ringing endorsement of the Hiroshima
narrative” (ibid.: 74). These changes included the insertion of a number of inaccuracies and
outright fabrications reinforcing official distortions and contributing to decades of widespread
misunderstanding of the historical record. One of the most important changes involved a scene
depicting Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb; the White House complained it made
Truman appear overhasty and demanded the scene be rewritten and reshot. The actor who
originally played Truman, Roman Bohnen, was replaced; the replacement was told to portray
the president with a more “military bearing”; and the resulting scene merely dramatized the
lies of Truman, Groves, Henry Stimson, James Conant, and others, in order to retrospectively
justify the attacks (ibid.: 172). After losing his role, Bohnen wrote a letter to Truman suggesting
he play himself in the film. But Truman seems to have missed the irony. He answered by saying
he did not have “the talent to be a movie star” (ibid.:172).
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Several hundred thousand people around the country went to see the movie. M-G-M’s
trailer called it “the most timely production in motion picture history.”10 The film has often
been described as a docudrama, for its pretensions to historical accuracy and its depiction of
historical figures. Nevertheless, in true M-G-M style, the science narrative is doubled with an
entirely fictitious, melodramatic love story. A review in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by
Harrison Brown, a nuclear chemist, reflects the troubled reaction of the scientific community
depicted in the film. Brown called it “a dream in which fantasy is superimposed upon reality”;
said that it was “as a whole of poor quality”; pointed out that “the misrepresentations of the
sequence of events and of the events themselves were too numerous to discuss”; and took
particular umbrage at “the most horrible falsification of history in the film,” that the people of
Hiroshima had been warned of an impending attack. Nevertheless, despite these historical,
scientific and aesthetic failings, Brown thought the American people needed to see it anyway,
as only then might they begin to understand the dramatic realities of the atomic age. The film is
oddly apocalyptic; it begins with the principal characters burying a time capsule, to preserve a
record of human civilization in case of absolute destruction. However, this sense of danger is
countered at every step by characters assuring each other that it was absolutely “inevitable”
humankind would create an atomic bomb and that the only question was if Hitler would be able
to use one first. Versions of the script even suggested there existed an atomic-bomb
development program in Imperial Japan, a complete fabrication (Lifton and Mitchell 1995: 362).
One crucial editorial revision replaced a shot of Hiroshima victims with a shot of a burning
landscape observed from the air. No trace of the real human lives destroyed by the bomb,
much less of the survivors whom Hersey depicted, could be found in Hollywood’s version.
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Anyone familiar with the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer films of the period should not be too
shocked to learn that the studio struggled to produce the work of dour moral admonition the
atomic scientists had originally envisioned. Their most financially successful productions of the
era were musicals, and impulses toward melodrama are evident in The Beginning or the End.
Just four years later, L.B. Mayer would complain about John Huston’s artistic pretensions in
another war film, The Red Badge of Courage. Lillian Ross catches Mayer’s unforgettable,
blustering dialogue, in a nonfiction novel profiling the making of the film:
“Art. ‘The Red Badge of Courage’? All that violence? No story? Dore Schary wanted it. Is
it good entertainment? I didn’t think so. Maybe I’m wrong. But I don’t think I’m wrong. I
know what the audience wants. Andy Hardy. Sentimentality! What’s wrong with it?
Love! Good old fashioned romance!” He put his hand on his chest and looked at the
ceiling. “Is it bad? It entertains. It brings the audience to the box office.” (1952: 197-98)
Mayer seems to have spoken primarily in abbreviated, emphatic sentences, designed to allow
for no rejoinders, but another executive summed things up more eloquently. Arthur Freed,
producer of many of the studio’s most successful musicals, including Singing in the Rain (Freed
wrote the lyrics for the title song), told Ross more succinctly, “In musicals we don’t have any of
those phony artistic pretensions” (ibid.: 25).11 Lillian Ross portrayed the two men along with a
number of other Hollywood figures in a series of New Yorker articles, later published as Picture
(1952), a profile of Huston’s film adaptation of Stephen Crane’s classic Civil War novel.
Picture begins with a clear statement of intentions. Ross is going on assignment, but her
subject is not a war fought on some distant continent. She sets out to report on Hollywood by
telling the story of the production of one particular film, “to follow the history of that particular
movie from beginning to end, in order to learn whatever I might learn about the American
motion-picture industry” (1952: 3). In fact, the project began as a profile of Huston himself,
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with whom Ross was already friendly, and only later did it become a profile of the movie and
the industry. Her interest in the subject went back several years. In 1948, she wrote a long
piece for the New Yorker about Hollywood’s befuddled reaction to the House Committee on
un-American Activities under J. Parnell Thomas, which ‘blacklisted’ eight writers, a producer
and a director for refusing to disclose their political affiliations. This satirical report from
Hollywood is sometimes remembered for a marvelous dialogue between Humphrey Bogart,
John Huston and Edward G. Robinson, in which Ross displays her impressive talent for
portraying character through speech:
“The big shots wanted Bogie to say this in his own words,” Huston explained,
“but I insisted that Roosevelt’s words were better.”
Bogart nodded. “Roosevelt was a good politician,” he said. “He could handle
those babies in Washington, but they’re too smart for guys like me. Hell, I’m no
politician. That’s what I meant when I said our Washington trip was a mistake.”
“Bogie has succeeded in not being a politician,” said Huston, who went to
Washington with him. “Bogie owns a fifty-four-foot yawl. When you own a fifty-fourfoot yawl, you’ve got to provide for her upkeep.”
“The Great Chief died and everybody’s guts died with him,” Robinson said,
looking stern. (1948)
Ross had developed her unique style of humorous, candid portraiture during years of writing
“Local Items” and “Talk of the Town” style pieces for the New Yorker. But her mature profiles
develop into larger perspectives; this first report on Hollywood describes an industry in turmoil,
in which only one big star remained unaffected by the political climate:
“We’d be in a hole if we didn’t have Lassie,” I heard an M-G-M man say. “We like
Lassie. We’re sure of Lassie. Lassie can’t go out and embarrass the studio. Katherine
Hepburn goes out and makes a speech for Henry Wallace. Bang! We’re in trouble. Lassie
doesn’t make speeches. Not Lassie, thank God.” (ibid.)
After “Come In, Lassie!” Ross continue reporting from beyond New York. She traveled to
Mexico to profile Sidney Franklin, the bullfighter from Brooklyn, who told her, “Death, shmeath,
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so long as I keep healthy” (Ross 1998: 60). Before publishing “El Único Matador,” she traveled
to Idaho to meet Franklin’s friend, Ernest Hemingway. “Very patiently, Hemingway tried his
best to give me an education in the art and meaning and delights of bullfighting,” Ross wrote,
but ended up calling her “the person least suited in the world to do an article on bullfighting”
(ibid.: 66). Their friendship lasted until Hemingway’s death. When Hemingway came to New
York for a weekend in 1950, Ross met him and his wife, Mary, at the airport. They drank
champagne in the morning, visited Marlene Dietrich (whom Hemingway called, “the Kraut”),
took Hemingway coat shopping and saw paintings in the Metropolitan Museum. Ross’s profile
of Hemingway for the New Yorker, “How Do You Like It Now, Gentleman?” (1950), recounted
the weekend and captured the famous author’s self-obsessed, garrulous chatter memorably.
He talks endlessly about himself in it, and ends up seeming like an eccentric, insufferable crank,
though he apparently liked the article very much when he read the galleys.
Ross’s Hemingway profile elevated her status at the magazine. When she began writing
for the New Yorker, before the end of the war in 1945, she wrote for the “Talk of the Town”
section anonymously, never receiving a byline. Her work was rewritten in the masculine gender.
Five years later, she was esteemed among the finest of the publication’s stylists, her name
mentioned along with Joseph Mitchell, A.J. Liebling and John Hersey. Though Lillian Ross did not
participate at all in the publication of Hiroshima, the editing of which was kept secret by Harold
Ross and William Shawn, she certainly would have read it. She was probably also aware of the
experiments in literary journalism that Mitchell was undertaking with his composite profiles.
Ross notes in her memoirs that Mitchell was writing “fiction in the form of fact, but this was a
secret for a long, long time” (1998: 27). The subject of Ross’s writing may seem less momentous
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than Hersey’s, but it would be a mistake to suggest her talents were limited to depicting
celebrities and their humorous, candid off-camera dialogues. Witty observation became
something of a trademark. According to Ross, “somewhere along the line, a critic made up the
phrase ‘fly on the wall,’ to describe my journalistic ‘technique’” (ibid.: 103). But her goal was
not so much humor as revelation. She goes to Hollywood to pull back the curtain on America’s
most beloved industry, to learn what there is to learn about it while watching it work, up close.
She lived in Los Angeles for a year, observing the filming, editing and release of Huston’s film.
Years later, she would recall:
As I spent time with the characters involved in the making of the picture, I became more
and more excited about their relationships with one another, the development of the
action, the drama of the story. It was like a novel unraveling right in front of me. It was
fact, but it could be fact written in the form of fiction. I would be able to catch it. (ibid.:
90)
In a letter that Ross sent in 1950 to William Shawn, Ross’s editor at the New Yorker and her
lover for many decades, she wrote:
You see, if the story turns out to be what I think it is, it’s really almost a book, a kind of
novel-like book because of the way the characters may develop and the variety of
relationships that exist among them. I don’t know whether this sort of thing has ever
been done before, but I don’t see why I shouldn’t try to do a fact piece in novel form, or
maybe a novel in fact form. It’s an exciting thing to think about. It’s almost as though the
subject matter calls for that kind of form. (ibid.: 91)
Fifteen years later, critics would vociferously debate the validity of the literary form Ross here
describes inventing, the “novel in fact form,” which Capote would rename the nonfiction novel.
Hardly anyone would recall Ross’s contribution. However, Ross’s assertions that she did not
“know whether this sort of thing ha[d] ever been done before” are dubious, considering her
admission about Joseph Mitchell’s inventions, and that she may also have read John Hersey’s
article from the previous year outlining “The Novel of Contemporary History.”
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Ross constructs her “novel in fact form” around four characters and their relationships,
friendships, antagonisms, partnerships and struggles: Huston, the director; Gottfried Reinhardt,
the co-writer and principal producer; and Dore Schary and L. B. Mayer, both M-G-M executives.
The story begins with Huston telling Ross, “They don’t want me to make this picture. And I want
to make this picture” (1952: 4). Huston wins the battle over making the film, but a struggle for
creative control of it ensues. Early in the book, Ross describes how the studio did business:
At Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Gottfried Reinhardt had witnessed a succession of struggles
for power among the executives at the studio. He had learned many lessons simply by
watching these battles, he told me. “M-G-M is like a medieval monarchy,” he said.
“Palace revolutions all the time.” (ibid.: 19)
Huston and Reinhardt make the film more or less how they originally intended. They are forced
to film it on Huston’s ranch in California instead of in Leesburg, Virginia or Nashville, Tennessee,
with a smaller budget and a shorter shooting schedule than planned. But during the editing and
preliminary screenings, they remain satisfied. However, when the first previews elicit confused
and lukewarm audience responses, along with real antipathy, the executives begin to panic.
Mayer, against the project from the beginning, smells blood and begins circling. Schary insists
on cutting and rearranging scenes and sequences that Reinhardt and Huston consider essential
to what they were attempting to express. Huston turns to his next project, leaving town to film
The African Queen (1951). Reinhardt, feeling he is responsible for the film’s commercial success,
contradicts Huston’s clear decision and adds a voice-over narration, arguing “the people must
know this is a classic,” as though a classic novel would ipso facto be classic cinema (1952: 179).
The artistic problem they face is one that often troubles movie adaptations of books.
The novel as a form is particularly suited to describing interiority, while cinema cannot refer so
easily to the thoughts and inner experiences of characters. Lukács’s famous argument – “the
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novel tells of the adventure of interiority” – refers to this characteristic of the form: how novels
can narrate journeys of self-discovery (1971: 89). Crane’s novel describes the protagonist’s
dramatic transformation during his first days of battle, when he flees from the fighting in terror,
convinced that he is a coward, only to return later and fight with distinction. The story is about
the nuances of his psychological development and various states of fear and anger that we
describe with catch-all terms like courage and cowardice. The battles are mostly unimportant;
the novel’s bathetic conclusion reveals that the protagonist’s heroism has all been for the sake
of a mere diversionary action. Like Hersey’s Into the Valley, Crane depicts the feeling of war,
those “sensations” that Hersey wanted to convey to all “the people in the homes.” This focus
on psychology, along with The Red Badge’s solemn, brooding tone, make it a particularly
difficult novel to adapt to film. Reinhardt seems to have realized too late how difficult adapting
such an “adventure of interiority” might be. Huston categorically objects to voice-over
narration, but Reinhardt insists, arguing in a letter to Schary that Ross reproduces in its entirety:
It will immensely clarify [the film] for those who are now confused. It will prepare them
for what is coming and tell them what it is about: namely, the INNER evolution of a man.
It will also demand the necessary respect from the average audience, so that we can at
least expect a true and more dignified reaction. (emphasis not mine, 1952: 184)
Ross is especially attuned to this particularly novelistic theme of “inner evolution”; she works to
reveal similar inner changes undergone by her own characters. Reinhardt constantly describes
the film’s production with the metaphor of battle. “It is you who will have to engage the enemy
from today on,” he tells Huston on the first day of filming (ibid.: 76). But if Crane’s novel echoes
in Ross’s story, Huston does not play the part of the young soldier going into battle so much as
Reinhardt himself. By the end of Ross’s novel, Reinhardt has become a jaded veteran, while
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Huston remains the same successful auteur he always was. Reinhardt gives up on films with
“artistic pretensions” and decides to direct a movie called Invitation (1952):
“I have stars and I have a story in this picture,” Reinhardt said ... For the past year, he
said, he had been trying to make a picture that was both an artistic and a commercial
success; now he was going to simplify matters. “I will give them just what the doctor
ordered,” he said. He had a new job, a new outlook, and a new contract with M-G-M. To
celebrate, he bought a new Cadillac convertible. “Money is good for bribing yourself
through the inconveniences of life,” he said. (Ross 1952: 227)
His story echoes a novelistic bildung narrative: the idealism of youth struggling with the reality
of adult life and the loss of youthful illusions. Though Ross begins her novel with Huston,
probably the most intriguing of the book’s four principal characters, Huston’s role diminishes as
the others wrest more and more creative control from him. In the end, Reinhardt himself seems
to bet more and to lose more on The Red Badge of Courage than Huston has.
In her depiction of Huston, Ross reveals the admiration and sensitivity that she would
show throughout her career when depicting artists. What drew her to Huston, and perhaps to
the project in general, was a sort of aura of creative power that he emanated, both by his
eccentric character and in his artistic sensibility. Several times, Ross attempts to describe
precisely what made him such a wonderful film director:
The sun had gone down and the light coming into the suite, high in the Tower, was
beginning to dull. Huston looked as though he might be waiting - having set up a Huston
scene - for the cameras to roll. But, as I gradually grew to realize, life was not imitating
art, Huston was not imitating himself, when he set up such a scene; on the contrary, the
style of the Huston pictures, Huston being one of the few Hollywood directors who
manage to leave their personal mark on the films they make, was the style of the man.
In appearance, in gestures, in manner of speech, in the selection of the people and
objects he surrounded himself with, and in the way he composed them into individual
“shots” ... and then arranged his shots into dramatic sequence, he was simply the raw
material of his own art; that is, the man whose personality left its imprint, unmistakably,
on what had come to be known as a Huston picture. (my ellipsis 1952: 5-6)
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Huston’s eerie power to turn moments into “scenes” typical of his films strikes Ross several
times during the book, though she carefully removes herself from the narrative. Sometimes, it
happens by surprise, like some sort of magic trick:
Suddenly, against an out-of-focus bar background, Huston, his beautiful wife, and the
unanswered question about the ducks turned into a Huston scene that was full of
mysterious, even sinister possibilities. (1952: 133)
At other moments, the effect seems perhaps to be a result of the observer’s gaze, perhaps even
the result of her sensitivity to Huston’s art, like something that Ross herself is searching for.
One potential moment disappoints her, “The small man wearing the derby suddenly lost his
promise. There was no Huston scene” (1952: 236). These are not only descriptions of what
made Huston such a powerful film director; they also reveal Ross’s own interests and artistic
powers. Ross herself has a startling ability to turn moments of lived reality into ‘Ross scenes,’
for example those sparkling dialogues her critics are always praising bear her unmistakable
artistic fingerprints. They are part of “the style of the [wo]man.” Ross’s contribution to the
development of the nonfiction novel form can be found here: it was not just the invention of
her so-called ‘fly-on-the-wall’ technique, but her ability to recast reality according to her own
sensibility, to infuse events and scenes with her strange and unique vision. Ross discovered that
even “a novel in fact form” might express its author’s precise and idiosyncratic style.
Picture is in some respects an extended look at the ambiguous distinction between art
and life. It is an exercise in blurred boundaries: Ross turns life into literature, by writing a factbased-novel about a film adapting literature into cinema. Huston’s personal artistic style,
sensibility and vision is at the core of Ross’s story, in a book that began as a profile of the man
and personality she calls “the raw material of his own art.” Ross is exactly right, then, to raise
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the question of imitation in its first pages. “Life was not imitating art,” she says, but rather,
Huston’s art imitated “the style of the man.” When critics write about cinema as a mimetic art,
they often think in terms of the projected image on the screen as a reflection of the surface of
the world or of our visual apprehension of the world. Ross’s version of cinematic mimesis is
more original: she says the director leaves his “personal mark” on the film. The movie thus
reflects the director himself; he is its “raw material.” Huston’s personal mark or “style” - though
we might interchange any number of other words here, for example, his personality, sensibility,
self or vision - happened to be strong enough to appear even at prosaic moments while he was
waiting around to go to dinner, talking with his wife or passing a stranger in the hall.
Not many shared Huston’s powers. He is “one of the few Hollywood directors who
manage to leave their personal mark on the films they make,” Ross says; and after she details
the filming and first round of editing of The Red Badge of Courage, her subject becomes the
many reasons why that is so, the mechanisms by which directorial influence is diminished in
Studio-Era Hollywood. In fact, Picture tells the story of how Huston’s personal mark is effaced
from his project. It is about the unmaking of Huston’s film, just as much as it is about the
making of it. When Ross’s book was published in England, Graham Greene suggested this sort
of interpretation, calling it, “a terrifying picture of how a great film, directed by one of the best
living directors, based on an American classic, can be slashed into incoherence through the
timidities and the illiteracy of studio heads” (qtd in Ross 1998 103). Sociological perspectives in
art criticism have often emphasized the social conditions of production and consumption.
Ross’s portrait of Hollywood at work can be read in this sense, as a “picture” of social and
economic forces in competition with creative ambitions in an art industry. This is the primary
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conflict from the beginning, when Huston tells Ross “they don’t want me to make this picture,”
and the point is driven home by L.B. Mayer’s churlish tirades against art and Huston’s “artistic
pretensions.” No investigation of the “motion-picture industry” would have been complete
without a portrait of the economics that made it such a profitable business.
Ross is a careful reporter of this aspect of the production. Picture includes a number of
budgets with exact dollar amounts including a general budget for the film - projected to cost
$1,443,789, though the final total cost “turned out to be $1,642,017.33” (1952: 243). Ross
details equipment costs down to the flags – Confederate flags are four times as expensive as
Union flags – equipment – dummy horse carcasses go for a whopping $275 each – the daily
wages of extras – $25 – and even Huston’s weekly salary – $4,000. Ross compares Red Badge’s
budget with those of other films; An American in Paris had “a thirteen-minute ballet sequence
costing $400,000” and Quo Vadis would have an overall cost of $8,500,000, or about five and a
half times that of Huston’s film (ibid.: 106). She includes the yearly net income of Loew’s, Inc.,
the management company that owned M-G-M, and how much was paid to M-G-M directors
Schary and Mayer. Revealing the value of stock dividends is not enough for Ross; the
penultimate scene in her book takes the reader inside the annual shareholder’s meeting, where
an executive is surprised by a stockholder’s praise for Red Badge. “It’s a tribute to the company
that they had the courage to put out a picture that did not make money,” the stockholder says
(ibid.: 244). The moment is particularly ironic for readers who recall Reinhardt’s insistence that
the film would both be “a commercial success ... and a great picture” (my ellipsis ibid.: 19).
The effect of Ross’s attention to the economics of Hollywood is gradual, but by the end
of the book, it has consumed more pages than the subject of Houston’s artistic gifts. Art as it
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exists in the real world must include financial considerations; the question that hovers over
Picture, though Ross poses it so carefully that it never quite needs to be formulated, is the
paradox of the art industry. Is the term antithetical? Can the two sides of the coin be reconciled
or is there an irresolvable conflict between art and industry, creativity and business, inspiration
and economics? Certainly, art industries do exist. The subtlety of Ross’s report reveals that the
conflict between the two sides is not quite so simple, either. The dynamic cannot be reduced to
two positions, on the one side, artists, and on the other, executives. Huston denies that Red
Badge is a prestige film and hopes all along that it will be a financial success. Mayer and others
deride him for being uninterested in making money, but Ross shows him consistently worrying
about it. Huston says, in the end:
You know, there’s a strange irony in what happened to ‘Red Badge.’ Even though a lot of
people in the business think otherwise, my other pictures did all right at the box office ...
The only picture I ever made that seems as though it’s going to be marked down simply
as a box-office failure is ‘The Red Badge of Courage.’ And I thought that was the best
picture I ever made. (my ellipsis 1952: 238)
Of Ross’s four principal characters, Huston is furthest toward the artistic side of the art-industry
spectrum, while Mayer is clearly the industry villain. But Reinhardt and Schary perhaps prove
more consequential figures in the final form Red Badge takes, and they are torn throughout by
conflicting imperatives. Reinhardt, under pressure after some unsuccessful previews, breaks
with Huston’s vision and tries to make the film more understandable. Schary, an executive,
learns the dangers of financing projects with complicated aesthetic goals. Ross ends her novel,
like Hersey did, with the inclusion of a new voice. Here, it is the secret voice of the boardroom.
Nick Schenk, the head of Loew’s, Inc., has been a distant presence throughout, financing the
project from his offices in New York without ever getting involved. Schenk gets the last word,
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and his perspective makes for a final revelation. William Shawn, Ross’s editor, insisted she get
an “ending to [her] tale” (qtd in Ross 1998: 162). So she sat in the lobby of Schenk’s office
building until he agreed to an interview. Schenk reveals another layer of palace intrigue:
Huston’s film served his political purposes, by: 1) driving a wedge between Mayer and Schary,
M-G-M’s two chief executives, and ultimately forcing Mayer to leave the studio; and 2) teaching
Schary, the younger executive, to consider commercial success first. He tells Ross:
I supported Dory. I let him make the picture. I knew that the best way to help him was
to let him make a mistake. Now he will know better. A young man has to learn by
making mistakes. I don’t think he’ll want to make a picture like that again. (1952: 258)
But even this perspective on Huston’s film – that, all along, it was just a sort of lesson in
Hollywood management, a project doomed to failure – is far from certain. Perhaps, like some of
Huston’s other films, it would have grossed a profit over time, if Huston’s vision had not been
“slashed into incoherence,” as Graham Greene says. Huston himself makes the point that one
of his most recognized and now classic works, The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, had only just
broken even by 1951, three years after its release.
Graham Greene’s reading of Picture, as a story about business executives destroying
Huston’s art, suggests we’ll never know what The Red Badge of Courage might have been, a box
office success or a flop, a classic or a failure, if Huston’s vision had been respected. Ross’s book
is a portrait of an industry in transformation, of Hollywood during the last years of the studio
system era, challenged both by the rise of television and by industry-wide changes following
the Supreme Court’s 1948 “United States vs. Paramount Pictures” antitrust decision.
Hollywood’s problems are evident, though perhaps no art-industry can avoid some of the
conflicts that Picture describes. The film industry we find in Ross’s pages seems predisposed
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against certain types of art, among which we might count Huston’s brand of cinema. The
executives Ross describes seem more interested in producing films that, in the words of the
atomic scientist reviewing Hollywood’s take on Hiroshima, are like “a dream in which fantasy is
superimposed upon reality.” But this is perhaps a simplification of the complicated nexus of
commerce and creativity we have been referring to as an art industry. Such an argument seems
to presuppose what has been called the autonomous theory of art: the idea that genuine art –
in contrast with ersatz art or mass entertainment – is fundamentally disinterested from
practical, worldly concerns and incentives like wanting to turn a profit.
Ross’s book undermines this theory, even as it dramatizes the conflict between M-G-M’s
profit-oriented executives and the more creative director and producer. Huston’s rhetoric
suggests that he thought carefully about profits and never fit Mayer’s caricature of a director
only interested in abstract self-expression. M-G-M, even in the golden age of studio musicals,
took on less conventional projects like The Red Badge of Courage and The Beginning or the End,
and was never mindlessly profit-driven or uninspired. M-G-M shareholders appreciated when
the studio took a chance on a more experimental film, even if it hurt the value of their shares.
Picture explores and ultimately draws a nuanced, complex picture of the supposed conflict
between art and commerce that has found its way into many philosophical attacks on mass art,
and on literary journalism, by proponents of modernist or avant-garde art. Noël Carroll
considers such philosophical arguments at length in A Philosophy of Mass Art (1998), describing
one recurrent charge which argues that mass art “is a commodity, and, therefore, neither is it
disconnected from society and practical concerns, nor is it disinterested” (1998: 89). Carroll
argues that this charge derives from a misapplication of Kant’s theory of free beauty in the
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Critique of Judgment, which, as Kant formulated it, explained universal aesthetic reactions to
the sublime and the beautiful, primarily as found in nature. Our judgment of a sunset as
beautiful can be said to be universal, in part, because we consider the sunset disinterestedly.
Judgements of dependent beauty, on the other hand, occur “when we recognize that
something fully realizes its concept,” Carroll summarizes (ibid.: 101). Kant suggests this may be
more appropriate for judging artworks, because “we will, for the most part, experience them in
terms of the genre to which they belong, and in terms of the concepts appropriate to that
genre” (Carroll ibid.: 101). The neo-Kantian argument12 in favor of Modern avant-garde art
replaces the disinterested state of the viewer of free-beauty with a hardly-possible requirement
that art objects be somehow disinterested from society and commerce, or ‘autonomous,’ a
requirement that mass art like Mayer’s brand of formulaic cinema does not satisfy. Lillian Ross
portrays the competition between imperatives of artistic innovation and economics in her
profile of The Red Badge of Courage, but she does not advocate for a variety of cinema that
might somehow be autonomous or disinterested from the realm of everyday life. In fact, we
might argue that it was only M-G-M’s commercial successes, for example all those musicals,
that financed Huston’s artistic experiments – or as Carroll puts it, “when art production rises
due to the demands of the mass art market, the avant-garde boats are lifted as well” (ibid.: 27).
One of the critics who attacked mass art, the first whose theory of it Carroll takes up,
would later turn his ire upon the form of literary journalism Ross’s Picture helped to innovate.
Dwight MacDonald wrote his “Theory of Mass Culture” in 1953, outlining the distinction
between high and mass culture and bemoaning the supposed impoverishment of the former at
the hands of the latter. Twelve years later he published another jeremiad lamenting an art form
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that did not meet his lofty standards – a jeremiad in two parts, in fact, the first of which was
titled “Parajournalism, or Tom Wolfe & His Magic Writing Machine” (1965). MacDonald’s
critique of the literary journalism of the 1960s follows from his polemic against mass culture.
“We convert everything to entertainment,” he begins it by saying (1965:3). High art, the
argument runs, should require effort. It should not be easy or merely entertaining. Mass art or
kitsch, on the other hand, turns audiences into passive consumers by using formulas that are
certain to induce emotions, be they tears, screams or laughter, depending on the work’s genre.
When MacDonald analyzes a passage of Tom Wolfe’s “The Nanny Mafia,” his observations
follow from his philosophy of mass art, likening it to a commodity relying on formulas.
“Stylistically, the above passage has the essential quality of kitsch, or a pseudo-cultural product
manufactured for the market: the built-in reaction. The hastiest, most obtuse reader is left in
no doubt how he is supposed to react,” MacDonald writes (1965: 4). MacDonald claims that
Wolfe’s brand of “parajournalism” is dangerous, “a bastard form, having it both ways,
exploiting the factual authority of journalism and the atmospheric license of fiction” (1965:3).
But in fact, he sees literary journalism as merely another example of mass art threatening the
status of more difficult, avant-garde high art, not art at all really so much as a “pseudo-cultural”
commodity manufactured to make money. MacDonald’s attack on Wolfe is representative of a
long history of what John Hartsock has called the “critical marginalization” of journalism:
The “fall,” then, of journalism – and by extension narrative literary journalism – from
literary grace was largely the result of the invention of a high literature in the
nineteenth century. That fall would be complete with the rise of aesthetic modernism
and the New Criticism. Moreover, journalism would be condemned as a merely
utilitarian exercise by the rise of the concept of objectivity and the scientific direction
mass communication study would take, both of which are founded on positivist
assumptions about what we can and are permitted to know about the world, a world
that could not be literary. (2000: 244)
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Literary journalists, unable to satisfy the utilitarian requirements of the profession of journalism
and its rising objectivity norm, disparaged by high-minded literary critics like MacDonald whose
sensibilities had been formed by avant-garde and Modernist art, were caught on two sides.
Though doubly marginalized, by both critics and professionals, their work remained popular.
Subtle readings of examples like Picture and Hiroshima reveal that there is much more
to literary journalism than kitsch. Instead of asking if such books should be read as mass art or
as some sort of ersatz art-product, it seems more relevant to consider the relation of such
books to other works of journalism and to the sort of truth-claims upon which informational
journalism depends. The division between informational and narrative journalism would only
grow stronger over the decades, as the objectivity norm became more and more entrenched in
the profession and the experiments of the literary journalists grew bolder.
4.

Why Not Make A Good Thing Better? Truman Capote’s Artistic License

In February of 1953, less than a year after the failure of his Broadway play, The Grass
Harp, Truman Capote arrived in the picturesque seaside town of Ravello, south of Pompei on
the Italian Amalfi Coast, “wearing an overcoat that fell almost to his ankles and trailing a long
lavender scarf” (Clarke 1988: 238). Humphrey Bogart, writing to his wife, Lauren Bacall,
captured the sentiment of the film crew Capote was joining. “At first you can’t believe him, he’s
so odd, and then you want to carry him around with you always,” Bogart said (qtd in Clarke
ibid.: 238).
Capote needed money, and perhaps more than that, he needed a project. David O.
Selznick had hired him as a screenwriter for a collaboration with Vittorio de Sica, Stazione
Termini (1953), released in English as Indiscretion of an American Wife.13 Capote had impressed
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Selznick, although the film would prove an abject flop. So when John Huston complained to the
famous producer about the script for his latest project, another collaboration with Bogart,
Selznick did not hesitate to recommend “the wonderful but bad little boy” in the trench coat
and flamboyant scarf (ibid.: 238). Huston had already met Capote, it turned out, at a party in
New York. The film proved to be a much longer affair. “It is indescribable how much we all
drank,” John Barry Ryan would remember (qtd in Plimpton 1997: 126). Capote tried to keep a
day or two ahead of the shooting, writing late into the night alongside Huston, then arriving on
set with the day’s script in hand. By the end of the production, he had won the affection of the
cast, fractured Bogart’s elbow in a drunken wrestling match (they would remain friends), and
turned a would-be crime-thriller into something quite original. Beat the Devil (1953) became
more comedy than suspense, a story of inept, oddball criminals exchanging witty, sparkling
dialogue. Capote’s impish wit turned out to be perfectly suited to Huston’s peculiar aesthetic.
The twenty-eight-year-old author of two novels, a collection of short stories, a book of
travel writing, a Broadway play and now two screenplays, was by his own description passing
through an exploratory period. “I experimented with almost every aspect of writing,” he would
recall years later, “Of course, I failed in several of the areas I invaded, but it is true that one
learns more from a failure than one does from a success” (1975: xii). Out of these experiments,
the most important, “from the point of view of my creative destiny,” would prove to be a pair
of 1955 New Yorker articles, published a year later as a book, The Muses Are Heard (1956)
(ibid.: xii). They tell the story of the first cultural exchange between America and the Soviet
Union, when the entire cast, crew and entourage of Porgy and Bess concluded a four-year
world tour with performances in Leningrad and Moscow. After the U.S. State Department
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declined to support the visit, the musical’s producer, Robert Breen, negotiated with the Soviet
Ministry of Culture, who funded it. The Soviets’ motivation wasn’t entirely innocent. At the
height of the Cold War, the subject of the play would reinforce Soviet propaganda about the
hypocrisy of American ideals like civil rights and equality. Capote, a southerner himself, wrote:
After all, and despite its accent on folkish fun, the situation of the American Negro as
depicted in Porgy and Bess, an exploited race at the mercy of ruthless Southern whites,
poverty-pinched and segregated in the ghetto of Catfish Row, could not be more
agreeably imagined if the Ministry of Culture had assigned one of their own writers to
the job. (1956: 20)
Breen’s mostly black troupe would be the first American performers to appear on stage in the
Soviet Union since the Bolshevik revolution, and they were not motivated by entirely altruistic
sentiments either. The musical was nearing the end of its run and all of the principal cast
members had been replaced, many of them several times. The new performers were anxious
for the media attention the trip would garner. Capote shared a berth during the train voyage
from Berlin to Leningrad with a young couple planning to be married in Russia, because, in the
soon-to-be-groom’s words, it was “bound to be a big story” (ibid.: 38). After the performance,
the cast regarded Soviet praise “with a yawn. ‘Sure it’s nice they write okay things, but who
cares,’ said one member of the cast, expressing a prevalent attitude. It’s not what the Russians
think. It’s what they’re hearing about us back home. That’s what counts” (ibid.:180). Capote,
invited by the Breens to write about what they hoped would be a historic voyage and success,
sensed an opportunity to tell a very different story.
In the preface to a collection of late writings, he would recall how his first foray into
journalism had been inspired by Lillian Ross’s Picture. However, Capote would not recognize the
aspect of Ross’s book that was most influential to his “creative destiny,” what led her to call it a
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“novel in fact form.” This was something Capote would always claim to have invented himself.
Instead, he misrepresented Ross’s book, describing it as cinematic in order to suggest that the
crucial discovery of “handl[ing] her material as if it were fictional” had been his idea:
Some years earlier, Lillian Ross had published Picture, her account of the making of a
movie, The Red badge of Courage; with its fast cuts, its flash forward and back, it was
itself like a movie, and as I read it I wondered what would happen if the author let go of
her hard linear straight-reporting discipline and handled her material as if it were
fictional - would the book gain or lose? I decided if the right subject came along, I’d like
to give it a try: Porgy and Bess and Russia in the depths of winter seemed the right
subject. (1975: xiv)
Capote may have equivocated about what exactly he owed to Ross, but he described with
perfect clarity what about her work appealed to him the least, what he would “let go” of in his
own journalism: that “hard linear straight-reporting discipline” that Capote would all too often
dispense with, whenever he let his nonfiction novels veer decidedly in the direction of fiction.
Journalistic “discipline” does not necessarily equate to reportorial skill; Capote’s capacity to
depict real characters and dialogues in prose does not preclude a tendency to invent scenes,
characteristics or speeches. Ten years later, Capote would be forced to defend his skills as a
reporter, particularly in regards to his unwillingness to take notes or otherwise record his
interviews. He claimed to have trained himself to reproduce pages of testimony, verbatim, from
memory. But this argument about technical abilities is a bit of sleight-of-hand: to misremember
is not the same as to misrepresent or to invent. Even a reporter with total recall can lose his
“discipline” and decide to exaggerate.
Questions of factual credibility should be considered separately from those of literary
quality, if possible, and there is little doubt that in literary terms The Muses Are Heard is a
virtuoso demonstration by a great stylist. Gerald Clarke, whose biography became the basis for
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Bennett Miller’s film, Capote (2005), described Muses as the one work in Capote’s oeuvre that
seemed to have been painless, even easy to write; the book seemed “to write itself, a magical
moment [in his career] when the ink rolls from his pen as smoothly as Old Man River” (1988:
93). Capote described it as “the one work of mine I can truly claim to have enjoyed writing, an
activity I’ve seldom associated with pleasure” (ibid.: 294). Clarke decides this was because the
tone of the book was very much like the tone of Capote’s “lunchtime conversation at its best observant, gossipy, bitchy, and always entertaining” (ibid.: 294). Capote has more fun with
some characters than others. Mrs. Lenore Gershwin, wife of the lyricist, Ira, sister-in-law of
composer George, seems to inspire a laugh every time she appears; “she is a small and fragile
woman devoted to diamonds, and wears them, quite a few, at both breakfast and dinner,”
repeating “Oh, love,” and “Darling, do you think it’s true?” ad absurdum (Capote 1956: 4). For
contrast, Capote gives us Miss Lydia, the translator assigned by the Soviet Ministry of Culture to
escort the troupe:
One sensed that for this middle-aged woman, who said that her ordinary life was
translating articles and living in a room in Moscow, the unique experience, the one that
brought a flush to her cheeks, was not that she was talking to foreigners, but that she
was sitting in a dining car riding on a train. Something about the silver and the clean
cloth and a little basket of puckered apples ... made her fuss with her ivory rose and tuck
up the straying ends of her hair. “Ah, we eat!” she said. (1965: 69)
Ironic characterizations such as these - to which one could add a host of examples - might
certainly be described as gossipy or even catty; yet these sorts of contrasts are exactly the
subject of Capote’s story, which sets out to describe the juxtaposition of two cultures. It is a
measure of his success that Miss Lydia and Mrs. Ira Gershwin seem to hail from entirely
different planets. Miss Lydia herself provides the book with its title, when she translates the
greeting of a Ministry of Culture bureaucrat with a phrase that somehow rings both poetic and
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wooden, “Your visit is a step forward in the march toward peace. When the cannons are heard,
the muses are silent; when the cannons are silent, the muses are heard” (1956: 60). Though the
poetry of the original Russian phrase was perhaps untranslatable, Miss Lydia’s strange rendition
has its own music. The awkwardness of the passive-voice phrasing, which must have appealed
to Capote, is in itself an ironic example of cultural counterpoint, as though East were meeting
West in its very stiltedness.
Capote is as attuned to any signs of deprivation shown by the Russians as he is to the
excesses and decadence of the Americans. The weak point of his story lies not in these
characterizations, which have not faded in six decades, but in certain passages which strain
credulity; narratives about a handsome, mysterious Russian, speaking perfect English, who
invites him to a long, unlikely night out on the town; the shadowy figure who follows Capote all
afternoon while he is out shopping, only to finally return a forgotten hat; a Madame Nervitsky,
who, in whispers, offers to buy Western clothes and jewelry, saying, “bring anything, I will pay
very well” (1956: 173). According to Clarke, Capote’s night out in Petersburg with a mysterious
Stefan Orlov may have been based on a drinking spree that actually took place in Moscow with
“an English professor at the University of Leningrad”; likewise, an entire scene in the railway
station at Brest-Litovsk was pure invention (1988: 292). Other episodes probably include
smaller inventions, distortions or exaggerations, though we can hardly confirm or “fact-check”
them now. It is clear, however, that Capote is entirely uninterested in journalistic “discipline.”
Clark quotes Capote’s friend, Nancy Ryan, who traveled with the group to Leningrad and
Moscow as the Breen’s assistant, and who became a character in Muses:
Like many later New Journalists, [Capote] took substantial liberties for the sake of lively
reading, sometimes changing the order of events and occasionally bringing separated
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episodes together. In one case, he even invented a whole scene - a hilarious encounter
in the Brest-Litovsk railroad station - and fabricated, or made composite figures of,
some of his characters. “He fiddled with things,” said Nancy Ryan. “But he didn’t destroy
the basic truth or genuine spirit at all.” (1988: 294)
Though Capote’s fiddling may not seem so problematic to Clarke or Ryan, it points straight
toward the debates soon to come over the many factual inaccuracies in In Cold Blood (1966).
One wonders exactly what the difference between “the basic truth” and the truth might be, or
between the “genuine spirit” and what really happened. The two truths derive from two
different epistemologies: empirical fact and what Hersey called the “human truth” of the novel.
We might ask if Capote’s writing can even be considered journalism, or if a narrative including
so many inventions should instead be called something else, fiction disguised as journalism
perhaps. In the next section, I will argue that such distinctions ultimately depend on the
reader’s perspective on the text, which I will call the reader’s stance. I don’t deny, of course,
that the author’s intentions matter or that textual markers help to make such determinations.
Usually, when a writer claims to be writing fiction, or when a book is labeled as fiction, readers
can be sure they are reading fiction. But Capote’s “fiddling” reveals the advantages of focusing
on the reception side of the communication model when deciding on the genre of a book.
Dubious nonfictions like Capote’s suggest that the reader also has a role to play. Sometimes,
some authors and some genre labels cannot be trusted.
At least one of Capote’s subjects of mockery, New York Post columnist, Leonard Lyons,
claimed in print never to have said comments that Capote attributed to him (Clarke 1988: 294).
The Breens, made to look slightly ridiculous, were also disappointed by Muses. After its success,
Capote tried to repeat the experiment, traveling to Kyoto, where Marlon Brando and Joshua
Logan were making a film called Sayonara; Logan, forewarned by the Breens, refused Capote
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access to the set, cast or crew. But Capote was already in Japan, and Brando made the mistake
of inviting him over to his hotel for dinner. They exchanged personal anecdotes in confidence.
When Capote published a profile of Brando filled with those personal details, Brando reportedly
threatened to kill him.14 Claiming artistic license was convenient for Capote whenever it suited
him, but his subjects could not so easily reconcile themselves to his artistic caprices, which,
from their perspective, seemed much more like the indiscretions of an unscrupulous journalist.
Capote’s willingness to insert purely invented fictional episodes into factual writing, and to
seduce and deceive his subjects, pushed literary journalism in a dangerous new direction.
The Muses Are Heard concludes when the Everyman Opera troupe gives their first
performance of Porgy and Bess in Leningrad. Capote’s story builds to this event, then breaks off
at the crucial moment, only to describe the sequence from a later position in narrative time;
this analepsis (“completed analepsis” in Genette’s terms) allows Capote to narrate the
performance along with his subjective perception of it (Genette 1980: 51). The device requires
a first-person narrator: Capote describes himself remembering the show, replaying it mentally,
as if “slowing the film down”:
It was very long. The curtain, announced for eight, went up at nine-five and came down
at eleven-forty. By midnight I was back at the Astoria waiting for a call from Henry
Shapiro, the AP correspondent in Moscow who’d said he would telephone me after the
premiere to find out “how it went. What really happened.” There is no absolute truth in
these matters, only opinion, and as I attempted to formulate my own, tried to decide
what I was going to tell Shapiro, I stretched on the bed and switched on the light. (1956:
164)
In the account that follows, the performance is not at all the smashing success the Breens had
hoped for. In fact, the Russians struggle to follow the narrative and offer brief, muted applause.
Capote seems to agree with one American audience member who decides, “It’s such a second70

rate production. That’s what makes me sad. If only it were really good, then you could blame
them” (1956: 172). But Breen orchestrates a long curtain call that requires an extended ovation,
and then manages the publicity so as to inspire mostly positive reviews. Capote depicts himself
as torn between wanting to criticize the “second-rate production” and feeling goodwill toward
the cast and crew:
And yet, as I lay in my room thinking it over, qualms seized me when eventually the
telephone rang. “How did it go? What really happened?” were questions to be
answered on journalism’s unsubtle level. Could I, with any honesty, give Shapiro a
radiant account of the opera’s overall reception? I preferred to; and suspected that it
was what he, quite naturally, wanted to hear. (1956: 178)
The picture Capote has already painted, though perhaps subtle, is not at all radiant. The
question, “Could I, with any honesty,” answers itself in the negative. Capote’s “account” of the
journey of the Everyman Opera builds from ironic characterization toward this larger picture of
a cultural exchange verging on farce, both sides with their ulterior motives, neither one
understanding the other. Disdain for journalism and for “journalism’s unsubtle level” ring
through Capote’s prose. Perhaps there is no “absolute truth” in the realm of art criticism, but
for someone who claimed to have found his “creative destiny” in journalism, he was
surprisingly dismissive of its basic commitment to reporting events as they actually occurred.
The Muses Are Heard concludes with Nancy Ryan, the Breen’s assistant, admitting that
“the Breens did a little adding and editing” to the headlines from American newspapers that
they shared with the cast; “‘there was one line: Times says scored moderate success. You can
bet Wilva cut that out! Well,’ she said with a smile, a sigh, ‘why not make a good thing better?’”
(1956: 182) It is an appropriate ending: the phrase reveals both the duplicity of the show’s
producers, who have staged the trip as an elaborate public relations ploy, and echoes Capote’s
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journalistic philosophy. Even while writing about real people and real events, he did not
hesitate to relax his “straight-reporting discipline” when he thought that inventing or
exaggerating would “make a good thing better.”
5. Conclusion
Narrative literary journalism developed throughout the twentieth century alongside and
often in conflict with the central occupational norm and key precept of mainstream
informational journalism: objectivity. As journalists became professionals, experimentation at
the boundaries of fiction came to seem antithetical to their newly envisioned role as arbiters of
veridical credibility. More than storytellers, journalists came to see themselves as gatekeepers,
entrusted with confirming the factual accuracy of the information entering the public sphere.
This vision of journalism was perhaps always more ideal than real, however. By the time
Jürgen Habermas outlined his theory of the public sphere in 1962, he already thought that it
was in “decayed form” (1991: 215). The transformations that he described it undergoing
depended on transformations in the press, some seemingly similar to the ones considered in
this section. Literary journalism played a central role, as he saw it. Habermas describes the
advent of literary journalism as a sort of industry shift, when a new product competed with the
older “business in pure news reporting,” pushing the press into “involving ideologies and
viewpoints” (ibid.: 182). He argues that a more literary and editorializing press was better able
to resist censorship and state power, a sort of resistance that he imagines had no place in “pure
news reporting” – though contemporary examples suggest that investigative journalism is
usually the more adversarial sort. But Habermas sees this change as transforming the press into
“a forum of rational-critical debate released from the pressure to take sides ideologically” (ibid.:
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184). This sort of publicity became a site where private individuals could engage in debate and
constitute, as much as possible, a public. But what Habermas seems to be referring to as
literary journalism are 18th century literary journals like Richard Steele’s Tatler (1709-11) and
Samuel Johnson’s Rambler (1750-52) and Idler (1758-60), rather than the narrative form we
have been considering here. Despite Habermas’s emphasis on changes in journalism
corresponding with transformations of the public sphere, his discussion sheds little light on the
nature of those changes as they actually appeared in print.
Habermas may offer us something like a theory of objectivity, though he would probably
prefer to consider it a sort of rational public opinion. But the idea that some “rational-critical”
press ever served the functions of private persons acting together as a public is not convincing.
As soon as the press became sufficiently literary and editorial to constitute a rational debate, as
he tells us, it began to suffer from the forces of capitalism. Habermas writes:
The history of the big daily papers in the second half of the nineteenth century proves
that the press itself became manipulable to the extent that it became commercialized.
Ever since the marketing of the editorial section became interdependent with that of
the advertising section, the press (until then an institution of private people insofar as
they constituted a public) became an institution of certain participants in the public
sphere in their capacity as private individuals; that is, it became the gate through which
privileged private interests invaded the public sphere. (ibid.: 185)
The history of the press after this change in the middle of the nineteenth century, as he sees it,
is a decline toward commercialization. The organs of mass media have since “the liberal era,”
Habermas says, “been moved further out of this [public] sphere and reentered the once private
sphere of commodity exchange” (ibid.: 188). So when exactly might the public sphere have
existed? Nancy Fraser suggests that the idea is not plausible so much as useful, calling the
public sphere “a counterfactual ideal that served to reveal the democratic deficits of existing
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societies” (2018: 247). In contrast to “the deformed pseudopublicity of contemporary society,”
Fraser writes, the public sphere and the sort of rational public opinion it entailed was “a
normative ideal whose emancipatory potential Habermas wished to redeem” (ibid.: 247).
James Carey argued against what he called a Whig interpretation of journalism history –
journalism seen as progressively marching toward greater freedoms of speech and democracy.
Habermas offers something contrary to that Whiggish picture: a vision of some lost golden era
of “rational-critical debate.” His theory might be an ideological source, or another reflection, of
the critical concern about a loss of objectivity in journalism. A number of critics have found
Habermas’s vision of the bourgeois public idealized.15 Among them, Michael Schudson asks,
“Was there ever a public sphere?” in an article searching for traces of it in the history of
American journalism (1996: 143). Schudson concludes, “It does not appear that in any general
sense rational-critical discussion characterized American politics in the colonial era” (ibid.: 160).
Imagining that such a rational public sphere and press once existed, and has since been lost,
may be wishful thinking. “Critiques of American politics and culture are sometimes posed as if
contemporary life represents a decline from some great and golden age,” Schudson reminds us
(ibid.: 143). Histories of American journalism like those by Schudson and the others considered
in this section suggest that, if such a public sphere ever existed, it was probably not here.
Literary journalism faced a “critical marginalization” on two fronts during the twentieth
century, John Hartsock tells us (2000:204). Literary critics like Dwight MacDonald disparaged
works of literary journalism as “naturalism,” while advocating for a more avant-garde,
Modernist sort of art. Literary journalism seemed, to MacDonald and to others, a dangerous
example of mass culture, undermining the foundations of more difficult art forms and
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stupefying audiences. While these critics attacked the art status of literary journalism on the
one side, on the other the rise of the objectivity norm in professional journalism discounted its
utility. Hartsock explicitly connects the ideology behind a book like Walter Lippman’s Public
Opinion (1922) with the “critical essentializing” of the New Critics and the high-minded
aestheticism of T.S. Eliot, who was not interested in objectivity exactly, but rather the ‘objective
correlative’ (2000: 232). The rising power of the objectivity norm can be evinced from a series
of polemics and veracity scandals beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the 1980s. Dwight
MacDonald’s attack on Tom Wolfe in 1965 was disguised as a defense of journalistic objectivity,
but in fact, MacDonald’s two essays came in response to a pair of articles Wolfe wrote in 1965
satirizing the New Yorker. MacDonald’s second article attacking Wolfe in the New York Review
of Books, titled “Parajournalism II: Wolfe and the New Yorker” (1966), was an explicit defense
of the magazine under William Shawn, and also a moralistic defense of informational
journalism. Literary journalism had become low-brow again. The magazine whose founding
editor encouraged his best journalists to create composite characters had by 1965 become a
solemn defender of objectivity.16 “I don’t think Wolfe will be read with pleasure, or at all, years
from now, and perhaps not even next year,” Macdonald wrote, fifty years ago (1965:3).
Considering the outpouring of praise following Wolfe’s death in 2018, his guess was ill-judged.
His accusation that the so-called parajournalists of the 1960s produced “entertainment rather
than information” recalls a schism in journalism dating back at least to the 1890s and suggests
his criticism may have in fact been motivated by his theory of high and mass art. (ibid.:3).
In 1971, Gail Sheehy published a nine-thousand-word article in New York magazine on
the life of a Manhattan prostitute, titled “Red Pants and Sugarman,” in which, she wrote later,
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she “used the literary device of a composite character” (2014: 146). She claimed that editors
had cut a paragraph from the article that explained her technique, making it seem deceitful:
I called my New York magazine editor on the piece, Jack Nessel. How could the
explanation have been left out? He didn’t know either. I went to the office and asked
everyone what had happened. No one would admit to removing it. I was sick. The
controversy would give ammunition to the increasingly vocal critics of the New
Journalism.
Using the literary devices of scene setting, dialogue, and the expression of a
person’s inner thoughts was new and startling at the time. Today, it is expected. It’s in
the leads of the New York Times, for heaven’s sake. (2014: 146-7).
The loudest criticism of Sheehy in 1971 came from the Washington Post. But the history of
veracity scandals in journalism should be understood as a history of competing publications,
and when panic erupted again in 1981 over another supposed crisis, this time it was at the
Washington Post itself. Janet Cooke’s Pulitzer-Prize-winning article, “Jimmy’s World” told the
story of a heroin-addicted fourth-grader being prepared for a life of crime, but Jimmy turned
out to be a composite character and the Washington Post was soon forced to return the prize.17
“It was a dark day for American journalism, one that provoked extravagant metaphors and dire
prophecies,” Shelley Fisher Fishkin writes (1985: 211). She quotes some of James Michener’s
outrage for flavor; “‘When Janet Cooke turned in a fake story, she knocked down the central
pillar of her profession – integrity – and the reverberations went far,” he wrote (qtd in Fishkin
ibid.: 211). The veracity scandals continued, despite the many protestations of moral outrage.
In December of 1981, the New York Times Magazine ran a cover story by Christopher Jones, “In
the Land of the Khmer Rouge,” that was revealed to be not only pure invention but also a
plagiarism of parts of the 1930 novel by André Malroux The Royal Way (Fishkin ibid.: 213).18 The
New Yorker was the next big publication to fall, even while managing editor William Shawn
claimed it was “the most accurate publication not only in this country, but in the entire world”
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(qtd in Fishkin ibid.: 214). In 1984, a Washington Post reporter named Joanne Lipman exposed
more journalistic malfeasance when she revealed that Alastair Reid, who had been publishing
nonfiction in the New Yorker since 1951, had been creating composite characters, inventing
scenes and conversations, and rearranging events for over three decades. Reid had made the
mistake of admitting it while giving a seminar at Yale in which Lipman was in the audience.19
“The end of the world seems near now that our colleagues at the New Yorker, that
fountainhead of unhurried fact, turn out to tolerate, even to justify fictions masquerading as
facts,” ran an editorial in the New York Times (qtd in Fishkin ibid.: 214).
These scandals in journalism do not reveal the decline of the profession, as so many
editors lamented they did, but rather, the increasing strength of the objectivity norm in
American publishing and society.20 The fervor of the outrage indicates Schudson was correct in
his suggestion that norms like objectivity may be fundamentally moral. Just a few decades after
Joseph Mitchell’s composite profiles were revealed without “a single brow being raised,” Janet
Malcolm was forced to defend her techniques for editing quotations – quotations for which she
had reporting notes – both in the press, in trial, and ultimately before the Supreme Court
(Roberts Forde 2008: 42).21 During the intervening decades, two forms, narrative literary
journalism and informational reporting, had become separated by an insurmountable barrier.
Narrative literary journalism, the genre within which lives the so-called nonfiction novel,
developed into its contemporary form in the context of that growing divide. Though its
“modern emergence” can perhaps be traced to the 1890s, the genre is continuous and has no
clear origin, only more or less contemporary sources. Several of its key forms were
institutionalized by the New Yorker magazine in the 1920s and 30s, including the feature article
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and the profile. New Yorker writers like Joseph Mitchell and A.J. Liebling, looking back to turn of
the century innovators like Stephen Crane and Theodore Dreiser, pushed journalism toward
heights of literary artfulness. Reporters struggling to describe the troubled realities of World
War II, like Liebling and John Hersey, looked to the classics of war reporting, including to
Stephen Crane’s war writing. Lillian Ross and Truman Capote followed suit with stylistic
innovations. For three decades, the New Yorker served as a seedbed for developments in
experimental journalism, and it was not until the 1950s, when William Shawn became editor,
that the magazine assumed a more conservative approach to factual accuracy.22
Hersey employed complicated narrative strategies in order to convey the complex
phenomenological experience of battle and the trauma experienced by the survivors of the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima. He focused on their feelings and sensations, and used narrative
techniques to help “make reality seem real” and convey the sort of “human truth” of their
experience which “the great industries of mass communications” and informational journalism
could not express. Hersey even theorized a literary form at the limits of the novel and history.
He won a Pulitzer Prize for a book written in that style, A Bell for Adano; and he produced
arguably the most famous work of journalism of the century, Hiroshima, which is at the very
least inspired by a novel and filled with novelistic passages. In it, Hersey used “the wonderful,
flexible” form of the novel to achieve what simple reports of the events themselves could not,
“to illuminate human beings who are caught up in events.”
The success of Hiroshima opened up possibilities for other writers to attempt long works
using literary techniques to approach factual material. Lillian Ross wrote about very different
subjects, but Picture, her investigation of the conflict at the heart of America’s favorite art
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industry, created new narrative possibilities for literary journalists. Ross pioneered a style
founded upon canny observation and witty, candid dialogue, which would become part of the
standard lexicon of writing terminology: the so-called ‘fly-on-the-wall’ narrative perspective.
More importantly, she showed that an author might express her own unique and idiosyncratic
vision of the world even while writing about living people and real events. Ross revealed that
the force of a sophisticated, individual literary style could work as well in journalism as fiction.
She also theorized a new literary form, which she called the “novel in fact form,” though her
claims of not knowing “whether this sort of thing has ever been done before” seem dubious
(1998: 91).
Truman Capote admitted that Ross’s work inspired him to attempt writing journalism,
but he misrepresented Ross’s style in order to obfuscate the extent to which it had influenced
his own, which was also founded upon wry observation, candid dialogue and sparkling wit.
Capote’s literary journalism would eclipse Ross’s when In Cold Blood appeared in serial form in
the New Yorker in 1965 and Capote claimed to have invented his own new form, which he
called, similarly, the “nonfiction novel.” In the story of literary journalism, In Cold Blood remains
one of the high points for artfulness, and a low point for veridical credibility. Apart from
Capote’s impressive gifts as a novelist, his most salient contribution to the form can be evinced
from his earlier work, The Muses Are Heard: it is his disdain for what he calls “hard linear
straight-reporting discipline” – that is to say, for the objectivity norm, the pretense towards
empirical credibility that was increasingly important in American publishing. Capote was
especially daring in his willingness to “fiddle,” even while writing about real people and events.
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His brazen, ingenuous assertions of factual reliability after the meteoric success of In Cold Blood
reveal a potential for duplicity in literary journalists torn between two imperatives.
This was dangerous territory for later writers, who, if they dared take similar artistic
licenses and be exposed, faced editorial polemics, the shameful return of literary prizes and
career-ending scandals. Their mistakes were perhaps not simply a product of their failure to
properly assimilate to the growing moral standards of journalistic objectivity. The two
imperatives they faced, artfulness and reliability, reveal the fault lines undermining literary
journalism itself. The bipartite name of the genre – all the many different names for the genre –
reflect this inherent duality. Whatever this form of writing is called, it is the servant of two
masters; it is torn between two epistemologies, two distinct varieties of truth. Is literary
journalism even possible, one wonders? Certainly, it exists. But the ambiguous, recalcitrant
form reveals how difficult it is to determine what distinguishes different literary genres and
demands a more theoretical investigation of the boundaries between art and fact.
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Section Two
Blurred Mirrors:
The Nonfiction Novel and the Fake News
1. John Hersey’s Reversal: Fake News and Mimesis
In an eloquent tribute to John Hersey published in the Sewanee Review soon after
Hersey’s death in 1993, D.W. Faulkner recalls a fascinating scene that, he thought, illustrated
his mentor’s remarkable patience and character. The moment seems more remarkable when
we consider Hersey’s career: it is a rare sort of occasion when an artist finds himself faced with
some unforeseen consequences of his own work, to which he is now estranged, even opposed.
In the 1940s, Hersey was a war correspondent writing experimental literary journalism
that attempted to convey the strange phenomenology of combat and trauma, and also a new
genre that he decided to call the novel of contemporary history. His first novel, A Bell for Adano
(1944), won the Pulitzer Prize in 1945; his most famous putative journalism from the period,
Hiroshima (1946), has been called the most important journalism of the twentieth century.23
But in the early 1980s, when the night Faulkner remembers took place, Hersey was one of
Yale’s most popular professors. The appeal of his writing classes and his personal magnetism
had not waned during his two decades on campus, even “during the hegemony of Yale literary
theorists,” who, according to Faulkner, avoided considering “writers as writers,” as Hersey did
(1993: 636). Yale was hosting a colloquium presentation of writers of nonfiction. Hersey had
just published a withering review of several books of nonfiction in the Yale Review, including
Norman Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song. But Hersey’s review was just a pretext; “The Legend
on the License” (1980) was in fact a broad attack on the New Journalism of the 1960s and 70s.
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The colloquium that night happened to feature Mailer, along with Gay Talese, Joan Didion and
John Gregory Dunne, a representative cohort of the writers Hersey had just been criticizing.
He rose during the question and answer period and, Faulkner recalls, asked “a simple
question about the responsibility to fact of the nonfiction writer” (ibid.: 637). With its
underlying suggestion of ethics, of moral responsibility, this was perhaps not such a simple
question at all. In his review, Hersey had described Mailer as “so richly talented and so grossly
perverse,” and that night in New Haven, it was Mailer who answered him (1980: 13). Mailer
sidestepped the question by “offering a blustering homage to Hersey as ‘the granddaddy of the
effort we’re all engaged in,’” Faulkner recalls (1993: 637). The silence with which Hersey
accepted this mixed praise and blame, delivered in front of his faithful students, perhaps
reflected more than patience. He was being confronted by his own sort of “responsibility,”
responsibility for a literary form he had helped to innovate three and a half decades earlier.
Hersey had suggested something similar in “The Legend on the License.” In it he reacted
to Tom Wolfe naming his Life magazine piece, “Joe is Home Now” (1944), among the ancestry
of the New Journalism, writing, “The word ‘ancestry’ makes me feel a bit like the Peking Man,
and in laying claim to authority in this field I prefer to think of myself as nothing more remote
than a grandfather” (1980: 3). The joke could hardly hide the awkwardness of Hersey’s position.
As much as any other writer, Hersey had helped to develop the literary innovation that was
now going by the name of the New Journalism: the use of the forms of fiction when writing
about real events and people, often using evidence gleaned from reporting.24 It was not just
Hersey’s composite character of a soldier with war fatigue that connected him to the origins of
the movement; in fact, “Joe is Home Now” did not attempt to hide the crucial detail that there
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was no “Joe Souczak.” The article was prefaced with a note that read, “Like the best-selling
novel A Bell for Adano by the same author, this story is in fiction form but is based on fact. It is
distilled from the actual experiences of 43 different discharged soldiers” (1944: 68). Joseph
Mitchell’s composite characters in the New Yorker predated Hersey’s, they were also “in fiction
form but … based on fact,” and they would prove more influential than Hersey’s distillation.25
But Hersey had also developed a style of reporting that created novelistic scenes in order to
describe the phenomenological strangeness of war, published in book-length dispatches like
Into the Valley (1943) and his most famous work, Hiroshima (1946). And Hersey had theorized a
“novel of contemporary history,” that, much like the nonfiction novels of the New Journalists,
would use “the wonderful, flexible form” of the novel to tell what he called the “human truth”
that the great industries of mass communications could not express (1949: 80). Thirty-five years
after A Bell For Adano, his novel “in fiction form but based on fact,” won the Pulitzer prize,
Hersey was recasting himself as the defender of the ethical responsibilities of journalists.
Perhaps he saw his own early forays into experimental literary journalism as somehow different
from those of the younger generation, perhaps many years of life had changed his perspective.
He would, perhaps, have argued that there was a different legend on the license of his work –
that he followed the dictum with which he ends his review, “The writer of fiction must invent.
The journalist must not invent” (1980: 25). But this argument elides the substance of his
contribution to the development of literary journalism: his attention to the form of the novel.
As we will see in this section, invention is not always just an unscrupulous or creative handling
of details and facts. The use of certain literary forms can also equate to invention.
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Despite what Faulkner wrote, Hersey did not consider writers simply as writers. In 1949,
he had argued that it was the novelists, the writers of fiction, who had a special tool for
describing lived experience. He wrote that “these individuals have frequently been able to do
what the powerful organs of ‘fact’ could not do: make reality seem real” (1949: 5). It was a
formal advantage, inherent to the novel, achieved only by artists “all alone at their desks,
thinking back and trying to recapture impressions and feelings, dealing with the baffling,
shadowy components of human character,” he said (1949: 5). Hersey’s best war writing had
done just that; Hiroshima, for example, is not so much a record of the events of August 15 th,
1945, and their aftermath, as it is a record of the “baffling, shadowy components” in the
characters of six men and women who survived them. Hiroshima was a novel in disguise,
though it is rarely read as one. But by 1980, Hersey was inveighing against a “great fallacy” that
endangered exactly what he had once described as the essential strength of the novel form:
Our grasp on reality, our relationship with the real world, is what is at stake here. We
have to grope our way through that world from day to day. To make sense of our lives,
we need to know what is going on around us. This need plunges us at once into
complicated philosophical issues, having to do with trees falling in distant forests. Can
we always rely on what others tell us about what is “really” going on? A suspicion that
we cannot has led to the great fallacy, as I see it, of the New Journalism, and indirectly
to the blurring in recent years of fiction and nonfiction.
That fallacy can be crudely stated as follows: Since perfect objectivity in
reporting what the eyes have seen and the ears have heard is impossible, there is no
choice but to go all the way over to absolute subjectivity. The trouble with this is that it
soon makes the reporter the center of interest rather than the real world he is supposed
to be picturing or interpreting. A filter of temperament discolors the visible universe.
The report becomes a performance. What is, or may be, going on in “reality” recedes
into a backdrop for the actor-writer; it dissolves out of focus and becomes, in the end,
fuzzy, vague, unrecognizable, and false. (1980: 23)
The essential task for Hersey, by 1980, was no longer making “reality seem real,” but rather,
providing a measure of epistemological certainty about contemporary events so that readers
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might better “grasp” or “make sense” of the world around them. Thus runs an ethical argument
about the social value of journalism, an argument that resounds with significance in our day.
Our inability to grasp a shared “reality” like human effects on climate change may, for example,
threaten the continued survival of human civilization on Earth.26
Hersey lays the blame for this “grave social harm” directly at the feet of “works like
Capote’s and Wolfe’s and Mailer’s,” and perhaps by extension his own (1980: 24). If journalism
is our sole mechanism for verifying and communicating shared “facts,” unscrupulous writers
should not undermine it in the name of art, lest we find ourselves living in an “out of focus …
fuzzy, vague” world, in which our most sincere convictions can be easily subverted by cynical
cries of ‘fake news.’27 The New Journalists’ art, Hersey suggests, is a crime against the polis:
These blurrings lead to, or at the very least soften the way for, or confirm the
reasonableness of, public lying … Habitual acceptance of little fibs leads to the
swallowing whole of world-shaking lies … We write that off; it’s just a formula; we’re
used to all that stuff. But have we also gotten used to writing off big lies? Did we write
off – I am afraid the vast majority of Americans did write off – being told in official
announcements that bombs were being dropped on North Vietnam, when in fact they
were being dropped on Cambodia?
It would be preposterous, of course, to hold Mailer’s and Wolfe’s recent
inventions responsible for lies told a decade ago. But the point is that the two
phenomena – the blurring of fiction and journalism, as Mailer and Wolfe and many
others have practiced it (for quite a bit more than a decade), and public lying, as
Kissinger and Nixon and many others have practiced it (and some still do) – the two
have had something like a symbiotic relationship with each other. Each has nourished
and needed the other. Each in its way has contributed to the befogging of the public
vision, to subtle failures of discrimination, and to the collapse of important sorts of
trust. (1980: 25)
Hersey’s concerns about the dangers of unscrupulous storytelling recall ancient debates about
the role of art in society; one suspects that, like Socrates, Hersey might banish the poets from
his Republic. And yet, since 1980, public lying seems only to have garnered more practitioners.
Though it is certainly fantasy to believe there was ever some halcyon past when American
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leaders did not dare fudge a fact,28 Hersey’s fears about the “befogging” of the public vision and
the resulting “subtle failures of discrimination” and “collapse” of political trust seem to describe
the roots of a current crisis. Our politics is riven by competing discourses that don’t rely on facts
so much as feelings, discourses that don’t foster certainty so much as sentiment.29
We might add any number of fresh examples of public lying to Hersey’s accusation, and
now we have the pithy attack line, “fake news,” to sum up this crisis of public confidence. That
the phrase has proven such an effective weapon for politicians and partisans around the world
attacking adversarial journalists may reveal the scope of the current “collapse” of trust.30
Journalism in crisis has been the subject of a great deal of handwringing and debate, especially
in regards to corporate control of media outlets and their resulting credibility problems.31
Television journalism, Phyllis Frus was writing as early as 1994, “blurs the line between
entertainment (fiction) and news programming (nonfiction or fact)” (1994: 3).32 The editors of
N+1 recently wrote about “The New Reading Environment” created by internet publishing and
by Twitter, lamenting a now ubiquitous “internet house style” that usually incorporates bulletpoints (skip ahead two paragraphs). If Frus described the conflation of entertainment with
information, N+1 described the confusion of the informational with the editorial. In the age of
internet writing, “everything is an op-ed,” they said (2018).
Hersey lays the blame for official public lying on unscrupulous literary journalists, then
hesitates, unsure of himself, hence his triple equivocation that the books he is attacking “lead
to, or at the very least soften the way for, or confirm the reasonableness of [such public lying].”
It is difficult to believe without any evidence at all that the literary experiments of writers like
Mailer, Capote and Wolfe helped pave the way for lies told by presidential administrations. But
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Hersey was not alone in lamenting what he saw as the impending demise of objective
journalism. Composite characters had been a part of mainstream journalistic practice for
decades, and journalists before the 1960s were often freer with details than we now expect
journalists to be. Journalism was not in crisis, but the yardsticks with which the truth was
measured were moving. Hersey’s argument perhaps captured best the philosophy of the new
gatekeepers of objectivity – and, by forgetting his own history, a certain penchant for hypocrisy.
Hersey’s vision of the dangers of unscrupulous journalism relies on the most uncertain of
critical territory: “our grasp on reality” and how reality is represented in literature. But realism,
mimesis, verisimilitude – these are fraught subjects for critics. When Hersey calls unscrupulous
works of literary journalism “blurrings,” he recalls questions essential to the study of art since
the dialogues of Plato, questions about the sort of truth to be found in representation and the
relationship between mimetic art and the world of experience.
Let me try to summarize the problem in terms as succinct as those he used when giving
his prescription for correcting the confusion of fiction with fact. Hersey, an excellent writer,
went right to the heart of the question, “It is very simple. To redraw the line we need merely
think clearly about the legends on the licenses. All we need do is insist upon two rules: The
writer of fiction must invent. The journalist must not invent,” he wrote (1980: 25). Yet the
nature of “the line” in question requires further explication. Likewise, we must also consider
the relationship between the reader, writer and subject – that is, in Hersey’s metaphorical
terms, the exact nature of the license and the rule. The problem can be outlined as follows:
•

Journalism is responsible for confirming and communicating shared facts or
realities, essential for society’s well-being.
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•
•
•

A text that confuses journalism with fiction may harm journalism’s social
effectiveness and reduce that work’s value as non-art; but that confusion may,
on the contrary, increase its effect as a work of art.
The sort of truth found in a work of art is not equivalent to the sort of truth
found in a work of non-art.
The distinction between art and non-art depends on the relationship between
the artist (writer, journalist), the text, and the audience.

To this outline, I will merely add that my intention is not at all to go about exposing works that
seem to me to be fiction posing as journalism, or dividing works of art from works of non-art – a
strange term, I admit. Saying that pieces of writing might fall into one or the other of these two
categories – art or non-art – suggests that there is a set of objects out there in the world that
are somehow fundamentally different from all the other objects in the world. But I have not in
Arthur C. Danto’s words “supposed apriori that the set of artworks constitutes a kind of species,
like zebras, a logically homogenous set of objects the principle of whose homogeneity must be
found”; like Danto, I will entertain the possibility that works of art constitute “a different sort of
set altogether … a logically open set of things that share no common feature in order to be
members of the set” (not my emphasis 1981: 58). I don’t equate fiction with art and journalism
with non-art; I adopt the terms art and non-art precisely to avoid critical confusion arising from
imprecise descriptions of the parts of the binary. In fact, I will argue later that the very same
work may be art or non-art depending on the “aesthetic stance” the audience strikes toward it
(Danto 1980: 99). That is to say, the transfiguration takes place in the eyes of the beholder.
The books considered in this section have one element in common. They were not
chosen as outstanding examples of literary journalism or the New Journalism. Many admirable
works of book-length novelistic nonfiction were written during the same period, some of them
formally inventive, some the result of heroic labors of reporting, some true testaments to
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journalistic accuracy. The works considered here are more dubious. They bring the question of
genre into focus not simply because they borrow the techniques or forms of fiction, but
because they are not to be trusted. They hide acts of illicit invention. Their authors were
unscrupulous, deceiving their subjects, falsifying, inventing evidence and testimony, presenting
their work to the public in bad faith. In short, from the moralists’ perspective, they are good
examples of public lying. Like a bent stick in water, they don’t reflect reality back to us clearly.
But if we look into these cloudy mirrors, we may perhaps discern something about the truth.
From one perspective, they might be called works of fiction masquerading as fact, or even, if I
may say it, fake news. Yet we can only call them “blurrings” if we take representations to be
imitations of reality whose verisimilitude should be judged as more or less accurate to the
model in the sense that Socrates intends it in Book X of Plato’s Republic.
Hersey reveals more than he intends in his 1980 review: both the complexity of
journalism’s connection to the truth, and also, the inadequacy of his philosophy to explain it.
Hersey describes how one of the subjects of Tom Wolfe’s The Right Stuff, senator and former
astronaut John Glenn, found Wolfe’s portrait of him “mostly pretty accurate,” even though
Hersey himself thinks Wolfe has portrayed Glenn as “an insufferable prig, a prude, a killjoy”
(1980: 8). Glenn, Hersey says, has been fooled by “the hypnotic ambiguity of Wolfe’s prose”
(ibid.: 8). Hersey does not seem to consider the implications for his “two rules” of the relation
between journalist and subject, but he does suggest deceit is involved:
One cannot help wondering whether even these interested parties, in their numbed
acceptance of the premise that there is no difference between fiction and nonfiction,
between real life and a skillfully drawn mirror image of a dream of it, haven’t been to
some extent taken in. (ibid.: 8)
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Personal and especially financial motivations lurk behind the theorizing of the New Journalists,
Hersey suggests, an accusation he repeats later in the same essay when he turns to Mailer. But
his description of art as “a skillfully drawn mirror image of a dream” recalls the Socratic notion
of mimesis – though Hersey adds a confusing element. Art is not just a mirror held up to nature,
but one held up to a dream. In Book X of Plato’s Republic, Socrates considers why poets should
be excluded from his ideal city. He argues that all art is an imitation and therefore subordinate,
and he describes the artist with a clever, ironic metaphor, as a man whose creative powers
seem even to rival those of god himself:
everything that grows from the earth, he makes; every living creature he fashions, including
even himself. And on top of all that he does earth, heaven, gods, the things in the heavens,
things in Hades under the earth - he fashions it all. (2012: 341)
How does this seemingly omnipotent demiurge manage it? Easy, Socrates says, “The quickest
way is probably for you to carry a mirror around with you everywhere – in a flash you’ll make
the sun and all the things in the heavens, you’ll make the earth, you’ll make yourself” (ibid.:
341). This is the origin of the imitation theory of art, one of the recurring conceits of aesthetics
since Plato’s time. But it is sometimes forgotten that this definition of art was meant as an
attack. Socrates, after all, was no neutral in the ancient feud between philosophers and artists.
The idea that art is an imitation of reality comes in fact from the theory of forms, often
remembered in the context of Plato’s famous allegory of the cave. Socrates explains the theory
in different terms in Book X, using a more banal example: a still-life painting of a sofa:
‘These couches of ours, then - there turn out to be three of them, don’t there, in a way?
First, there’s the one that’s there in nature, which I imagine we’ll say was fashioned by a
god - who else?’
‘Nobody.’
‘Then there’s the one fashioned by the carpenter.’
‘Yes,’ he said.
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‘And then the one fashioned by the painter. Right?’
‘Let’s take it to be so.’
‘So we have painter, couch-manufacturer, god: three makers overseeing three different
kinds of couches.’ (2012: 342)
Plato’s three couches might be named the (1) ideal, (2) actual, and (3) mimetic. The first couch,
the one supposedly found “in nature,” in fact can nowhere be seen or experienced, because it
is a predicate to experience, like the idea of couch. This truly true couch can only be realized in
the realm of philosophy, it can only be “grasped by intellect and not seen” (Plato ibid.: 233).
When carpenters construct actual couches, they merely refer back to the ideal couch. But their
products must nevertheless be serviceable, so they have a kind of “specialist knowledge” that
still-life painters, who merely imitate what couches look like, don’t have (Plato ibid.: 344).
Mimetic artists are thus “twice removed from the real thing” (Plato ibid.: 344). They may hold a
mirror up to nature, but it produces a weak reflection. “The reason, it seems, why [mimetic art]
can fashion everything is because it gets only a small hold on anything, and an illusory one at
that,” Socrates says (ibid.: 344). Thus, for Plato, an artist is “a kind of sorcerer” whose illusory
copy of the world, when verisimilar, can “fool children and people with no sense into thinking it
was a real one, if he showed it to them from suitably far away” (ibid.: 344). Socrates cannot
admit such dangerous pleasures into his ideal city, no matter how enchanting he finds poetry.
He must protect the education of the Guardians, from whose ranks the philosopher-kings of the
Republic will arise. “A young person is not capable of telling the difference between what is
allegory and what is not,” he claims (ibid.:71). Legends, myths, epic poems – and perhaps,
though it is a wild anachronism, all the sort of writing we call fiction today – even if written with
“allegorical intent,” must all be literally false (ibid.:71).
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No artist, I suspect, would accept that making art is quite so effortless as holding a
mirror up to nature. This version of the imitation theory of art conflates verisimilitude with
illusion and reduces the work to its content, Danto points out (1980: 151). It will not serve our
purposes, even if the writers of these nonfiction novels claim merely to relate the facts. Neither
the journalist nor the novelist holds a mirror up to nature. Redrawing the line between
literature and journalism, novels and history, art and life, requires taking a closer look into the
blurry lenses of some problematic books, books which are not mirrors but something different
altogether, through which we may perhaps discern the truth about the true and fake news.
2. The Nonfiction Novel and the Debates on Fictionality
A popular account of the historical origins of the novel in the eighteenth century
provided Tom Wolfe with a mischievous riposte to critics like Dwight MacDonald, who saw
literary journalism and the nonfiction novel as a sort of debased, “pseudo-cultural” commodity
that did not quite count as art. Wolfe described the New Journalism of the 1960s as “an
absolute rerun of the early days of the realistic novel in England,” a rerun that was even facing
similar criticism -- “in each case, the new form is seen as ‘superficial,’ ‘ephemeral,’ ‘mere
entertainment,’ ‘morally irresponsible,’” he wrote (1973: 37). He made the comparison at
length in the introduction to a 1973 anthology,33 describing New Journalists not as opportunists
practicing a sort of literary chicanery, but aspiring literary men and women surprised to find
novelists had given up formal verisimilitude and social commentary, ceding them the field:
Most serious, ambitious and, presumably, talented novelists had abandoned the richest
terrain of the novel: namely, society, the social tableau, manners and morals, the whole
business of “the way we live now,” in Trollope’s phrase … The Sixties was one of the
most extraordinary decades in American history in terms of manners and morals.
Manners and morals were the history of the Sixties. (my ellipsis 1973: 29).
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Wolfe’s journalists had discovered more than just a wealth of novelistic material, he claimed.
They were “learning the techniques of realism,” what he called “the main circuit” (Ibid.: 34).
Wolfe was careful to note that there was nothing very new in the New Journalism, that
reportage had always been an important element of fiction,34 and that early novels like Defoe’s
Robinson Crusoe and A Journal of the Plague Year were first published as factual accounts.
Wolfe claimed that the “really stylish reporting” of the 1960s was merely getting back to what
modernist and post-modernist novelists had abandoned: realism (1973:11). Experimental
journalism and the nonfiction novel recalled the novel’s origins in the invention of new modes
of representation and referentiality – what Ian Watt called “formal realism” (Watt 1957: 32).
A tradition of literary criticism investigating the historical origins of the English novel
begins with Watt’s The Rise of the Novel in 1957, the same year Wolfe earned his Ph.D. from
Yale. Like Wolfe, Watt considered the essential aspect of the novel genre its “formal realism,”
by which he meant “the narrative embodiment” in certain “procedures” of “the premise, or
primary convention, that the novel is a full and authentic report of human experience” (ibid.:
32). Among these procedures, he noted the innovation of giving characters ordinary proper
names, the inclusion of particulars like the times and places of actions, and “a more largely
referential use of language” (ibid.: 32). He argued that this change followed upon the rise of a
middle-class audience of readers. Subsequent critics have revised and debated his account.
Lennard Davis argued that the novel developed from a tradition of sixteenth-century ballads,
which he calls the “news/novels discourse” (1983: 49). Davis shows that, in this pre-novel
discourse, “the word newes was applied freely to writings which described either true or
fictional events” (ibid.: 50). His study also reveals how murky and indeterminable the origins of
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literary genres may be. “The problem,” he writes, “is that though these beginnings are within
archeological grasp, they are not clear and luminous; rather they are shrouded in minor details,
obscure technological innovations, and problematic chains of causality” (ibid.: 2). Barbara Foley
traces a form she calls the documentary novel from its origins in Davis’s ballads through the
early novels of the eighteenth century, “the major tradition of realism” in the nineteenth, and
the modernist experiments of the twentieth (1986: 26). She locates this documentary form “at
the border of factual discourse and fictive discourse,” arguing that it reveals how fiction relies
on the factual in order to distinguish itself (1986: 25). “Fiction,” Foley proposes, “is intrinsically
part of a binary opposition” (1986: 28). Michael McKeon’s The Origins of the English Novel
(1987) revises Watt’s study by describing not a binary opposition but a dialectical process:
What is required is a theory not just of the rise of the novel but of how categories,
whether “literary” or “social,” exist in history: how they first coalesce by being
understood in terms of – as transformations of – other forms that have thus far been
taken to define the field of possibility (1987: 4).
Fiction did not simply come into existence by distinguishing itself from fact, he says. The novel
provided “a conceptual framework” for mediating the ethical and epistemological dilemmas of
the age, in a process in which literary genre both responded to changing social needs and also
became the means for meeting them (ibid.: 20). The novel form therefore still bears the marks
of the “questions of truth” it was invented to resolve, he argues (ibid.: 88).
The historicist debate over the origins of the English novel has turned in recent years
toward the question of fictionality, taken as a category overlapping with but not equivalent to
fictional literature or the novel. Catherine Gallagher sees fictionality as a category of nonfactual assertion not intended to deceive. Her essay, “The Rise of Fictionality” (2006), argues
that a “cultural imperative” in eighteenth-century England made what had always been a
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discursive possibility into “a sustained and durable novelistic practice” (2006: 345). Gallagher
also makes an argument about why the concept of fictionality has so easily escaped the
attention of critics. “The novel reader opens what she knows is a fiction because it is a fiction
and soon finds that enabling knowledge to be the subtlest of the experience’s elements. Just as
it declares itself, it becomes that which goes without saying,” Gallagher writes (2006: 349). Her
description of the experience of reading fiction, though less remarked upon than other aspects
of the essay, will prove crucial here. “Knowingly reading a novel,” Gallagher writes, “does not
involve the continuous activity of negating its objective correspondence to reality,” because:
willingly entering the language game of fiction, as some theorists35 would now say,
consequently enables a psychological state of ontological indifference, a temporary
disregard for the fictional conditions of the pleasurable sensation. (Ibid.: 349)
Gallagher develops her idea of the reader’s “voluntary framework of disbelief” by returning to
Coleridge’s famous formulation of the suspension of disbelief (2006: 349). Reading fiction,
according to this description, might be called an aesthetic interpretive stance oriented toward
pleasure, to be contrasted with what I will call the skeptical stance, more suited to nonfiction.
Skeptical readers are constantly measuring a text’s “objective correspondence to reality.” But
one problem with the idea of the suspension of disbelief is that it suggests a formal threshold
rather than an interpretive choice. To appreciate fiction, we need the “enabling knowledge” of
how we should read fiction. But it is certainly possible and in some cases it may be appropriate
to remain skeptical, to abstain from the “language game of fiction” and insist on fact-checking.
At the heart of Gallagher’s essay is an argument about literary characters. Readers,
Gallagher says, do not confuse fictional characters with embodied, extratextual persons, like
Don Quixote does. We simply become, “at moments of keenest involvement, too interested to
95

care about the [ontological] status of the experienced beings” (Ibid.: 349). This way of reading
developed alongside a new literary mode of nonreferentiality, Gallagher argues, in which
“proper names do not take specific individuals as their referents, and hence none of the specific
assertions made about them can be verified or falsified” (Ibid.:341). A statement about Pamela
Andrews was neither true, as she was a fictional creation, nor intended to deceive, as
Richardson’s novel was not meant to convince readers Pamela did exist. Literary characters
were a category of “fictional nobodies,” neither allegorical, mythical nor exemplary (Ibid.: 353).
By Gallagher’s account, this change in reading and writing practices occurred either between
Delarivier Manley’s New Atalantis (1709) and Charlotte Lennox’s The Life of Harriot Stuart,
written by Herself (1751) (Gallagher 1994); or, in another version of her argument, between
Defoe’s intentionally deceitful presentation of Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Henry Fielding’s
narrator in Joseph Andrews (1742) (Gallagher 2006). These new fictional nobodies, Gallagher
points out, arose alongside the invention of modern economic forms of credit and were lent
“ironic credulity” by readers also learning to speculate, as “such flexible mental states were the
sine qua non of modern subjectivity” (2006: 346). Their nonreferentiality “could be seen as a
greater referentiality,” because the lack of “an extratextual, embodied” referent meant readers
could see themselves or see general types in them, making novels “generally true even though
all of [their] particulars are imaginary” (Ibid.:342). Readers were therefore drawn to fictional
characters exactly because they were ontologically different, imaginary, literal nobodies.
Nicholas Paige points out some problems in Gallagher’s account in Before Fiction (2011),
while putting forward his own broad historical description of fictionality. Paige describes three
relationships of the novel with empirical reality, which he calls regimes: Aristotelian,
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pseudofactual, and fictional. This division helps him point out some chronological quirks in the
previous histories, like the “longevity of the pseudofactual posture,” persisting long after
fictional characters had supposedly become an accepted discursive mode of nonreference; and
the impossibility of deciding upon the criteria that divide the “ironic pseudofactual stances”
from later, fully-fictional ones (2011: 22). He points out how anglophone histories of fictionality
struggle to account for the rise of epistolary novels in France around 1670 (Paige 2011: 29).
They are likewise troubled by the shadow of Cervantes in Spain (Davis 1983: 11), and by postcolonial critics reading the rise of the novel from the context of non-European traditions
(Aravamudan 2012: 25). Paige’s regimes are merely the “dominant practices” of their times, not
necessarily reflecting any new social or cultural developments, and so not needing to develop
historically, avoiding the problem in Davis and Foley’s versions he calls “gradualism” (2011: 21).
In a pair of more recent articles, Paige argues against interpretations that would discover the
symptoms of sweeping cultural, social and mental transformations in the rise of literary forms,
proposing that we instead view literary forms as artifacts, invented much like “the telephone or
the bicycle,” neither historically necessary nor particularly revealing about the societies that
invented and practiced them (2018: 45). His quantitative approach likewise seeks to avoid some
classic methodological problems, like the relatively few examples drawn mostly from the canon
that theorists usually select specifically because they confirm an already held position; or
reading canonical examples as the “epiphenomena” of vast, unmeasurable cultural changes
(2017: 505). According to the data drawn from Paige’s evidence-oriented historical study, it
seems we may not know very much at all about the history of fictionality.
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In a recent issue of Poetics Today devoted to fictionality, Monika Fludernik also
confronts Gallagher’s essay, while introducing a wealth of European scholarship that cannot be
considered in detail here.36 Fludernik begins by outlining what she takes to be the opposed
camps in the fictionality debate: historicists like Gallagher are not to be confused with
narratologists, nor with semantic and possible-worlds-theory philosophers, nor with what
Fludernik calls “performative nonliterary approaches” (2018: 71). But these distinctions are not
entirely reliable, as Gallagher responds to semantic and possible-worlds-theory philosophical
approaches like those of Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (1981); Lubomir Dolozel’s
“Mimesis and Possible Worlds” (Poetics Today 9, no.1: 475-496, 1988) and Heterocosmica:
Fiction and Possible Worlds (1998); Thomas Pavel’s Fictional Worlds (1986); and Ruth Ronen’s
Possible Worlds in Literary Theory (1994). Gallagher also responds to illocutionary, linguistic and
narratological approaches like those of John R. Searle’s Expression and Meaning: Studies in the
Theory of Speech Acts (1979), Ann Banfield’s Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and
Representation in the Language of Fiction (1982), and Dorrit Cohn’s “Signposts of Fictionality: A
Narratological Perspective” (Poetics Today 11, no. 4: 775-804, Winter, 1990). Fludernik herself
even admits “the performative approach somewhat overlaps with possible worlds theory”
(2018: 71). Her central criticism of Gallagher is the problem of occasional examples of
fictionality arising before the advent of the fictional nobodies of the 1740s, the persistence of
pseudofactual tropes after that, and the incongruence of the various competing chronologies –
though Gallagher was careful to explain why none of these facts contradict her vision of the rise
of a “cultural imperative” connected to the creation of a “novelistic practice.” Fludernik’s 2018
account of fictionality is less specific than Gallagher’s and ends up echoing what it attempted to
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critique. Thus for Fludernik fictionality “largely overlaps with the practice of the arts” without
being contingent upon the novel and “to some extent lies in the eyes of the beholder” (Ibid.:
78). Like Gallagher, Fludernik emphasizes “the foregrounding of the protagonists of fictional
worlds,” even while arguing that, “for such creations to be taken as fictions (to be considered
fictional), there needs to be distancing in their reception, that is, an aesthetic distance,”
recalling Gallagher’s description of the reader’s indifference about a character’s ontological
fictionality (Ibid.: 86). Fludernik finally correlates fictionality with literacy, suggesting her
position is closer to the “sociological approach” of the historicists than she would lead us to
believe, as does the purview of her 1993 investigation into the nature and history of free
indirect discourse, The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: Linguistic
Representations of Speech and Consciousness.
Fludernik is certainly correct in arguing for the relevance of several somewhat parallel
traditions of criticism on fictionality, though scholars of narratology and fictional rhetoric have
never been entirely separated from historicists. Wayne Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961)
had a wide impact across literary studies, Dorrit Cohn attempted to bridge the traditions in
1990 and in 1999 with The Distinction of Fiction, and Ann Banfield’s Unspeakable Sentences
(1982) was widely read. Paul Dawson sees the origins of the field of narratological studies of
fictionality in debates in the 1970s and 80s “between semantics and pragmatics” approaches to
delimiting fictional discourse (2015:75). These debates, Dawson argues, borrowed the
distinction between semantics and pragmatics (somewhat incorrectly) from traditions of
philosophy of language and modal logic dating to Gottlob Frege’s “On Sense and Reference”
(1891). The semantic or “illocutionary” position was put forward most famously by John Searle,
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who argued that “the identifying criterion for whether or not a text is a work of fiction must of
necessity lie in the illocutionary intentions of the author” (1975: 325). In 1980, Martinez-Bonati
criticized Searle’s assertion that fictional sentences were “pretended assertions” (1980: 429),
while also proposing that “fictitious acts of speech … have, in addition to the common
properties of ordinary sentences, fantastic properties” (Ibid.: 427). In 1979, Gottfried Gabriel
wrote that “to decide whether a referring expression is used correctly in an utterance, we must
know its pragmatic context,” pointing toward a more situational understanding of the
intentions of the author in determining fictionality (1979: 246).37
Richard Walsh’s The Rhetoric of Fictionality (2007) denied the practicality of both
speech-act-theory and possible-worlds-theory approaches. Walsh argued a text’s fictionality
must be understood in terms of its context, relocating fictionality in the “rhetorical nature” of
the text (2007: 7). Walsh framed his call for a “rhetorical” study of fictionality in the context of
Paul Ricoeur’s revision of Auerbach and Lukács’s arguments about mimesis, which conceived of
mimesis “as a process” (Walsh 2003:118). Walsh described fictionality similarly, “Fiction is
distinguished from nonfiction, I suggest, as the exercise of our narrative understanding” (my
emphasis ibid.: 119). More recently, Walsh co-authored an article in a 2015 issue of Narrative
along with James Phelan and Henrik Skov Nielsen, outlining their rhetorical understanding of
fictionality, tendentiously titling the piece, “Ten Theses about Fictionality” (Nielson et al. 2015).
Their argument emphasized “the intentional nature of communication” and suggested that
fictionality should be understood in regards to the effect an author or speaker seeks to have on
an audience (2015: 63). Paul Dawson put forward a counter-argument in the same issue, also
with a tendentious title, “Ten Theses against Fictionality” (Dawson 2015). Dawson argued that
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fictionality studies emerged in response to “the narrative turn” in literary theory, a turn away
from deconstructionist approaches that would reduce literature to its textual aspect alone. But
this new discipline of narratology, Dawson argued, conflates fictionality with narrativity
whenever it is convenient and thus ends up repeating the logic of post-structuralism (Ibid.: 89).
“While the concept of fictionality once promised to rescue fiction from the narrative turn”
Dawson writes, “it has since turned into another version of the narrative turn by seeking to
identify fictionality in all narratives, and beyond” (ibid.: 93).
In his introduction to the 2018 issue of Poetics Today in which Fludernik, Paige and
James Phelan all revisit Gallagher’s 2006 essay on fictionality, Dawson reconceives of fictionality
studies as a site for “theoretical and methodological exchanges” and conversation between the
disciplines of narratology and historicist novel studies (2018: 1). The debates within narratology
have since continued. In a recent article, Greger Andersson and Tommy Sandberg outline what
they conceive of as a “difference approach,” (i.e. the argument that fictional narratives should
not be “understood in terms of non-fictional narratives”) and the reasons why the dominant
“sameness approach” of narratology has not yet registered or responded to this radical critique
(2018: 241). Meanwhile, on the historicist side, Michael McKeon has recently attacked the
discipline of narratology for analyzing “the universal nature of the mode” of narrative “apart
from the evidence provided by its generic instances” in their full historical context (2017: 40).
His critique extends from the structuralist narratologies put forward by Genette and others to
the “post-classical narratology” current in the field, including that of Skov Nielsen and other
proponents of so-called ‘unnatural narratology.’ Connecting these disparate strands of
scholarship seems likely to remain a difficult task.
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James Phelan, writing in the same issue of Poetics Today as Fludernik and Paige,
attempts to reposition Gallagher’s 2006 thesis in the context of rhetorical studies of narrative,
arguing that historicist and rhetorical “approaches sometimes converge, sometimes
complement each other, and sometimes diverge” (2018: 114). Phelan’s revision of what
Gallagher calls readerly ontological indifference is particularly important for my argument.
Phelan compares Gallagher’s formulation of suspended-disbelief with one first put forward by
Peter J. Rabinowitz in “Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences” (Critical Inquiry 4, no. 1:
121-41, 1977) suggesting a dual position or “double consciousness” in reading audiences
(Phelan 2018: 116).38 Disbelief is never quite suspended, as Phelan and Rabinowitz have it.
Rather, the novel reader is divided between two perspectives that they call “narrative and
authorial audiences” (ibid.:121). The narrative audience engages with fiction from “the position
of the on-scene observer of the story world,” “reading from an interested and involved rather
than a detached position,” as if wearing an “invisibility cloak” (Ibid.:122). The authorial
audience, on the other hand, “remains aware that the characters, events and story world are
invented by someone for some purposes” (emphasis not mine, ibid.: 123).39 Rabinowitz used his
theory to redefine verisimilitude, writing that “at the extreme end of realism, narrative and
authorial audiences are so close as to be almost indistinguishable,” while less realistic novels
“contradict the very beliefs and experiences of the authorial audience,” moving the two
audiences further apart (1977: 131). Rather than seeing verisimilitude as a text’s ability to
represent empirical reality, Rabinowitz and Phelan see it as a function of the compromise
between two opposed types of readerly expectation.
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Phelan connects this version of realism to Gallagher’s description of fictionality by
considering the question of literary character. He schematizes three constituent components:
literary characters are composed of “mimetic,” “thematic” and “synthetic” elements, he says
(2018: 126). For the narrative audience, reading from under an invisibility cloak, characters
have “a strong mimetic component” (Ibid.:127). They seem to have an existence beyond mere
words on a page. But this mimetic sense is subsumed “within what Rader calls the ‘subsidiary
awareness’ that characters are … invented to play some role in the execution of some
underlying authorial purpose. In this way, the mimetic component coexists with the synthetic
component” (my ellipsis ibid.: 127). Thus, the authorial audience will recognize that characters
are mere textual constructions (synthetic), created to serve an author’s specific (thematic)
ends, while the narrative audience is free to “regard novelistic characters as somebodies whom
they can come to care about” (Ibid.: 128). Phelan claims that this resolves one paradoxical
feature Gallagher pointed out about literary characters, that “they are at once utterly finished
and also necessarily incomplete”:
The proper name “Anna Karenina” is made up a finite set of sentences no matter how
much more insightful, mature or knowledgeable our reading becomes, no matter how
much more skillfully we analyze that text or how much more ruthlessly we deconstruct
it. The text may be hermeneutically inexhaustible and labile; it may be indeterminate
and inconstant, but this only means that a variety of “Anna”s can be produced from it,
none of whom will have a more fully described childhood. (Gallagher 2006: 358)40
Anna is incomplete, according to Phelan, because she was constructed to serve the thematic
purposes of her author and to do no more than that. The apparent paradox of her perfectly
finished incompletion is merely an effect of the two audiences’ mixed perspectives, a sort of
blurred vision caused by seeing her both “mimetically” and “synthetically” at once. Thus,
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Rabinowitz’s insight into the connection between audience and mimesis can be extended to
help explain the ambiguous fictionality of our most beloved textual figments.41
Does the reader shuttle back and forth between these opposed interpretive positions,
first donning her invisibility cloak and letting herself be convinced of a character’s existence,
before seeing the invisible author’s thematic intentions and remembering that Anna is merely
“a finite set of sentences?” How is our awareness of fictionality subsumed within an awareness
of authorial intent? How does the double consciousness of reading actually work? Gallagher
describes fictionality as an “enabling knowledge” that allows the reader to relax or even to
abjure “the constant maintenance of active skepticism,” like a sort of fundamental premise that
must first be accepted. She reminds us of Coleridge’s comparison of reading with dreaming.
“Our state while we are dreaming differs from that in which we are in the perusal of a deeply
interesting novel in the degree rather than in the kind,” Coleridge wrote (qtd in Gallagher 2006:
348). Described thus, reading fiction seems to be a threshold that one voluntarily crosses, but
beyond which one loses the willpower to exercise skepticism – though Gallagher envisions a
more flexible sort of experience when she notes it is only “at moments of keenest involvement”
that the reader becomes “too interested to care” a character is merely fictional (ibid.: 349).
States of double consciousness like what Phelan and Rabinowitz describe are more
typical of waking life than the sort of overwhelming loss of willpower that Coleridge describes.
We experience double consciousness whenever we engage in imaginative play, for example.
Children playing at cops and robbers do not believe they are literally performing dangerous
applications or transgressions of the law. They never forget, at a certain level, that they are
playing a game. This sort of analogy is the foundation for those performative non-literary
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approaches that Fludernik mentioned, which proponents have called the “make-believe” theory
of artistic reception (Walton 1990).42 Philosophers of literature like Noël Carroll have
investigated these arguments at length (Carroll 1990: 60). Dreaming turns out to be a bad
analogy for reading fiction, because most dreams cannot accommodate states of double
consciousness like imaginative play or like reading can. A reader engrossed in a novel knows she
is reading, but a dreamer does not know she is dreaming. This lack of subsidiary awareness is
exactly what makes dreams so exhilarating or frightening. Sometimes, in a so-called lucid state,
we recognize we are in a dream, but this is almost always a threshold experience and cannot be
maintained. Usually, the moment we recognize we are dreaming is when we begin to wake up.
The account of readerly reception I will lay out in the rest of this section does not
necessarily contradict arguments emphasizing the opposite side of the communications-model
approach, for example Simona Zetterberg Gjerlevsen’s recent essay defining fictionality as
“intentionally signaled invention in communication” (2016: 176). Similar perspectives in
philosophy of literature follow upon Paul Grice’s Studies in the Way of Words (1989), which
argues that meaning in literature can be judged, as Noël Carroll summarizes Grice’s argument,
according to “an intention/audience-response model of communication” (Carroll 2016: 364).43
To argue that the responsibility for distinguishing fact from fiction must rest with the reader is
not to contradict the assertions of rhetorical narratologists, Gricean philosophers and others
who argue fictionality begins with an intentional signal from an author – only that it ends there.
The point may seem excessively obvious to some, but it has an advantage in confronting texts
which are presented with ambiguous or misleading authorial signals. For example, Capote’s
famous nonfiction novel has been shown to be partly fictionalized, despite his assertions that
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“it was precisely as described” (Plimpton 1966: 41). Usually, a book presented as fiction can be
read as fiction. Only in the realm of dubious nonfictions must we learn to read skeptically.
My argument for the importance of reception in determining fictionality relies on
philosophy of art and philosophy of literature, much more than on the reader response theories
popularized by Stanley Fish and others.44 Scholars in the philosophy of art and the philosophy of
literature, it turns out, have been engaged in debates very similar to those of the historicists
and narratologists studying fictionality.45 Noël Carroll’s recent review of the positions in
philosophy of literature regarding the concept of “Fiction” reveals how similar the questions
often are between the disciplines (Carroll 2016).46 Carroll elsewhere sketches a picture of
interpretive double consciousness while offering a solution to what has been called the paradox
of fiction: how readers can feel genuine emotions for what they believe to be fictional entities
(Lamarque 1981; Carroll 1990: 59; Freeman 2016).47 Carroll calls his solution to the paradox of
fiction the “thought theory,” as it rests upon a distinction between thought and belief:
To have a belief is to entertain a proposition assertively; to have a thought is to
entertain it nonassertively. Both beliefs and thoughts have propositional content. But
with thoughts the content is merely entertained without commitment to its being the
case; to have a belief is to be committed to the truth of the proposition. (1990:80)
If genuine emotions “can be generated by thought contents entertained as a result of the
representational content of the fiction,” be those contents horrifying monsters onscreen or
sympathetic fictional characters in a novel, then there need be no paradox of fiction at all
(Carroll 1990: 81). Readers can merely entertain the thought of Anna Karenina (technically, the
thought-content of her) without needing to believe she is real (or to “make-believe” she is real).
This distinction between thought and belief seems to be a superior formulation of readerly
double-consciousness, in that it correlates to experience. We are used to entertaining thoughts
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that contradict our beliefs; we do it every time we have a debate. Carroll extends his argument,
proposing that readers need not experience “some process of character identification,” usually
loosely defined in psychological terms, to feel such strong and genuine emotions (1990: 89).
Arthur Danto puts forward a theory in which an “act of artistic identification” does play
a central role, although Danto is careful to define it (1981: 126). Danto says that this sort of
identification has the structure of a metaphor, and he situates it within his larger theory of
artistic representation (1981: 173). Danto’s Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981) is
relevant to my argument for two reasons: first, Danto’s account of artistic identification seems
to me an acceptable description of the sort of reading I am calling aesthetic; and second,
because nonfiction novels often figure among the examples in his thought experiments.
Danto’s philosophy was designed to encompass another problematic class of artworks,
readymades, which like nonfiction novels make art out of commonplace, ordinary life.
More recently, Stacie Friend has made an impressive argument describing the
distinction between fiction and nonfiction. She calls the categories “supergenres,” determined
by a cluster of non-essential criteria that influence and guide appreciation, “so that knowledge
of the classification plays a role in a work’s correct interpretation and evaluation” (2012: 181).
Friend uses the nonfiction novels of the New Journalists as an example and defends this use
from other philosophers of literature48 who find them too marginal or otherwise problematic.
She surveys fictive utterance theories and decides to base her own theory not simply on the
intention of the speech act or on a reductive classification determined by the presence of
fictional passages in a narrative, but instead, on “how the whole work is embedded in a larger
context, and specifically in certain practices of reading, writing, criticizing, and so on”
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(ibid.:187). Whether or not the writer intends her work to be fiction is only one fact in “a cluster
of non-essential criteria,” Friend says, no more or less important than any other fact (ibid.:187).
In Friend’s view, what Wolfe drew from fiction and called the techniques of realism may be
“contra-standard” features in a work of non-fiction, but that doesn’t make such a work fiction,
as many works contain features that contradict the standard for their genre (ibid.:191). Often,
as with non-fiction novels, such contra-standard features produce part of the work’s interest.
Though Friend emphasizes how categorizing a work as fiction or nonfiction will affect a reader’s
appreciation of it, she does not suggest such a classification is finally dependent upon the
reader. “There is simply no question that In Cold Blood is non-fiction,” she writes (ibid.:203).
Friend will only go so far as to admit certain works may be “both fiction and non-fiction,” while
suggesting that a more nuanced appreciation of the reader’s role in classification opens up new
avenues for study (ibid.: 205). She does not consider in depth the possibility that the reader’s
perspective, the choice between interpretive stances, may be the determinative factor.
Nonfiction novels make an interesting test case for fictionality because readers must
decide how to read them.49 Not only did the New Journalists reveal that fictionality was not a
necessary condition for a book to be a novel.50 Their books show that the same nonfiction novel
can appear to be fictionalized depending upon the interpretive stance a reader takes toward it.
Readers at first enchanted by a nonfiction novel can, upon discovering that the author has
invented details, react angrily, judging it to be deceit. Fictionality, as it appears in these books,
is often conflated with falsification or deception. Some may therefore escape from the category
of fictionality altogether, at least according to Gallagher’s definition of fictionality. However,
even nonfiction novels that do not intend to deceive reveal the importance of interpretation, as
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their fictionality can seem more like deception to the subjects of the books themselves,
subjects who can object to how their story has been told or even sue for libel.
My emphasis will be on the reader choosing an interpretive position, on readerly
responsibility, which I think points toward the wider social repercussions of knowing which
texts should be appreciated as fiction and which should be judged as fact. This is not meant to
deny the validity of other approaches described above. The nonfiction novel example merely
points to this argument, which has more relevance, perhaps, for journalism than for literature.
The choice, as I see it, is between two interpretive positions, one aesthetic, the other skeptical.
The counter-argument that, if asked, readers probably would not remember having made any
choice at all, does not make the notion of choosing an inaccurate description: the choice is
usually one of the assumptions implicit in reading a particular genre and only becomes evident
in ambiguous sorts of texts.51 Readers can certainly not choose, just as they can choose wrong,
but they will utilize one of two interpretive positions when approaching the truth of a text.
Learning when to read skeptically is merely a crucial step in learning to be an intelligent reader
in a world filled with ambiguous narratives.
3. Janet Malcolm, Joe McGinniss and the Journalist as Confidence Man
Among the “grave social harms” Hersey laid at the feet of Capote, Mailer and Wolfe,
was the inspiration of imitators. “The infection spreads,” Hersey wrote, sanctimoniously, “If the
great Mailer can do it, so can any tyro” (1980: 24). Joe McGinniss was no tyro. His book on
Nixon’s 1968 publicity team, The Selling of the President (1969), was a classic of political
journalism that had been excerpted for Tom Wolfe’s 1974 anthology The New Journalism. But
in 1983 McGinniss published Fatal Vision, and the resulting controversy might have confirmed
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Hersey’s fears. Like many nonfiction novels, Fatal Vision was a true-crime story. The murderer
was a Green Beret doctor, Jeffrey MacDonald, accused of killing his wife and two daughters.
Like many nonfiction novels, Fatal Vision was also immense, just short of a thousand pages.
Authors who draw their material from the impossibly cluttered, endless pages of life seem to
struggle with the crucial task of delimiting the essential, drawing a line between the story and
the meaningless details, and finding a conclusion. Choosing where to begin and where to end
may be two of the nonfiction novelists most significant authorial decisions.
Fatal Vision is not notable for illicit invention, so much as what it reveals about the
ethical problems of the writer’s relationship with a subj-ect. Janet Malcolm uses it to develop a
fascinating thesis about journalism in The Journalist and the Murderer (1990), which both tells
the story of the writing of Fatal Vision and repeats the pattern of writer and subject, once
removed, Malcolm writing about McGinniss writing about MacDonald, like a postmodernist
parergon, or added, extra, supererogatory frame. Malcolm describes McGinniss befriending the
accused murderer, MacDonald; joining his defense team; maintaining a disingenuously
sympathetic correspondence for four years and then finally publishing a book that portrays
MacDonald as a sort of inhuman monster. MacDonald, understandably upset, sued McGinniss;
McGinniss won the civil trial, but only by the strength of a single juror’s vote, after being
“mauled … until there was little left of him” by the prosecuting attorney (Malcolm 1990: 9).
McGinniss’s mistake, Malcolm says, was leaving “in the form of some forty letters to
MacDonald – a written record of his bad faith” (ibid.: 9). His defense team reached out to
Malcolm, hoping she would write about the dangerous precedent for journalists that the civil
trial set, which is to say, that she would tell the story with McGinniss as the victim. Malcolm
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found herself sympathetic with the betrayed subject of Fatal Vision, the convicted murderer.
The cycle of journalist disappointing subject was thus perpetuated. Around Malcolm’s story,
there is another frame: the civil case brought against her by Jeffrey Masson, the disgruntled
subject of an earlier book of hers. Masson’s case was argued before the Supreme Court in 1991,
and only finally decided in Malcolm’s favor in 1994. Malcolm’s interest in the ambiguous ethics
and angry subjects of journalism, therefore, is not quite as disinterested as it seems.
Malcolm did not deceive McGinniss. They only met for a single interview and did not
correspond. But according to her, the essence of every relationship between journalist and
subject is bad faith. The “naïve subject” only agrees to be interviewed out of “the frailty of
human nature”: that is, his or her natural weakness for wanting their side of the story to be told
(1990: 8). Malcolm hopes that McGinniss will know better, that he will avoid what she calls “the
old game of Confession” (ibid.: 8). He is of the same tribe as her, but falls into the trap anyway.
According to Malcolm, every journalist:
is a kind of confidence man, preying on people’s vanity, ignorance, or loneliness, gaining
their trust and betraying them without remorse … The catastrophe suffered by the
subject is no simple matter of an unflattering likeness or a misrepresentation of his
views; what pains him, what rankles and sometimes drives him to extremes of
vengefulness, is the deception that has been practiced on him. On reading the article or
book in question, he has to face the fact that the journalist – who seemed so friendly
and sympathetic, so keen to understand him fully, so remarkably attuned to his vision of
things – never had the slightest intention of collaborating with him on his story but
always intended to write a story of his own. (my ellipsis ibid.: 3)
If there are two people there are two stories and the journalist always tells “a story of his own.”
Malcolm’s thesis is cynical, suggesting that the journalist can never really be the subject’s ally,
and their relationship relies on a sort of betrayal. The “catastrophe” felt by the duped subject is
a visceral encounter with the boundary between experience and representation. By some trick,
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the false representation bears the subject’s name. Jeffrey MacDonald hoped Joe McGinniss
(and later, Janet Malcolm) would write an exculpatory story about the mis-prosecution of an
innocent man, exactly the story that McGinniss led him to believe he was writing. But when
Fatal Vision was published, MacDonald found himself portrayed in it as a murderer suffering
“from the effects of the strain required to repress the ‘boundless rage’ which psychological
maladjustment had caused him to feel toward ‘child or woman, wife or mother … the opposite
sex’” (my ellipsis McGinniss 1989: 610). Rather than winning MacDonald sympathy, the book
provoked floods of hate-mail, including one surreal letter that Malcolm reproduces in full. The
writers of this letter were an anonymous husband and wife who had read Fatal Vision while on
vacation at Waikiki. “At any rate, we just wanted you to know we enjoyed the novel but feel
sure you are guilty and a pervert maniac like you should never be cut loose,” they tell
MacDonald; Malcolm then jumps to an interview she did with MacDonald:
I said, “There is something baffling and confusing to me about this. These people
lying on the beach in Hawaii are writing a letter to a person they have read about in a
book – to a character in a book whom you reject as a representation of yourself – and
yet the letter arrives in your hands, you read it, and are afflicted by it.”
“Yeah,” he said. “That’s part of the shattering impact of McGinniss’s book.
People who have read it feel that they know me, that they have got inside my head.”
(1990: 126-127)
The confusion of thresholds is evident in the couple claiming to have “enjoyed the novel,” even
while they damn the living human being who inspired it. Their position – as readers who know
MacDonald only as a literary character – cannot be reconciled with the contrary position: that
of MacDonald’s friends and lawyers, for example Michael Malley, who reject McGinniss’s book
because they do not find the “portrait of Jeff” in its pages to be accurate (Malcolm ibid.: 136).
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Unlike the vacationers, those readers knew Jeff MacDonald the man before they read about
Jeffrey MacDonald the literary psychopath.
These two sets of readers represent two opposed, mutually exclusive interpretive
positions or stances. The couple in Hawaii might as well be writing letters to Raskolnikov: they
are entirely free to adopt “an aesthetic stance” toward the man (Danto 1981: 99). He is a
complete stranger to them, nothing but a name. But MacDonald was not such a blank for his
friends and defenders, like Malley. Those readers might adopt an aesthetic stance towards
Fatal Vision, judging the book on its literary merits, but they are not free to adopt the same
stance toward its main character. Their lived experience acts as a constraint on their freedom of
interpretation; they collide with the same ontological boundary that the deceived subject does;
MacDonald is real to them in a way Dostoyevsky’s famous murderer cannot be, unless they
suffer from Quixote’s sort of delusions. Their interpretation of the MacDonald character in
McGinniss’s book is unlikely to be what Arthur C. Danto calls an “act of artistic identification”:
The logical fulcrum on which a mere thing is elevated into the Realm of Art is what I
have casually introduced as the act of artistic identification; its linguistic representation
is a certain identificatory use of “is,” which I shall merely designate the “is” of artistic
identification: as when one says of a dab of paint that it is Icarus, or of a smudge of blue
that it is the sky, or – pointing to a certain knock-kneed actor – that he is Hamlet, or
singling out a passage of music and saying it is the rustling of the leaves … It implies, in
self-conscious cases, a participation in the artworld, a readiness to acquiesce in a literal
falsehood. (1981: 126)
Malley refuses to “acquiesce” in this sense, objecting that the character in McGinniss’s book is
not his friend Jeffrey MacDonald. The same refusal leads MacDonald to say, “people who have
read [Fatal Vision] feel that they know me, that they have got inside my head.” That is not me,
the duped subject asserts. Regardless of whether or not McGinniss has intentionally
fictionalized or merely told the story his way without inventing any evidence, transcripts,
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testimony or facts, the result still seems to the duped subject to have broken Hersey’s rule.
Literary representations, following this argument, are in Danto’s words “literal falsehood[s].”
The argument has some important implications. First, it suggests that all representations
are capable of being “elevated into the Realm of Art,” as Danto says, which is not to say that all
representations are apriori works of art. Neither must Danto’s metaphors of elevation or
transfiguration necessarily imply superiority. But drawing distinctions between art and non-art
requires some parsing of categories. I have tried to avoid using the terms fiction and nonfiction.
Fiction may be synonymous with art, but nonfiction does not equate to non-art. “The very term
‘nonfiction’ discloses the former Romantic bias toward fiction: everything not fiction is
nonfiction,” Barbara Lounsberry writes, beginning her treatise on literary nonfiction with an
exploration of the “semantic quandary” of the name (1990: xi). Literary nonfiction can often be
extremely artful, as Lounsberry’s subtitle attests. But the adjective, literary, can suggest a book
is also technically artful (or filled with erudite references) without requiring it be art itself.
Phyllis Frus insists the word distorts the way we read books that fall into that category,
removing them from their political and historical contexts, and so she rejects it entirely, writing:
I cannot accept the valuation that results from separating some examples of journalistic
narrative from general coverage of current events and issues. Designating narratives as
‘literary’ places them within an objectivist and essentialist framework that inevitably
affects our readings of these works: it implies some aesthetic judgment and tends to
remove the text from historical or political analysis. (1994: x)
The aesthetic connotations of the adjective, literary, can be confusing. An elegant biography
like Francis Steegmuller’s Flaubert and Madame Bovary: A Double Portrait (1939), for example,
can be extremely literary without aspiring to be art in the same sense that Flaubert’s novel is.
What exactly separates them? Are Janet Malcolm’s pellucid, lovely and very literary works of
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investigative journalism art? The question reveals a confusion of categories: the difference
between Steegmuller’s book (and Malcolm’s) and Flaubert’s is not a distinction between art
and non-art, but between different genres. Steegmuller and Malcolm did not write novels.
Biography and journalism have different requirements than novels; they connect to lived
experience differently than novels.52 But these distinctions are thrown into doubt by a form like
the nonfiction novel, which claims to be neither one genre nor the other, but both at once.
A second implication of the argument above: there must be some genre distinction
between a representation and a report. This distinction has sometimes been considered as a
contrast between subjectivity and objectivity, though we have already seen that concepts like
objectivity are not static but have their own social histories. Hersey, with typical precision,
laments that for Capote, Mailer and Wolfe, “the report becomes a performance” (1980: 23). His
supposed fallacy of the New Journalism argues that, because “perfect objectivity” is impossible,
writers must give up factual accuracy entirely for the sake of a subjective, performative style.
According to him, once they have made the leap, “a filter of temperament discolors the visible
universe” and, continuing the visual metaphor, there is a blurring of the real world the writer is
“picturing or interpreting.” But Hersey does not explore the history or philosophical
foundations underlying the conceptual binary of subjectivity versus objectivity. John Hartsock
connects the origins of early twentieth-century American literary journalism with “a growing
unease with positivist assumptions” (2000: 47). Hartsock writes that:
The rise of a factual or objective journalism style provoked an epistemological crisis for
subjectivity, whether the journalist’s, the reader’s, or that of the object of the report.
Narrative literary journalism was a response to that crisis in an attempt to reestablish
what critic John Berger ably calls the ‘relationship between teller, listener (spectator)
and protagonist(s).’ (2000: 51)
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Hartsock argues that this “response” sought to bring the new positivist assumption that there
was a single, verifiable, objective reality into contact with what, to borrow Hersey’s description,
we might call the “impressions and feelings [and] the baffling, shadowy components of human
character” (1949: 5). In Hartsock’s view, literary journalism was formulated as a rejection of the
idea of objectivity itself; for Stephen Crane, Hartsock shows, remembering the lives of dead
regular soldiers was not the same as counting “the interesting sum of men slain” (2000: 41).
The name often given to the genre, human-interest stories, suggests that objectivity was seen
by some as a de-humanizing narrative form. The truth of a lost life cannot be reduced to a mere
unit in a sum or statistic, though telling the story of that life might lead away from objectivity.
Subjectivity and objectivity seem to be new names for the two distinct varieties of truth that
are operative in the binary of literary journalism, describing its opposed epistemologies.
Mas’ud Zavarzedeh, in The Mythopoeic Reality (1976), develops a theory of the genre of
the nonfiction novel by attempting to identify its “structural principles” (1976: vii). Zavarzedeh’s
theory supposes that literary innovation is connected to certain larger changes in society, and
he argues that the genre he calls the “postwar American nonfiction novel” must be read in the
context of the larger social and literary developments of the twentieth century, developments
which we often refer to as Postmodernism (ibid.: vii). According to him, the innovative genre is
not only “the outcome of purely aesthetic processes; rather it is largely a function of the
pressures created by the new configurations of forces in reality which render the previous
aesthetic forms incapable of effectively approaching new experiential données” (1976: 4).
Those “previous aesthetic forms,” primarily what Zavarzedeh refers to as the “totalizing novel,”
had emerged in response to “the subversion of agrarian social structures which had conceived
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and ordered life according to preestablished collective norms” (1976: 5). Zavarzedeh echoes
Georg Lukács’s famous notion, from The Theory of the Novel (1915) connecting the rise of the
form with the longing for a lost ‘totality’ known in pre-industrial European society, writing:
Through a complete interpretation of life, the classic novel orders the chaos of
experience and shapes it into a comprehensible whole endowed with purpose and
governed by laws that are discoverable by the rational mind. In doing so, the
conventional novel imposes necessity and certainty on life and, to the comfort of its
bourgeois reader, removes the anguish of the contingent. (1976: 6)
Ignoring the fact that some classic novels sought precisely to make bourgeois readers
uncomfortable, Zavarzedeh’s theory helps to locate the nonfiction novel in the critical territory
of postmodernism. He places the nonfiction novels of Capote and Mailer alongside other
innovative works of the era, like the novels of Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut and John Barth.
David Lodge made the point even more forcefully in 1971, in his The Novelist at the Crossroads.
In the title essay, Lodge claimed the contemporary English novelist had arrived at a conceptual
crossroads in “the main road” of English literature, by which he meant “the realistic novel, the
compromise between fictional and empirical modes” (1971: 18). Some novelists would certainly
continue writing in “the central tradition, of the English novel, coming down through the
Victorians and Edwardians, temporarily diverted by modernist experimentalism, but
subsequently restored,” Lodge writes (ibid.: 18). And yet, he found:
the pressure of skepticism on the aesthetic and epistemological premises of literary
realism is now so intense that many novelists, instead of marching confidently straight
on, are at least considering the two routes that branch off in opposite directions from
the crossroads. One of these routes leads to the non-fiction novel, and the other to
what Mr. Scholes calls ‘fabulation.’ (ibid.: 19)
Zavarzedeh’s “totalizing novel” and Lodge’s “central tradition” are both descriptions of the
same thing: the foil of the ‘classic’ or ‘traditional,’ against which all formulations of Modernism
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and Postmodernism must posit themselves. Lodge’s description of the compromise between
“fictional and empirical modes” is another formulation of the ontological border territory that
we have been considering: a work of literature’s connection to life outside the pages of a book.
Perceptive and fascinating though these analyses may be, they do not elucidate the
distinction we are seeking between the literary representation and the report. They both rely
on sociological context to explain the genres. Lodge argues that by the late twentieth century,
“Art can no longer compete with life on equal terms” (1971: 33). For Zavarzedeh, “The structure
of contemporary consciousness and the forms of recent narrative literature have changed so
radically that the present seems to be more a mutation than a continuation of the past” (1976:
9). The most convincing part of Zavarzedeh’s book is his rejection of the subjective-objective
binary, a rejection that he sees at the heart of the nonfiction novel’s endeavor:
Epistemologically, the nonfiction novel is rooted in the idea that the experiencing mind,
confronted with the impossibility of reaching a total view of contemporary life and the
unavailability of any communal values which could endow experience with a shared
significance, is left with a stripped reality: the facts of the phenomenal world of events,
its surfaces and appearances … The nonfiction novelist goes beyond the myth of
mutually exclusive categories of “objective” and “subjective” and in the dual modes of
his narrative acknowledges the inherently ambiguous nature of human knowledge of
the external world. (my ellipsis ibid.: 225)
According to Zavarzedeh, the nonfiction novel and its strange relation to “facts” follow from the
Postmodern dissolution of traditional forms of literature and consciousness. However, in his
analysis he seems to reproduce the very binary he decries, dividing the nonfiction novel into
sub-genres that he calls: “exegetical” (read objective), “testimonial” (read subjective), and
“notational” (in which the author claims to merely make a recording of something; for example,
Andy Warhol’s novel a, a word-for-word transcription of twenty-four hours of audio tape).
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Zavarzedeh rejects the subjective versus objective framework only to reformulate the problem
in new terms, as a new binary that merely renames the strange dual nature of these books.
In Literary Journalism and the Aesthetics of Experience (2016), John Hartsock describes
the formal differences between what we think of as a news report and what we call narrative,
story or feature journalism, while drawing on narratology, Hayden White, and Gerard Genette’s
idea of narrative as a “sequence of events”:
The rhetorical framing of the hard news model is constructed in what has traditionally
been called the ‘inverted pyramid.’ Such a structure is altogether different from that of
a narrative literary journalism because the inverted pyramid addresses the “news” in a
continuously digressing manner, starting from the conclusion of a sequence of events …
Given that the inverted pyramid with its summary lead came to all but represent in the
twentieth century the rhetorical embodiment of what constitutes objective journalism –
short, concise, relatively neutral in tone and intent, and structured in presentation from
the most important to the least important information – the contrast with a traditional
narrative model could hardly be more striking. In a sense, the inverted pyramid
represents a reversal of the complication-resolution litmus test of traditional narrative …
The configuration of the report reflects the rhetorical intention to isolate information
from the sequence and to deprioritize it as it proceeds. (my ellipsis 2016: 10-11)
Hartsock’s analysis of the “rhetorical framing” of the news report as a form of writing is useful
in that it provides a definition based on textual difference, rather than on “objectivity” as a
philosophical principle or professional norm, and without relying on social or historical context.
The difference between a report and a representation can then be understood as a difference
in ways of telling a story: one, beginning with the most salient point, or conclusion, and
proceeding toward the most trivial; the other, employing all the varied narrative devices
described by the method of analysis Gerard Genette called “narratology” (1980: 22). We can
imagine a writer turning a ‘hard news’ report on, let’s suppose, the tragic collapse of a bridge,
into what Hartsock calls “a traditional narrative,” merely by reconfiguring the sequence of
events, foreshadowing, withholding the resolution of the collapse until the end, without
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necessarily making a leap into the subjective perspective of any of the characters and without,
in Hersey’s words, discoloring the visible universe with the filter of temperament. The second
version might even contain the same sentences, in a different order, and nevertheless still be a
“traditional narrative” and not a report, according to Hartsock. If we follow this distinction,
then the “rhetorical framing” of all nonfiction novels, what Hartsock might call their
“configuration,” makes them narrative representations rather than true reports, regardless of
the accuracy of their reporting. If we suppose that a report, no matter how technically artful,
cannot be “elevated into the Realm of Art,” as Danto puts it, while a representation may be so
elevated, then our binary of art versus non-art has some solid more footing. Such an argument
might find a logical basis in the unlikelihood of the report’s reader performing an act of “artistic
identification,” what Danto called the “logical fulcrum” of artistic transfiguration. For the report
as a form constantly reminds the reader that the figures being described are real living people,
and that the stories are mere accounts of actions performed elsewhere. This is exactly the
rhetorical intent of most newspaper writing. “It may be that the very use of objective sorts of
writing is rhetorical in its own right, its rhetorical purpose being to assure the reader that these
are but the facts, speaking for themselves,” Danto observes (1981: 166). Rather than following
Hartsock’s use of the term “hard news,” I would connect the form he describes – the report –
with what we usually call investigative journalism, which does not usually seek to represent or
to humanize so much as to reveal or denounce.53
Solving the question posed by the nonfiction novel might be simple: we might decide
these books are all simply representations, not investigative reports, and therefore beholden to
a different sort of truth, and then worry no more about their accuracy. But then how would we
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defend them from the accusations of the figures they are based upon, the real living people,
like Jeff MacDonald, who are afflicted by them and who might call them false representations?
How would we defend them from the fundamentalist, Platonic position, that all representations
are literal falsehoods and therefore dangerous lies? At the same time, theoretical perspectives
can seem to lead us to merely dress up the same old mystery in new terms: ‘report’ versus
‘representation’ replaces ‘objective’ versus ‘subjective,’ which replaced ‘fact’ versus ‘fiction,’
which replaced ‘true’ versus ‘false.’ To escape this impasse, we will have to consider the
different sorts of truth that are presented by art and non-art, and at the same time, to look into
the relationship between the writer, the subject, and the reader.
4. Truman Capote and the Ambiguities of Literary Character
The strange variety of communication that fiction entails comes further into the light
when we consider the problem of literary character. The nonfiction novels discussed below,
none less than five-hundred pages long, all present characters and can all be read either as
literary representations or as pseudo-biographical reports. Average readers of Fatal Vision
might find its version of Jeffrey MacDonald to be a convincing literary character, while
MacDonald’s friends can argue that the book is false biography.
When creating literary characters, which is to say, literary representations of people,
different standards seems to apply for what it means to be true. Malcolm describes how
McGinniss, while writing, struggled with the sheer uninterestingness of MacDonald’s life story.
MacDonald’s descriptions of himself, of his youth and of his relationships were all insipid, trite,
superficial. In Malcolm’s words, they exhibited “a sort of reflexive and unremitting bogusness”
(1990: 99). During four years of correspondence, while answering McGinniss’s increasingly
121

personal questions in a series of audio recordings made in prison, MacDonald could not make
his life story compelling. McGinniss realized too late, Malcolm says, that despite the horrific
nature of the crime, the accused murderer’s story could not carry the book. MacDonald’s
“language was dead, flat, soft, clichéd, unnuanced,” in contrast to his more dynamic physical
presence (ibid.: 67). But Malcolm catches herself. “I had made the same mistake that Stone [the
psychiatrist] made in marveling at MacDonald’s incapacity for rendering Tolstoyan portraits of
himself and his family,” she writes (ibid.:70). Literary characters are not like living people:
For while the novelist, when casting about for a hero or a heroine, has all of human
nature to choose from, the journalist must limit his protagonists to a small group of a
certain rare, exhibitionistic, self-fabulizing nature, who have already done the work on
themselves that the novelist does on his imaginary characters – who, in short, present
themselves as ready-made literary figures. (ibid.: 70-71)
Malcolm names “Joseph Mitchell’s Joe Gould and Truman Capote’s Perry Smith” among these
human ready-mades (ibid.: 71).54 Fabulizing, or perhaps “self-fabulizing,” does not merely make
a literary character more interesting; rather, that is what makes the character seem true.
Malcolm quotes one of the witnesses in the McGinniss-MacDonald trial, the psychiatrist,
Michael Stone, discussing over six-hundred pages of MacDonald’s transcript testimony. “In all
this, there is nothing that touches one as genuine about either [MacDonald] or anyone else …
None of them come alive; they’re all stiff figures,” Stone says (ibid.: 70). Stone is describing a
literary problem: coming alive or being stiff are criteria applied to literary portraits, not people.
We can apply them to people, of course, but when a human being fails to seem “genuine,” we
suspect duplicity, sinister interiority, withheld secrets – exactly the line of reasoning that leads
to MacDonald being labeled, using some especially crude psychology, as a “psychopath … not a
real human being but a mere simulacrum of one” (my ellipsis Malcolm ibid.: 74). MacDonald is
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of course a “real human being,” though he may not seem like a trustworthy one to those who
know him only from reading transcripts of his prison interviews. The correspondence between
subject and representation, according to Malcolm, is not mimetic: if McGinniss's portrait of
MacDonald had corresponded exactly to the living MacDonald, as his friends claim it does not,
it would be a correct imitation. However, the criteria that makes an artistic representation true,
convincing or “real” doesn’t equate to the sort of verisimilitude that makes an imitation correct.
E.M. Forster famously distinguished between literary characters based upon a single
psychological principle (“flat”) and those that defy such reductive descriptions (“round”) (1927:
118). Forster suggests that “round” characters are more satisfying, more real, because they
better approximate human beings, always surprising us and confounding our expectations.
Malcolm echoes Forster’s equation, but she draws the opposite conclusion. For Malcolm:
literary characters are drawn with much broader and blunter strokes, are much simpler,
more generic (or, as they used to say, mythic) creatures than real people, and their
preternatural vividness derives from their unambiguous fixity and consistency. Real
people seem relatively uninteresting in comparison, because they are so much more
complex, ambiguous, unpredictable, and particular than people in novels. (1990: 122)
Joe Gould and Perry Smith are “ready-made literary figures” because they have drawn their
own characters with “mythic” strokes, because they are fixed and consistent, obsessed, defined
by an overarching passion or vision, unlike MacDonald, who is just uninteresting. But when she
picks the subject back up a bit later in the book, Malcolm undermines her own argument:
I omitted a crucial element of the transformation from life to literature that the masters
of the nonfiction genre achieve. This is the writer’s identification and affection for the
subject, without which the transformation cannot take place. The Joe Goulds and the
Perry Smiths of life tend to be windy bores and pathetic nutcases; only in literature,
after they have got under the skin of a writer, do they achieve the ambition of fantastic
interestingness that in actuality they only grotesquely gesture toward. (1990: 96)
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To what degree does “the writer’s identification” with the subject ‘mythify’ him? Who is
responsible for the “preternatural vividness” that makes a character seem real in this special,
literary sense? Who does the inventing here, the character himself or the writer whose skin he
has got under? When Capote tells Smith’s story, or when Mitchell tells Gould’s, do they repeat
the deception that Malcolm began her book describing, swindling their subjects of their stories
like the con-men she assures us that all journalists are? Does “the writer’s identification and
affection for the subject” violate Hersey’s rule and count as invention?
This is slippery territory. We are reminded of the fragility of our grasp on whatever it is
we call reality. In her first book, Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession (1980), Malcolm
describes with admirable clarity, “the phenomenon of transference – how we all invent each
other according to early blueprints” (1980: 6). This idea, “Freud’s most original and radical
discovery,” suggests all interpersonal understanding is tinged with invention (Malcolm ibid.: 6).
Knowing anyone, even those whom we know best, may be impossible, Malcolm tells us:
The concept of transference at once destroys faith in personal relations and explains
why they are tragic: we cannot know each other. We must grope around for each other
through a dense thicket of absent others. We cannot see each other plain. (ibid.: 6)
This “destroy[ed] faith” in personal relations is perhaps what led Malcolm to her deeply cynical
view of journalists and the angry, jilted subjects that they abuse. When Joseph Mitchell wrote
about Joe Gould a second time, twenty-four years after his first New Yorker article about him,
“Professor Seagull” (1942), Mitchell described the history of his changing perceptions of Gould
over the years and the strangeness of their relationship, just as much as he revealed the secret
of Gould’s mysterious, missing oral history. His transformation of Gould the “pathetic nutcase”
into Gould the “fantastic[ally] interesting” character was an invention tinged with the personal;
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Hersey might say that the filter of Mitchell’s temperament discolored the visible universe.
Mitchell’s best profiles, we saw, are in fact double-portraits: of both himself and his subject(s).
Mitchell ends up telling the story of Gould’s deception, but also the story of how he, Mitchell,
during hours of listening to Gould’s life story, became “a kind of stand-in relative” (1965: 129).
Janet Malcolm is brave enough to consider the possibility, as Freud did, that we are all tragically
alone, trapped behind the filters of our temperaments. If that is the case, then we “invent”
everyone we think we know, from our dearest friends and lovers to those sitting across the
table during interviews, and Hersey’s two rules become untenable.
Critics have often suggested that Truman Capote’s identification and affection for the
subject of In Cold Blood (1966), Perry Smith, turned the writing of his famous nonfiction novel
into a personal “strain” (De Bellis 1979: 531). Capote admitted as much, “I did identify with him
to a great degree. Never did deny it. It’s also quite true that my portrait of him is absolutely one
hundred per cent the way he was” (Nance 1970: 215). Malcolm’s argument suggests that it
would be more accurate to say Capote’s portrait of Smith was “one hundred per cent the way”
Capote saw him. After all, we can only guess how Smith might have told the story himself.
William L. Nance considers this problem in The Worlds of Truman Capote (1970), an early
critical reading as notable for Nance’s candid interviews with the author as for his balanced
judgments. Capote reveals to Nance in one interview how, after eight months of investigation
and indecision in Kansas, he was finally convinced the project was worthwhile:
And then something in the whole material appealed to something that has always been
inside me anyway, waiting there. It was Perry that made me decide to do it really.
Something about Perry turned the whole thing, because Perry was a character that was
also in my imagination … [He] could absolutely step right out of one of my stories.” (my
ellipsis ibid.:211)
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Nance develops the point with astute comparisons between the Perry Smith of In Cold Blood
and Holly Golightly, heroine of Breakfast at Tiffany’s (1961), as well as other figures from
Capote’s earlier fiction, like Joel Knox of Other Voices, Other Rooms (1948). These characters
are somewhat childlike, imaginative dreamer-victims, fleeing from traumatic pasts, usually
playing the guitar. Nance sums up the coincidence of a real-life character matching the figures
of Capote’s imagination: “either he distorted Perry in the book, or he was remarkably lucky”
(ibid.:211). George Plimpton makes a similar point in his New York Times Book Review interview
of 1966, asking Capote, of the nonfiction artist, “Isn’t luck involved?” (1966: 41) According to
Malcolm, this is exactly the bad luck McGinniss had in choosing to write about MacDonald.
Certainly, we can say that the second of Nance’s possible interpretations is true: Capote was
very lucky. But our only criteria for judgment is the text that Capote produced, and critics have
also shown the first suggestion to be equally true. Capote argued in a series of interviews given
soon after the book’s publication that writing In Cold Blood involved no invention, even of
minor details, “It was precisely as described. One doesn’t spend almost six years on a book, the
point of which is factual accuracy, and then give way to minor distortions” (Plimpton ibid.: 41).
But critics looking closer have found exactly that – a multitude of minor distortions.
Between the version of In Cold Blood serialized in the New Yorker in the autumn of 1965
and the Random House edition published ten weeks later, Capote made “nearly five-thousand
changes,” according to Jack Du Bellis, who not only finds and counts them all, but creates tables
quantifying the changes in punctuation, diction, and more substantial amendments (1979: 520).
Such changes make De Bellis suspicious of “the accuracy of the narrative, since the New Yorker
version was ostensibly accurate to begin with” (ibid.: 523). Many of these errors suggest an
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attitude toward facts that more scrupulous journalists might call sloppy; in some cases,
Capote’s revisions actually created errors. For example, in the New Yorker version, Perry
Smith’s right arm is tattooed with a snake; in the book version, the tattoo is on his left arm;
however, in Richard Avedon’s famous portrait, the tattoo is clearly visible on Smith’s right arm.
Most of De Bellis’s discoveries suggest Capote’s overwhelming concern was with prose style,
sometimes even at the expense of accuracy. However, Phillip K. Tompkins wrote an essay for
Esquire in 1966 describing examples of more intentional duplicity. Tompkins traveled to Kansas
to interview many of Capote’s subjects and found that their stories, in some cases, were not in
harmony with Capote’s book. Some of the changes seem fundamentally aesthetic. For example,
Capote subtly revises the dramatic turning point of the case, Perry Smith’s confession while
being driven by detectives from Las Vegas to Kansas. Capote has Smith in the lead car and his
confession is prompted by details that Hickock, his accomplice, has already revealed – a classic
trope of police drama. Narrating in the present tense, Capote has Smith turn around at the
climactic moment to peer out the rear windshield, looking back at the informer and exclaiming,
“The tough boy! Oh, a real brass boy” (1966: 232). Certain he has been betrayed, Smith
recounts the night of the murders for the detectives – and for the readers, who have also been
waiting to learn the truth. In fact, Hickock was in the lead car and Smith’s confession was
prompted not by any information given to the detectives but by the sight of his accomplice,
who Smith could see in front of him, talking on and on (Tompkins 1966: 127). Tompkins quotes
court transcripts in full for evidence. However, Capote’s version of the confession scene makes
for a superior narrative, with its dramatic reversal, like a brilliantly scripted film noir scene.55
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More serious still is Tompkins accusation that Capote altered Smith’s confession in order to
suggest a different “mental state” during the moment of the murder of Mr. Clutter than that
suggested by Detective Dewey’s official transcripts, which show Smith confessing to
“committing the murder with full consciousness and intent” (not my emphasis ibid.: 167).
Capote’s version is more literary here as well, suggesting a moment of existential detachment.
Some of Capote’s more minor distortions might be defended with aesthetic arguments.
It is the writer’s business, after all, to shape the events of the story into a satisfactory narrative.
But there are other distortions that subtly alter Perry Smith’s character, a sort of rearranging
that cannot be seen as purely cosmetic when we recall that Smith was a real living person. After
being sentenced to death, Smith’s weeping resounds through the sheriff’s courthouse quarters,
where Mrs. Meier, the under-sheriff’s wife, cannot escape the sound. Capote includes a short
chapter entirely in her voice, in quotations, in which she recalls comforting Smith and hearing
him say, “I’m embraced by shame” (1966: 308). According to Tompkins, when he interviewed
Mrs. Meier in 1966 she denied the scene had happened or that she “had told such things to
Capote,” insisting that she had never heard Smith cry (1966: 168). Likewise, Capote
misrepresents Smith’s last words before climbing the scaffold in the Kansas State execution
chamber that was called, “The Corner” (1966: 249). He tells us that Smith’s “assurance faltered;
shyness blurred his voice, lowered it to a just audible level. ‘It would be meaningless to
apologize for what I did. Even inappropriate. But I do. I apologize” (ibid.: 340). The chapter is
narrated from the perspective of Detective Alvin Dewey, but Dewey later said he was not sure
what Smith’s last words had been. Two reporters just a few feet away from Smith when Capote
himself had walked off, unable to watch, reported Smith’s last words differently and insisted
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that he “did not apologize” (Tompkins 1966: 168). Such distortions constitute a deliberate
appeal to pathos. In an interview given to Playboy in 1968, Capote claims that:
Conscience didn’t enter into it all; Perry Smith, as a matter of fact, told me he was
somewhat upset that he didn’t have any conscience. So the murder of the Clutter family
would have been only the first of many. (1968: 60)
In the text, Capote describes a prison conversation between Smith and an old army friend and
character witness, a Catholic from Boston bent on saving Smith’s soul, during which Smith says,
“Am I sorry? If that’s what you mean – I’m not. I don’t feel anything about it. I wish I did, but
nothing about it bothers me a bit” (1966: 291). Claiming to have no conscience doesn’t
preclude the possibility Smith had a last-minute change of heart when faced with the gallows.
His amorality also recalls similar themes in the Existentialist literature of the era, for example,
Camus’s Meursault, who, like Smith, kills “without apparent motive,” revealing the irrational
violence and brutality hidden in the heart of civilized, rational humankind (Capote ibid.: 298).
Smith makes this argument himself, “Soldiers don’t lose much sleep. They murder, and get
medals for doing it. The good people of Kansas want to murder me” (Capote ibid.: 291). Capote
seems to have exaggerated or fictionalized Smith’s remorse, casting doubt on the “one hundred
per cent” accuracy of his portrait. Tompkins decides, “it is a moving portrait, but not, I submit,
of the man who actually was Perry Smith,” though Tompkins tempers his criticism of In Cold
Blood’s accuracy by praising it as “a work of art” (1966: 171). The book, he suggests, will
ultimately outlive the memories of the people and events that inspired its pages, suggesting a
fraught relationship between this sort of testimonial art, living memory and history.
Capote has organized his narrative so as to inspire sympathy for Perry Smith –
absolutely essential for his book to succeed as a novel. This informs the structure from
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beginning to end. In Cold Blood opens with an epigraph from François Villon’s Ballade des
pendus, verses that explicitly ask the reader not to harden his heart towards his “frères
humains” though they have been condemned to death. The book begins with a lyrical depiction
of the setting in remote Western Kansas, but this first chapter – In Cold Blood is divided into
four parts and eighty-six unnumbered chapters, each of which stands alone as a short,
complete narrative – ends with a cliffhanger, “At the time not a soul in sleeping Holcomb heard
them – four shotgun blasts that, all told, ended six human lives” (1966: 5). The message is clear:
we must see the killers as human beings and count their lives along with those of the victims.
We cannot succumb to the sort of thinking that leads McGinniss to call MacDonald “not a real
human being but a mere simulacrum of one.” The title of Capote’s book has the same double
meaning: it is the story of the murder of Hickock and Smith, a murder done in cold blood at the
hands of “the good people of Kansas,” just as much as the story of the Clutter family’s murder
(Plimpton 1966: 3). Capote forces his reader to reject moral absolutism and to exercise what we
might call moral relativity: balancing Smith’s culpability in a horrendous crime with the
culpability of the whole society in creating Smith, in turning him into a cold-blooded killer.
The two sides of this equation – individual and society – are finely balanced. George
Creeger points out how, in Capote’s story, the people of Kansas “deprive the killers of their
humanity and effectively exile them from the community” of humankind with a rhetoric that
reduces them to the realm of the subhuman (1969: 94). Creeger traces dehumanizing language
and a hunting motif throughout the book, connecting the pheasant shooting popular in
Western Kansas to the shotgun used by the murderers, to the language used by detectives and
townspeople for the suspects. He focuses in on the final description of Smith, who “possessed a
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quality, the aura of an exiled animal, a creature walking wounded,” and connects this aura of
exile (exile from humanity) to the biblical myth of the Garden and its more earthly substitute,
Garden City, Kansas (Capote 1966: 341). Capote’s portrayal of the Clutters resounds with
beatific overtones, seraphic daughter and teetotalling father most of all. Herb Clutter’s grove of
“fruit bearers growing by the river was his attempt to contrive, rain or no, a patch of the
paradise, the green, apple-scented Eden, he envisioned” Capote tells us (1966: 12). The last
days of the Clutter family and the community they represent are linked to the exiled killers by
narrative structure as well as thematically; Capote interweaves episodes, beginning the third
chapter, for example, “Like Mr. Clutter, the young man breakfasting in a café called the Little
Jewel never drank coffee” (1966: 14). This split narrative sequencing, sometimes described as a
cinematic technique, combats in narrative form what Creeger calls a “failure of the
imagination”: the sort of blindness or hard-heartedness that would deny any connection or
shared responsibility between society and the criminals cast out from that society (1966: 101).
The narrative builds toward the drama of their meeting-points: first, on the night of the murder
of the Clutter family; and second, the apprehension, trial and execution of the killers. Thus,
Capote’s book, both in form and content, demands a balancing of moral perspectives.
According to Milan Kundera, this is central to the origins of the novel form. Kundera describes
The Art of the Novel in similar terms:
To take, with Cervantes, the world as ambiguity, to be obliged to face not a single truth
but a welter of contradictory truths (truths embodied in imaginary selves called
characters), to have as one’s only certainty the wisdom of uncertainty.
(Emphasis not mine, 2003: 6)
The contrasting truths in Capote’s story might then be, in the first place, that of the honorable
farmer, foremost citizen of Holcomb, contrasted with that of the long-suffering outcast, Smith,
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who says of the Clutters, “They never hurt me. Like other people. Like people have all my life.
Maybe it’s just that the Clutters were the ones who had to pay for it” (1966: 290). Capote
balances the contradictory truths of individual against society; of victim against victim; and of
criminal against legal system, forcing his readers away from easy judgments. “The novel’s spirit
is the spirit of complexity,” Kundera tells us (2003: 18). The ghostly voices whispering “in the
wind-bent wheat” in the book’s final sentence are not merely the voices of the Clutters, but
also of the other two human beings whose lives have been prematurely ended (1966: 343).
But a question remains, despite Kundera’s assertions, about exactly how many
contradictory truths can fit into a novel. Not all of the characters demand our imagination and
attention equally, after all. Of his two condemned murderers, Capote only succeeds in truly
bringing one to life, achieving, in Malcolm’s words, “the transformation from life to literature”
that makes Perry Smith so unforgettable. In fact, Capote manages this feat only at the expense
of Hickock, the other killer, and perhaps at the expense of the victims as well. Capote seems to
have organized his narrative in order to direct the reader’s sympathy and imagination away
from the story of Hickock and toward that of Smith, essentially making a villain of Hickock.
Though Capote humanizes Hickock with pathetic portrayals of his mother and father grieving
over the death sentence, Hickock himself becomes the one truly responsible for the crime,
though he was not brave enough to do the killings himself. Capote withholds until several
hundred pages into the novel the revelation Hickock had “a sexual interest in female children”
and in “seducing pubescent girls” (1966: 201). This piece of withheld information takes on
exaggerated significance, coming as a surprise and undercutting Hickock’s many assertions of
normality, “‘Deal me out, Baby,’ Dick said, ‘I’m a normal” (1966: 108). Finally, during the trial,
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Hickock admits, “I think the main reason I went there was not to rob them but to rape the girl”
(1966: 278). He was the one who planned the robbery, and so sexual deviance seems one
important “Answer” – as one of the four sections is titled – to the over-arching mystery of why
the crime happened. Capote’s story is not only thematically oriented toward sympathy for
Smith but also structurally arranged to create sympathy for him. For example, Capote narrates
the night of the Clutter murders, the crucial episode, in Smith’s voice. He devotes much
lengthier sections, the longest chapter of the book in fact, to Smith’s biography, and includes
long texts written by Smith’s father and sister. Smith’s psychology gets analyzed in detail, while
Hickock’s sexual deviance is first hidden, then dramatically revealed, then suggestively ignored.
By the end, the reader agrees with a detective watching Hickock’s execution, “I never would
have believed he had the guts. To take it like he did. I had him tagged a coward” (1966: 339).
Two different classes of distortion seem to be at work here: factual errors and
intentional narrative strategies. Mistaking how many churches are in Garden City, Kansas, or
how many assistants Detective Dewey had on the case doesn’t turn Capote’s book into fiction
ipso facto. Danto points out that:
Certainly, Capote could have made mistakes, but the appearance of these in his account
would not make it a work of fiction, for then errors in the forensic report or in the
newspaper article would constitute their authors as creative writers. (1981: 144)
The other class of distortions at play are strategic narrative decisions that help the author to
shape the limitless material of the world into a unified, coherent story. Capote himself referred
to these changes as “a question of selection”:
Now in that particular section where Perry talks about the reason for the murders, I
could have included other views. Perry’s happens to be the one I believe is the right one
… I could have added a lot of other opinions. But that would have confused the issue,
and indeed the book. I had to make up my mind and move toward that one view,
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always. You can say that the reportage is incomplete. But then it has to be. It’s a
question of selection, you wouldn’t get anywhere if it wasn’t for that.
(my ellipsis Plimpton 1966: 38)
Biased authorial selection does not carry the text over some invisible boundary into the world
of art; investigative reporters also select the facts that seem most relevant and leave out other
elements, making their reporting, strictly speaking, incomplete. But this sort of selection does
suggest that unity of perspective – “one view, always” – is an important principle for the writer.
Despite Capote’s hyperbolic claims to “one hundred per cent” factual accuracy, we must
remember that, as Nance puts it, “what In Cold Blood presents is Truman Capote’s view of the
facts,” not the facts themselves (1970: 180). That view is inseparable from the perspective of
the creative artist who saw, in Smith, “a character that was also in my imagination,” like a living
correlative of a fictional figment. Capote did not need “to invent” Smith to see him that way.
Smith certainly had not gone through life imagining himself to be a character in the fiction of
Truman Capote. So intentional distortion, done in bad faith, turns out to be only one variety of
invention. We might even ask, what representation of a human being, living, dead or imaginary,
turned into a literary character, rendered as language, is not at least partially an invention?
In other words, Capote seems to begin Danto’s “act of artistic identification … the logical
fulcrum on which a mere thing is elevated into the Realm of Art,” before he has written a word.
It is a question of perspective, of how he looks at his subject. To Capote, Smith may be both a
friend and a figment, a living human being and a literary character. Nevertheless, in order for
Capote to create his work of art, he must exercise his powers of authorial selection in order to
isolate “one view,” perspective, or truth, even at the expense of other perspectives, views or
truths. Such narrative work, when it succeeds, may bring a literary character to life,
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transfiguring a literary representation from the realm of true or false biography into the realm
of art. The difference between biographical representation and literary character thus matches
the distinction between mere representation and literary art. Capote’s “large and small errors
and inventions” are a “violation of contract” pushing his book toward the “‘truths’ of fiction
rather than fact,” Lounsberry says (1990: xiv). But another way of putting things, avoiding the
fact-fiction binary, might be to say that In Cold Blood’s factual inaccuracies are criteria suited to
judging its veridical truth, while its strategic distortions reveal Capote’s artistic aspirations.
When we consider how literary characters relate to the strange transfiguration of life
into art, the metaphor of the mirror reappears – because Capote’s art relies on his ability to see
himself in Perry Smith, and his ability to make us, reading at home, see ourselves in his
representation of Perry Smith. This is what Arthur Danto suggests is Hamlet’s canny revision of
the imitation theory of art, in which art’s task is “to hold as ’twere the mirror up to nature; to
show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his
form and pressure” (1997: 1708). Rather than representational art being a mere illusion,
Hamlet sees it as a powerful force for self-revelation, a sort of metaphorical image in which we
can see ourselves. “The greatest metaphors of art I believe to be those in which the spectator
identifies himself with the attributes of the represented character,” Danto writes:
So the thought that art is a mirror (a convex mirror!) has after all some substance, for, as
we saw at the beginning of our inquiry, mirrors tell us what we would not know about
ourselves without them, and are instruments of self-revelation. One has learned
something about oneself if one can see oneself as Anna [Karenina], knowing of course
that one is not a Fine Woman or necessarily a woman at all … You are what the work is
ultimately about, a commonplace person transfigured into an amazing woman.
(my ellipsis 1981: 173)
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From the preceding pages and from Danto’s reflections we can draw one salient point about
the nature of the relationship between the writer, the reader and the subject of a work of art.
The relationship between writer and subject – and also between reader and subject – seems
analogous to artistic identification and has the structure of a metaphor. The metaphorical
identification is double: 1) the literary representation is Perry Smith; and 2) I myself while
reading am also Perry Smith, or more correctly, I can imagine myself as Perry Smith.
The identification is not literal. The words on the page are never confused with the
once-living human being known as Perry Smith, and if we entertain the thought-content of
being Perry Smith, we do so nonassertively, without actually believing the propositional content
that we are in fact Perry Smith, without ever being “committed to the truth of the proposition,”
in Carroll’s terms (1990: 80). To be convinced thus would be to confuse illusion for reality,
replacing literary verisimilitude with deception. That would make the artist a magician. Rather,
the sympathetic reader acknowledges his or her metaphorical connection with the condemned
pariah, “a commonplace person” turned momentarily into an outlaw killer. The power of the
metaphorical transfiguration lies in the contrast between the two terms, as much as in their
conjunction. You do not have to be on death row to understand Perry’s rage against society.
You are “what the work is ultimately about,” Danto says, but you are not the work itself.
5. Norman Mailer and the Novel as History
Capote explained authorial selection as the means by which he asserted creative control
over his material. When Plimpton pressed him on if he was also a participant, Capote admitted,
“the single most difficult thing in my book, technically, was to write it without ever appearing
myself” (1966: 38). Capote finds a near substitute for an author figure in Detective Dewey,
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whose investigation parallels his narrative, but there is nothing like the authorial presence of
The Muses Are Heard, in which Capote often includes himself in the dramatic mise-en-scène.
Though he did many interviews for In Cold Blood, we never read Capote’s questions, and only in
a few crucial moments does he provide the detectives’ questions. But the author’s influence
appears in the arrangement of the material as a narrative: we see his handiwork in the
organization of the evidence, the testimony, the facts and interviews.
Capote’s technique is conspicuous. He moves freely between perspectives – or in the
terminology of non-art, between sources. Capote described his process to Plimpton like this:
It began, of course, with interviews – with all the different characters of the book. Let
me give you two examples of how I worked from these interviews. In the first part of the
book – the part that’s called “The Last to See Them Alive” – there’s a long narration,
word for word, given by the school teacher who went with the sheriff to the Clutter
house and found the four bodies. Well, I simply set that into the book as a straight
complete interview – though it was, in fact, done several times: each time there’d be
some little thing which I’d add or change. But I hardly interfered at all. A slight editing
job. The school teacher tells the whole story himself – exactly what happened from the
moment they got to the house, and what they found there.
On the other hand, in that same first part, there’s a scene between the
postmistress and her mother when the mother reports that the ambulances have gone
to the Clutter house. That’s a straight dramatic scene – with quotes, dialogue, action,
everything. But it evolved out of interviews just like the one with the school teacher.
Except in this case I took what they had told me and transposed it into straight narrative
terms. Of course, elsewhere in the book, very often it’s direct observations, events I saw
myself – the trial, the executions. (ibid.: 38)
Any critical appraisal of Capote’s book as non-art would find matter for criticism here: the
reader can never be quite certain of the source of any piece of information. Not only does
Capote move with unscrupulous fluidity between quoted testimony – supposedly exact except
for his “slight editing job[s]” – and “dramatic scene[s],” but some of the material is also drawn
from his own “direct observations.” In places, Capote has inserted his own eyewitness
testimony, surreptitiously, into the testimony of others, for example in Smith’s dubious apology
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from the gallows (which of course might also have been pure fiction). This sort of creative
freedom makes In Cold Blood an unreliable factual record of the historical events it describes;
but this is exactly the principle of “selection” that Capote argued was the basis for his style and
the foundation of his book as a work of art. Can we distinguish between artistic and non-artistic
methods of handling evidentiary material? Is Capote’s willingness to sacrifice veridical certainty
for the sake of narrative style merely a sort of failure of credibility, a lack of trustworthiness?
The questions point back to the difference between the genres.
Norman Mailer attempted to describe their difference in The Armies of the Night (1968),
not by removing himself from the narrative, as Capote had done, but by making himself the
protagonist. His book bore a subtitle, History as a Novel, The Novel as History. In the first part, a
character named Norman Mailer, who is always referred to in the third-person, attends a
protest rally against the Vietnam war on the steps of the Pentagon. In the second part, the
story of the anti-war movement leading up to and during that rally is narrated in the style of
factual, objective history. Thirty years later, Mailer described his intentions in an interview with
J. Michael Lennon, “I divided the book into fiction and nonfiction. I was saying, in effect, that
they’re equal. When you write history, you’re writing a species of fiction. What one’s doing,
ultimately is giving one’s vision of life” (1999: 145). In fact, what Mailer “say[s]” with the
bipartite structure of his book is more complicated than that. The split narrative dramatizes the
difference between the two forms: it reveals the different narrative styles and perspectives
they rely on, their rhetorical framing and their range. Mailer also reveals, perhaps
unintentionally at first, that he is not an historian. Not only is “History as a Novel” much longer,
more original and more successful than the second part, “The Novel as History”; but Mailer
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cannot maintain even a parody of a formal, judicious, non-intrusive historical style for long.
After five chapters, he is forced to admit “that the conceit one is writing history must be
relinquished” (1968: 254). The two sections were never quite so simple as novel and history.
Right at the moment when the historical narrative breaks down, Mailer shows his hand:
The first book can be, in the formal sense, nothing but a personal history which while
written as a novel was to the best of the author’s memory scrupulous to facts, and
therefore a document; whereas the second, while dutiful to all newspaper accounts,
eyewitness reports, and historic inductions available, while even obedient to a general
style of historical writing, at least up to this point, while even pretending to be a history
(on the basis of its introduction) is finally now to be disclosed as some sort of
condensation of a collective novel – which is to admit that an explanation of the mystery
of the events at the Pentagon cannot be developed by the methods of history – only by
the instincts of the novelist. (1968: 255)
When Mailer stops to consider, he decides that the genres (or forms) he is writing are neither
novel nor history. The first part, because it involves no invention and is, he insists, scrupulous to
facts, he calls “a document.” We can assume he does not mean document in the same sense
that my shopping list or rental agreement is “a document,” but does not elaborate on what
such a documentary novel might look like. The second part seems even more mysterious: it is
“some sort of condensation of a collective novel” disguised as history, though what makes it
“collective” is not explained either. Rather than switching from novel to history, Mailer has
written two different sorts of novels, neither more “scrupulous to facts” nor more reliable than
the other. The difference between the two parts is that one is about the character-protagonist,
Norman Mailer, while the other is about the anti-war movement and the rally, the “collective,”
taken as a character.
Rather than proving that fiction and nonfiction are, “in effect,” equal, Mailer has made
an argument for the superiority of the novel as a mode for recording history. The problem is
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not necessarily the impossible to convey complexity of the historical event itself – “forget that
the journalistic information available from both sides is so incoherent, inaccurate,
contradictory, malicious, even based on error that no accurate history is conceivable” – but
rather, the sort of story Mailer wants to tell (1968: 255). The March on the Pentagon in October
1967 was not such an important event in the larger historical sense; it is not often remembered
today; nothing was decided by it, nothing much changed because of it. But “the mystery of the
events” Mailer wants to reveal is not their historical importance; it is their importance for the
cultural and spiritual life of the nation. They reveal something about the real “collective” hero
of the novel: the generation coming of age in the 1960s. This sort of story can be disguised as a
history, but only for so long. In the end, the mask must fall away and the face beneath it be
exposed. History and novels are both narrative forms, but it seems that some narratives may be
novelistic in themselves, rather than in their “framing,” while others are historical per se. This is
what we meant to suggest by referring to the range of the different forms. Mailer explains:
No, the difficulty is that the history is interior – no documents can give sufficient
intimation: the novel must replace history at precisely the point where experience is
sufficiently emotional, spiritual, psychical, moral, existential, or supernatural to expose
the fact that the historian in pursuing the experience would be obliged to quit the
clearly demarcated limits of historic inquiry. So these limits are now relinquished. The
collective novel which follows, while still written in the cloak of an historic style, and,
therefore, continuously attempting to be scrupulous to the welter of a hundred
confusing and opposed facts, will now unashamedly enter that world of strange lights
and intuitive speculation which is the novel. (1968: 255)
Mailer cannot resist his “instincts” to novelize. The sort of inquiry he is pursuing is a different
variety than the “historic inquiry” he has been trying to approximate. But Mailer was hardly the
first to think of the novel as the history of a hero’s interior life. Georg Lukács, in his The Theory
of the Novel (1916), also wrote about the novel as this sort of an inquiry, “The novel tells of the
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adventure of interiority; the content of the novel is the story of the soul that goes to find itself,
that seeks adventures in order to be proved and tested by them, and, by proving itself, to find
its own essence” (1971: 89). These are the strange lights and intuitive speculations that Mailer
can’t resist. “Norman Mailer,” the hero of part one, is “proved and tested” by the protest just
as much as the collective movement, the hero of part two, is “proved and tested” by it. Both of
these protagonists must face the crucible of realizing their inner essence in outer experience, in
a world that does not correspond to their interiority, a world they must transform in their own
image. “The contingent world and the problematic individual are realities which mutually
determine one another,” Lukács writes (1971: 78). The relationship between interiority and
world is the “the mystery of the events.” It is the story of the world becoming itself. History can
only tell us of events and of the people who lived and performed them, while novels can tell us
of the inner events pushing characters to make history – though it can only do so by creating
metaphorical characters, “imaginary selves” as Kundera says, in whom we see ourselves.
This necessary leap, from the factual to the metaphorical, is the reason why Norman
Mailer must, in the first, autobiographical part of The Armies of the Night, refer to himself in
the third-person as “Norman Mailer.” He begins by mocking the journalistic accounts of his
participation in the protest. “From the outset, let us bring you news of your protagonist,” he
writes, before quoting a short article from Time magazine, in its entirety, describing a speech
that he gave in not very flattering terms (1968: 3). The entire book thus contradicts and
attempts to correct the journalistic and historical record, setting itself up from the beginning as
a sort of anti-history. But the crux is the creation of an author-figure to stand in for Mailer as
the protagonist, whom Mailer never calls “I.” The reason for that, I think, is his sense of the
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inherent fictitiousness of the “I” in journalism, and his hope that emphasizing it will help the
reader to metaphorically identify with the character. Janet Malcolm is at her most trenchant
when she considers the sort of first-person narration common in literary journalism. In the
afterword to The Journalist and the Murderer, she describes:
a misconception about the identity of the character called “I” in a work of journalism.
This character is unlike all the journalist’s characters in that he forms the exception to
the rule that nothing may be invented: the “I” character in journalism is pure invention.
Unlike the “I” of autobiography who is meant to be seen as a representation of the
writer, the “I” of journalism is connected to the writer only in a tenuous way – the way,
say, that Superman is connected to Clark Kent.” (1990: 160)
The problem, she suggests, is the impossible ideal of the “participant-observer,” which
journalists, like anthropologists, aspire to in vain (1990: 160). The Armies of the Night suggests
that the primary conceit of first-person journalism may be inherently fictitious.
Another of Mailer’s most successful literary experiments also narrates how the interior
life of a character became the primary material of history, though that character is not Mailer.
In fact, Mailer’s most brilliant touch in The Executioner’s Song (1979) is to make the fiction of a
pure “observer” seem almost plausible. The book tells the story of Gary Mark Gilmore,
convicted of two murders by the state of Utah and executed by firing squad. Gilmore’s case
became one of the most written about stories of 1976, both because he was the first American
to be executed in over a decade and because he refused to appeal and insisted on his death
sentence being carried out quickly. Mailer gave his book a subtitle he later regretted, invoking
and at the same time avoiding Capote’s formulation by calling it “A True-Life Novel.” The book
does not only tell Gilmore’s story, but it also shows how Gilmore’s story becomes fodder for a
voracious news media, descending upon small town Utah to capitalize on a narrative of grisly
crimes and violent death. The second part of Mailer’s thousand-page-long tome is dominated
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by the figure of Lawrence Schiller, a producer and, for some, a media “carrion bird” who had
already made a profit on the stories of Jack Ruby, Susan Atkins and Marilyn Monroe (1979:
640). Schiller resents his bad reputation and aspires to do more meaningful journalism. He sees
Gary Gilmore as a chance to realize his more noble aspirations and he descends on the scene,
buying the rights to the story from all the principle characters, interviewing Gilmore secretly
while he waits on death row, trying to sell the project to film and television companies, and
constantly repeating the word “history”:
He had learned one lesson he would never erase, and thought of it again on the night he
dined with the Judges. The secret of people who had class was that they remained
accurate to the facts. Schiller called it history. You recorded history right. If you did the
work that way, you could end up a man of substance. (1979: 600)
Again and again, Schiller claims his interests are more respectable than mercenary. “Forget
Larry Schiller the businessman,” he tells his accomplices, “that’s a side of me, but we’re
forgetting it. We have history here. We have to get that” (1979: 719). In the final four-hundred
pages of the novel, Schiller goes about accumulating information, negotiating contracts,
interviewing, amassing a trove of material any way he can – all in the name of “history.” What
Mailer does not reveal, though the reader quickly suspects it, is that this mass of documentary
evidence, interviews, testimony, contracts and legal acquisitions will ultimately find its way to
him, to Mailer; that this is the very source material of the “history” we find ourselves reading.
Perhaps Mailer had forgotten the discovery made in The Armies of the Night of the
essential difference between the two forms: that the novel records its own sort of history, filled
with “strange lights and intuitive speculation.” He described The Executioner’s Song to Lennon,
years later, as a roman-à-clef with real names:
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The Executioner’s Song absolutely defies category, because I use the real names of the
people … I could have made it a novel by changing all the names. Call Gary Gilmore,
Harry Kilmore, and so forth, and it would have been a “key” novel. People would have
said, “Oh, so-and-so is so-and-so in that book.” But by keeping the same names I pushed
the envelope forward on what a novel is and what it isn’t. I would say that what makes a
novel is not whether the facts occurred or not. You can never get the real facts. You
approximate them; you approach them. What is important is the way you present the
facts. I would argue then that since I wrote it in the form of a novel, it is a novel. The
form, the medium, determines the message. (my ellipsis Lennon 1999: 146)
Mailer made a number of other provocative statements about the novel as a genre and its
difference from history and journalism. He often maligned journalism and professed the novel
as his calling, though his nonfiction (or perhaps we should say his journalistic fiction) proved
more successful than his novels both in terms of readership and recognition, as Lennon shows
in another article, “Norman Mailer: Novelist, Journalist or Historian” (2006). Often, Mailer
played the provocateur with his quips and one-liners, as when he told an interviewer from the
New York Times, “A writer has certain inalienable rights, and one is to create confusion” (qtd in
Hersey 1980: 22). Perhaps it was exactly by creating generic confusion that he saw himself
“push[ing] the envelope” of the novel form. Even more suggestively, Mailer defended calling
his book a “true life novel” by saying, “God was at least as good a novelist as I am” (qtd in
Hersey ibid.: 15). Looking past these theatrics, we can describe Mailer’s views in simpler terms:
he sees history as a sub-genre of fiction. Historians “never get the real facts,” they only
“approximate,” and Mailer does not hold their approximations in very high regard. Historians,
he says, are “dealing with 10,000 facts and they select 300 very careful ones to make their case,
and call that stuff history when we all know it’s fiction” (Qtd in Lennon 2006: 96). If history is
inherently inferior to the novel, a sort of novel written with the facts prejudged and the
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conclusions already drawn, Mailer writes a variety of “history as a novel” more open to
ambiguity, uncertainty and all those “strange lights and intuitive speculations.”56
The problem is in the presentation of interiority on which Mailer’s novel relies. Whose
interior lights and speculations are we reading about, anyway? The book contains an afterward
that draws back the curtain on Mailer’s process and thanks the people who contributed to it,
over a hundred names, including all the interviewees, readers and assistants. Unlike Capote,
who insisted his book was entirely accurate without revealing his research methods, Mailer
attempts to outline the story behind the narrative and to admit where and why he has
embellished. He verges on admitting deceit. For example, the novel opens and closes with the
same “old prison rhyme,” that Mailer concedes in his afterword “is not, alas, an ancient ditty
but a new one and was written by this author” (1979: 1052). He also admits to editing
“secondary material, like newspaper quotes”; to revising Gilmore’s interviews so as “to treat
him decently”; and crucially, to improving Gilmore’s letters to Nicole Baker “to show him at a
level higher than his average” (1968: 1052). In just a few sentences, he reveals several classes of
distortion; the truth about the old prison rhyme caps the series and has the effect of distracting
the reader from Mailer’s more serious admissions, like a diversionary tactic. Gilmore’s letters to
his girlfriend, Baker, written during the months before his execution when the lovers were not
allowed to see one another, are the basis for the story of their romance and offer the most
complete glimpse into the main character’s interior life. They constitute the heart of the drama.
The only passages in the novel that compete with these letters in terms of offering a direct
glimpse of the hero’s emotions, memories, desires, spiritual longings and regrets are the
transcripts of the interviews, included as a series of questions and answers, with which Mailer
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admits he has also tampered. As in The Armies of the Night, Mailer has diverged from writing
history “at precisely the point” where experience touches the “emotional, spiritual, psychical,
moral, existential, or supernatural.” Whether the book he has produced is about Gary Gilmore
the human being, or about Mailer himself metaphorically transposed onto Gary Gilmore the
literary character, is a question that each reader must answer for himself, without, perhaps,
enough information to know for sure. Gilmore himself would have been best able to tell us.
Perhaps the average reader will be more likely to judge the book based on the power of the
metaphorical transfiguration, if it convinces her to imagine herself as Gary Gilmore; or instead,
if she chooses merely to judge the book as a more or less accurate history of some events in the
biography of a paroled, recidivist killer who went by that name.
John Hersey did not pull any punches in his review of The Executioner’s Song. His
criticisms come in the same essay, “The Legend on the License,” in which he distanced himself
from all of the writers who had been experimenting at the crossroads of fiction and journalism
since he had moved on to the more ethically secure territory of teaching the classics to
undergrads at Yale. In Mailer’s book, Hersey was particularly disgusted to see Schiller’s alacrity
to collect and Mailer’s willingness to include intimate sexual details from Gilmore and Baker’s
relationship, writing that, “One of the conveniences of having a book be both fiction and
journalism is that when the journalist’s money-grubbing dirty tricks begin to stink, the novelist
can soar away on wings of art, far above it all” (1980: 14). Hersey also condemns the acquisition
of Gilmore’s letters, stolen from Baker by a “cub reporter” who had befriended her, and then
seized upon by Schiller as soon as “the copyright owner,” who was Gilmore, was dead (ibid.:16).
Yet it is not the provenance of the letters alone that bothers him, but that of all of Mailer’s
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information. In his afterword, Mailer emphasizes the vastness of the trove of interviews and
research materials that Schiller collected and then handed over to Mailer to shape into a book.
“It is safe to say that the collected transcript of every last recorded bit of talk would approach
fifteen thousand pages,” Mailer writes (1979: 1051). Hersey criticizes the reliability of this
research, and of scenes and dialogue based on second and third-hand accounts, writing that:
the filtration leading to direct quotation is through three and (when the informant is
repeating something another person has told him), even four sensibilities, to say
nothing of a fallible memory or two or three. And then, on top of all that, for art’s sake,
Mailer has tinkered. (1980: 15)
Such a criticism might seem to assume that all dialogue presented within quotation marks must
contain only the exact words literally spoken, and that dialogue in nonfiction just as much as in
fiction is not in itself a literary form. Hersey certainly knew better. Janet Malcolm reveals the
naivety of such a position in the afterword to The Journalist and the Murderer, when she takes
up the subject of transcribing tape-recorded interviews:
When we talk with somebody, we are not aware of the strangeness of the language we
are speaking. Our ear takes it in as English, and only if we see it transcribed verbatim do
we realize that it is a kind of foreign tongue … [But] novelists of our tape-recorder era
have continued to write dialogue in English rather than in tape-recorderese, and most
journalists who work with a tape recorder use the transcript of an extended interview
merely as an aid to memory … The transcript is not a finished version, but a kind of
rough draft of expression. As everyone who has studied transcripts of tape-recorded
speech knows, we all seem to be extremely reluctant to come right out and say what we
mean – thus the bizarre syntax, the hesitations, the circumlocutions, the repetitions, the
contradictions, the lacunae in almost every non-sentence we speak.
(my ellipses 1990: 155)
She proves her point by offering two versions of the same testimony, given by Michael Stone,
the psychiatrist who testified in the MacDonald-McGinniss lawsuit: first, she includes her
verbatim transcript; then, her edited version, also included in the body of the book. By
comparing them the reader easily grasps her point and also sees that this sort of editing is not
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equivalent to invention. But Malcolm describes another “technique” for rendering dialogue,
one practiced by another witness brought to testify in McGinniss’s defense, a writer of truecrime nonfiction novels, Joseph Wambaugh (formerly of the LAPD), who claimed to “invent
probable or at least possible dialogue based upon all the research that I do” (1990: 107).
Malcolm cuts him and his technique of writing “possible dialogue” to shreds with a single
sentence, and in the process reveals an important boundary line:
Although the Wambaugh technique is frequently used in historical novels – “Mon dieu,”
Richelieu said, “when the king hears this, he will freak out!” – as well as in Wambaugh’s
own “true crime” novels, it is out of the question for works that present themselves as
journalism. When we read a quotation in a newspaper story or in a text such as this one,
we assume it to be a rendering of what the speaker actually – not probably – said. The
idea of a reporter inventing rather than reporting speech is a repugnant, even sinister
one. (emphasis mine 1990: 158)
The work of “rendering” tape-recorder transcripts into readable dialogue is not at all the same
as “inventing” what someone probably or possibly said, and the difference between the two
techniques is also the difference the genres. But that difference might not always be as obvious
as Richelieu speaking contemporary American slang. Judging which technique a writer has used
in creating dialogue may rather be a question of evaluating their methodology and their sourcematerial – exactly as Hersey has done with Mailer. He makes a good case that Mailer’s dialogue
has strayed, at least in places, into the realm of the probable and the possible.
Rendering dialogue is not the same thing as transforming thoughts and feelings, many
months after they were experienced, into a narrative. Hersey also criticizes Mailer’s technique
for depicting this other sort of interiority, by making a list of what he calls “Mailerisms”:
touches of prose, nearly always final lines in the chapterettes, buffed to such
hummingbird-feather iridescence as almost to hurt the eye with the lights of their
beauty and intensity. Pure Mailer. From a journalistic standpoint, the significant thing
about these tag lines is that each Mailerism is presented as if within the point of view of
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a character. This is not reporting; it is projection. And the cumulative force of the
projections pushes the book right out of the country of journalism.
(emphasis not mine 1980: 18)
Hersey’s list of “Mailerisms” shows him to be a critic with a careful eye for the nuances of
prose: he identifies a number of Mailer’s brightest authorial flourishes. What Hersey does not
say is that each of these flourishes serves, and most succeed, at making the inner experience of
a character quickly accessible to a reader. One technical problem Mailer must have faced in a
novel with such an immense cast of characters, composed of brief sections (“chapterettes”) and
longer chapters all alternating between many perspectives, was how to render each character
as a unique individual very quickly, how to make each ‘come alive’ in just a few paragraphs.
Mailer seems to have solved the problem, in part, with these flashes of interiority. Removed
from their context and read together, as Hersey asks us to read them, we see the artisan’s hand
at work in them, we hear Mailer’s own voice. But read in context in the novel, they function;
only a skeptical reader, or perhaps a journalist, would pause over them and ask how Mailer
could possibly have known what it felt like for that character to be there on that day. The other
crucial detail Hersey leaves out is that these Mailerisms more or less correspond to what I have
described in Hersey’s own writing, most particularly in his Hiroshima, as novelistic moments.
They succeed, as Hersey wrote decades earlier, in “recaptur[ing] impressions and feelings,
dealing with the baffling, shadowy components of human character” (1949: 80). Perhaps they
“push” Mailer’s book “out of the country of journalism,” but Mailer was certainly not the first
traveler to have passed that way. Hersey’s main point of contention is that, between the
provenance of Mailer’s information, scenes which strike him as dubious, and these authorial
flourishes, “one can never know where Mailer the reporter leaves off and Mailer the novelist
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takes over” (1980: 20). This is the same point, essentially, that we made in regards to Capote’s
technique, which made the source of any particular piece of information finally unknowable.
We asked if there were two different methods for handling evidentiary material. Hersey offers
an answer when he writes, “In fiction, the writer’s voice matters; in reporting, the writer’s
authority matters” (1980: 20). The journalistic method accentuates the authority of the
narrative by scrupulous use and sourcing of evidence; and the fictional method makes the
source of the material secondary to the “voice,” power, “beauty and intensity” of the narrative.
The Executioner’s Song is not just Mailer writing his version of In Cold Blood. Mailer’s
true-life, true-crime novel about a murderer includes at least one formal development,
nowhere to be found in Capote’s book: Mailer includes the story of Lawrence Schiller and,
through him, the story of the source of his information. Mailer, like Capote, never enters the
text homodiegetically, yet his book is self-referential, dramatizing its own incipient production.
This functions as a sort of built-in argument for its veridical credibility, showing the reader how
Mailer got all fifteen-thousand pages of that hypothetical transcript. We imagine Mailer waiting
in the wings, off-stage and still oblivious. He seems to have recognized that half of the public’s
interest in In Cold Blood was imagining the story behind the story, picturing Capote in Kansas,
investigating, collecting the raw material for the book. Schiller, in a sense, demonstrates exactly
how events from life are transformed by a media industry into narratives to be consumed,
revealing not the border between life and art, but between life and representation. The irony
with which Mailer tells this story gives his book a unique, critical perspective on the world and
how we grasp its stories. His version of the tale of Gary Gilmore is probably not entirely reliable,
but his point seems rather to be revealing how little we know about such a story.
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We might have read about Gilmore, seen his face in the news and thought we
understood, only to find, after we have read The Executioner’s Song, that we did not
understand at all. The false face of celebrity is one of Mailer’s favorite themes, a theme
returned to in many of his works. When Gilmore’s lifeless body is brought to the autopsy room
at the University of Utah Hospital, Mailer makes the metaphor literal: he describes the autopsy
in gruesome detail, including a procedure that involved “pull[ing] the whole face down below
his chin until it was inside out like the back of a rubber mask” (1979: 1011). The shock of
revealing the hidden aspects of human character, what lies under the skin, has been Mailer’s
program throughout. He is more interested in startling his readers, in inspiring a sort of awe,
than in getting the anatomy exactly right. We can only trust he is as careful a worker as the
coroners, who finally stitch Gilmore back together and put the mask of his face back where it
belongs, and, “when they were all finished,” Mailer writes, “it looked like Gary Gilmore again”
(1979: 1011).
6. Conclusion: Skeptical Reading
Hersey made a mistake in his attack on the New Journalism: he suggested the problem
with literary journalism and veracity was something new, as though there were once a time
when reporting was sacrosanct and swashbuckling writers did not make accuracy second to art.
Other voices in the chorus of veracity scandals during the 1970s and 80s also suggested that
objectivity had once been hallowed and was now endangered, though historians of journalism
like John Hartsock and Michael Schudson suggest just the opposite. But Hersey’s mistake was
even more grave. He also named the wrong writers as examples. Hersey suggests Tom Wolfe
attacked the New Yorker with his 1965 “Tiny Mummies!” articles because he was afraid that:
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“his” New Journalism would have to be measured sooner or later against the
meticulously accurate and vivid reporting of such New Yorker writers as the wonderful
Joseph Mitchell or, let’s say, Lillian Ross and Truman Capote; who in turn were writing in
an honorable tradition, not new at all, reaching back to George Orwell, Henry Mayhew,
James Boswell. (1980: 6)
Hersey should have known by 1980 that Mitchell’s New Yorker writing, wonderful as it was,
could no longer pass for meticulously accurate “reporting.” In fact, Mitchell and Ross had
created their very own hybrid forms, which upon closer inspection raise the same problems
Hersey was claiming to uncover. The New Yorker of their era was a laboratory for exactly the
sort of literary experimentation that blended the forms of fiction with narratives based on fact.
Tom Wolfe’s own version of his 1965 literary squabble with William Shawn’s New Yorker, which
accompanies the reprinted “Tiny Mummies!” articles in Wolfe’s collection Hooking Up (2000), is
much more acute and quite a bit more entertaining.
Wolfe also turns out to be the more interesting critic in his assessment of the
“honorable tradition” in question. Though he did his best always to present himself on the side
of the “low-rent” underdogs while chronicling his central theme – social class – Wolfe had
earned a Ph.D. in American Studies from Yale. He was a student of literary history. His preface
to The New Journalism (1974) is characteristically playful, irreverent, satirical and sly, but it also
reveals a nuanced perspective on the place of “his” movement in the wider literary context.
Wolfe recalls his reaction to Capote insisting that In Cold Blood constituted a new literary genre,
“It was the familiar ‘Aha!’ flash. In this case: ‘Aha! The ever-clever Fielding dodge!’” (1974: 37)
Wolfe compares Capote’s supposed invention of the nonfiction novel to Henry Fielding
describing his first novel, Joseph Andrews (1742), as well as Tom Jones (1749), as a new genre,
“the comic epic poem in prose” (ibid.: 37). Like Fielding, Capote wanted “to give his work the
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cachet of the reigning literary genre of his time, so that literary people would take it seriously …
A slice of literary history was repeating itself” (my ellipsis Wolfe ibid.: 37). The insight led him to
his view of the New Journalism – not a name he particularly liked – and of the movement’s
contentious entry into the literary field. Wolfe had an explanation for why Dwight Macdonald
and others attacked him and his fellow New Journalists so viciously in 1965, calling their work
“parajournalism”: it was status anxiety. The way Wolfe describes the American literary field of
the 1960s is remarkably similar to what Bourdieu would later argue about French 19 th century
literature: that the organization of the field of cultural production can be understood in terms
of class conflict, if class is replaced in the equation by literary “legitimacy,” or what Wolfe calls
status (Bourdieu 1986: 50). Like Lodge, Wolfe argues that by the 1960s novelists had more or
less turned away from the main tradition in the novel, which he calls social realism. It was only
in this newly open space that his own brand of innovative journalism became possible:
By the Sixties, about the time I came to New York, the most serious, ambitious and,
presumably, talented novelists had abandoned the richest terrain of the novel: namely,
society, the social tableau, manners and morals, the whole business of ‘the way we live
now,’ in Trollope’s phrase. There is no novelist who will be remembered as the novelist
who captured the Sixties in America, or even in New York, in the sense that Thackeray
was the chronicler of London in the 1840’s and Balzac was the chronicler of Paris and all
of France after the fall of the Empire …
This was marvelous for journalists – I can tell you that. The Sixties was one of the
most extraordinary decades in American history in terms of manners and morals.
Manners and morals were the history of the sixties. (my ellipsis Wolfe 1974: 27)
It was only natural for the established members of the literary field to respond to Wolfe and his
newcomers acrimoniously, as they represented a threat to their literary status. Wolfe explains
the vociferous attacks levelled against him by MacDonald, Renata Adler and others with a more
expansive conception of the functioning of the field:
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Looking back on it one can see that what had happened was this: the sudden arrival of
this new style of journalism, from out of nowhere, had caused a status panic in the
literary community. Throughout the twentieth century literary people had grown used
to a very stable and apparently eternal status structure. It was somewhat like a class
structure on the eighteenth-century model in that there was a chance for you to
compete but only with people of your own class. (1974: 25)
In Wolfe’s conception of the field, novelists sit comfortably at the top; below them, “‘men of
letters,’ the literary essayists, the more authoritative critics, the occasional biographer,
historian or cosmically inclined scientist”; below them, the journalists; and so far below them as
to be invisible, the magazine journalists, “the lumpenproles” (1974: 25). Wolfe’s description of
finding himself in the vanguard of the creative spirit of his day and of discovering the enemies it
earned him seems convincing, but perhaps there is no better argument than an appeal to the
lasting relevance of Wolfe’s brand of “parajournalism,” easily evinced by the accolades that
followed upon his death in 2018, especially in comparison with Dwight MacDonald and Renata
Adler’s relative obscurity. Today, Wolfe’s work seems even more like the voice of the Sixties.
His attempts at a technical description of the New Journalism and its strange
intermingling of fact with fiction are not quite so convincing, however. Critics often describe the
form with ambiguous phrases that echo Capote’s formulation of it as a variety of journalism
that used “the techniques of fiction.” Wolfe connects Capote’s idea to literary history:
And here we come to a fine piece of irony. In abandoning social realism novelists also
abandoned certain vital matters of technique. As a result, by 1969 it was obvious that
these magazine writers – the lumpenproles themselves! – had also gained a technical
edge on the novelists. (1974: 29)
But Wolfe goes beyond Capote and elaborates what he sees as the essential points that
constitute this “technical edge.” He counts four: 1) scene-by-scene construction, or what we
might call the mimetic representations of events; 2) realistic dialogue, which Wolfe claims
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“involves the reader” and “establishes and defines character more quickly and effectively than
any other device”; 3) narrative point of view, or what Genette calls focalization, in which scenes
are presented from the perspective of characters; and 4) what Wolfe calls “status details,” or:
the recording of everyday gestures, habits, manners, customs, styles of furniture,
clothing, decoration, styles of traveling, eating, keeping house, modes of behaving
toward children, servants, superiors, inferiors, peers, plus the various looks, glances,
poses, styles of walking and other symbolic details that might exist within a scene.
Symbolic of what? Symbolic, generally, of people’s status life.
(emphasis not mine 1974: 31-32)
We should recognize an allusion in the word “recording” to what Wolfe describes as “the
crucial part that reporting plays in all story-telling” (1974: 14). For Wolfe, these four “devices”
are the essential characteristics of the central tradition in the history of the novel, “the main
circuit, which is realism” (1974: 34). While Lodge and Zavarzedeh saw experiments in literary
journalism as a rejection of the epistemology underlying literary realism, Wolfe, speaking as an
insider, described his work exactly opposite: as a return to the tradition of literary realism. But
he glosses over the contradictions in his argument, and several of his points appear
incompatible when viewed from other perspectives. For example, Wolfe writes “The idea was
to give the full objective description, plus something that readers had always had to go to
novels and short stories for: namely, the subjective or emotional life of the characters” (1974:
21). He does not pause to wonder if the two projects might be contradictory. What if attempts
to portray “the subjective or emotional” experiences of characters who are based on real living
human beings necessarily reduce the veridical reliability of an “objective” and “full” narrative?
Hersey makes exactly this argument when he says that a writer’s “authority” as a source of
information is not equivalent to the power of his “voice.” Wolfe gets into more problematic
territory when he describes what he calls a structural “advantage” inherent to his technique:
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The result is a form that is not merely like a novel. It consumes devices that happen to
have originated with the novel and mixes them with every other device known to prose.
And all the while, quite beyond matters of technique, it enjoys an advantage so obvious,
so built-in, one almost forgets what a power it has: the simple fact that the reader
knows all this actually happened.” (emphasis not mine 1974: 34)
Here we find the two components of the problematic equation of literary journalism described
as if they were not in conflict: on one side, the form of the novel, the techniques of fiction and
all the literary devices connected to the history of the novel; on the other side, a claim of
veridical credibility, of objectivity and truth, the knowledge that “all this actually happened.”
Wolfe even suggests that the second component lies within the purview of the reader, who
“knows,” or more accurately, believes, in the reliability of the narrative.
This is the crucial point: the technical apparatus of fiction and the literalist’s claim that
“all this actually happened” are irreconcilable. They form a sort of zero-sum binary: one side’s
strength is the other side’s weakness. To have authority one must forgo voice; to have the
power of fictional prose one must sacrifice some veridical credibility. The absolutely reliable
journalist must sacrifice some of the artfulness of her style, while the truly inspired novelist
must sacrifice some of her narrative’s believability. The two methods of handling evidentiary
material are incompatible, as are the two genres. Of course, the fact that these two imperatives
are mutually exclusive does not mean they cannot be forced together. It is a testament to
writers like Capote, Mailer and Wolfe that they pushed the equation to such limits. But our
argument suggests that this sort of an experiment relies on the reader’s belief in the narrative,
much more than on the reader’s knowledge of it.
The “bastard form” Tom Wolfe helped to “spawn” enjoyed its heyday, then disappeared
from the scene, it would seem. Literary journalists no longer call their books nonfiction novels.
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Despite Wolfe’s predictions that the writing practice would spread, it remained marginal, then
returned to the place from whence it came, namely, what we call magazine feature articles.
Even there, the frauds of the 1970s and 80s and the resulting veracity scandals raised industry
standards about accuracy and led to more reliable reporting and the disavowal of tropes like
the use of composite characters. But contemporary book-length works of nonfiction still bear
the marks of the nonfiction novel. A recent example of narrative journalism, Katherine Boo’s
Pulitzer Prize-winning Behind the Beautiful Forevers (2012), makes its case for credibility, as
Mailer did, with a concluding author’s note. This sort of author’s note, defending the reporting
usually by making claims about the extent of the interviewing done, the number of documents
consulted or pages of interview transcript compiled, seems to be one of the genre’s tropes.
Writers like Boo expect readers to be skeptical of the sources of information and especially of
the use of novelistic techniques like free indirect discourse, and so Boo writes:
When I describe the thoughts of individuals in the preceding pages, those thoughts have
been related to me and my translators, or to others in our presence. When I sought to
grasp, retrospectively, a person’s thinking at a given moment, or when I had to do
repeated interviews in order to understand the complexity of someone’s views – very
often the case – I used paraphrase. (2014: 250).
Boo attempts to make transparent the story of the interviewing, translation and transcription
through which the information has passed, allowing us to consider its provenance, as Hersey
did for Mailer. However, she has removed all reference to herself and to her participation in the
lives of her characters from the narrative itself, relegating this part of the story to the note.
Readers have little choice but to trust her.57 Rania Abouzeid begins her recent book on Syria, No
Turning Back, with a note reassuring readers that, in it, “there are no composite characters”
(2018: xii). Abouzeid also inserts occasional first-person descriptions of her own participation in
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scenes, interviews and interactions with characters into the narrative, perhaps so that she will
not be confused for a non-focalized or omniscient narrator. Her concluding author’s note
attempts to describe the sources and checks done for quite a bit of the information in the book,
admitting when some storylines, like that of the political infighting within Islamist factions,
were, “to put it mildly, difficult to report” (2018: 361). Abouzeid grounds her claims to authority
on eyewitness participation – there are fewer cultural or linguistic barriers here – and on
reportorial rigor:
I spent so much time in northern Syria that fighters who moved from battle to battle
often recognized me on various fronts, a fact that helped me gain the access – and trust
– of a number of armed groups. Witnessing, however, is one thing – trusting a person’s
testimony is another. I believe nothing until I have what I deem a critical mass of
information to consider something true. It’s an unemotional skepticism that is central to
my work. (ibid.: 357).
To describe the source of every piece of information in a book like Abouzeid’s or Boo’s would
require another book, like a companion volume, that only professionals would bother reading.
But every reader of nonfiction can emulate the sort of “unemotional skepticism” that Abouzeid
professes, weighing authors’ notes against narrative techniques against reporters’ reputations,
withholding belief until we have accumulated “a critical mass of information.”
But even these various criteria will depend upon a larger, categorical question: how we
understand the genre of the book. Knowing when to suspend disbelief and when to exercise
skepticism, or in philosophical terminology, when to entertain a thought-content and when to
accept a work’s propositional content, depends on what sort of book we think we are reading.
We make this determination all the time, though usually we do not even recognize that we are
making it. Jonathan Culler writes:
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Creatures of language, we encounter a wide range of discourses every day and sort
them into genres, more or less automatically, so as to process them and determine how
to respond: this is an advertisement; this is a friendly message; this is a news story. A
society is in part constituted by its discourses; to be a functioning adult is to be able to
recognize swiftly what sort of discourse we are dealing with. (2015: 39) 58
The nonfiction novel problematizes this “more or less automatic” genre-recognition process.
Readers are never quite sure which interpretive stance to adopt. We know that while reading
nonfiction we must exercise skepticism, but the novelist’s artistry leads us in another direction.
We can even swing back and forth between these interpretive positions while reading. In some
recent scholarship distinguishing the genre of the counterfactual or alternate-history novel
from that of the historical novel, Catherine Gallagher reveals how readers navigate between
these different discourses more or less automatically even within the same text:
Modes of reference often vary widely within works and just as we usually read names in
novels differently from the way we read them in newspapers or history books, we
sometimes – especially in historical novels – engage in a dialectically different reading
within a work. Competent readers do not first encounter the names of well-known
historical figures in novels, for example “Napoleon,” with the same suspension of
semantic expectations we have when first reading the names of fictional characters, like
“Pierre Bezukhov.” (Gallagher 2011: 318)
Competent readers understand that much of what is said about Napoleon in War and Peace is
fictional, while the character himself has a measure of particular referentiality Pierre does not.
Readers encountering Tolstoy’s Napoleon thus travel “a modal arc, even though the sentences
remain grammatically indicative,” as we move between historical facts and fictional inventions
(Gallagher ibid.: 321). Readers of a nonfiction novel travel a similar “modal arc,” pulled between
novelistic prose and Wolfe’s built-in advantage: that all this (may have) actually happened.
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Of all the critical approaches to the problem of distinguishing art from history, perhaps
none is so elegant as that found in Aristotle’s Poetics. It appears in his description of the
components of tragic plots, in the context of what he calls universality:
The historian and the poet are not distinguished by their use of verse or prose; it would
be possible to turn the works of Herodotus into verse, and it would be a history in verse
just as much as in prose. The distinction is this: the one says what has happened, the
other the kind of thing that would happen.
(1996: 16)
The use of the conditional in “would happen” here is meant to suggest “what is possible in
accordance with probability or necessity,” in contrast to the particular (ibid.: 16). These are
separate quantities, Aristotle says, and they determine the genre. A categorical distinction
between historians and poets suggests that the nonfiction novel is ultimately an impossible
ideal, a combination of fundamentally distinct units, like an admixture of oil and water. “The
kind of thing that would happen” is by necessity not the same thing that “has happened”; it is
the merely possible or plausible. “Poetry tends to express universals, and history particulars,”
Aristotle says (ibid.: 16). But the categories are perhaps not quite as distinct as it would seem –
notice the hesitancy of the verb “tends.” Poets, and in particular the ones Aristotle is
considering, tragic poets, did write about historical figures and they did “keep to actual names”
(ibid.: 16).59 But Aristotle explains this away as an appeal to our willingness to believe their
stories, rather than as an essential of the form itself. “What is possible is plausible; we are
disinclined to believe what has not happened is possible, but it is obvious that what has
happened is possible – because it would not have happened if it were not,” he says (ibid.: 16).
Thus, historical figures can share the stage with invented characters and the product “gives no
less pleasure,” despite the pretense toward history (ibid.: 16). Aristotle’s notion of universality
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thus answers Plato’s charge, from Book X of the Republic, that poets are merely sorcerers,
trafficking in illusions. He accepts Plato’s notion that the arts are imitation, but he disputes the
contingent claim that there are only “two kinds of compositions, one true, one false” (Plato
2012: 69). Poetry, he suggests, presents its own kind of truth, universality, in contrast to
history’s variety of truth, which is particularity. But what exactly is universality?:
The universal is the kind of speech or action which is consonant with a person of a given
kind in accordance with probability or necessity; this is what poetry aims at, even
though it applies individual names. The particular is the actions or experiences of (e.g.)
Alcibiades. (emphasis not mine Aristotle 1996: 16)
How a person of a particular rank, position, or personality type would likely behave in a given
situation: that is Aristotle’s idea of poetic truth. This suggests that the poets have a specialized
knowledge of human nature, and from there, it is but a short leap to the idea that art is a mirror
revealing us to ourselves. Historians do not write to express this sort of “universal,” but rather,
as Herodotus tells us at the beginning of his History, “in the hope of thereby preserving from
decay the remembrance of what men have done” – not what men would have done or might
have done (Finley 1977: 29). Yet Aristotle’s distinction between history and poetry and their
two aims – one expressing particularity, the other universality – perhaps reformulates the same
binary we have seen described with other labels, albeit in more limited and convincing terms.60
How can we be sure that Aristotle’s approach is not simply another description of the problem,
rather than a true solution to it? Is it possible to draw a distinction between history and art?
The answer seems to lie beyond merely the author’s intentions and the narrative tricks
and techniques used in the text itself, but also, at least in part, with the reader. I have called
this aspect of the question the reader’s stance. When the reader takes an aesthetic stance
toward the work, then she reads it not as “what men have done,” as particular historical fact,
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but rather as “the kind of thing that would happen,” as universal, aesthetic, or human truth.
Knowing when to accept a book as worth believing is the problem. Some extra knowledge or
training may be necessary, if we are to read from the correct stance. Reading is not simply the
ability to recognize symbols as letters, groups of letters as words, groups of words as sentences,
and so on. One higher-order component of reading may be knowing when to read skeptically.
This extra knowledge may be roughly equivalent to what Danto calls “the artworld,” when he
explains why a contemporary artist putting a readymade in an art gallery can call it an art work,
while the factory-worker who fabricates the actual item is not making art:
[The artist’s] identification of what he has made is logically dependent upon the theories
and history he rejects … To see something as art requires something the eye cannot
decry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.
(my ellipsis Danto 1964: 579)61
Something similar may be true of a reader’s ability to identify a work of nonfiction as deserving
of belief: the decision depends upon some extra sort of training or ability – in this case, rather
than “an atmosphere of artistic theory,” it would seem to be some sort of journalistic training,
or perhaps in some cases a natural disposition toward skepticism. It is something like a good
reporter’s habit of withholding belief until she has accumulated “a critical mass of information.”
But it does not come natural to all of us. If Danto suggests that the untrained will not
recognize the art in replacing the fountain with the urinal, the example of dubious nonfiction
suggests just the opposite: that the aesthetic stance may be the more natural one for us to
take. Children hardly need to be coached to believe their favorite stories. Most of us are more
naturally imaginative than skeptical. We are, perhaps, born believers, and must learn to doubt.
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Part Two
Section Three
Riding the Bus:
Tracing a Legacy of Influence in Three Mexican Urban Chronicles
1. Origins and Idiosyncrasies of the Contemporary Mexican Chronicle
The first time Carlos Monsiváis published his anthology of Mexican crónica (chronicle),
in 1979, he included an appendix discussing another, similar form, the literary journalism that
was still en vogue across the border, called the New Journalism. This version of Monsiváis’s
anthology was put out by the Humanities Department at UNAM, the university where he had
studied and with whom he published a number of lesser works. It bore the rather edifying title
Antología de la crónica en México (Anthology of the Chronicle in Mexico) (1979). A year later, he
published another version, this time for a wider audience, with many of the same readings.
Now the book bore a more engaging title, A ustedes les consta (As You Will know) (1980), it
included new material and was graced by a revised, expanded prologue. This version of the
anthology remains popular. It can still be found quite easily among the stalls of the tianguis de
libros in the alley behind the Palacio Postal in Mexico City, or among the stacks of volumes
climbing up to the ceiling in the used bookstores of Calle Donceles.
Monsiváis was one of the principal figures in a generation of writers who, beginning in
the 1960s, reinvented the Mexican chronicle, turning it into a tool for recording and intervening
in a dramatically changing society. He would produce books in many genres, but his most
famous works would be collections of crónicas. He would also write two long critical studies
tracing the genealogy of the form through Mexican literary history to its earliest antecedents.
The prologue to A ustedes les consta was the more substantial of these two studies, and it
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contains Monsiváis’s “working definition” of the nebulous, protean genre, as well as some of his
most perspicacious reflections on it. But both that essay as well as the article, “De la Santa
Doctrina al Espíritu Público (From the Holy Doctrine to the Public Spirit),” end with critical
reflections on Monsiváis’s own contemporaries, suggesting a historically coherent tradition. The
form of the crónica dates back, he suggests, to the crónicas de Indias, those accounts of the
conquest written by the first Spanish to arrive in the New World, accounts that were
contemporary with Cervantes’s Don Quixote, making the form about as old as the modern
novel. This section will describe part of that history, considering the contemporary Mexican
chronicle as a literary form entirely distinct from North American literary journalism.
What Monsiváis’s second version of the anthology does not contain are the pages on
North American New Journalism that he had included as an appendix to his first anthology.
Neither will readers find the entry, amidst examples of “Chronicle in Mexico,” of an excerpt
from John Reed’s Insurgent Mexico (1914), which Monsiváis had included in the first version.
Much of Monsiváis’s critical writing has been neglected because of “la condición dispersa y
fragmentaria de su obra (the fragmentary, dispersed state of his works),”62 spread out between
countless publications (Villoro 2017: 40). Monsiváis’s forgotten reflections on North American
New Journalism are typically insightful, ironic, astute and wry. He has read all or nearly all of
the crucial texts, including the thousand-odd pages of Mailer’s most recent tome, published
that very same year. His conclusions – “conclusiones que son generalizaciones (y viceversa)
(conclusions that are generalizations (and viceversa))” he says – are typically original and
attuned to the paradoxes of media, “se va abandonando la obsesión de las jerarquías
noticiosas, imposibles de establecer en esa democracia forzada de imágenes que es la TV (the
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obsession with new hierarchies is being abandoned, impossible to establish in that democracy
of imposed images which is TV)” (1979: 215). Neither did his critical acumen fail him when it
came time for a prognosis: even while New Journalism was still riding the crest of its popularity
in the U.S., Monsiváis foresaw that the importance of the movement was already spent.
“Desaparece el esplendor arrogante del Nuevo Periodismo. Continúan vigente muchas de sus
lecciones técnicas (the arrogant splendor of the New Journalism is disappearing. Many of its
technical lessons remain valid),” he concludes (ibid.: 216). But the continuing importance of a
foreign literary tradition was perhaps a strange place to end an anthology of crónica en México,
and the appendix was cut and mostly forgotten.
Another short text on the same subject, published nearly forty years later, also suggests
the relevance of the “technical lessons” of the New Journalism. Monsiváis’s Antología personal
(Personal Anthology) (2009) is a sort of compendium of favorite subjects and influences,
popular, local and literary, and it includes a text on North American journalism:
En la década de 1960 se difunde internacionalmente una corriente norteamericana, el
New Journalism, el Nuevo Periodismo, la pretensión de capturar la actualidad con textos
a medio camino entre la información y la literatura … Son numerosos los (en América
Latina) que aprenden de Wolfe.
During the 1960s a North American trend spreads internationally, the New Journalism,
the attempt to capture the present with texts halfway between information and
literature … There are many (in Latin America) who learn from Wolfe.
(not my ellipsis Monsiváis 2009: 239)
This short text reprises some of the arguments from the earlier appendix, while suggesting even
more strongly a potential influence of the North American tradition on Monsiváis and his own
generation of “nuevos cronistas (new chroniclers)” confronting “el desmadre que ordena el
universo post-apocalíptico (the chaos that orders the post-apocalyptic universe)” (ibid.: 243).
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Nevertheless, any potential influence should not be overstated; Monsiváis’s pages on North
American literary journalists are far outweighed in Antología personal by his texts on Spanishlanguage journalists in Mexico and beyond. He did not edit all mention of the North Americans
from the second, more famous version of his anthology – he mentions Wolfe and Mailer in
several instances – but the decision to remove the appendix and the excerpt from John Reed,
and only to mention the tradition of writing being practiced just north of the border
haphazardly, rather than to directly confront it with a text, demands some interpretation.
Why did Monsiváis cut his pages on North American New Journalism? Perhaps there is a
hint in the title that he gave to the appendix, ironically borrowing that of James Agee’s book,
“Alabemos ahora a los hombres famosos (Let Us Now Praise Famous Men)” (1979: 199). The
North Americans were already getting enough attention. Monsiváis’s decision to change his
anthology must be read as the articulation of a critical position: the Mexican crónica should be
considered on its own, as a unique, independent literary genre with its own history and
traditions; as the product of a genealogy of writers belonging to a specific nation and culture;
and as not at all contingent upon or derivative of whatever exciting things journalists might
have been writing somewhere other than in Mexico. Chronicle in Mexico deserved no less
attention than that afforded to the famous literary journalists so lauded in the nearby U.S.A.
Monsiváis knew the U.S. tradition intimately, but it was still a different tradition.
Limiting the scope of his anthology to crónica en México was a shrewd tactic for many
reasons. The genre term, chronicle, comprises a broad variety of discursive practices, ranging
from print media to visual and radio culture, and even the literary form as it is practiced in
Mexico has varied widely between publications, epochs and authors. As a literary form, the
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Mexican chronicle is difficult to define, sharing characteristics with the novel, the essay, the
short story and also with forms of informational journalism. It exists at the hazy, ambiguous
threshold of artistic and non-artistic writing practices. José Joaquín Blanco writes, “Practically
any writing that is not the bare wire service or news bulletin could fit into the broad sack of the
chronicle in Mexico” (not my translation Corona and Jorgenson 2002: 62). Alfonso Reyes once
famously described the essay as “the centaur” of the genres (1959: 403). Juan Villoro, searching
for an equivalent metaphor for the chronicle, decided it needed a more complex mascot: the
chronicle, he wrote, is “the duck-billed platypus of prose” (2005: 14). Elsewhere, Villoro defined
it in terms of its relationship with time (chronos), emphasizing its potential for overstepping the
limits of the page and intervening in the world it describes, “La crónica altera el sentido del
tiempo; trata del pasado lejano o inmediato e interviene en el porvenir: narra lo que pasó para
que suceda algo distinto (The chronicle alters the sense of time; it treats the distant or
immediate past and intervenes in the future: it narrates what happened so that something
different will follow)” (2017: 84). Recent critical studies of the Latin American chronicle have
emphasized the imprecision of literary categories (Sefchovich 2009) or described the historical
trajectory of the form (Mateo 2001). Ignacio Corona and Beth E. Jorgenson begin The
Contemporary Mexican Chronicle: Theoretical Perspectives on the Liminal Genre (2002) writing:
this widely practiced and constantly evolving genre, conceived on the battlefields and in
the streets, in the plazas and at the theaters, is a hybrid form of writing that crosses
multiple discursive boundaries. (2002: 1)
Working “against the background of the reformulation of the traditional study of literary genres
motivated by cultural studies,” they suggest that the sheer variety of writing practices and
“other subgenres” connected to crónica reveal the arbitrariness of literary categories (ibid.: 4).
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“Clear-cut borders do not exist,” they write (ibid.: 4). Jorgenson considers an array of critical
theorists in an essay, “Matters of Fact,” in which she argues that the chronicle demands a more
nuanced, subtle understanding of categories like fiction and non-fiction—just as the duck-billed
platypus forced naturalists to reconsider overly simplistic taxonomies in the animal kingdom.
Others have pointed out the ambiguous nature of the form by demonstrating the many
things Latin American chronicles can do. Linda Egan takes up the subject in an essay in Corona
and Jorgenson’s volume, entitled, “Play on Words.” In it, Egan writes “questions regarding the
generic individuation of problematic forms such as the essay and the contemporary chronicle
continue to evade definitive answer”; but also that “to dismiss generic specification permits an
excess of interpretive freedom that may deny or distort a text’s potential to signify” (ibid.: 95).
No escaping from this muddle: the genre problem can neither be solved nor ignored. Egan’s
answer is to compare two pieces of prose on the same subject, one by Héctor Aguilar Camín
and the other by Monsiváis, elucidating by means of their contrast the impossible to define
divergence between essay and chronicle. In the process, she makes a convincing case that the
chronicle, rather than being a hybrid, is “its own thing,” a genre “not between two other forms
but within its own identifiable boundaries” (ibid.: 117). Mary K. Long, in an article on Salvador
Novo titled, “Writing the City,” signals the ability of the chronicle “to underline national
idiosyncrasies and define national identity” – an argument I will develop in this section, when I
consider a subversive tradition of urban chronicles at odds with the dominant strains of
Mexican cultural nationalism (ibid.: 181). But while Long very ably describes Salvador Novo’s
ability to negotiate history, tradition and Modernity, she ignores one idiosyncratic aspect of his
writing: she notes that “writing about the city is one of [Novo’s] many strategies for self168

exhibition or performance,” but does not confront the sexual subtext of that performance
(ibid.: 181). Long argues Novo “could not freely follow the inspiration of his subconscious and
write about everything, including, significantly, homosexual themes” (ibid.: 197). My reading
reveals he was in fact writing about homosexuality all along, in coded terms, in a discourse he
would call “cifrado (coded)” (Novo 1996: 228).
My strategy, approaching this uncertain critical territory, will be to repeat and
exaggerate Monsiváis’s critical gambit. This section will be limited not only to Mexican authors,
but also to a sub-genre of the Mexican chronicle, though the three Mexican writers considered
here were and are polyglot, cosmopolitan readers with an array of influences wider than
national boundaries, who wrote in many genres including other sorts of chronicles. I will further
limit the scope by placing a single chronicle from each under the microscope, as it were. These
three examples of a literary form, like samples drawn from the inexhaustible overabundance of
life forms, will perhaps reveal some common characteristics. But I will make no attempt to
define the chronicle or to argue that these examples constitute a concrete species, separate
and contained from the mass of other writing that falls under the wide rubric of the Latin
American chronicle. Connections might also be made between many of these works and texts
written outside of Mexico, including in the U.S. For example, the third-person narratorprotagonist in a Monsiváis’s chronicle, “13 de septiembre de 1968: La manifestación del silencio
(13th of September, 1968: The Silent Protest)” has been linked to Norman Mailer’s third-person
narrator in the first section of The Armies of the Night (Villoro 2017). I will leave it up to other
critics to make those arguments and consider the Mexican chronicle in its own right.
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One characteristic of these chronicles that I hope to reveal is their conflation of urban
space with subjectivity. Juan G. Gelpi compares Novo’s urban chronicles to those of Monsiváis,
to show how they “inscribe culture, and more specifically, urban culture, through the
construction of a particular subjectivity” (2002: 201). I will make a similar argument in regards
to the construction of an authorial subjectivity, when I describe what I will call a double-image:
a portrayal of urban space in which the author creates a self-portrait. The urban chronicle is at
the heart of the tradition of the chronicle in Mexico, and Monsiváis’s two long critical essays
emphasize its historical connection to writings about Mexico City and Tenochtitlan. The first
specifically urban chronicle of Mexico City was written in 1554 by Francisco Cervantes de
Salazar in Latin, as a textbook for students. In the Mexico City Reader, Rubén Gallo, following
the lead of Gonzalo Celorio, traces the genre back even farther than that, to the Nahuatl
writings of the Aztec poet-king, Nezahualcoyotl (2004: 4). The many writers who have taken up
the subject since have made Mexico City one of the literary capitals of the world, and their
portraits of it have often distorted things according to their unique individual perspectives, in a
process of refraction that the chroniclers I look at here attempt intentionally.
Another characteristic of the three chronicles I consider in this section is the way in
which they subvert discourses of cultural nationalism. In an essay included in a collection of
texts on Monsiváis, “El arte de la ironía (The Art of Irony),” Ignacio M. Sánchez Prado links
Monsiváis and the chronicle form with the liberal tradition of the nineteenth century. Sánchez
Prado argues that “la crónica siempre ha sido un género eminentemente político desde los
orígenes de la nación (the chronicle has since the origins of the nation always been an
eminently political genre)” (2007: 302). Rather than reading it ahistorically, as a hybrid genre
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that resists traditional genre boundaries, postmodern before postmodernism, my reading will
follow Sánchez Prado’s contention that the Mexican chronicle has been “un género nacional
por excelencia, enraizado en México desde las orígenes de la producción cultural (a national
genre par excellence, rooted in Mexico since the origins of cultural production)” (ibid.: 309).
The first of the chronicles I read in this section might seem to be firmly within the tradition of la
ciudad letrada.63 Sánchez Prado explains:
La literatura mexicana, en su largo y contradictorio devenir, ha sido un espacio de
conflicto entre dos fuerzas en constante pugna. Por un lado, la ciudad letrada ha
buscado en ella instrumentos de ordenamiento, control y cooptación. Ha sido el punto
de articulación del ser nacional y sus sucesivas identidades, de las aspiraciones de la
modernidad y de la normalización del poder político. Por otra parte, las venas literarias
del país son recorridas a lo largo de su historia por el inconformismo y la resistencia, por
figuras de pensamiento e imaginarios que han puesto en entredicho la autoridad.
Mexican literature, in its long and contradictory evolution, has been a site for conflict
between two forces in constant struggle. On one side, the lettered city has turned to
literature for instruments of order, control and co-optation. Literature has been the
point of articulation of the national self and its successive identities, for the aspirations
for modernity and the normalization of political power. On the other side, the literary
veins of the country run throughout its history with recalcitrance and resistance, with
figures of thought and imaginaries that have cast doubt on authority. (ibid.: 300)
Nevertheless, in the ambiguous portrayal of the first of these three chronicles’ narrators I find
some of the doubt cast on authority that Sánchez Prado describes. The other two chroniclers
will also use irony to paint complex psychological portraits, and in doing so, position themselves
somewhere between the two sides in the “pugna (struggle)” described above, in that middle
space that “tiene el nombre de modernidad (has the name modernity)” (ibid.: 300).
Psychological irony is what Monsiváis identifies as “el elemento unificador (the unifying
element)” in the writing of Salvador Novo, and which is also the key to Monsiváis’s own style.
He calls it, “la ironía, la distancia intelectual entre el tema y el escritor que solicita la
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correspondiente mala fe del lector (irony, the intellectual distance between subject and writer
that provokes the reader’s corresponding bad faith)” (1987: 766). Irony will be a unifying
element in the chronicles studied in this section as well; each uses it to articulate a mediating
position between discourses of nationalism aligned with power, aspirations for modernization,
and recalcitrance and resistance.
Subtle and not so subtle subversions of nationalist discourses are accomplished in the
same way in each of the three chronicles: with ironic evocations of the typical Mexican subject
or national character. Mexican cultural nationalism, in particular the tradition of writing about
mexicanidad (Mexicanness), el Mexicano (the Mexican) as a typical subject, or more abstractly,
lo mexicano as a quality, has been thoroughly critiqued in works like Roger Bartra’s La jaula de
la melancolía (The Cage of Melancholy) (1986) and Claudio Lomnitz’s Deep Mexico, Silent
Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism (2001). This discourse of Mexican cultural nationalism
has deep roots and modern examples branching out from classic cultural studies like José
Vasconcelos’s La raza cosmica (The Cosmic Race) (1925), Samuel Ramos’s El perfil del hombre y
la cultura en México (The Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico) (1934) and Octavio Paz’s El
laberinto de la soledad (The Labyrinth of Solitude) (1950); to more popular productions like
Ismael Rodríguez’s Nosotros los pobres (We the Poor) (1948). Critics have argued that these
discourses of “the Mexican” received the support of the political elite and played a role in the
exercise of political control. Bartra writes:
La idea de que existe un sujeto único de la historia nacional – “el mexicano” – es una
poderosa ilusión cohesionadora; su versión estructuralista o funcionalista, que piensa
menos en el mexicano como sujeto y más en una textura específica – “lo mexicano” –
forma parte igualmente de los procesos culturales de legitimación política del Estado
moderno. La definición de “el mexicano” es más bien una descripción de la forma como
es dominado y, sobre todo, de la manera en que es legimitada la explotación.
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The idea that there exists a single subject of national history – “the Mexican” – is a
powerfully cohesive illusion; its structuralist or functionalist version, which thinks of the
Mexican less as a subject and more as a specific texture, forms a part just as much of the
cultural processes of political legitimation of the modern State. The definition of “the
Mexican” is in fact a description of the way in which he is dominated and, above all, the
manner in which his exploitation is legitimated. (1986: 20)
Ironic appropriations of this discourse thus take a contradictory middle position; they neither
accept nor discount the possibility of such a national character, but merely attack the parodied
formulation of it and its connection with political power. At the outset, I will emphasize that
such portraits and counter-portraits do not necessarily reflect any objective truth about the
people or culture to which they refer. Bartra has called them “myths” and “an artificial
entelechy” created by the discourse itself, not reflecting facts (ibid.: 15). He writes:
no se puede llegar más que a la conclusión de que el carácter del mexicano es una
entelequia artificial: existe principalmente en los libros y discursos que lo describen y
exalten, y allí es posible encontrar las huellas de su origen.
one cannot avoid the conclusion that the Mexican character is an artificial entelechy: it
exists principally in the books and discourses that describe and exalt it, and it is possible
to find traces of its origin there. (ibid.: 16)
Like the social studies that Bartra is referring to, the portraits of Mexican typicality found in the
urban chronicles discussed in this section must be understood as discourse.
Another principal point in my argument is that the three chronicles here are related,
that if they do not form a direct line of descent, at the very least they share some of the same
DNA. Establishing literary genealogies can be treacherous, however. How can a critic be sure he
is not subjectively connecting disparate texts according to his own criteria? In a book on the
formation of the Mexican literary field between 1917 and 1959, Sánchez Prado identifies some
of those “imaginaries” he sees in positions of inconformity and resistance to state power,
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elucidating “la producción de estrategias intelectuales contrahegemónicas y de narraciones
culturales de la nación distintas a las sustentadas por el Estado (the production of
counterhegemonic intellectual strategies and of cultural narrations of the nation distinct from
those sustained by the State)” (2009: 5). The three chronicles here all participate, to some
degree, in a similar production of intellectual strategies, mediating nationalist discourses and
modernist aspirations. They do not form one of what Sánchez Prado describes as Naciones
intelectuales (Intellectual Nations) but are what he calls “hilos conductores” (ibid.:6). He writes:
uno de los problemas que siguen persistiendo hasta nuestros días es que la producción
de estudios específicos de autores, épocas y temas no se ha traducido en una
reconsideración de la serie literaria mexicana posrevolucionaria, es decir, de la manera
en que estas producciones se engarzan directamente e indirectamente y constituyen
estrategias intelectuales comunes.
one of the problems that continues to persist in our day is that the production of studies
of specific authors, epochs or themes has not been translated into a reconsideration of
the post-Revolutionary Mexican literary series, that is to say, of the way in which these
productions are directly and indirectly linked and constitute common intellectual
strategies. (2009: 6)
I will show how these three texts are linked, both by describing common narrative strategies,
and by offering evidence of direct intellectual influence. That is to say, along with discussing the
chronicles themselves, I will also consider what these authors wrote about one another.
Each author enjoyed a relative autonomy from official power thanks to the sphere in
which he published, allowing him to engage in semi-critical and critical invocations of
nationalist discourse. The story of the Mexican chronicle cannot be told without consideration
of the place of popular print media in the field of cultural production. In the modernizing city of
the 1870s, writing for the popular press became one of the few professions in which letrados
(literates/ men of letters) did not rely directly on income from the state. Angel Rama writes in
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La Ciudad letrada that, in this period, “Only journalism enjoyed substantial economic
independence from government coffers” (1996: 52). But if “journalism … offered intellectuals
considerable autonomy in many Latin American countries and thus created some breathing
room for the philosophical development of a political opposition,” the case was slightly
different in Mexico, where, “as early as 1888, the government was making payments –
amounting to 40,000 pesos a month – to no fewer than thirty periodicals in Mexico City alone”
(my ellipsis 1996: 88). Nevertheless, we find our first chronicler, Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera,
operating in this sphere of relative autonomy, mitigated by the political positions of the various
publications and their editors with whom he published and by the presence of some
government funding and influence in his profession. Sánchez Prado notes that, “durante el
Porfiriato se dio una primera etapa de profesionalización, con la emergencia de revistas y
periódicos que permitieron a autores como … al poeta modernista Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera,
una relación más distante al poder (during the presidency of Porfirio Díaz a first step was taken
towards professionalization, with the emergence of magazines and newspapers that allowed
authors like the modernist poet Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera, a more distant relationship with
power)” (2009: 27). Though Gutiérrez Nájera later became a diputado (Congressman) in the
Estado de México, his daughter Margarita’s memoirs suggest he was more interested in the
salary than the politics, and, as Aníbal González notes, “Las alusiones que hace Nájera al
Congreso Nacional en su serie de crónicas, Plato del día … son casi siempre irónicas y
despectivas (the allusions that Nájera makes to the National Congress in his series of chronicles,
Daily Special … are nearly all ironic and contemptuous)” (my ellipsis 1983: 98). Like Gutiérrez
Nájera, our other two chroniclers, Salvador Novo and José Joaquín Blanco, both wrote
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prolifically for the popular press, publishing in a variety of outlets. But their relative autonomy
from state power did not result in a strict antagonism to official political discourse. At times,
these chroniclers reproduce the very discourses being promoted by the state.
The political content of their chronicles cannot be reduced simply to a dual paradigm of
either acquiescing to or resisting state power. In the chronicle, cultural or political criticism can
masquerade as literary narrative, and vice-versa. Often, it is impossible to distinguish them.
Both Gutiérrez Nájera and Novo might be described as apolitical, more concerned with their
literary voice and personality than with denouncing or proposing political positions. But
Monsiváis suggests that the contradictory tendencies toward both “cosmopolitanism and
nationalism” in Gutiérrez Nájera’s writing make his work political even when it does not seem
so (1980: 28). He makes a similar point about the tensions between modernity and erudition,
and the blending of “neologisms and archaisms” in the early works of Salvador Novo (1980: 40).
Viviane Mahieux brilliantly describes the politically subversive character of Novo’s early prose
style, or what she calls his “frivolity” (2011: 168). According to Mahieux, Novo’s essays written
on seemingly light subjects – “Meditation on Eyeglasses,” “Speech on Beds,” “About Beards,”
and “On the Infinite Pleasure of Killing Many Flies,” for example – can in fact be read as
extremely political interventions in the literary debates of the 1920s. Jorgenson and Corona
note that when Novo began writing chronicles:
the novel was positioned at the center of the official literary-cultural project.
Consequently, the novel became tied to a realist language and committed to the
consolidation of a nationalist project. Publication sponsorship and literary prizes were
invariably given to works fulfilling those expectations. (2002: 5)
The “frivolity” of Novo’s chronicles becomes political when considered in the context of a
literary field organized around “the official literary-cultural project” of the novela de la
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revolución (Novel of the Revolution), a genre in which there was no place at all for frivolity, but
only idealized heroes, revolutionary suffering, and the founding of a nation. The proof comes in
the attacks and charges leveled against Novo, beginning with the so-called debate of 1925, over
an alleged “afeminamiento de la literatura mexicana (feminization of Mexican literature)” and
then the counter-assertion that there did, in fact, exist some supposedly “virile” Mexican
authors, in articles by Julio Jiménez Rueda and Francisco Monterde, respectively (qtd in Sánchez
Prado 2009: 33). The attacks continued in 1929 with another polemic, this time between Novo
and Ruben M. Campos in El Universal Ilustrado (Mahieux 2011: 160). However, these implicit
and explicit attacks on Novo did not prevent him from becoming, as Monsiváis called his book
on Novo, “lo marginal en el centro (the marginal at the center)” (Monsiváis 2004).
In 1925, Jiménez Rueda and Monterde’s famous “debate” over the possibility of a socalled “virile” Mexican literature was not merely an implicit homophobic attack on the
Contemporáneos group and on Novo in particular, but also an attempt to determine the
parameters of an emerging national literature in which there would be no place for frivolous,
stylish chronicles. Yet for all of his cosmopolitanism, Novo cannot be described as antinationalistic. He remained a bureaucrat within the Ministry of Public Education (SEP)
throughout this period, and traces of dogmatic nationalism can be found in his writing at least
as early as 1935, when he wrote in Continente vacío that “pertenecemos, en verdad, a un solo y
mínimo pedazo de la tierra (we belong, in truth, to a single small piece of earth)” (1996: 728).
Novo’s courtship of official recognition by the state during the later years of his career has been
harshly criticized, by José Joaquín Blanco among others. Blanco is extremely outspoken in his
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political positions and some of his chronicles become polemics, problematizing Monsiváis’s
“definición de trabajo de la crónica (working definition of the chronicle)” as a:
reconstrucción literaria de sucesos o figuras, género donde el empeño formal domina
sobre las urgencias informativas … Tradicionalmente – sin que eso signifique ley alguna-,
en la crónica ha privado la recreación de atmósferas y personajes sobre la transmisión
de noticias y denuncias.
literary reconstruction of events and figures, a genre in which the formal intention
dominates informative urgencies … Traditionally – without it becoming any sort of rule –
in the chronicle the recreation of atmospheres and characters has taken precedence
over the transmission of news and denunciations.
(my ellipsis Monsiváis 1980: 13)
Blanco’s chronicles sometimes verge on denunciations. But Monsiváis, always a shrewd critic,
was careful not to make unequivocal declarations, preferring “working definitions” filled with
provisos and exemptions, because he foresaw counter-examples to his claims. My argument
follows Sánchez Prado’s suggestion not to attempt “una esquemática comparación lado a lado
entre nacionalistas y no nacionalistas (a schematic side by side comparison of nationalists with
anti-nationalists)” (2009: 9). Rather, I read these chronicles as multifaceted interventions in a
complex cultural discourse with a variety of nuanced political positions.
Why is the chronicle a marginalized form in Mexican literary history? Monsiváis begins
his 1987 essay, “De la santa doctrina al espíritu público (From the Holy Doctrine to the Public
Spirit),” with that question. His text does not answer it so much as discredit it; the essay shows
that, in fact, the chronicle is central to the story of Mexican literature. The popularity and
importance of his own chronicles in contemporary Mexican letters only serves to make the
point all the more evident. Perhaps one of his chronicles could be analyzed alongside the three
texts this section will consider; but it seems to me that these three works se engarzan (link)
more closely, the legacy of influence they share is more direct, that, in a sense, each chronicle
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either foresees or rewrites the other texts. My decision not to include Monsiváis in this chapter
is not at all meant to marginalize or diminish his place in this story. Just the contrary, the
prologue to his anthology directly connects Gutiérrez Nájera with Novo, suggesting the legacy
this chapter explores. He writes, “Gutiérrez Nájera popularizó la sensibilidad que lo había
formado; Novo anticipa la sensibilidad que avasallará (Gutiérrez Nájera popularized the
sensibility that had educated him; Novo anticipates the sensibility that will dominate)” (1980:
40). Monsiváis anticipates the destruction of sensibility itself, without ever stopping from his
tireless efforts to celebrate and popularize it, we might say, if we were to add him to the
comparison. But I will leave it to another critic to find one of his chronicles with a narrative like
that of the other three texts I will discuss here, all of which tell a story about, among other
things, going for a ride on the bus.64
2. Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera and “The Novel of the Streetcar”
Erwin K. Mapes called Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera “una figura descollante (an outstanding
figure)” in the development of Latin American modernism (1959: xii). We have this State
University of Iowa professor and researcher to thank for the twenty-odd volumes of Gutiérrez
Nájera’s collected prose, the compiling of which must have been a herculean editorial labor;
Gutiérrez Nájera had left his writing dispersed in around sixty periodicals, published under
nearly thirty different pseudonyms, many of which had already been used by other authors.
Mapes was trained at the Sorbonne, where he wrote a study of the influence of French
literature on Rubén Darío. He would describe his discovery of Gutiérrez Nájera thus:
Pronto estos estudios me llevaron a una conclusión, en la que concuerdan otros muchos
investigadores del modernismo: de que a pesar de la enorme importancia de Darío en el
movimiento, él no fue el verdadero inventor de muchos de los procedimientos que se
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dan como características de su obra. Para descubrir al iniciador había que examinar los
escritos de los primeros modernistas.
Soon these studies brought me to a conclusion, with which many other researchers of
modernism concur: that despite the enormous importance of Dario in the movement,
he was not the true inventor of many of the procedures that are thought characteristic
of his works. In order to discover their origin I had to examine the writing of the first
modernists. (ibid.: xii)
Gutiérrez Nájera, Darío’s predecessor, is still often credited with introducing the techniques of
French Modernism into Latin American literature. But Aníbal González echoes Mapes’s view,
writing:
Poet, journalist, and founder of Spanish American Modernism, the Mexican Manuel
Gutiérrez Nájera was also the creator, along with his friend the Cuban José Martí, of the
genre of the Modernist crónica. Both men published their first crónicas in the late
1870s, modeling them on a similar genre, the chronique, invented by French periodicals
such as Le Figaro and La Chronique Parisienne during the 1850s. (2002: 157)
Gutiérrez Nájera, with his long mustaches, top hat and learnéd allusions to Bossuet and Hugo,
seems the most Francophile of Mexican writers even during an era that “Mexicans themselves
call their belle époque” (González 2002: 158). But in a lecture titled, “Evocación de Gutiérrez
Nájera,” Salvador Novo rejected that vision of him.
Expert in French literature that Gutiérrez Nájera was, his own innovation was not simply
to mimic in a Latin American context what was happening in France. Maybe he was flaunting
his expertise in order to satisfy his audience, Novo suggests. “Si Gutiérrez Nájera consagraba la
mayor parte de su producción a ganarse una reputación de afrancesado, sería porque también
ganaba con ello su pan de cada día; que era esa la mercancía que le compraban a mejor precio
(if Gutiérrez Nájera dedicated the greater part of his production to earning a reputation as a
Francophile, it would be because that earned him his daily bread; for that was the merchandise
they bought from him at the highest price)” Novo said, in a lecture later published, in 1962
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(1996: 356). So if Gutiérrez Nájera’s legacy is not as simple as la modernité, what did he
contribute to Mexican literature? Among his inventions we find a new sort of narrative about
the city, already crystallized in his early, “La novela del tranvía (The Novel of the Streetcar),”
first published on the 20th of August, 1882, when he was twenty-three. It appeared in a
newspaper, La Libertad, as “Crónicas color de Lluvia (Chronicles the Color of Rain),” along with
under what would be Gutiérrez Nájera’s most famous pseudonym, El Duque Job (Duke Job).
Later, he included the text in the only book he published during his lifetime, Cuentos fragiles
(Fragile Stories) (1883). From the beginning, he seems to have been in doubt about what this
text was, or at least what to call it. First, it is a chronicle, then a novel, and finally part of a
collection of stories. Perhaps the stories were “fragile” because, in part, of the ambiguity of the
chronicle form itself, a sort of writing that is always at the threshold of different genres,
audiences and imperatives. Monsiváis included “la novela corta sin ficción (the short nonfiction
novel ” in a list of the chronicle’s many masks, without explaining such a contradiction in terms
(1987: 771). He was being witty, of course. “No son precisas las fronteras entre cuento y crónica
(the boundaries are not precise between story and chronicle),” Monsiváis also wrote, pointing
to the ambiguous, liminal territory in which we find the “Novel of the Streetcar” (1987: 756).
For readers familiar with Mexico City’s particular climate, the first line of this “novel”
establishes the setting. It begins at the moment when a rain storm breaks, a daily occurrence
during the tempestuous season in the Valley of Mexico:
Cuando la tarde se obscurece y los paraguas se abren, como redondas alas de
murciélago, lo mejor que el desocupado puede hacer es subir al primer tranvía que
encuentre al paso y recorrer las calles, como el anciano Victor Hugo las recorre, sentado
en la imperial de algún ómnibus. El movimiento disipa un tanto cuanto la tristeza, y para
el observador, nada hay más peregrino ni más curioso que la serie de cuadros vivos que
pueden examinarse en un tranvía.
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When the afternoon darkens and the umbrellas are opened, like the round wings of
bats, the best thing that the idler can do is climb into the first tram that he finds passing
and ride through the streets, like the old Victor Hugo rides through them, seated in the
imperial of some bus. The movement dissipates the sadness a bit, and for the observer,
there is nothing more fleeting or curious than the series of living paintings that can be
examined in a tram. (2005: 117).
The narrator is an “idler,” presumably a member of the upper-class with the luxury of free time,
in search of aesthetic experiences in the form of living “paintings,” more like urban tableaux or
city scenes. He is a privileged “observer”; the city is the object of his gaze and the reader is
complicit. He addresses us directly, as though we too have indulged in his pleasures. The
narrator asks the reader to enjoy, at least imaginatively, these leisure activities, to use the city
for adventure and poetic experience, to get on the bus alongside him. He is something like a
Parisian flâneur and his mysterious “sadness” recalls Baudelaire’s spleen. We find the principal
trope of the three chronicles studied in the chapter here in the configuration – and eventually,
the reconfiguration – of these three positions: 1) the narrator; 2) the city, which is to say, the
people (“living paintings”) being described; and 3) the assumed reader. An early paragraph in
Gutiérrez Nájera’s novela sketches out these three positions:
Yo, sin embargo, paso las horas agradablemente encajonado en esa miniaturesca arca
de Noé, sacando la cabeza por el ventanillo, no en espera de la paloma que ha de traer
un ramo de oliva en el pico, sino para observar el delicioso cuadro que la ciudad
presenta en ese instante. El wagon, además, me lleva a muchos mundos desconocidos y
a regiones vírgenes. No, la ciudad de México no empieza en el Palacio Nacional, ni acaba
en la calzada de la Reforma. Yo doy a Uds. mi palabra de que la ciudad es mucho mayor.
Es una gran tortuga que extiende hacia los cuatro puntos cardinales sus patas
dislocadas. Esas patas son sucias y velludas. Los ayuntamientos, con paternal solicitud,
cuidan de pintarlas con lodo, mensualmente.
I, nevertheless, pass the hours comfortably ensconced in that miniature Noah’s Ark,
sticking my head out the window, not in hopes that the dove will have carried the olive
branch in its beak, but in order to observe the delicious painting that the city presents at
that instant. The wagon, furthermore, carries me to many unknown worlds and virgin
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territories. No, Mexico City does not begin at the National Palace, neither does it end at
the Avenue of la Reforma. I give you all my word that the city is much greater than that.
It is a giant tortoise that extends its dislocated legs toward the four cardinal points.
Those legs are dirty and hairy. The municipal governments, with paternal solicitude, are
careful to paint them with mud, monthly. (ibid.: 118)
The narrator’s view of the city is centrist and elitist. The unknown worlds where he goes
sightseeing are only unknown to members of the upper class, who reside in the fashionable
central districts between the Palacio Nacional and Reforma. The zones on the outskirts are so
foreign and strange to him that they lend themselves to odd, prophetic imagery. Historian
Michael Johns describes this urban and social division of center from periphery in Mexico City,
in The City of Mexico in the Age of Díaz (1997):
Like no other city in the Americas, the capital of Mexico mixed the top hat and the
sombrero, the mansion and the hut, the refinements of the aesthete and the squalor of
the peasant. The unstable mixture was a result of the pressing weight of the campo
(countryside) on the capital. It showed a city that was destined to internalize the
polarities – of wealth, race, and power – signaled by that great divide. (1997: 43).
Likewise, the narrator’s vision of a biblical flood is not purely imagined; in 1882, the draining
and paving of the Lago de Texcoco was not yet complete, and flooding in the city built in its
lakebed was (and remains) frequent.65 Johns writes:
The city not only lacked an adequate system of sewers, it housed tens of thousands in
substandard and dangerous dwellings, it had too much floodwater and not enough that
was fit to drink, its ruling class was given to neglect and its peasant masses were without
power to object. (1997: 43)
Neither was the “paternal solicitude” of the municipal governments purely rhetorical, it seems,
In a city where the poor suffered an extremely high mortality rate thanks in part to problems of
public hygiene, the phrase strikes an ironic chord.66 The tone of the passage reveals the third
position in this chronicle’s narrative configuration: that of the reader in relation to the narrator
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and the city. It is suggested by the playful oath. “I give you all my word,” the narrator says,
assuming, in jest, that we have not been to the outskirts of this monstrous city either.
Salvador Novo was a careful reader of Gutiérrez Nájera. In his private library, which can
now be consulted in the Casa del Poeta museum in Mexico City, one finds a two-volume edition
of Gutiérrez Nájera’s Prosa (Prose). This edition was put together by Gutiérrez Nájera’s friends
and contemporaries after his early death, compiled by Amado Nervo, with an introduction by
Luis G. Urbina, and published in 1898 and 1903 by a historic Mexican state press, La Oficina
Impresora del Timbre. It was one of the few collections of his prose available during the first
half of the Twentieth Century and Novo’s copy bears signs of careful scrutiny, including
annotations, notes written on personal letterhead left between the pages, food and coffee
stains. The following passage from “La novela del tranvía” is highlighted in Novo’s copy and
must have appealed to the author who had already written an ingenious essay “About Beards”
and waxed poetic about barbershops in print67:
Más allá de la peluquería de Micoló, hay un pueblo que habita barrios extravagantes,
cuyos nombres son esencialmente antiaperitivos. Hay hombres muy honrados que viven
en la Plazuela del Tequisquite, y señoras de invencible virtud cuya casa está situada en el
Callejón de Salsipuedes. No es verdad que los indios bárbaros estén acampados en esas
calles exóticas, ni es tampoco cierto que los pieles rojas hagan frecuentes excursiones a
la Plazuela de Regina. La mano providente de la policía ha colocado un gendarme en
cada esquina. Las casas de esos barrios no están hechas de lodo ni tapizadas por
adentro de pieles sin curtir. Son casas habitables, con escalera y todo. En ellas viven muy
discretos caballeros y señoras muy respetables y señoritas muy lindas. Estas señoritas
suelen tener novios, como las que tienen balcón y cara a la calle en el centro de la
ciudad.
Beyond the barbershop of Micoló, there is a people who live in extravagant
neighborhoods, whose names are essentially unappetizing. There are very honorable
men who live in the little Plaza of Tequisquite, and ladies of invincible virtue whose
houses are situated in the Alley of Salsipuedes. It is not true that barbarous Indians are
camped out in these exotic streets, neither is it true that redskins make frequent
excursions to the little Plaza of Regina. The provident arm of the police has placed an
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officer on every corner. The houses of these neighborhoods are not made from mud or
decorated inside with untanned animal hides. They are habitable houses, with stairs and
everything. In them live very discrete gentlemen and very respectable ladies and very
pretty girls. These girls usually have boyfriends, just like those who have a balcony facing
the street in the center of the city.
(2005: 118)
The ironic, aristocratic tone of this passage prefigures the style that would make Novo famous
four decades later. Those “unappetizing” place names are quite obviously indigenous and
sound more comic in Spanish; “Tequisquite” perhaps derives from tetl, Nahuatl for stone;
“Salsipuedes” sounds like “Leave-if-you-can.” Saying no “barbarous Indians” or “redskins” are
to be found in such exotic-sounding streets is apophasis: the rhetorical device that attacks by
means of suggestive denial. 68 The narrator invokes the prejudices that elites have about the
poor living on the periphery, beyond the invisible boundaries of the fashionable peluquería:
that they are savage Indians; that their houses are built with mud and decorated with untanned
animal hides; that there are no police on the corner keeping order; that the people are not
“discreet” or “respectable”; and that the young girls and men behave very differently than
those “who have a balcony facing the street in the center of the city.” The narrator assumes
the reader will share his racist, moralizing perspective, which he invokes in the negative. This is
all done in jest, of course; the reader is not meant to take him at his word. Even while
defending these citizens of the periphery, the narrator ridicules them and the places where
they live.69 The effect is subtle, but the true subject of the chronicle is already the narrator’s
problematic perspective.
The first “delicious painting” that the city presents is not glimpsed through the windows
of the streetcar. Instead, it is a literary sketch the narrator draws of the life of a total stranger, a
passenger seated nearby, “un viejo de levita color de almendra (an old man in an almond185

colored coat)” (2005: 119). The man’s unshaven face and out-of-fashion clothes signal poverty,
and the narrator begins his description in the same witty, caustic tone:
La levita de mi vecino era muy mayor. En cuanto al paraguas, vale más que no entremos
en dibujos. Ese paraguas, expuesto a la intemperie, debía semejarse mucho a las
banderas que los independientes sacan a luz el 15 de septiembre.
My neighbor’s coat was very old. As for his umbrella, it would be better if we don’t
begin to sketch it. That umbrella, exposed to the elements, must have seemed very
much like the flag that the revolutionaries waved on the 15 th of September. (ibid.: 119)
An umbrella as tattered as a ragged battle flag, linking the man with the Mexican War of
Independence, is hyperbole. That war, lasting from 1810-1821, was just within living memory.
But the poetic linkage with the día de la independencia suggests the possibility of a nationalist
motif. Is the stranger a representative of the typical Mexican? In fact, the passage is not about
the old man at all, but rather the tone with which the narrator describes him. Though he might
call himself an “observer,” he seems far from a disinterested one:
¿Quién sería mi vecino? De seguro era casado, y con hijas. ¿Serían bonitas? La existencia
de esas desaventuradas criaturas me parecía indisputable ... Incuestionablemente, ese
caballero tenía hijas. ¡Pobrecitas! Probablemente le esperaban en la ventana, más
enamoradas que nunca, porque no habían almorzado todavía.
Who might my neighbor be? Certainly he was married, and with daughters. Would they
be pretty? The existence of those poor creatures seemed to me indisputable …
Unquestionably, that gentlemen had daughters. The poor things! They were probably
waiting for him at the window, more in love than ever, because they still had not eaten
lunch. (my ellipsis ibid.: 119)
The fantasy becomes more overtly romantic, even as his elitism and racism grow unmistakable.
The imaginary family grows poorer and poorer, until their furniture has been repossessed by
avaricious landlords; the proud daughters, whose skill as seamstresses has been made
redundant by modern factories, are forced to consider begging, and their days are spent in fits
of tubercular coughing. Fragile characters like these often appear in Gutiérrez Nájera’s Fragile
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Stories, revealing what Aníbal González describes as a complex “ethics,” triangulating – in a
pattern like the one I describe – the sympathetic Other, the reader and the narrative act itself:
Who is the Other to whom Nájera relates in his writings? … [His] stories focus their
attention preferentially on people lacking authority, people who are in a relatively
defenseless, even destitute position with regard to Nájera. Particularly, the category of
the Other in Nájera is comprised by women, children, the elderly, and the poor, but also
by the readers, and ultimately, I would argue, by a personified version of writing itself.
(my ellipsis 2002: 161)
The imaginary daughters appear in a social and moral order in which the narrator occupies the
opposite extreme, emphasizing his power and their helplessness. Eventually, he decides to save
them, imagining his messianic appearance as a rich suitor delivering them from poverty – but
only if they meet his moral and racial standards. The careful reader understands that the
narrator’s excitement arises from this fantasy of the girls’ helplessness:
Tengo la certidumbre de que son bonitas. El papá es blanco, y si estuviera rasurado no
sería tan feote. Además, han de ser buenas muchachas. Este señor tiene toda la facha
de un buen hombre ... Probablemente no carecerán de admiradores. Pero como las
pobrecitas son muy decentes y nacieron en buenos pañales, no pueden prendarse de los
ganapanes ni de los pollos de la plazuela. Están enamoradas sin saber de quién, y
aguardan la venida del Mesías. ¡Si yo me casara con alguna de ellas! ... ¿Por qué no?
Después de todo, en esa clase suelen encontrarse las mujeres que dan la felicidad.
Respecto a las otras, ya sé bien a qué atenerme.
I am certain that they are pretty. Their father is white, and if he shaved he would not be
so ugly. Even more, they must be good girls. This gentleman has the face of a good man
… They are probably not lacking in admirers. But as the poor things are very decent and
they are from good parents, they cannot fall in love with the louts and the toughs in the
street. They are in love without knowing with whom, and they are waiting for the arrival
of the Messiah. If I were to marry one of them! … Why not? After all, it is among that
class that the wives who make you happy are found. In regards to the rest of women, I
already know exactly what to expect. (my ellipsis 2005: 121)
We can add frustrations in romantic life to our picture of the narrator as a character. While the
reader is invited to laugh at him as he day-dreams about marrying one of these working-class
girls, the fantasy slips closer and closer to satire.
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Gutiérrez Nájera’s narrator is a typical bourgeois. His fantasy of marriage even devolves
into bourgeois maxims, “Si es joven, yo la educaré a mi gusto. Le pondré un maestro de piano.
¿Qué cosa es la felicidad? Un poquito de salud y un poquito de dinero (If she is young, I will
educate her how I see fit. I will get her a piano teacher. What is happiness? A little health and a
little money.)” (ibid.: 121). This is just the sort of thing that Monsieur Homais, Flaubert’s
bourgeois par excellence, might have said. But Gutiérrez Nájera’s narrator is far too timid to
carry out his plan; the “old man in an almond-colored coat” gets off the tram and the narrator
does not follow him. If it wasn’t raining so hard, he thinks to himself. But in fact, he is inhibited
by the classic misgiving of hypocritical bourgeois morality: What would people say? “La verdad
es que mi suegro, visto a cierta distancia, tiene una facha muy ridícula. ¿Qué diría, si me viera
de bracero con él, la señora de Z? (The truth is that my father in law, seen from a certain
distance, looks very ridiculous. What, if she were to see me arm in arm with him, would Mrs. Z
say?” he thinks, telling himself he would have given the man money if he had asked (ibid.: 122).
Bourgeois moralizing, in the end, is just another transaction.
The narrator’s next fantasy, the next “delicious painting,” reveals even more about him.
A woman sits down in the old man’s seat, a woman with sensual lips. “No tiene malos ojos; sus
labios son gruesos y encarnados: parece que los acaba de morder (Her eyes aren’t bad; her lips
are thick and sensual: she seems to have just been biting them)” he says (ibid.:122). From the
first, the narrator’s interest is sexual. He claims to have seen her many times, always getting off
this same tram in the same plaza, entering the same church. But who goes to church when it’s
raining, he wonders? She has no prayer book or rosary, and he is certain she is more likely to
read romance novels than devotional books. His description sexualizes her unto absurdity:
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Tiene una mirada que, si hablara, sería un grito pidiendo bomberos. Viene cubierta con
un velo negro. De esa manera libra su rostro de la lluvia. Hace bien. Si el agua cae en sus
mejillas, se evapora, chirriando, como si hubiera caído sobre un hierro candente.
She has a gaze that, if it could speak, would be a fire alarm. She comes covered in a
black veil. That keeps her face out of the rain. It’s a good thing. If the raindrops landed
on her cheeks, they would evaporate, sizzling, as if falling on burning steel. (ibid.:123)
The hyperbole verges on pastiche, approximating the florid, moralistic style of some nineteenth
century journalistic prose; the unknown woman is the caricature of a harlot, so fiery that even
raindrops evaporate on her skin. The narrator’s chain of hypotheses parodies scientific
reasoning, giving his monologue a thin veneer of rationality:
La señora de treinta años no va indudablemente al novenario. ¿A dónde va? Con un
tiempo como este nadie sale de su casa, si no es por una grave urgencia. ¿Estará
enferma la mamá de esta señora? En mi opinión, esta hipótesis es falsa. La señora de
treinta años no tiene madre. La iglesia de Loreto no es una casa particular ni un hospital.
Allí no viven los sacristanes. Tenemos, pues, que recurrir a otras hipótesis. Es un hecho
constante, confirmado por la experiencia, que a la puerta del templo, siempre que la
señora baja del vagón, espera un coche. Si el coche fuera de ella, vendría en él desde su
casa. Esto no tiene vuelta de hoja ... La única explicación de estos viajes en tranvía y de
estos rezos, a hora inusitada, es la existencia de un amante.
The thirty-year-old woman certainly is not going to church. Where is she going? With
this weather in which nobody leaves the house, it must be for something urgent. Could
her mother be ill? In my opinion, this hypothesis is false. The thirty-year-old woman
doesn’t have a mother. The church at Loreto is not a guest house or a hospital. No
sacristans live there. We have, then, to look for other hypotheses. It is a proven fact,
confirmed by experience, that at the door of that church, where the woman always gets
off the streetcar, a car is waiting … The only explanation for these rides on the streetcar
and visits to church at strange hours is the existence of a lover. (my ellipsis ibid.:123)
In the narrator’s overheated imagination, even the woman’s outward expressions of piety are
cause for suspicion; simply going to church while it’s raining is enough for him to condemn her.
The false rationalism, the use of overtly scientific language combined with the ironic portrayal
of an overexcited narrator, whose fantasy is quite clearly sexual and irrational, creates a
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humorous and critical effect. “The only explanation” the narrator seems able to offer for this
stranger’s behavior, in fact, characterizes him: he is an inquisitorial moralist and a hypocrite.
Gutiérrez Nájera’s chronicle has become an unflattering portrait of the narrator himself.
He has revealed sentiments of racism and elitism directed towards his social inferiors, prurient
fantasies about their daughters, and hypocritical outrage over imagined breaches of public
morality. His vision of this loose woman, supposedly on her way to meet a lover, is particularly
unsettling. He imagines she must be the unfaithful wife of some acquaintance, only to recall
that the man is in fact a widower, “¡Ah!... ¡Sí!... ¡es aquél! No, no puede ser: la esposa de ese
caballero murió cuando el último cólera. ¡Es el otro! ¡Tampoco! Pero, ¿a mí qué me importa
quién sea? (Ah! … Yes! … It’s her! No, no it can’t be her: the wife of that gentleman died during
the last cholera epidemic. It’s the other one’s wife! Not that one either! But, why do I care who
she is?)” (not my ellipsis ibid.: 124). He imagines investigating, “¿La seguiré? Siempre conviene
poseer un secreto de mujer (Should I follow her? It’s always useful to know a woman’s secrets)”
(ibid.: 124). He imagines, with outrage, the fate that will befall her children and family when her
adultery is exposed. He sees himself leading the offended husband to the scene of the crime,
interrupting her tryst, helping the husband get revenge, seeing her “abofeteada (slapped)” in
the street, destined for “el Infierno (Hell)” (ibid.: 126). But the woman gets off the tram and he
stays seated, disturbed by his fantasy, “Un sudor frío bañaba mi rostro ... Después de todo,
¿qué me importa? (A cold sweat bathed my face … In the end, what does it matter to me?)”
(not my ellipsis ibid.: 126). The reader will have realized by now that the narrator has never
seen this woman before in his life, that the story of her infidelity is a fantasy. It does not
describe the woman at all, only the narrator indulging in it. He seems to be a cautionary figure,
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warning of the dangers of combining an overheated imagination with elitism, racism and
rampant moralism. His final question – ¿qué me importa? – answers itself.
The pseudo-scientific discourse with which the narrator considers the woman’s case
places him within an even more specific social context. Positivism was a powerful strain in the
national discourse in Mexico at the end of the Nineteenth Century, closely connected with the
dominant political class during the era of Porfirio Díaz. A group of the most influential
politicians, intellectuals and businessmen in Mexico at that time would later be called los
científicos (the Scientists), because of their adherence to Auguste Comte’s brand of Positivism.
Gutiérrez Nájera wrote frequently about science, though always with an ironic, humorous tone.
During the two years before he wrote The Novel of the Streetcar, he had published articles on:
Louis Pasteur and the microorganisms visible in food through a microscope; astronomy and the
observatory in Chapultepec Park; electricity; Darwin; comets; the replacement of fairies and
dwarves in the imagination of children “con Robinson, ese milagro de la voluntad, [y] con las
novelas de Mayne Reid y Verne, esas magias esplendorosas de la ciencia (with Robinson, that
miracle of the will, [and] with the novels of Mayne Reid and Verne, those splendid magicians of
science)” (2009: 341) Twelve years later, Gutiérrez Nájera would humorously complain about
the emphasis on national progress through science, “¿No sería mejor, más práctico y más útil
establecer la universidad de zapateros? (Wouldn’t it be better, more practical and more useful
to establish a university of shoemakers?)” (2009: 436) Gutiérrez Nájera was well-versed in
Positivism, the dominant philosophy of his times, but he was also critical of it.
The last line of his “Novel of the Streetcar” can be read as a bitterly ironic description of
the failures of Positivism in Mexican society during the Porfiriato, which claimed to be making
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progress even as it left so many people behind. The chronicle ends, “Yo sigo en el wagon.
¡Parece que todos vamos contentos! (I am still in the wagon. We all seem so happy!)” (2005:
126) Social troubles like those the narrator has envisioned – poverty, disease, poor living
conditions, industry’s effects on the traditional economy, hypocritical social and moral codes –
hiding behind Díaz’s façade of progress and contentment, would eventually erupt in revolution,
though Gutiérrez Nájera would not see it. Johns describes the discrepancy between appearance
and reality, discourse and lived experience, during the presidency of Porfirio Díaz:
In Mexico, nothing was as it seemed … Mexicans lived in the gaps between spoken word
and its real meaning, between written law and its practical application, between the
form of politics and the substance of statecraft, between a fawning deference to
superiors and a deep resentment of authority … But when these gaps got squeezed a
little too hard, or for too long, the apparent and the real rubbed against each other. By
the end of Díaz’s reign there were many among the wealthy who were no longer
content with the mere façade of democracy … And when Díaz was openly challenged by
disgruntled factions of the upper classes, masses of poor country folk, who for so long
had tolerated the abuses of rapacious landlords and crooked politicos, finally had an
outlet for their immemorial grievances. (my ellipsis 1997: 90-91)
Nowhere in The Novel of the Streetcar does Gutiérrez Nájera, a “gran conservador (great
conservative),” engage in political denunciations or criticisms of the state (González 1983: 99).
But his ironic portrait of the chronicle’s narrator, I would argue, demands to be read, at least in
part, politically. The portrait of this belle époque boulevardier-científico subverts the dominant
discourse of Porfiriato Mexico, which insisted, as its official slogan, on orden, paz y progreso
(order, peace and progress).
The effectiveness of the chronicle relies on the reconfiguration of the narrator, reader
and subject matter. Though at first the city seems to be the subject, a slyly subversive portrait
of the narrator himself comes to the fore. Though at first the reader is invited to share the
narrator’s perspective, the narrator soon grows too repugnant. But how can we be certain that
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Gutiérrez Nájera meant for his narrator to be judged critically? Perhaps his sanctimonious
Catholic moralism is distasteful to modern readers; for example, when he says, “hay besos que
se empiezan en la Tierra y se acaban en el Infierno (there are kissed that begin on Earth and
end in Hell),” about the woman whom he both desires and condemns (2005: 126). But
Gutiérrez Nájera was himself both a Catholic moralist and a man of his times. El Duque Job
published articles on morality which consider perspectives difficult for us to fathom today. For
example, in “Los hombres que matan (The Men Who Kill),” published in El Partido Liberal on the
26th of May, 1889, he asks, “¿Existe el derecho de matar a la mujer infiel? (Is there a right to kill
an unfaithful wife?)” (2007: 240). But a careful reading of this piece reveals that, rather than
answering the question, which seems so odious and outrageous to our modern sensibilities,
Gutiérrez Nájera complicates it. He denounces the immorality and hypocrisy of husbands who
suddenly become defenders of their honor, beacons of morality, “juez de su propio causa, en
héroe de gacetillas y crónicas de tribunales (judge of their own case, hero of the tabloids and
courthouse chronicles),” only after discovering their wives’ infidelities; whereas, as long as their
wives were faithful, they themselves had behaved quite immorally and duplicitously. Which is
to say, Gutiérrez Nájera exposes the psychological ambiguity and hypocrisy of the moralistic
position – exactly as does the portrait he draws of the narrator in “Novel of the Streetcar.”
The creation of a “literary persona” allows Gutiérrez Nájera to ironically undermine
dominant cultural discourses (González 2002: 166). Whether the narrator is an honest or
disingenuous portrait of the author himself, even whether the author intended this portrait to
be read as such, is immaterial. The narrator represents a social type, and he is presented so as
to invite ridicule. But the uncertainty of this distinction between author and narrator probably
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contributed to the critical disregard into which Gutiérrez Nájera fell after his premature death.
For decades, his place in the Mexican literary canon was precarious, despite his brilliance and
his innovations. This disregard arose in part from the fact that much of his writing was left
dispersed among so many periodicals, and in part because of his reputation for being
cosmopolitan. Sánchez Prado writes, “históricamente, la crítica literaria en México ha estado
íntimamente ligada a los intentos mismos de constitución de la literatura nacional (historically,
literary criticism in Mexico has been intimately linked with the attempts to constitute a national
literature)” (2009: 4). Gutiérrez Nájera’s excesses of European culture and erudition, his
flaunting of French and of his knowledge of French literature, his apparent lack of interest in
the Mexico that existed beyond the world of fashionable Mexico City, “beyond the barbershop
of Micoló,” and the subtlety of his criticisms of his highly elite world, soured post-revolutionary
nationalist Mexican critics to him. Though these critics would not include Nájera or his legacy in
the cultural project of a new national literature, “The Novel of the Streetcar” and the chronicles
it inspired were never marginal in terms of originality, readership or influence. They represent a
literary genealogy running like an invisible thread through the center of the canon.
3. Salvador Novo and “Oh Mexico! A Novel in Which Nothing Happens”
Salvador Novo begins his “Evocation of Gutiérrez Nájera” with a warning: looking for a
“double image” in his predecessor’s chronicles, an image of the city and of the author’s
biography, will lead to disaster, to shipwreck in a sea of lovely, lyrical prose in which the
mysterious city merely lingers like a hazy, indistinct background:
Si ahora, 60 años más tarde, pretendemos conjugar de las crónicas de Gutiérrez Nájera
una doble imagen: la de su vida y la de la ciudad de su tiempo, naufraguemos, perdidos,
en un mar de bellas, líricas prosas en que la ciudad que las lee, las aguarda, las admira y
aplaude, no aparece sino como el vago fondo de una vida refinada, europea, ultraculta.
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If now, sixty years later, we attempt to conceive of a double image in the chronicles of
Gutiérrez Nájera: that of his life and that of the city of his times, we will be shipwrecked,
lost, in a sea of lovely, lyrical prose in which the city presented, hidden, admired and
applauded, appears only as the vague backdrop of a refined, European, ultra-cultured
life. (1996: 345)
The insight is pointed, but not entirely frank. In “The Novel of the Street Car” we saw a
conflation of an urban portrait with what begins, at least ostensibly, as a self-portrait. But Novo
could not admit that he had learned this very same trick from Gutiérrez Nájera and then put it
to good use himself. Though Novo was the quintessential chronicler of Mexico City in his time,
all his writing points back to the same subject. Monsiváis calls Novo “el primer escritor
mexicano enteramente dedicado en su obra al culto de la personalidad (the first Mexican writer
entirely dedicated in his work to the cult of personality)” (2000: 104). Everything Novo wrote,
including all that prose about his city, was always also about Novo.
His “evocation” of an admired predecessor is no exception. Novo defends Gutiérrez
Nájera from charges of elitism. “¿No habría barrios pobres; gentes en ellos incapaces de
descifrar las citas francesas de sus crónicas, o aun de leerlas? (Weren’t there poor
neighborhoods; people in them incapable of deciphering the French references in his
chronicles, or even of reading them?)” Novo asks (1996: 345). And just as he laid the blame for
Gutiérrez Nájera’s frequent Gallicisms on the tastes of readers and the literary market, so does
Novo turn the accusations of indifference to the “poor neighborhoods” and readers on its head;
it was not the author’s snobbery but the city that did not want to know itself, that preferred to
read about theaters and balls in the fashionable parts of town. “El Duque Job no hacía sino
plegarse – claro es que de buen grado – a la corriente (Duke Job merely followed – certainly
followed very closely – the spirit of his times),” Novo writes (ibid.: 345). Both arguments, in fact
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all of Novo’s lecture-evocation of Gutiérrez Nájera, are actually about Novo himself. Novo had
also been attacked for: an intellectualism verging on snobbery; a cosmopolitanism that was
deemed unpatriotic; and for living “a refined, European, ultra-cultured life.” The contest
between universalist and nationalist tendencies, between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, was
one of the central cultural flashpoints during the formation of the Mexican literary field,
motivating polemics and attacks like those made against the Contemporáneos and against Novo
in 1925 and 1929. Novo began his career by exaggerating his worldliness. When he first started
writing for El Universal Ilustrado in 1924, the editor introduced him to his new readers as “un
escritor yanqui, con sólida cultura inglesa y francesa, que escribe en español (a Yankee writer,
with solid English and French culture, who writes in Spanish)” (qtd in Long 1999). Even as late as
1962, while ostensibly defending a predecessor, Novo was still defending himself.
He describes the influence that Gutiérrez Nájera had on his career as “sentimental, or
magical,” in a lyrical and periphrastic aside about having been there to meet Gutiérrez Nájera’s
surviving contemporaries “en los primeros años de mi tímido ingreso en el mundo literario de
México (in the first years of my timid entry into the Mexican literary world)” (350). But in fact,
Novo’s lecture focuses on two minor aspects of Gutiérrez Nájera’s production, which just
happened to be crucial to Novo’s own oeuvre: his scant extent satirical poetry; and the few
travelogues written by a man who was born and who died in Mexico City without hardly ever
leaving. When Novo describes “el proceso de su descubrimiento del mar (the process of his
discovery of the sea)” in a chronicle about a visit to Veracruz, Novo might be writing about his
own book, Return Ticket (1928) (1996: 358). More than a lecture on Gutiérrez Nájera, his
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“evocation” is an attempt to establish a link with a literary predecessor, which lapses, in a
conclusion invoking the man’s pen and inkpot, among other memorabilia, into adulation.
Novo never mentions “The Novel of the Streetcar,” though he does repeatedly invoke
the metaphorical boundaries of “the barbershop of Micoló” and the “Avenue of the Reforma.”
However, one of Novo’s earliest publications also first appeared with the word “novela (novel)”
in the title. The piece would later be republished as, “El joven (The Youth)”; but it first appeared
when Novo was only nineteen years old, and not at all “timid,” in La Falange with the early title,
“¡Que México! Novela en que nada pasa (Oh Mexico! A Novel in which Nothing Happens)”
(1923). La Falange, published in seven issues between December 1922 and October 1923, was
directed by Jaime Torres Bodet and funded by José Vasconcelos’s SEP. Novo first published this
“novela” as part of “Kodak,” an irregular column he wrote for the magazine whose title perhaps
recalled the comparisons of Modernist writing about the city with photography, a critical topos
as old as Baudelaire’s Le Spleen de Paris. Novo would rewrite and republish the piece several
times before it appeared in 1946 in expanded form as an appendix to Novo’s most successful
urban chronicle, Nueva grandeza mexicana: Ensayo sobre la ciudad de México y sus alrededores
en 1946 (New Mexican Grandeur: An Essay on Mexico City and its Surroundings in 1946).
Though El Joven70 was written early in his career, it strikes many of the notes that would color
Novo’s vast body of prose about the city: contemporary modes of leisure and pleasure; the
constitution of identity within urban and social space; a personal confession, filled with
surreptitious revelations about gender and sexuality.
But are these twenty pages really a novel? Like Gutiérrez Nájera’s “novela,” Novo’s text
inhabits ambiguous territory. It begins with a novelistic trope, a cliché signaling genre, though
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here it is an intentional diversion. The story, it there is a story here, begins with the protagonist
waking up:
Levantóse temprano, alegre. Sentía al respirar, su corazón. Desde el alba, en vez de
gallos higiénicos que hubiera amado oír, había sentido la voz de los autos y el trote
mañanero de los carros de leche.
He woke up early, happy. He felt himself breathing, his heart. Since dawn, instead of the
healthy sound of roosters he would have loved to hear, he had heard the voices of the
cars and the morning trot of the milk carts. (1996: 238).
He is not a provincial hero waking to the cries of the farmyard, but an urban hero rising to the
sounds of automobile traffic. But in fact, this hero will quickly disappear. We follow our recently
awoken protagonist for a page, just long enough to imagine this will be a traditional narrative.
“¡Todo, todo igual! (Everything, everything the same!)” he says, looking out the window as he
rides a bus downtown (ibid.: 238). Like the hero of Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Man in the Crowd,”
he has just recuperated from an illness and is leaving his bedroom for the first time in days.
Novo’s narrative follows his perceptions:
Pasaba uno que otro camión. De los pueblos, venía gente de cuadros a establecer
repollos y pollos ... El ruido de la calle era para él armonía sabida. Los trenes urbanos,
como personas decentes, con un poco de todo, zafando el trole en las esquinas mientras
los rápidos atropellaban los minutos, como nuevos ricos. ¡Todo, todo igual!”
One bus passed after the other. From the outskirts, people straight from paintings were
coming to sell cabbages and chickens … The noise of the street was for him a familiar
harmony. The urban trains, like decent types, with a little of everything, speeding past
the trolley at the corners while the quick trampled the minutes, like new rich people.
Everything, everything the same! (my ellipsis ibid.: 238)
Novo’s “Youth” hears harmonies in the city, even in the noisy chaos of morning traffic
contending with vendors from the countryside who seem suited the same sort of “painting”
that Gutiérrez Nájera imagined. Walter Benjamin describes Baudelaire’s response to the urban
experience in starkly different terms:
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Of all the experiences that made his life what it was, Baudelaire singled out having been
jostled by the crowd as the decisive, unique experience … Baudelaire battled the crowd with the impotent rage of someone fighting the rain or the wind … If he succumbed to
the force by which he was drawn to [crowds] and, as a flâneur, was made one of them,
he was nevertheless unable to rid himself of a sense of their essentially inhuman makeup. (my ellipses 1968: 193)
If the city, for Baudelaire, was dehumanizing, Novo finds it so animating that even the trains
and trolleys are anthropomorphized. In a chronicle published from 1926, “Elogio del automóvil
(In Praise of the Automobile),” in El Universal Ilustrado, Novo mentions that in “una cierta
novela corta que llamé El joven, que esta casi inédita (in a certain short novel I called The Youth,
which is nearly unpublished),” he had established the superiority of automobiles over bicycles,
streetcars and horse-drawn cabs (Quirarte 2016: 270). Rather than reacting with horror to the
urban, Novo’s Youth celebrates it, praising the automobile above all else. His gaze flashes past
the city and past his subject matter with the rapidity of a passenger looking out the window,
turning corners suddenly into brand new territory, catching glimpses of scenes without
bothering to linger on them. His style might be described with a single word: velocity. Gutiérrez
Nájera’s belle époque is over and the world has sped up.
Sometimes, the words the joven reads in the street and his reactions to them become
the narrative. The ephemera of urban life scintillates for a moment in the light of his gaze,
transforming, as he perceives it, into poetry. Advertisements, menus and announcements taken
out of context become pure lyricism, recalling Joyce’s Ulysses, published just two years earlier:
Man Spricht Deutsch “Florsheim”, Empuje usted. Menú: sopa Moscavita. Shampoo. “Ya
llegó el Taíta del Arrabal”, ejecute con los pies a los maestros, Au Bon Marché Facultad
de México, vías urinarias, extracciones sin dolor, se hace trou-trou, examine su vista
gratis, diga son-med, Mme. acaba de llegar, estamos tirando todo, hoy, la reina de los
caribes, The leading Hatters, quien los prueba los recomienda, pronto aparecerá, ambos
teléfonos, consígase la novia. Agencia de inhumaciones “Eveready”. ¿Tiene usted callos?
Tome Tanlac.
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Man Spricht Deutsch “Florsheim,” Come in. Menu: Moscow Soup. Shampoo. “The Star of
the Suburbs has arrived,” use your feet like the masters, Au Bon Marché Mexican
Authority, urinary tracts, painless extractions, we do trou-trou, check your vision for
free, say son-med, Mrs. has just arrived, we are getting rid of everything, today, the
queen of the Caribbean, The Leading Hatters, those who try it recommend it, soon it will
appear, both telephones, get a girlfriend. Cremation agency “Eveready”. Do you have
callouses? Take Tanlac. (1996: 239)
A careful reading reveals more in this passage than just words found in the street. The ironic
and poetic sensibilities of the narrator are also evident. A cremation agency named
“Eveready?” A remedy for the calluses likely to trouble a flâneur? His vision of the city reveals
his sense of humor; he and the setting begin to merge, and the reader is left chasing after:
Siguió caminando. Todo lo conocía. Solo que su ciudad le era un libro abierto por
segunda vez, en el que reparaba hoy más, en el que no se había fijado mucho antes.
Leía con avidez cuanto encontraba. ¡Su ciudad! Estrechábala contra su corazón.
Sonreía a sus cúpulas y prestaba atención a todo.
He kept walking. He knew it all. Only that his city was to him a book opened for
the second time, to which he paid more attention, on which he had not focused much
before.
He read avidly everything he found. His city! It wrapped itself around his heart.
He laughed at its towers and paid attention to everything. (1996: 239)
Novo uses the third-person, but the narrative is from the subjectivity of the young protagonist,
mimicking his elatedness as he rediscovers “his city!” a city which is explicitly literary,
something to be “read” in advertisements, in street scenes and amusing tableaux vivants,
which are like a familiar, half-forgotten “book.”
The anonymous, titular Youth soon disappears, only to return at the conclusion of
Novo’s narrative when he returns home at the end of the day. He is a device: the narrative
seems to consist of his thoughts, perceptions and experiences on a day spent wandering
through the city. But for most of the text, we find none of the standard markers fixing the
narrative to this particular character. Novo’s chronicle is much more radical: a discourse located
200

neither in the thoughts nor voice of its author or any of its characters, which adopts literary and
journalistic tropes freely, blending lyrical, confessional and satirical tones, veering sharply
between social commentary and urban rhapsody. There is no story here, no characters, and no
events; there is only literary sensibility, only style.
The sarcasm in “The Youth” recalls that of Novo’s Ensayos (Essays), published in 1925.
They contain some of the finest commixtures since Oscar Wilde of the seemingly frivolous with
the erudite and the profound. Distinguishing between satire and social critique in Novo’s
writing from this era often seems impossible. In “The Youth,” he writes:
La soltería, el cinematógrafo, el vegetarianismo, el teléfono y las novelas francesas
tienen grande culpa del grupo de las enfermedades. Antaño sólo en las novelas o en el
teatro moría de amor alguna desdichada; hoy el profesor Freud nos las muestra en la
vida cometiendo olvidos, torpezas, equivocaciones, errores, supersticiones... Toda la
psicopatología de la vida diaria y de la lucha por los maridos.
Bachelorhood, the cinema, vegetarianism, the telephone and French novels bear great
responsibility for a group of illnesses. In older times it was only in novels and plays that
some unfortunate woman died from heartbreak; today Professor Freud shows them to
us in everyday life, forgetting things, slipping up, making mistakes, errors, superstitions
… All the psychopathology of daily life and the battle between husband and wife.
(not my ellipsis 1996: 240)
This playful list is actually a pointed one: “bachelorhood” as a viable lifestyle choice suggests
changing social mores in a culture that had traditionally placed great emphasis on the family;
cinema was still a very new art form in 1923; “vegetarianism” suggests the trendiness of diets
and similar fads that come and go with the seasons; the telephone was still a new technology,
often associated with modernity; and French novels had long been favorite targets of the
morality police. The “illness” Novo is describing here seems to be none other than Modernity
itself, bringing with it changing social conditions, moralities, technologies and art forms. The list
of afflictions ends with those for which we have Sigmund Freud to thank: complexes, Freudian
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slips, superstitions and other love-sicknesses. The passage is more serious than it seems. In
Freud’s Mexico (2010), Rubén Gallo shows that Novo was in fact an extremely careful reader of
Freud, who, during the course of more than a decade of study, turned himself into one of
Mexico’s foremost experts on psychoanalysis. He subscribed to a number of psychoanalytic
journals, wrote commentaries on Freud and his contemporaries, and even wrote a salacious
sexual autobiography, Estatua de sal (Pillar of Salt) (1998) that can be read as a self-analysis.71
What at first seems frivolous in Novo is anything but, Viviane Mahieux shows. The
lightness of Novo’s style was a deliberate tactic in the literary debates of 1920s Mexico, in the
context of a society still reeling from the dramatic effects of a terrible revolution, in which
authors were expected to be solemn and ponderous:
Novo transforms the very critiques that dismiss him as banal into trademarks of his
cultural production. It is tempting to say that Novo’s cultural project is frivolity itself, but
it might be more appropriate to argue that frivolity is Novo’s style. (2011: 135)
Novo could make light of everything, including the changes that the revolution had wrought –
very much against the grain at a moment when, Mahieux writes:
intellectuals were expected to act as solemn guides for a nation that was emerging from
ten years of civil war. (ibid.:112)
Just after the mention of Freud, Novo is explicit that his subject is the changing nature of
Mexican society - but he can’t resist sly mockery, of everything, always:
Hay dos grandes muestras de la fuerza que crea dividiendo en nuestra moderna
sociedad. El aviso oportuno, en lo moral, y la casta de los choferes, en lo material.
Nadie que use planillas ignora estos dos hechos. Anteriormente a la Revolución,
podía leerse entero el periódico, y se podían atravesar las calles. Hoy los diarios dan
demasiado papel y los hijos de Ford existen demasiado.
There are two great signs of the force that is creating division in our modern
society. The timely warning, in the moral, and the profession of drivers, in the material.
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Nobody who uses a payroll has not heard of these two facts. Before the
Revolution, you could read the whole newspaper, and you could cross the street. Today,
the dailies use too much paper and there are too many of Ford’s children. (1996: 240)
The Revolution has divided modern Mexican society from its past, but a professional journalist
seems an unlikely candidate to complain about the growth of the very industry that feeds him,
and later Novo will celebrate the new abundance of automobiles in his city. Blaming such
quotidian developments on the Revolution was tantamount to mocking the solemn,
nationalistic literature that treated it as the birth of a new nation and people. Sánchez Prado
writes, in regards to “Viaje (Journey),” a poem Novo also published in 1923, “encontramos en
Contemporáneos una literatura desenfadada, como la de Salvador Novo, quién deconstruye el
nacionalismo decimonónico desde un trabajo poético con el humor (we find in the
Contemporáneos an informal literature, like that of Salvador Novo, who deconstructs stilted
nationalism through the poetic use of humor)” (2009: 41). Though Sánchez Prado’s focus here is
Novo’s poetry, the effect of the passage from “The Youth” quoted above is similar: a humorous
deconstruction of the discourses of Mexican nationalism.
Novo’s reference to “the profession of drivers” sounds innocent enough, but the figure
of the driver returns a few pages later, and we know from other sources that Novo’s interest in
these men was more than just academic. One of the principal developments between the draft
of “The Youth” published in 1923 and the 1928/1946 version is a mock history of the changing
modes of public transportation that gave rise to this new social type:
Tampoco existía antes de 1900 ese tipo ágil que constituyen los choferes. Más lejos, en
las diligencias y en los coches genéricamente de caballos, los aurigas eran serios, un
poco viejos, o gordos o secos, pero siempre con algo de daguerrotipo y de incómoda
silla real. Deben de haber olido a la paja que estornudaban sus caballos.

203

Neither did there exist before 1900 that agile type that is the driver. Before that, with
stagecoaches and horse-drawn carriages generally, the coach hands were serious,
slightly older, or fat or dry, but always with something of a daguerreotype and of the
uncomfortable wooden seat. They must have smelled like the hay their horses sneezed.
(1996: 241)
The tone is satirical. He uses an antiquated term for driver, “coach hand”; he compares railroad
workers to executioners, killing “a una que otra María Antonieta (one Marie Antoinette after
the next)” with their modern guillotines; he calls the bicycle “ornitorrinco ... toro bípedo y
solípedo que no comía ni se entripaba ni podía matar a nadie. Ni a su jinete (duck-billed
platypus, one or two-footed bull that does not eat what it disembowels and can’t kill anybody.
Not even its rider ” (ibid.: 241) The bicycle, Novo says, is a “grito de Dolores” against the
mechanized tyranny of the railroads (ibid.: 242). Invoking el grito, the shout celebrated as the
beginning of the Mexican War of Independence and the founding moment of the nation,
reenacted by the President on every Mexican Independence Day, is not just innocent humor.
Vicente Quirarte describes Novo and the Contemporáneos as “guerreros que libraban otra
forma de batalla contra la reducida visión nacionalista, despreciadora de una cultura que no
naciera de la pólvora y las cananas (warrior who opened up another sort of battle against the
reduced nationalist vision, contemptuous of a culture that had not been born of gunpowder
and cannons)” (2016: 12). Instead of the dramatic birth of a nation, the Revolution as Novo
describes it merely changed the sort of people driving around the city:
Ya los científicos, los que habían visitado Europa, iban al Paseo de la Reforma en
coloniales autoedificios marca Renault. Los héroes provincianos – cuya vida y hechos
saben algunos maestros de escuela – desde su mohonera, acentuaban su gesto trágico o
requerían el sable insurgente o se aseguraban el sombrero o la muleta, al ver pasar, con
los caballos en píldoras, aquellas cosas que les hacían taf-taf y les volvían la espalda y un
humo incorrecto que les salía por la espalda.
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Before, the Scientists, the ones who had visited Europe, went up and down the Avenue
of the Reforma in massive car-buildings built by Renault. The provincial heroes – whose
lives and works some school masters know – from the boondocks, exaggerated their
tragic gesture or demanded the revolutionary saber or held on to their hat and crutches,
when the saw them pass, with their horses under the hood, those things that went taftaf and turned their backs and an inappropriate smoke slipped out behind them.
(ibid.: 242)
This passage only appeared after the schism in Mexican literature began, with the so-called
Debate of 1925, pitting the Nationalists against the Contemporáneos. Novo’s parenthetic
remark, noting that the lives and deeds of the provincial heroes were only known by “some
school masters,” ridicules those who would make them the subject of a new national literature.
Instead, Novo describes them as bumpkins from the “mohonera (boondocks),” who, startled by
automobiles that they compare unfavorably with their horses, accentuate their tragic gestures
and hold on to their hats. His humor verges on insult. “Estos automóviles – iba a escribir con b
(These automobiles – I was going to write with v),” Novo writes, in effect calling those same
“provincial heroes” illiterate (1996: 242).
Though the tone may be satirical, the changes in the city were very real. During and
after the Revolution, Mexico City became a city of cars. “Con la Revolución (with the
revolution),” Novo wrote, “hubo tantos autos – ya rápidos y yanquis – como generales (there
were as many cars – already fast and American – as generals)” (ibid.: 242). Rubén Gallo writes:
No other invention had a comparable impact on Mexico City: what had been a town of
carts and horse-drawn carriages before the Revolution had now become a city bustling
with automobiles, buses, tramways, and taxicabs … Novo, following the lead of
European avant-garde poets from Marinetti to Apollinaire, applauded the acceleration
of time brought about by the automobile. (my ellipsis 2010: 23)
Novo’s vision was prescient. By 1995, when Monsiváis wrote, Los rituales del caos (The Rituals
of Chaos), he could ironically describe one of the city’s most frequent scenes as, “el hervidero
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de vehículos. De golpe parece que todos los automóviles de la tierra se concentrasen en un
punto para avanzar sin avanzar, mientras el embotellamiento es ya segunda naturaleza del ser
humano (the swarm of vehicles. Suddenly it seems all the automobiles on earth are
concentrated in a single point trying to move forward without moving, while the traffic jam is
already second nature to human beings)” (1995: 18). Seventy-two years earlier, Novo had
written, “Tráfico tan constante reclamaba una orientación (Traffic so constant demands a
direction)” (1996: 243). But there is more here than a satirical history of public transportation,
an attack on nationalist discourse, and a description of the forces of modernization at work in
the city – there is also a confession. In 1925, Novo began writing for El Chafirete, a guild journal
for drivers. He published some of his most brilliant satirical poetry in its pages, and made his
romantic conquests among the young men who read it and frequented the office. In his erotic
autobiography, Pillar of Salt, not published until 1998, Novo wrote:
Una insaciable sed de carne y una audacia a la vez segura de mi belleza y mi posibilidad
de comprar caricias, me arrojaban a la caza de género de muchachos que me electrizaba
descubrir, tentar, exprimir: los choferes, que en el México pequeño de entonces eran la
joven generación lanzada a manejar las máquinas, a vivir velozmente.
An insatiable hunger for flesh and an audaciousness at once certain of my beauty and of
the possibility of buying embraces, sent me into a general hunt for the boys that it
electrified me to discover, tempt, squeeze: the drivers, who in the little Mexico of those
days were a young generation launched to drive the new machines, to live fast.
(qtd in Barrera 1999:105)
“The Youth” was meant to be understood differently by different readers; those friends of
Novo’s who knew of his taste in lovers recognized how personal it was; meanwhile, a more
general audience might see these passages about chauffeurs and public transportation more
like quirky urban history. When republished in 1946, the narrative followed upon a chapter of
New Mexican Grandeur titled, “Todo en este discurso está cifrado (Everything in this discourse
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is coded)” (1996: 228) Here too there are hidden secrets, double images and stories written in
cipher with which Novo has inscribed his own image into a text ostensibly about the city.
In his book on Novo, Carlos Monsiváis considers a passage from Return Ticket and asks,
“¿Se puede en 1928 ser más explícito? (Can one be more explicit in 1928?)” (2000: 105) “The
Youth” is similarly explicit, but Novo confesses with such style and subtlety that the casual
reader glances right over it. For example, in regards to this new caste of drivers, Novo wrote,
“Ya nada les inmuta. Ni que un señor se suba y, cuando no lo ven, saque del chaleco una cajita
repleta de polvos cristalinos. Ni otras cosas dentro del coche. El silencio es oro. El oro es silencio
(Already nothing bothers them. Not even a passenger who gets in and, when no one is looking,
takes from his jacket a little box filled with crystalline powder. Nor other things inside the car.
Silence is golden. Gold is silence)” (1996: 244). In his autobiography, Novo admits to using
cocaine around this time. “Other things” is as suggestive as it is vague and the chiasmus with
which the passage ends might be read as a description of the sort of relationships Novo had
with his choferes, relationships that required discretion and involved financial transactions, in
which he quite literally purchased their silence. “The Youth” continues:
Ahora tenía que comprar algo en una botica y se detuvo en un aparador ... No es raro,
pues, que cuando un joven que ha comprado ya muchas cosas y que ya saluda al
responsable, le pida, por lo bajo, un poco tembloroso, un gramo de cocaína, el
responsable conteste: “Pero sólo con receta se vende, joven, en fin ... por ser usted ...” Y
ya en adelante, por ser él le venderá todos los gramos que quiera.
Now he needed to buy something in a pharmacy and he stopped in at the store window
… It is not strange, then, when a youth who has already bought many things and chatted
with the clerk, asks him, under his breath, a little anxiously, for a gram of cocaine, the
clerk answers, “But you know you need a prescription, young man, well … because it is
you …” And from then on, for being him he sells him all the grams he likes.
(not my ellipsis ibid.: 244)
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The narrative of a journey through the city is beginning to take on a more subversive aspect.
How to procure cocaine? Transactional sexual relationships? Novo gets away with it because of
the free indirect style and third-person narration. The triangle of narrator, city and reader
grows fluid. Whose perspective are we seeing the city from, Novo’s own or some character’s?
Are we seeing the city at all, or only Novo’s reflection in it? How are we, the readers, implicated
by this tone suggesting these might be the thoughts of any young man out walking the streets?
According to Monsiváis, Novo was exploring “las distancias entre el Yo y la Ciudad (the
distances between the I and the City)” (1987: 769). But the relationship has a third perspective:
the reader, trying to make sense of what it means, or perhaps just laughing quietly.
The subject quickly turns banal: a series of scenes of student life follow, with various
student types, satirical dialogue, literary references and philosophical debate. Of a law student
with literary ambitions, Novo mocks, “¿No la querría editar la casa ‘Cultura’? (Wouldn’t he like
to be an editor with ‘Cultura’?)” (1996: 249) Wouldn’t a parrot be better than the wise old owl
on the ex-libris of Cultura? Novo suggests. Satire, parody and the repurposing of popular forms
are literary techniques summed up nicely by the image of the parrot. Novo offers the bird as
the emblem of a new, “frivolous” literature, while the wise old owl reminds him of one of the
venerable old men of letters, “El búho está ya un poco Urbina (The owl is a bit too Urbina)”
(ibid.: 249). In between jokes, he asks, “¿Existe en México una literatura que sintetice el espíritu
popular? ¿Hay slang, argot? (Is there a literature in Mexico that synthesizes the popular spirit?
Is there slang? Jargon?)” (ibid.: 249) In the midst of irreverent humor, he touches the central
concern of the literary critics of his era: formulating the parameters of a specifically Mexican
national literature. Perhaps the suggestion is that Novo’s own appropriation of popular culture,
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slang, journalism, the tropes of cinema and radio was itself a synthesis of “the popular spirit.”
But there is no argument here, only mockery. The question that immediately follows the point –
“Is there slang?” might refer to certain novels much praised by Nationalist critics. Mariano
Azuelas’s Los de abajo, for example, used dialect and non-standard orthography to depict the
revolutionaries’ speech. Is there a literature that reflects the national character? Of course! Just
look for the slang, Novo says, with a wink.
In fact, he does not argue for or against the existence of such a literature. Rather, Novo
parodies the debate, just as he parodies students pontificating about Plato, Baudelaire, Azorín
and Huysman. He discounts the broadsides and popular engravings of the Nineteenth Century,
like those of Antonio Vanegas Arroyo and José Guadalupe Posada, along with the corridos
(ballads) often printed on them. He slyly suggests “lyric theater” as a possibility. He gives
examples of satirical poetry, including some lines, “with slang,” written by Fernández de Lizardi,
the great virreinista writer who incorporated into his prose the dialect produced by the
admixture of Spanish with indigenous languages. Decades later in Letras Vencidas, Novo would
begin an essay on Luis G. Inclán’s nineteenth-century novel, Astucia, by describing how critics
had objected to Inclán’s use of “la bastardía del lenguaje o dialecto Mexicano (the bastardized
Mexican language or dialect)” (1996: 332). But in the reproduction of this debate in “El Joven,”
Novo does not lay out a position or even sketch out an argument. Raising the subject creates
the effect of pertinence – Novo seems always up-to-date on the intellectual vogue – while in
fact he is merely ridiculing the debate itself. The passage merits quotation in full:
¿Cuándo será que pueda haber literatura mexicana, teatro, novela, canción,
música? No ser normales es, en los pueblos, un defecto mayor que en las mujeres ser
sietemesinas o gemelas. Que la ontogénesis nos ayude a descubrir que a esa América
mía, que palpo toda en el mapa de relieve de mi corazón, le ha faltado algo. ¿Cuando
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debieron las hijas de Europa empezar a huirse de su casa? ¿Por qué no tuvimos, como
todos los pueblos, primero lo épico y luego lo lírico? ... Lo epopéyico nos salió un poco
tarde, ya que se habló del código de Napoleón; pero ya el egloguismo era cadáver,
polvo, sombra, nada, cuando el Diario de México y el Pensador empezaron con
indirectas.
No hemos tenido nunca humanismo ni renacimiento. A Cristo nos los trajeron ya
en ediciones con copyright ... El teatro, la novela, los frescos, todo lo tenía ya Europa;
Tezozomoc se había dormido sobre sus algodones. Lo único que producía Tenochtitlán
eran esculturas y piedras de los sacrificios que a su vez favorecerían el turismo
norteamericano y las excavaciones desconcertantes.
When might there have been a Mexican literature, theater, novel, song, music?
Not to be normal is, in the country, a worse defect than for women to be premature or
to give birth to twins. Let ontogenesis help us to discover that this America of mine, that
beats all across the map of my heart, has been missing something. When would the
daughters of Europe have begun to flee from their house? Why didn’t we have, like all
the other peoples, first the epic and then the lyric? The epic came to us a little late,
already the laws of Napoleon were set; but the pastoral was already cadaver, dust,
shadow, nothing, when the Diario de México and el Pensador were first printed.
We have never had humanism or renaissance. They even brought Christ to us in
copyrighted editions … Theater, the novel, painting, Europe had everything; Tezozomoc
slept on his pillows. The only thing Tenochtitlan produced were sculptures and stones
for sacrifices that in their time would inspire North American tourism and surprising
excavations. (my ellipsis 1996: 250)
At the advent of the era of Mexican cultural nationalism, Novo could not have written about it
more controversially. He suggests that American literature is no match for that of Europe; he
belittles Aztec art; he ridicules the pretensions to the epic of the Ateneo de México and of the
writers of the novel of the Revolution. If the development of the arts over the centuries can be
understood as ontogenesis, then the case of Mexico, Novo argues, represents some sort of
aberrant pregnancy, a premature birth or perhaps a set of twins. Though his heart beats the
map of “his America,” he will declare its shortcomings. the culture of the Americas is derivative;
even Christ was brought here with a copyright.
This is not evidence Novo was unpatriotic, anti-nationalistic or a malinchista. The
original title of the narrative, “¡Que México!,” expresses both admiration and exasperation.
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One need only read certain passages from Novo’s travel writing to be reminded of his
problematic patriotism, like the moment in Continente vacío (Empty Continent) (1935), when,
on a ship headed towards Montevideo, desperately homesick, Novo writes in a letter, “No
puedo olvidarme de México en ningún instante (I can’t forget about Mexico for an instant)”
(1996: 718). Novo attacks the search for a specifically Mexican literature synthesizing “the
popular spirit” for the same reasons that, six decades later, Roger Bartra calls the discourse of
the Mexican national character “an artificial entelechy.” He is not convinced. In fact, Novo is
more concerned with the grace of his prose than with staking out a position in the debate. He
seems simply to want to show off his intelligence, skepticism and mordant wit, which explains
why an echo of a poem finds its way into the passage quoted above. In El Chafirete, in 1923,
Novo published a parody of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, under the pseudonym, Radiador
(Radiator). Novo’s poem, which began, “Este que ves camión descolorido (This discolored truck
you see),” rewrote Sor Juana’s famous sonnet on art, artifice and illusion, “Este que ves, engaño
colorido (This colored trick you see)” (qtd in Barrera 1999:106). Both original and parody ended
with the line, “es cadáver, es polvo, es sombra, es nada.” In the passage quoted above, the
allusion becomes merely another virtuoso touch, another sign of Novo’s brilliance and talent. Is
there a specifically Mexican literature? Is such a thing even possible? The answer does not
interest him.
For most of “The Youth,” the nameless, titular character has vanished, he has become
indistinguishable from the city itself. Some of the people he describes, however, contradict
stereotypical portrayals of “el Mexicano” as strongly as he does. Novo writes, “El dueño de una
zapatería, de aptitudes enciclopédicas, ahora defiende en inglés un par de zapatos. Luego se
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exhibe en mil formas la habilidad manual indígena al servicio de otra habilidad no manual ni
indígena (The owner of a shoe-shop, with encyclopedic aptitudes, now defends a pair of shoes
in English. Then he exhibits in a thousand forms the indigenous manual ability in the service of
another ability neither manual nor indigenous)” (1996: 253). Is this polyglot shopkeeper meant
to represent the national character? Is he a racially-charged stereotype of the urban middle
class? Is he a parodic depiction of what nationalists like Vasconcelos called a mestizo? Or is
Novo simply describing with wit and irony a character observed in the street? Who can say.
“The Youth” ends by switching to a first-person narration. The young man who awoke at
the beginning of the story returns to his bedroom, and the story ends with him taking off his
shoes. The final paragraph is rendered in his voice, as a quotation, like the epilogue spoken by a
character at the end of a play. He imagines the possibility that he might die the next day and
that this city and world might go on without him. “Hay cosas invariables, que gustan siempre
(there are invariable things, which always please),” he says; yet he also says, “Lo que hice hoy ...
no tendrá ya objeto mañana (What I did today … won’t make any sense tomorrow)” (ellipsis not
mine 1996: 254). Contradictory, satirical, self-mocking, compromised in business and in
pleasure, impossible to pin down to a single political perspective, consistently brilliant, with
“encyclopedic aptitudes,” polyglot and derisive, Novo’s young man is like his Mexico: defined by
“invariable” tastes – which is to say, by culture – but also brand new, bound to the moment and
to chronos, evolving in time, different today than it will be tomorrow.
4. José Joaquín Blanco Visits “Plaza Satélite”
The central library on the campus of UNAM is unmistakable, both for the murals painted
on its sides by Juan O’Gorman, representing the history of Mexican culture, and for its
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prominent position in the heart of la ciudad universitaria (University City), just at the northern
edge of the wide lawn of verdant green grass divided into squares by cement walkways that is
known informally as las islas (the Islands). It was there in las islas, where students are always
lounging, necking and smoking, that José Joaquín Blanco first learned the word “transa,” slang
for transaction, particularly transactions of the more nefarious sort.72 He was a student at the
time, we presume, perhaps already writing his undergraduate thesis for the Facultad de
Filosofía y Letras on the subject of “La crítica cultural de la generación de Contemporáneos (The
Cultural Criticism of the Contemporáneos Generation)” (1977).
The study was never published, but it remains in the thesis library at UNAM, not far
from the lawn where students still complete their nefarious transactions, sprawl in the sun and
avoid their schoolwork. The Contemporáneos group was best known for poetry, but Blanco’s
thesis focused instead on their “cultural criticism.” His thoughts on Salvador Novo stand out.
Blanco was still a young man and had not yet made a name for himself as a critic, chronicler,
award-winning poet, novelist and screenwriter, when he wrote a chapter describing Novo as
the most scandalously precocious talent in a group of precocious young talents. He claims that
Novo, “a los veinte años publica los mejores libros de toda su obra – llegó posteriormente a
igualar el nivel entonces adquirido, nunca a superarlo – y los más originales, atrevidos y
perfectos de su época: XX Poemas (1925) y Ensayos (1926) – (published his best work at twenty
– he later managed to equal it, never to outdo it – and the most original, daring and perfect
works of his era: XX Poems (1925) and Essays (1926)” (1977: 7). Rarely have writers, much less
groups of them working and publishing together, created mature works as early in their lives as
did the Contemporáneos. Yet Blanco’s interest seems also to be in the subject in general.
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Youth is an important topos in much of Blanco’s writing, from chronicles like “Un chavo
bien helado (An Ice Cold Kid)” (1990) to the stories of La vida es larga y además no importa (Life
Is Long and It Doesn’t Matter Anyway) (1979) to his novel, Las púberes canéforas (The Young
Water-Bearers) (1983). Youth and the wisdom of youth had new gravitas in the aftermath of
the Student Movement and the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968 and the “Halconazo” massacre of
1971, a time when government discourses and the status quo were being questioned. While
Blanco’s thesis remains fixed, outwardly, on literature, the historical context is palpable:
La historia de los otros Contemporáneos [excluyendo Pellicer] es la de una declinación
después de haber creado la obra alta en sus años jóvenes; y de este modo dejan de
escribir, o escriben cosas malas, e incluso viles, y el ideal libre del joven aventurero,
deslenguado, audaz, independiente, etc., viene en ocasiones a parar a la gris o turbia
figura de un funcionario burocrático, por cuyos méritos o deméritos oficiales da su
nombre a alguna calle, a una tumba en la Rotunda de los Hombres Ilustres.
The history of the other Contemporáneos [excluding Pellicer] is that of a decline after
having created their best work in their early years; and in this way they stop writing, or
they write bad things, even vile things, and the ideal of the youth who is adventurous,
outspoken, audacious, independent, etc. ends up sometimes in the gray or murky figure
of a bureaucratic functionary, for whose merits or demerits officials give his name to
some street, and a tomb in the Rotunda of Illustrious Men. (1977: 15)
Salvador Novo worked for the Ministry of Education (SEP) for many years, where he was a
bureaucratic functionary. In 1965, his street in Coyoacan, the neighborhood where he had lived
for many years, was named after him. The honor was awarded by the man who that very year
named Novo the Official Chronicler of Mexico City, his friend, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz
(1964-70) – the same president responsible for the massacre of several hundred students in the
Plaza of the Three Cultures in Tlatelolco, on October 2nd, 1968. After the massacre, Novo
refused to criticize his friend Díaz Ordaz or his administration. Earlier that summer, during
months of intense student demonstrations, Novo had even written several gossipy, humorous
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editorials about the protest movement, making light of a subject that was for much of the rest
of the capital no laughing matter. Beneath Blanco’s reading of “the cultural criticism” of Novo
there resound echoes of this dramatic turning point in Mexican history.
A generational rift looms between the two writers: one was still enamored of the
Mexico of the 1950s, a society in which he had moved among the wealthy and the powerful;
the other was stridently critical of the old political and social structure, and had no sympathy
for the powerful or their defenders. In an essay written for his website in 2012, Blanco recalls
seeing Novo on television in the 1960s and being disturbed by “el papel cortesano, conformista,
adulador del poder y de la riqueza, que jugaba el Cronista de la Ciudad (the role of courtesan,
conformist, sycophant to power and to wealth, that the Chronicler of the City played) ” (2012)
Blanco’s 1977 thesis is strictly literary criticism, but he is quite tough on Novo:
Letras vencidas es un pobre, triste volumen; su titulo es exacto y cumple lo que
pregona; más pobre aún, y mucho más triste, si se le compara con los precoces y
juveniles títulos de Ensayos, En defensa de lo usado, etc. Y sin embargo no logra ser un
mal libro ... por aquí y por allá saltan virtudes, párrafos, frases como ciertos rasgos que
en una arrugada actriz septuagenaria – Novo mismo habría usado la comparación –
recuerdan involuntariamente una belleza, una personalidad largamente perdida.
Defeated Letters (a later work by Novo) is a poor, sad volume; its title is exact and the
book fulfills what it foretells; even more poor, and much sadder, if it is compared with
the precocious and youthful titles from Essays, In Defense of the Used, etc. And
nevertheless it is not quite a bad book … here and there escape virtues, paragraphs,
phrases like certain features in a wrinkled septuagenarian actress – Novo himself would
have used the comparison – involuntarily recalling a beauty, a personality mostly lost.
(my ellipsis 1977: 69)
Blanco repeats this balancing act throughout his chapter on Novo, comparing brilliantly daring
and inventive early works with, in his opinion, mediocre late ones. There are signs of sensitive
understanding: the simile of an aging actress occasionally offering flashes of her former beauty
is as charming as it is apt. Viviane Mahieux has shown that Novo’s early essays can be read as a
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sort of transvestite literature. Mahieux points toward the ambiguity of their genre; the way
their narrator aligns himself with feminine figures like film actresses, while also describing his
own masculine body; and their performative aspect, likening the essays to a striptease. Novo
was known for appearing in bright eyeshadow, makeup, gaudy jewelry and other typically
“feminine” accessories, even while wearing elegant, tailored men’s suits. Novo’s early essays,
according to Mahieux, problematize any idea of gender as binary. In 1925, in an interview with
El Universal Ilustrado, when asked about the state of Mexican literature Novo called it, “a fresh
and virile girl” (Mahieux 2011: 106). After the polemics about some supposed lack of “virility” in
Mexican literature raised during the debates of 1925, Novo’s paradoxical formulation could
only have been deliberate. Describing of his own masculine physical features – Novo was
extremely tall – became the perfect retort to critics who accused him of a lack of “virility.”
Blanco seems to recognize the gender ambiguity in Novo’s self-presentation and literary style
when he compares Novo’s prose to an aged actress whose faded beauty occasionally appears
through now withered features.
Rather than creating a double portrait, with the author dressed as subject, as Novo did
with Gutiérrez Nájera, Blanco attacks his predecessor’s trajectory, implicitly aligning himself
with Novo’s youthful phase. The style of Blanco’s attack – pellucid, cultured, satirical, audacious
– especially recalls the young Novo’s prose:
Así, él que había llamado a la revolución "una cena fatídica de negros," y usado su
efectivismo ingenio contra las consignas, mitos y estandartes del populismo mexicano,
en su vejez oficializada aún se atreve a continuar en la burla, pero cortandose
previamente las garras y descendiendo de la capacidad sarcástica a la otra, de ser un
tolerado impertinente, de exigir privilegios para una maledicencia ya meramente
decorativa. Novo, el más original de los ensayistas mexicanos en sus primeros libros,
concluye como el más convencional, aceptando la receta alfonsina de aprovecharse del
escasísimo nivel cultural de México para hacer pasar como sabiduría la mera divulgación
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escolar, refrito o paráfrasis, de los bien hechos manuales escolares europeos de
literatura e historia.
So, he who had called the Revolution “a fateful dinner of blacks,” and used his lightning
ingenuity against the slogans, myths and symbols of Mexican populism, in his old age as
an official still attempted to keep up the mockery, only clipping his claws beforehand
and descending from his capacity for sarcasm to merely being a tolerated impertinent,
to demanding privileges for a sort of slander that was already merely decorative. Novo,
the most original of Mexican essayists in his first books, ends up as the most
conventional, accepting King Alfonso’s recipe for taking advantage of the scanty cultural
level in Mexico by passing off as wisdom what was merely scholarly divulgation, refried
or paraphrased, of the well-written European manuals of literature and history.
(1977: 69)
Novo began by ingeniously subverting the classic “slogans, myths and symbols” of Mexican
cultural nationalism, the same myths that Bartra would explore many years later. But Novo’s
descent from the “most original” to the “most conventional” was paralleled by his increasing
unwillingness to use his claws. If he began his career by undercutting the propaganda and selfmythification of the new Revolutionary state, he ended it cozying up to power and rehashing
foreign scholarship. This line of criticism reveals Blanco’s own preoccupations. Blanco’s early
chronicles in Unomásuno, Revista de América, La Cultura en México, Nexos and elsewhere –
many of which were collected in Función de medianoche (1981) – target the “slogans, myths
and symbols” undergirding a new generation of elites, with similar “lightning ingenuity.” Blanco
perhaps even modeled their mocking tone, in part, upon his reading of Novo’s early essays.
In his chronicles, Blanco invokes a much broader tradition. “Otra prosa periodística
(Another Journalistic Prose),” calls for a prose style at cross-purposes with the one imposed by
mass-media, consumerism and inequality. This would be nothing new, he claims, because “ese
estilo ya había existido en México en una admirable tradición que se inicia antes de la
independencia y llega aun a la mitad de este siglo (that style had already existed in Mexico in an
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admirable tradition that began before Independence and reached even as far the middle of this
century” (1981: 19). Such a tradition, as Blanco describes it, would include:
nombres que significan épocas y representan a lectores solidarios: Lizardi, Fray
Servando, Bustamante, Alamán, Ramírez, Zarco, Payno, Altamirano, Prieto, Gutiérrez
Nájera, Micrós, Tablada, Posada, Flores Magón, López Velarde, Reyes, Vasconcelos,
Guzmán, Caso, Novo, Cuesta, Cosío Villegas, Leduc, Alvarado, Revueltas, Sotomayor,
Martínez de la Vega ... Hay una hermosa tradición dispuesta a ser proseguida.
names that signify epochs and represent mutual readers … Lizardi, Fray Servando,
Bustamante, Alamán, Ramírez, Zarco, Payno, Altamirano, Prieto, Gutiérrez Nájera,
Micrós, Tablada, Posada, Flores Magón, López Velarde, Reyes, Vasconcelos, Guzmán,
Caso, Novo, Cuesta, Cosío Villegas, Leduc, Alvarado, Revueltas, Sotomayor, Martínez de
la Vega ... There is a lovely tradition ready to be continued.
(my ellipsis ibid.: 19)73
Many of Blanco’s chronicles might be more easily connected to other literary predecessors on
this list than to Gutiérrez Nájera or to Novo. In 2009, Blanco published a list on his website of
“Mis top 25 cronistas mexicanos (siglos XIX y XX) (My top 25 Mexican Chroniclers – 19th and 20th
centuries)”; Gutiérrez Nájera and Novo would come in at second and third place, respectively,
behind Guillermo Prieto (Blanco 2009). While respecting the diversity of Blanco’s literary and
journalistic influences, I would suggest that at least one of his chronicles invokes a distinctive
tradition of urban chronicle that connects him Novo and Gutiérrez Nájera.
This tradition overlaps to an extent with his description of “another journalistic prose,”
though in some respects it also diverges from it. Blanco describes his ideal prose as
“plurivalente and horizontal (plurivalent and horizontal)” as though the writer were speaking to
the reader “a traves de una mesa de café (across a coffee table)”:
Esta horizontalidad de la prosa permite personalizar las crónicas, entrelinear emociones,
destacar aspectos laterales, matizar y sobre todo proponer (no imponer) informaciones,
ideas y comentarios.
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This horizontality of the prose allows for chronicles to be personalized, for emotions to
be outlined, for lateral aspects to be outlined, for nuances and above all for proposing
(not imposing) information, ideas and commentaries. (1981: 19)
Rather than establishing truth, Blanco would create discussion – a very different paradigm than
the “autoritarismo tecnológico con que los mass-media abruman la mente y la sensibilidad del
individuo (technological authoritarianism with which the mass-media exhausts the mind and
the sensibility of the individual)” (1981: 19). Two points about Blanco’s ideal prose recall
Gutiérrez Nájera and Novo: an anti-authoritarian streak that proposes rather than imposes; and
an attempt to “personalize.” Their narratives offer alternative (or “lateral”) perspectives, arising
from the idiosyncrasies of their narrators, who perceive the city in distinctive ways and write
themselves into the urban landscape. Such a “journalistic prose” has much in common with his
description of Novo’s youthful style. However, in outlining the contours of Novo’s precocious
brilliance, Blanco comes even closer to defining the specific tradition he inherited from him:
El futuro no le importa a Novo: no hay ahorro intelectual, no hay madurez, no hay
planeación. Todo ahora, de una buena vez, en una sola carta. Ese firmeza de
personalidad y estilo da la impresionante solidez de sus libros, que no están
prometiendo ni anunciando nada, sino casi concluyendo: logrando: dejando finíquitado
con todos sus puntos y comas un estilo que es, de inmediato y sin concesiones, una
personalidad. Todos los ensayos son ostentosamente autobiográficos. La primera
persona, la misma primera persona siempre: irónica, inteligente, libresca, desdeñosa,
dandy, frívola, va recorriendo, como si fueran textos, las cosas de la realidad o de la
imaginación que la emocionan, aunque el lector descubra que lo que importa no es la
cosa emocionante sino la persona emocionada, que a Novo le entusiasma más
autorretratarse que describir el objeto criticado.
The future doesn’t matter to Novo: there is no intellectual economizing, there is no
maturity, there is no planning ahead. Everything right now, in one shot, in a single page.
That firmness of personality and style gives his books their impression of solidity, that
they are not promising or announcing anything, but almost concluding: arriving; leaving
wrapped up with their periods and commas a style that is, immediately and without
apologies, a personality. All of the essays are ostentatiously autobiographical. The firstperson, the same first-person always: ironic, intelligent, bookish, disdainful, dandyish,
frivolous, it goes traversing, as if they were texts, the things of reality or the imagination
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that inspire it, although the reader discovers that what matters is not the moving thing
but the person who has been moved, that Novo was more inspired to paint selfportraits than to describe the object under review. (1977: 66)
This is more than a wonderfully astute description of Novo’s writing; it is also a “double
portrait” of their two literary styles, Novo’s and Blanco’s, which share something of a family
resemblance. Precocity, daring, firmness of vision, freedom with subject matter, these are all
qualities of Blanco’s own essays. Two points bring us back to our specific tradition: 1) style as
personality, and 2) a hidden self-portrait, or double-portrait, conflating the city with the
observer. Ironic, intelligent, bookish, disdainful, though perhaps never quite so dandyish or
frivolous as Novo, Blanco’s chronicles draw freely from the rich history of Mexican prose writing
to create an astonishing style, capable of denouncing social injustice and envisioning ideal
societies and cities, even while surprising, entertaining, and remaining “horizontal.”
Blanco was a strident critic of power. Gutiérrez Nájera was much more quietly
subversive, presenting subtly critical assessments, while Novo’s writing beguiled and seduced,
upsetting traditional norms in a rush of ‘modern-ness.’ Nevertheless, all three authors engaged
with and subverted nationalist mythologies by confronting the “slogans, myths and symbols” of
power. Función de medianoche (The Use of Midnight) (1981), Blanco’s first anthology, begins
with an introduction, “¡México! ¡México!” Probably a parody of chants heard at soccer
matches, the title recalls Novo’s “The Youth,” first published as “Oh Mexico!” In both, we sense
exasperation with Mexican nationalism. Who exactly are you really chanting for? Blanco asks:
México son los otros: las cúpulas, con todo el dinero y todo el poder para cambiar
poblaciones y geografías a su gusto y conveniencia. Tanto hablar de raíces milenarias, de
idiosincrasias seculares, de instituciones y tradiciones que han triunfado contra
invasores, para que no se les tenga mayor respecto a los cachivaches y escenografías de
cartón en la trastienda de un viejo teatro de provincia. Los dueños del país están
poniendo su nueva casa.
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...
En sus tres sílabas de cuerno de la abundancia, con su é esdrújula como el gallo o el
clarín que abren el día, esa sonora palabra, Mé-xi-co, no incluye a los ciudadanos del
común. Ha sido remodelada. No incluye a los trabajadores, que son su enemigo: el
Huichililobos de overol que amenaza la quetzalcóatlica opulencia de las cúpulas. La
ideología nacional, que se interioriza en todos a través de los medios masivos de
comunicación, de la práctica de las corporaciones públicas y privadas, de las
reglamentaciones y del macanazo, no deja un instante de enfatizar que la brutalidad, la
ilegalidad, la lesa patria, la barbarie, la estupidez, la ignorancia y el apocalipsis son lo
que define a los trabajadores, cada vez que pretenden hacer valer alguno de los
derechos laborales y políticos que la Constitución misma les otorga.
Mexico is other people: the upper-crust, with all the money and all the power to change
populations and geographies for their pleasure or convenience. So much talking about
thousand-year-old races, about secular idiosyncrasies, about institutions and traditions
that have triumphed against invaders, just so they don’t have to show any more respect
for the rubbish and the cardboard scenery than for the backdrop of an old provincial
theater. The owners of the country are building their new home.
…
In its three syllables of a cornucopia of abundance, with its accented é like the rooster or
the bugle that begins the day, that sonorous word, Mé-xi-co, does not include the
common citizens. It has been remodeled. It does not include the workers, they are its
enemy: the Huichilobos (Aztec God of War) in overalls who threatens the Quetzalcoatllike (Aztec Feathered-Serpent God) opulence of the upper-crust. The national ideology,
that all of us interiorize thanks to mass media communication, of the business of private
and public corporations, of the regulations and the billy-club beating, never for a
moment stops emphasizing that brutality, illegality, the injured fatherland, barbarity,
stupidity, ignorance and apocalypse are what defines the workers, each time they
attempt to make good any of the political or labor laws that the Constitution itself
grants them. (1981: 12)
Blanco does not simply attack the elites, the “upper-crust” he mentions again and again, but
also the “national ideology” inculcated by mass-media and corporate power, which sustains
those hypocritical elites and keeps their victims chanting their name. Nationalist ideologies
elaborating a mythology of “the Mexican,” Bartra also tells us, in fact describe “la manera que
es legitimada la explotación (the manner in which his exploitation is legitimated)” (1986: 20).
The “cornucopia of abundance” is enjoyed by the upper echelons alone, despite or perhaps
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thanks to theories of ancient races like those proposed in José Vasconcelos’s The Cosmic Race,
and theories of “secular idiosyncrasies,” like those in Octavio Paz’s The Labyrinth of Solitude.
Mexico, as Blanco describes it, is a place of rigid class division, where social groups
compete for resources and the elites deprive the poor of basic necessities in order to live an
ever more affluent, consumerist lifestyle. The urban middle class, Blanco’s main subject, are
hardly better off, but they imagine they are, aspiring to a lifestyle they are consistently denied,
except in a fantasy of brand-name shopping:
Amplios grupos humanos insatisfechos, bastante transas, compitiendo todo el día para
trepar unos milímetros más en la escala que nunca, por lo demás, será suya; amargos,
maledicentes, sin que llegue a ocurrírseles que con un poco de razón y de buena fe, en
vez de andarse disfrazando tras las semblanzas de gerentazos y jefazos, podrían
inventarse mundos habitables y solidarios.
Both groups unsatisfied humans, too many swindles, competing every day to climb a
few millimeters more in the ladder that never, other than that, will be theirs;
embittered, slanderous, without it ever occurring to them that with a little intelligence
and a little good faith, instead of going around disguising themselves as managers and
bosses, they could invent inhabitable, communal worlds. (1981: 16)
The stark depiction of Mexican society hides idealism, Blanco’s belief that new worlds,
“inhabitable and communal,” are possible. “Plaza Satélite” (1978), one of Blanco’s most
celebrated urban chronicles, depicts middle-class social ambition and consumerism. In it, we
glimpse a society ripe for the dramatic rise of the social, economic and political model often
called Neoliberalism, in which market forces become one of the determining factors in cultural
life. David Harvey has described how, during the 1980s, Neoliberalism developed from political
and economic theory into a “hegemonic code of discourse” (2007: 3). Blanco’s attacks on the
language of mass-media, on social mythologies like the ideal of the “Junior Executive,” and on
the changing topography of Mexican social ambition, must be read within that context.
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The shopping center, “Plaza Sátelite,” was only seven years old when Blanco published
his chronicle. Recent changes in the shape of Mexico City had helped to create it. President
Miguel Alemán (1946-52) conceived of Ciudad Satélite as a bedroom community, in response to
the flight of the middle and upper-classes from traditional neighborhoods in El Centro. Soon
after its construction in 1952, the buffer between this “Satellite City” and the northern edge of
the rapidly expanding capital disappeared. This dramatic exodus away from the traditional
urban center towards more exclusive residential communities in the north and west lasted for
decades and coincided with the growth of the city to monumental proportions. Plaza Satélite,
the mall, was on the edge of these newly developed zones when it opened in 1971. It was thus
symbolic not only of the economic inequality that made it possible for elites to shop at
department stores like Liverpool and París Londres, but also of changes in urban geography and
the flight of the affluent toward an ever more exclusive and expensive periphery.
Like the two chronicles discussed above, “Plaza Satélite” begins with a scene of public
transportation. In an earlier chronicle, “El automóvil como consolador (The Car as Consolation)”
(1979), Blanco calls the automobile a fetish for troubled individualists, writing that, “en una
sociedad de uniformes masa urbanas, el coche es un contundente hecho de status (in a society
of uniform urban masses, the car is a forceful status symbol)” (1986: 77). Public transportation,
on the contrary, is an example of what Blanco calls solidarity: the camioneta, or public bus,
becomes a symbol of the society of the masses, in contrast to the individualist’s prized vehicle.
Another chronicle, “Panorama bajo el Puente (Panorama Under the Bridge)” (1978), compares
“the individual transport of the privileged” with “the collective transport of the masses” (ibid.:
62). Blanco argues that the elites destroyed traditional neighborhoods like Tacubaya by building
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freeways and elevated thoroughfares that allowed them to cross the city more quickly, while
ignoring the people “under the bridge.” But he finds an alternative system of transportation at
work under the freeways, where he sees people lining up at corners to wait for public buses.
Public transportation elucidates class disparities in his chronicles, revealing the effects of urban
planning decisions made for the benefit of some at the expense of others, and riding the bus
becomes a political position, both a reflection of disempowerment and a token of membership
in an incipient, potential, political solidarity.
“Plaza Satélite” opens with a reference to Salvador Novo and to Novo’s most successful
urban chronicle, New Mexican Grandeur (1946), which starts with the words, “Iremos en
camion (We will go by bus)” (Novo 1996: 165). Blanco paraphrases a sentence from Novo:
Uno pudo haber nacido, crecido y jurado no abandonar esta ciudad, y sin embargo,
apenas conocerla: vivir en ella es sólo ejercer (el verbo, deslumbrante, es de Salvador
Novo) algunos de sus lugares, los más solidarios con el propio temperamento.
One could have been born and raised in this city and have sworn never to abandon it,
and nevertheless, still hardly know it: to live in it is merely to exercise (the verb,
dazzling, is from Salvador Novo) some of its places, those most suited to one’s own
temperament. (1981: 85)
The metropolis defies even the most devoted urban chronicler. It is too enormous, multifaceted
and elusive. An individual can only “exercise” his small corner of it, hardly noticing how the
whole changes from one year to the next. Urban space is shared space, something to be used. It
is community infrastructure, not the “new home” of the “upper-crust” in power. But that
infrastructure, Blanco is always pointing out, frequently gets torn apart by the forces of wealth
and privilege. In 1968, Henri Lefebvre published his influential book, “The Right to the City,” in
response to destructive forces similar to those Blanco was writing about. In “Rebel Cities,”
David Harvey describes how this so-called “right to the city” was different from most of the
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other Human Rights movements of the twentieth century. “For the most part the concepts
circulating are individualistic and property-based and, as such, do nothing to challenge
hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market logics, or neoliberal modes of legality and state
action,” Harvey writes (2012: 3). The connection between urbanism and social idealism, even
the sort of collective “solidarity” Blanco envisions, becomes clearer:
The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of what
kind of people we want to be, what kinds of social relations we seek, what relations to
nature we cherish, what style of life we desire, what aesthetic values we hold. The right
to the city is, therefore, far more than a right of individual or group access to the
resources that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the city more after
our hearts’ desire. It is, moreover, a collective rather than an individual right, since
reinventing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the
processes of urbanization. (ibid.: 4)
Blanco’s emphasis on the collective “uses” of the city as a shared function of community rather
than the possession of a privileged group of elites aligns his perspective with Harvey’s.
“Processes of urbanization” in Mexico City like those that created Ciudad Satélite did not only
reflect the aspirations of the elite, but also their vision of “social relations,” and, as Blanco puts
it, their “temperament.” This is the logic of the double portrait, expressed theoretically: the city
reflects the society that created it, just as the chronicle of it reflects the citizen holding the pen.
By describing his chosen corners, the writer also describes his own “temperament.”
Plaza Satélite is not one of the places Blanco normally “exercises.” He claims, ironically,
to prefer other “rincones rancios y entrañables (rancid and endearing corners),” and sets out to
discover Plaza Satélite like a reporter going on assignment:
Novo tenía veintitrés años y no conocía el mar; Monsiváis tenía veintiocho años y no
conocía Europa; Aguilar Camín tenía veintinueve años y no conocía el PRI. Y yo
pertenecía a la más modesta población que se acerca a los evaluativos veintocho años
sin conocer Plaza Satélite - por haberse felizmente demorado en rincones rancios y
entrañables de esta ciudad ineficiente, pero en ellos familiar: la colonia Roma, el centro,
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Itzacalco, la cantinera Zona Rosa; Nueva Ansures, San Ángel, Condesa ... y una tarde
ociosa y sabatina del final del verano me trepé en Chapultepec a un pesero rumbo a
Satélite, dispuesto a tachar uno de los multiples ítems que conforman la lista de lo que
aún desconoceré cuando cumpla veintiocho años.
Novo was twenty-three and he had never seen the ocean; Monsiváis was twenty-eight
and he had never been to Europe; Aguilar Camín was twenty-nine and he did not know
the PRI. And I belonged to the more modest population that arrives at the reflective age
of twenty-eight without ever having been to Plaza Satélite – for having happily hung
around in rancid and endearing corners of this inefficient city, which were for that
reason familiar: la colonia Roma, downtown, Itzacalco, the bars of Zona Rosa; Nueva
Ansures, San Ángel, Condesa … and one lazy weekend afternoon at the end of summer I
climbed aboard a city-bus in Chapultepec that was bound for Satélite, ready to cross off
one of the many items on the list of what I still did not know at twenty-eight years old.
(not my ellipsis 1981: 85)
Blanco describes a context: the discoveries of Novo, Monsiváis and Aguilar Camín seem grander
beside his more prosaic trip to a shopping mall, while their names also alert us to possible
literary and journalistic models. However, the comparison is also in earnest. The social
inequality Blanco glimpses in Plaza Satélite perhaps seems as immense to him as the ocean,
Europe, or the political history of the PRI. He claims he was not ready:
Creía prever esta crónica: durante el trayecto casi la había redondeado mentalmente;
una diatriba contra el consumo, centrada en un lugar tan obvio que no requiere el
insulto: basta el registro objetivo de algunos de sus detalles.
I thought I could foresee this chronicle: during the trip I had almost written it mentally; a
diatribe against consumerism, centered on a place so obvious that no insult was
required: it was enough to objectively register some of its details. (ibid.: 85)
Instead of the diatribe, Blanco writes a narrative of the journey and his discovery there, but the
shadow of the unwritten article hangs over the piece. Many of Blanco’s chronicles have a much
more editorial, diatribe-like style than this one. Here, instead, he describes the critic at work
with his notebook, making astute and witty observations, in an oblique self-portrait:
Y efectivamente anoté en una libreta de bolsillo con mi lápiz Mirado mediano: un lugar
para dueños de coche (en los enormes y bodegueros estacionamientos el peatón se
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siente chinche; entra a la plaza previamente menospreciado, casi mutilado: como un
cojo en la Ciudad Deportiva o un manco en el abigarrado metro cachondón); es una
plaza cerrada; en cualquier lado uno está dentro de una propiedad privada, a diferencia
del metro o incluso de Plaza Universidad (donde los espacios al aire nos permiten la
sensación de libertad de la calle collectiva).
And in effect I jotted down in a pocket-size notebook with my Mirado medium pencil: a
place for car-owners (in the enormous and cavernous parking garages the pedestrian
feels like a louse; he enters the mall already knocked-down, almost mutilated: like a
one-legged man at Sports City or a one-handed man in the mix in the horny subway car);
it is a closed mall; on every side one is in private property, unlike in the metro or even in
the University Mall (where the open air gives one a sense of freedom like being in the
collective street). (ibid.: 85)
Riding the bus to Plaza Satélite, “a place for car-owners,” inspires satirical comparisons. But a
serious observation follows: the space itself emphasizes private property over the “collective.”
The chronicle will attempt to describe the true cost of this desire for private property, coming
at the expense of “solidarity,” community, and the “feeling of freedom” that one might also
describe as a “right to the city.”
Blanco is typically brash in his descriptions. Plainspoken disdain is part of his style.
Culture serves a decorative function in Plaza Satélite, and he skewers the pretensions to it that
he sees papering over the true character of the place:
Se ostentan el lujo y el “buen gusto” chafas característicos de esa clase media alta que
se sienta culta (cafés que se llamen Mozart; posters de Beethoven en las tiendas de
aparatos) y refinada (reproducciones de pintores galantes del siglo XVIII: damas
lánguidas en su boudoir con encajes desceñidos, pastoras, etcétera).
Luxury and “good taste” are shown off like the shoddy characteristics of this upper
middle class that feels educated (cafés that call themselves Mozart; posters of
Beethoven in stores and shop-windows) and refined (reproductions of dashing painters
from the eighteenth century: ladies languishing in their boudoir with ruffled lace,
shepherds, etcetera). (ibid.: 85)
Mozart and Beethoven help shoppers feel superior and increase sales, but the only real culture
in Plaza Satélite is consumerism: property, money, brand names. Blanco’s target is not the place
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at all, but the people who “exercise” it, and in whose image it was created. Plaza Satélite is a
pristine reflection of, in Harvey’s words, “what kind of people [they] want to be, what kind of
social relations [they] seek.” Blanco writes, “Pero estos anotaciones no describen la plaza ... Lo
particular eran las personas (but these notes don’t describe the mall … the unique thing was the
people)” (ibid.: 85). His chronicle is really a portrait of the people who shop at Satélite:
Si uno va correctamente vestido, peinado, silueteado - casi no hay panzones -, puede
andar como Pedro por su casa; tampoco se ven policías ... “Todos aquí somos ricos,
nada tenemos que temer unos de otros: honestos, pulcros, caballerosos; si algún
barbaján se atreviera a llegar hasta aquí, de inmediato sonaría alguna alarma con sones
de Bach o Vivaldi,” sería el pensamiento unificador.
If one goes there well-dressed, combed, in shape – there are almost no pot-bellies -, one
can walk around like the king of the castle; neither do you see police … “Here we are all
rich, we have nothing to fear from one another: honest, clean, gentlemanly; if some
barbarian dares to come as far as this, immediately the alarm will sound by playing Bach
or Vivaldi,” might be the common thought. (My ellipsis ibid.: 86)
They define themselves by exclusion, Blanco says; like readers of Gutiérrez Nájera’s chronicle,
they inhabit a closed, fashionable world, beyond whose boundaries live the “barbarians.”
Throw the “barbaján” out to the sound of classical music, just so he knows that he really
deserves it, they think. Blanco’s sarcasm is perspicacious: his shoppers don’t recognize the
social forces that make possible their sense of superiority, along with their designer clothes,
lean silhouettes, comforts and pretensions to culture. He watches these shoppers, the parents
making selections while their children play, the families resting from buying to eat in
restaurants. “En ningun otro lugar he visto manera tan distendida de consumir (In no other
place have a seen such a relaxed style of consuming),” he writes (ibid: 86). Blanco is always
attuned to the hidden ideologies informing social behavior. He concludes a chronicle on the
subject of bourgeois morality and monogamy with a fantastic coda, “La mala onda, hijín: ni aún
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en la cama nadie escapa la política (the bad news, brother: not even in the bedroom can you
escape politics)” (ibid.: 73). Likewise, in “Plaza Satélite” behavior reflects ideology:
Se paseaban tan arrogantemente saludables, limpias, perfumadas; tan soberana y
ajustadamente vestidas; los grupos familiares parecían tan hogareños, alegres y
cariñosos; se veían tan lúcidos al escoger productos; los novios se querían tanto; los
amigos se reían tan cálidamente; era tan espectacular el éxito de la monogamia en la
intensa comunicación de ese padre y ese hijo al examinar un cuadrafónico. Ni pensar
que alguien se echara un pedo, eructara, escupiera, se rascara el pito o el culo. Ninguna
utopía se parangonaba con Plaza Satélite: ya hubiera querido los griegos ese garbo, ese
pulcritud, ese suave aire de dominio, esa serenidad.
They walked around so arrogantly healthy, clean, perfumed; so soberly and
appropriately dressed; the family groups seemed so domestic, happy and loving; they
seemed so lucid as they chose their products; the young couples loved each other so
much; the friends laughed so warmly; the success of monogamy was so spectacular in
the intense communication of that father with that son as they examined a stereo
system. Unimaginable that anyone would fart, burp, spit, scratch their armpit or their
ass. No utopia ever compared with Plaza Satélite: the Greeks would have loved this
elegance, this neatness, this gentle air of domination, this serenity. (ibid.: 86)
Blanco’s classical ideals – health, cleanliness, sobriety, lucidity, politeness, filial affection,
respect, friendship – describe how these shoppers would like to see themselves. But he is not
satisfied with it. Something else makes this place unique, “sólo en concentración y en
ostentación se diferencia de lo visto en otros lugares (only in concentration and in
ostentatiousness did it differ from that seen in other places)” (ibid.: 86). Blanco’s subject is not
any particular shopping center or social group, but rather the priorities and ideologies of the
society to which they belong. His typical shopper at Plaza Satélite is a revision of the figure of
the typical Mexican: Blanco’s consumers stand in for a society that is entirely unconcerned with
or blind to economic inequality.
To find out the truth about Plaza Satélite, Blanco must leave it. He must look beyond the
boundaries of this modern day Barbershop of Micoló to see what has been excluded, and to:
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meditar melancólicamente en que esta población, financiada con el hambre de millones
de trabajadores y desempleados, tan sobreprotegido por todos los hallazgos modernos
de la ciencia y la técnica no produce, ni crea cultura, ni siquiera inventa los diseños de
las cosas que tan naturalmente consume.
meditate melancholically that this population, financed by the hunger of millions of
workers and unemployed, so overprotected by all the modern discoveries of science and
technology, does not produce or create culture, does not even invent the designs of the
things that it consumes so naturally. (ibid.: 87)
The full picture must include that aspect of Plaza Satélite that is carefully kept out of sight: that
it is “financed by the hunger of millions of workers” who will never set foot inside the fancy
shopping center. These rich shoppers don’t produce what they consume, not even the culture.
Only after meditating “melancholically” on the social injustice that makes Plaza Satélite
possible, can Blanco say what it means to him:
Lo particular era, creo, la sensación de impunidad ... otros se enfermarán, producirán, se
desesperarán; a través de otros reprimirán a sus enemigos; y ellos seguirán impune,
graciosa, sofisticada, soberanamente de tienda en tienda, sin siquiera las presiones que
otros países imponen a sus figurines.
The unique thing was, I think, the sense of impunity … others will get sick, work, despair;
through others they will repress their enemies; and they will continue untouched,
gracious, sophisticated, going soberly from shop to shop, without even the pressures
that other countries impose upon their elegant and fashionable. (my ellipsis ibid.: 87)
Plaza Satélite is not just the evidence of class warfare or the spoils of class warfare; it is the
absolute triumph of the tranquil, happy victors, who can forget that a war is even taking place.
Impunity means complete ignorance of the crime itself; it means remaining morally unsullied by
the spoils, “sin mancha, tan inmune a los traumas ... tan desahogada y deportiva (unsullied, so
immune to the traumas … so carefree and sportive)” (my ellipsis ibid.: 87). Blanco, still hoping
that “inhabitable and communal worlds” are possible for all, can’t bear to look. His final
rhetorical trick is to depict himself, the narrator with his pencil and notebook, sheepishly
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defeated, all the righteous anger of his planned diatribe sapped by the discovery of his own
powerlessness. His sympathies have always been with the masses, the “barbarians” not to be
found in the shops of Plaza Satélite, and he returns to the city on another pesero (city bus),
symbol of the urban poor.
Two fellow passengers provide subject matter for a conclusion. Like Gutiérrez Nájera,
Blanco imagines their perspectives and in doing so projects his own fantasies and insecurities
onto them. Like the other passengers on the bus, Blanco wears “la vencida expresión después
de turistear por la ‘opulencia’ de los otros (the defeated expression of having been a tourist
visiting the ‘opulence’ of others) ” (ibid.: 87). He has crossed the divide between the Mexico of
the fashionable elite and that of the underprivileged, and two figures offer possible reactions:
Salí con la cola entre las patas, sin mi diatriba beligerante; mi lápiz Mirado mediano, mis
anotaciones (caligrafía palmer) en la libretita de bolsillo, se parecían en su fatigada
inutilidad a las escenas que, en el camión apretujado (sólo obreros y sirvientas me
acompañaban en la ballena cafre), leía una trenzada chaparrita en una fotonovela
donde irrealmente fotogeniaba el galán Jaime Garza.
I left with my tail between my legs, without my belligerent diatribe; my Mirado medium
pencil, my notes (shakily written) in my pocket-sized notebook, seemed in their
exhausting uselessness just like the scenes that, in the crowded bus (only workers and
domestic workers accompanied me in that brutish whale), a short girl with braids was
reading in a photo-novel about the impossibly photogenic heart-throb Jaime Garza.
(ibid.: 87)
With an access of despair, he imagines his chronicle will be as useless as the scenes of celebrity
glamour and romantic escapism in a photo-novel. His fantasy of social justice, of solidarity,
seems just as unrealistic as that fantasy of celebrity. The idealism inspiring Blanco’s passionate
critique of social injustice becomes pessimism. The second passenger he sees reinforces it:
Doblemente vencida frente a la ejemplar atención con que un trabajador sexagenario
leía, en un volumen forrado con plástico, un manual sudamericano de sociología, que
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seguramente le había prestado un hijo o un nieto desamparadamente inscrito en algún
CCH.
Doubly defeated when faced with the exemplary attention with which a sexagenarian
worker was reading a plastic-bound volume, a South-American sociology manual, that
certainly had been lent to him by some son or grandson hopelessly inscribed in some
CCH.
(ibid.: 87)
The old man’s “exemplary attention,” as he struggles through a borrowed, foreign, probably
out-of-date sociology textbook, sitting beside the girl reading fotonovelas, adds insult to injury.
Social change is to the sixty-something laborer what dreams of celebrity romance are to the
young domestic worker: unattainable fantasies, hopeless and insubstantial, in the face of the
unquestionable impunity enjoyed by shoppers at Plaza Satélite. The final note is dissonant.
Blanco ends his journey “doubly defeated,” like the narrator of Gutiérrez Nájera’s “Novel of the
Street Car” worked up into a “cold sweat.”
The aging laborer pouring over a sociology textbook, read as a symbol, might be
interpreted differently, however. If even after a lifetime of hard work he can summon such
“exemplary attention,” perhaps there is cause for hope. The very presence of the textbook,
along with the mention of the “CCH” in which his son or grandson is so “hopelessly inscribed,”
suggest a possible remedy to the social injustices that Plaza Satélite exemplifies: sociological
education. The Colegio de Ciencias y Humanidades, or “CCH,” was a system of high schools in
the capital that allowed for direct admission to UNAM, the major national university. The CCH
was founded in 1971, the same year that Plaza Satélite was built, as part of a large-scale
attempt to educate Mexico City’s urban working and lower-middle classes. The creation of the
CCH was closely linked to the history of the Student Movement of 1968 and the legacy of
political activism that followed it. Only a project of social education on that scale can offer any
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hope, Blanco might suggest. If Plaza Satélite represents impunity caused by social ignorance,
then learning the truth about the crime, or at least trying to learn about it, is resistance. The
victim who knows he has been victimized is perhaps better equipped to face those rich elites
and to see through the supposed moral spotlessness upon which their impunity relies.
Gutiérrez Nájera, whose subject was the life of the fashionable elite, strayed into
fantasy when he attempted to imagine the other side of society, the people from beyond the
peluqería de Micoló. Just over one hundred years later, Blanco described social division in
Mexico from the opposite perspective, by imagining scenes of the wealthy elite. Comparing
their chronicles offers a vertiginous glimpse of the changes that transformed the geography of
Mexico City. When Novo wrote a chronicle in the tradition begun by Gutiérrez Nájera, he still
traveled to el centro, still the metaphorical heart of the capital; but by the time Blanco rode the
bus out to Plaza Satélite, the social topography had been turned inside out. The classes were
still just as divided, but they had switched places. For all, crossing over meant straying into
fantasy. Blanco may have reversed Gutiérrez Nájera’s journey, but the shoppers he finds at
Plaza Satélite are no more substantial than his predecessor’s figments. They are rich rather than
poor, but equally fantastical. For example, the happy father and son shopping for a stereo
might be cardboard cut-outs. They have none of the complexity of living human beings.
Blanco’s Plaza Satélite is a reflection of the narrator himself, of his overriding concern with
social injustice – an “entelequia” just as artificial as all those versions of the typical Mexican
Bartra described. Perhaps the figures we see across class divisions are always necessarily our
own projections, nightmares or fantasies – but in this tradition of urban chronicle, the stranger
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on the other side of the double-portrait reflects the author back to himself, in reverse, like a
negative caught in a snapshot of prose.
5. Conclusion
The two features I have shown these three Mexican chronicles to have in common will
perhaps reveal a few more characteristics of the literary genre itself, if we can step away from
the microscope for a moment and consider the Mexican chronicle more broadly.
Self-representations are indistinguishable in these chronicles from representations of
the object of the authorial gaze, be that object the city in general, scenes (“paintings”) drawn
from city life, or more specific representations of citizens, like the shoppers at Plaza Satélite
and the workers riding home on the pesero. These portraits that are hiding double-portraits
imply (or implicate) a third-position: the reader’s. We find our own relations with the city called
into question. Do we consider it from the same privileged, problematic position as the narrator
of “The Novel of the Streetcar?” Do we grasp the scandalous subtext in “The Youth’s”
fragmented visions of the city, and if so, how does that change our interpretation of Novo’s
experimental narrative? Where is our place in Blanco’s metropolis, divided between the elites
oblivious to the suffering masses and all the rest waiting for the bus “under the bridge?”
Complicated depictions of interconnected subjectivity like these do not allow for
simplistic applications of the criteria of objectivity, authorial disinterestedness, or faithfulness
to the facts. The objectivity norm as formulated in North American journalistic practice in the
1920s and made increasingly central for journalism during the twentieth century, is a very
different rubric for approaching the problem of distinguishing discourse from lived experience.
These authors may have been describing real facts and changes in their city, but their texts are
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far from reports, in the sense of the so-called “hard news” report favored by investigative
journalists. Judging them according to that metric would constitute a confusion of categories;
they are part of a distinct literary form, responding to its own history and pursuing different,
perhaps more complicated ends. Rather than trying to keep themselves out of their texts, these
authors inscribe themselves into their narratives and thus create complex, mixed portraits.
Their narratives are far from informational, and the clarity of the distinction between the
informational and the literary here is a useful lesson to fundamentalists elsewhere decrying the
confusion of fiction with fact: veridical accuracy is not the correct criteria to apply to some
texts, not, that is to say, if you really want to understand what they are trying to tell you.
The complicated evocations and subversions of nationalist cultural discourse in these
three chronicles also reveal something: their full social, dialogical nature. These texts respond
to and foresee each other and to other texts, and cannot be fully understood without recourse
to that contextual penumbra. Nationalist discourses happen to be a target in these three cases,
making the point more evident; but it might be useful to recall the wider social context within
which all journalistic and literary texts posit themselves and how it affects their genre. “Verbal
discourse is a social phenomenon,” Mikhail Bakhtin writes, in his essay “Discourse in the Novel”
(1981: 259). It is the wider conversation that determines genre parameters, Bakhtin argues, not
the sort of aesthetic questions that have traditionally concerned the study of what he calls
“stylistics” (ibid.: 259). The distinction between chronicle and short story, or between fiction
and nonfiction, might not be delimited by the text at all. We might not be able to find it in the
author’s style, treatment of the subject, or perhaps even his or her handling of evidentiary
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material. We might have to look beyond the text itself, to other texts, to other readers, in order
to decide what sort of thing we are reading and what sort of truth we should look for.
Considered in these terms, the chronicle – and literary journalism more broadly – may
have more in common with the novel than it seems. Bakhtin’s argument about heteroglossia in
the novel form also pertains to other “artistic-prose genres” like the chronicle, which developed
in Latin America alongside the novel (ibid.: 273). He writes:
At the time when major divisions of the poetic genres were developing under the
influence of the unifying, centralizing, centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life, the
novel – and those artistic-prose genres that gravitate toward it – was being historically
shaped by the current of decentralizing, centrifugal forces. (ibid.: 273)
The chronicles we have been reading fit many of Bakhtin’s criteria for discourse in the novel:
they are parodic; their multiple, competing subjectivities suggest heteroglossia; they contain
and recast multiple discourses and languages, if we understand ‘language,’ to include technical,
professional and social languages. Monsiváis’s narrators, according to Linda Egan, are often
“the wise fool of the seriocomic genre called Menippean Satire, itself a ‘subgenre’ of the
umbrella concept of ‘carnival’” (2001: 113). Bakhtinian heteroglossia is, for Egan, a useful tool
in parsing Monsiváis’s constantly shifting linguistic registers. She calls the chronicle form:
a dialogic hybrid [that] keeps its semantic options open with a mixed voice that not only
interweaves fact and fiction, but also reflects the fused dualisms of human society:
writing and orality, word and icon, elite (high) and popular (low), serious and comic,
archaic and modern. The genre’s characteristic diglossia figurally reminds us of the way
oral speech and written discourse intertwine. At the same time, it reminds us of the
conflicts that also arise between modes of representation and thinking that result in
empathic and analytical knowledges. (ibid.: 130)
These chronicles might then be read as “decentralizing, centrifugal” texts both for their
historical place alongside the novel in the “current” of prose writing opposed to the forces of
linguistic unity, for their reliance on a “mixed voice” narrative style, as well as for their
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frequently polemical, parodic interventions in a wider dialogue. They reveal the fault lines that
divide “empathic and analytical knowledges,” veridical and aesthetic epistemologies,
informational and ethical imperatives, simply by their constant defiance of those boundaries.
We should not be so quick, perhaps, to dismiss the possibility that a text of some mere
twenty pages may in fact be a sort of “novel.” The normal criteria for judging genre boundaries
may no longer help us, “should we imagine the work as a rejoinder in a given dialogue, whose
style is determined by its interrelationship with other rejoinders in the same dialogue,” as
Bakhtin says (1981: 274). Likewise, dualistic concepts like subjective and objective – and
perhaps even fictional and nonfictional – seem incongruous metrics to apply to a literary form
as old as if not older than those concepts themselves. The chronicle refuses to submit to
reductive readings, just as it has refused to ossify and become a footnote in literary history
during all the many centuries in which it has so frequently reappeared and been reinvented.
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Section Four
Testimony and Literature:
An Argument for Responsible Skepticism
1. Elena Poniatowska’s Massacre in Mexico as Problematic Literary Journalism
When Luis González de Alba published an article in 1997 in the magazine Nexos offering
an infelicitous new perspective on a book that was by then a contemporary classic, it became
the occasion, as the Nexos editors later put it, for a small earthquake in the heart of things.74
Elena Poniatowska resigned from the magazine’s editorial board in response. González de Alba
had reread her seminal account of the student movement of 1968, La noche de Tlatelolco
(Massacre in Mexico) (1971). He followed up his first article with several more, describing a
number of the book’s misattributions and factual errors and demanding almost sixty
emendations and a new version. Poniatowska refused, until she was faced with a legal
challenge. In 1998, there appeared a ‘second corrected edition’ of the book that had already
been re-published dozens of times and translated into half a dozen foreign languages. González
de Alba’s articles describe how he went from being a friend and protégé, always a bit in awe, of
the older, more successful author, who once invited him to dine with just her and Gabriel
García Márquez, to growing increasingly aware of what he calls her “intellectual dishonesty”
(2016: 114). Poniatowska claimed he was just jealous. Soon after he committed suicide, on
October 2nd, 2016, on the forty-eighth anniversary of the massacre that he, unlike Poniatowska,
had witnessed and survived, she told a reporter “González de Alba’s hatred” had followed her
“all of her life” (Poniatowska 2016a). Their feud did not begin until she was sixty-five. She
claimed it was his hatred for her that drove him to suicide, and that the saddest thing was that
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his “last written message was against me” (ibid). In fact, it was a tweet addressing a long-dead
lover and a quotation, in Greek, of the epitaph of Kazantzakis (Adrian Gonzalez de Alba 2016).
Few books had as decisive a literary, political and social impact on 1970s Mexico as did
Poniatowska’s La noche de Tlatelolco. Carlos Fuentes called it “the great and definitive chronicle
of the ominous dawn of a crime that also marked the twilight of the authoritarian regime of the
PRI” (qtd in Schuessler 2003: x). Carlos Monsiváis called it an “obra maestra del periodismo
participatorio (masterwork of participatory journalism),” while praising Poniatowska for what
we might call her objectivity :
Lo “sentimental” de La noche de Tlatelolco – libro que desde el instante de su
publicación se convirtió en hecho político – es exigencia del material mismo: al
Movimiento Estudiantil lo dotaron de vigor y sentido épico el espíritu de resistencia
cívica.
What is ‘sentimental’ in Massacre in Mexico – a book that from the instant of its
publication became a political event – is the urgency of the material itself: with vigor
and epic sentiment it endows the Student Movement with the spirit of civic resistance.
(not my emphasis 1980: 359)
For José Ramón Ruisánchez Serra, La noche is not only “the great and definitive chronicle” of
’68, but also the text that confronted the official government narrative of the events,
resituating the terrain of contemporary Mexican history and putting the story of the student
movement and the massacre at the center of the map. Ruisánchez Serra was no less dramatic
than Fuentes, calling it:
la historia que se eligió para desdecir la versión oficial del mayor acontecimiento de la
segunda mitad del siglo xx, para recuperar lo que se pretendía silenciar, y por otra parte
como la versión que se irguió como Historia y se convirtió en la renarración
prácticamente definitiva del 68.
the history that was chosen to contradict the official version of the most important
event of the second half of the twentieth century, to recover what they had attempted
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to silence, and furthermore as the version raised up as History and converted into the
practically definitive version of 68. (2012: 104)75
All of these perspectives reveal the wide impact of a book that is undeniably at the center of
the canon of contemporary Mexican literature. The book shades into history itself, “Historia”
with a capital H for Ruisánchez Serra, who also connected it with the fate of the PRI, the
political party that ruled Mexico for almost three quarters of a century. He wrote, “Sin duda hay
un fruto político, en forma de las primeras elecciones que le otorgan la presidencia a la
oposición en 71 años (without doubt it has borne political fruit, in the form of the first elections
that gave the presidency to the opposition in 71 years)” (2012: 103).76 Whether hyperbolic or
not, these discourses ignore or evade the question of La noche’s relation to empirical fact.
None of the book’s readers had the unique perspective on it that González de Alba did.
Poniatowska presented her work first as “testimonios de historia oral (oral history testimonies)”
(1971), then, in a later, special edition as a “crónica coral (choral cronicle)” (2015). The book
opens with a series of black-and-white photos of the principal events and characters of the
student movement for democratic rights of 1968, and the government violence and massacre
that ended it. The photos create the atmosphere of a journalistic report, emphasizing the lived
historical events behind the story. None of the photographers are credited, however. The
photo-sequence is followed by a collection of eyewitness testimonies arranged into a
compelling narrative divided into two parts. The majority of the voices are of the students
themselves, but there are also sympathizers, antagonists and news outlets. The testimonies
describe meetings and marches, police attacks, and, in the case of the organizers, months and
then years spent in prison. The testimonies of the first part, “Ganar la calle (To Win the Street),”
are interspersed with slogans and chants from the protests themselves, creating an experiential
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effect, as though the reader were participating, surrounded by the chorus of demonstrators.
The second part describes the events of October 2nd. Poniatowska later claimed that she
collected her first eyewitness testimony that very same night, from two women who attended
the meeting and witnessed the government attack, then came to her home, seemingly in shock,
to tell her about it (2012). The women would become two of her principal eyewitnesses to the
massacre, along with the leaders of the student movement themselves, whom Poniatowska did
not begin interviewing until a year later.
González de Alba was a psychology major in the School of Philosophy and Letters at
UNAM in 1968, when he was nominated to be a member of the National Strike Council (CNH),
the Student Movement’s leadership organization. Poniatowska met him “hacia finales de 1969
(toward the end of 1969)” in the political prisoners’ wing, Corridor C, of Lecumberri Prison, the
so-called Palacio Negro (Black Palace), designed as a Jeremy-Bentham-style panopticon
(González de Alba 2016: 34). Poniatowska arrived with a tape-recorder “como un maletín de
mano (like a briefcase)” and spent weeks interviewing all the student organizers as well as
those unlucky bystanders who had been detained along with them, he recalls (ibid: 34).
González de Alba did not become the most prominent voice in her chorus of eyewitness
testimonies because he gave a compelling interview, however. Poniatowska discovered his
manuscript, he claims. In the prologue to a later edition of La noche, she would describe her
interviewing process without mentioning his manuscript or her tape recorder:
Al principio, Raúl Álvarez Garín llamaba a sus compañeros: “Vengan a hablar con Elena”,
y nos acomodábamos en su celda … Al regresar a la casa, reconstruía yo lo que me
habían dicho los estudiantes, al lado de Felipe dormido. Le decía: “Dentro de veinte
años a ti irá mejor, a ti nunca te va a pasar eso.”
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In the beginning, Raúl Álvarez Garín called to his friends: “Come talk with Elena,” and we
got comfortable in his cell … When I got back home, I reconstructed what the students
had told me, with Felipe sleeping beside me. I told him: “In twenty years it will be better
for you, this will never happen to you.”
(my ellipsis 2015)
González de Alba would tell a less romanticizing story. He claimed that two fellow prisoners,
Garín and Gilberto Guevara Niebla, also leaders in the movement and members of the CNH,
asked him to write a narrative of the events that had led them all to jail. They planned to add
their political commentary, but he finished his part of the work before they began theirs, and
claimed to realize in the following weeks that they were not going to add any commentary to
the text, and that it was unnecessary anyway, “el análisis político estaba ahí (the political
analysis was there)” (2016: 33).77 According to González de Alba, Garín, a staunch communist
who did not believe in intellectual property rights, gave a copy of his manuscript to
Poniatowska, who smuggled it out of prison. The narrative was untitled and Garín presented it
to her “como producto de todos (as the work of everyone),” giving her permission to use it as a
source document and to present passages from it as testimony from various eyewitnesses,
González de Alba claimed (ibid.: 35). Only later, when Poniatowska interviewed him in his cell,
did he tell her that he had written “un relato ya completo sobre el tema del que ella se ocupaba
(an already finished account of the subject she was working on)” (ibid.:34). She offered to help
him find an editor for it and discovered, González de Alba suggests, that it was the very same
text she had already begun using as a source document. She asked if she could use passages
from it in her own book and González de Alba assented. One Sunday, she arrived for her weekly
visit with a surprise guest, the director of her own publishing house, there to offer him a book
contract. The young student had never published before and he accepted it, grateful to the
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already famous journalist and novelist, twelve years his senior, who in a stroke had jumpstarted his literary career. González de Alba’s book, Los días y los años (The Days and the Years)
(1971) appeared in February, the same month and with the same publisher as La noche.
Poniatowska mentions González de Alba’s book in the prologue to her “corrected”
edition of La noche, but only to say she had sent him the photograph gracing its cover, using
lawyers to smuggle it into prison (2015). But in an interview published in a collection of texts
edited by Hermann Bellinghausen to mark twenty years after 1968, Pensar el 68 (Considering
68), Poniatowska tells a different story of the photograph and of her own book78:
Me interesaban los testimonios de todos los muchachos, y me los contaban sin
grabadora, sin maldita la cosa, sin pluma ni papel, porque al entrar te revisaban todo,
así que cuando regresaba a mi casa reconstruía lo que me habían dicho. Una vez me
pidieron que sacara el libro de Luis Gonzáles (sic) de Alba para el editorial ERA, pero lo
acabó sacando uno de los abogados, medio por debajo del agua. Lo que sí llevé fue la
portada, una foto de Pedro Meyer donde salía un estudiante sobre un automóvil, muy
parecido a Luis.
I was interested in the testimonies of all the boys, and they told them to me without a
tape recorder, without the damned thing, without pen or paper, because when you
went in (to the prison) they checked everything, so as soon as I got back home I
reconstructed what they had told me. Once they asked me to smuggle out Luis Gonzáles
(sic) de Alba’s book for the publishers at ERA, but in the end one of the lawyers got it
out, sort of under the radar. What I did smuggle out was the cover, a photo by Pedro
Meyer of a student on a car, who looked very much like Luis. (1988: 248)
Poniatowska and González de Alba tell contradictory stories, and Poniatowska even contradicts
herself in different versions, so the details of who had what manuscript when, and who
smuggled what manuscript out of prison, will probably always remain murky. González de Alba
recalls Poniatowska sending him not a photograph but a copy of her book, also through the
lawyers, with “una extensa dedicatoria, a plumín sepia, muchas flores y hojas adornando el
texto que va por dos páginas, de derecha a izquierda, como hebreo, porque se la acababa una
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página, pero no la emoción (an extensive dedication, in sepia ink, lots of flowers and leaves
drawn around the text that ran two pages, from right to left, like Hebrew, because the page ran
out but not the emotion)” (2016:68).79 Twenty-six years later, he described why he had waited
so long to point out the twenty-eight paragraphs in La noche, amounting to nearly five-hundred
lines, he would claim were misattributed or factually inaccurate borrowings from his book:
Cuando leí La noche, todavía en la cárcel, me disgustaron esos numerosos cambios. Pero
le elaboré una inmediata justificación a mi heroína, la periodista de la capital que yo
había empezado a leer desde los 15 años, en Guadalajara, entre clase y clase de prepa:
no hubiera debido Elena, me dije, llenar su libro con citas mías y así arruinar la obra que
todo México alababa. Esto, por cierto, fue otro elemento de gran peso: el clamor era
unánime en el sentido de que el relato de Elena sobre el 68 era un clásico, un ejemplo,
una obra que lectores, críticos, militantes y le tout Mexique, como diría ella, cubría de
elogios. Aquella sombra de disgusto pronto me la arranqué de la consciencia, en un acto
feroz de autocensura de izquierda.
When I read La noche, still in prison, all those changes disgusted me. But immediately I
developed a justification for my heroine, the journalist from the capital whom I had
begun to read when I was fifteen years old, in Guadalajara, between one high school
class and the next; Elena could not have, I told myself, filled her book with quotations
from me and in doing so ruin the work that all of Mexico was praising. This, for sure, was
another really important thing: the unanimous clamor suggesting that Elena’s account
of ’68 was a classic, an example, a work that readers, critics, militants and le tout
Mexique, as she would say, were covering with praise. I quickly tore that shadow of
disgust from my consciousness, in a ferocious act of leftist self-censorship.
(2016: 86).
The blaming of “leftist self-censorship” hints at the changes in González de Alba’s politics during
the intervening decades. But it would hardly have made sense for him to criticize the accuracy
of Poniatowska’s book in 1971, while he was still in prison, accused of a host of crimes including
murder,80 and while La noche was inciting liberal outrage on his behalf. Later, when he returned
to Mexico after a year of exile in Chile, following his more than two years in prison, La noche
was already in its fifteenth edition. It had by then been cynically awarded the Xavier Villaurrutia
Prize by a government known for co-opting intellectuals in order to stifle dissent, a prize that
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Poniatowska declined in a letter published in Excélsior, in which she asked, “Who will give prizes
to the dead?” (qtd in Schuessler 2007: 164).
Gonzalez de Alba may not be an entirely credible witness. His book is not the simple
narrative that he claims, for example. But he makes some accusations about Poniatowska’s text
that deserve scrutiny. Passages taken from his book, spoken by what he calls his “narrator,”
appear in Poniatowska’s “oral history” attributed to other speakers, he says. Poniatowska
divides these passages between her cast of characters for aesthetic effect, creating an
impressive symphonic balance of interwoven voices, and also all kinds of factual problems.
During the massacre in Tlatelolco, in Poniatowska’s version, González de Alba is somehow on
both the third-floor balcony and in a fifth-floor apartment in the Chihuahua building at once.
Garín is on the third-floor balcony with him, when in fact he was in the plaza. Earlier, Guevara
Niebla proposes a political strategy that in fact he opposed and argued heatedly against. An
unknown student named Elena González appears, whom González de Alba suggests is an
invention with a “nombre más creíble que otra combinación: Luis Poniatowski (more believable
name than another combination: Luis Poniatowski)” (2016: 125). Some errors are graver.
Poniatowska’s version has Félix Lucio Hernández Gamundi tell the story of how the out-ofuniform Batallón Olimpia unit, all wearing one white glove so as to be recognizable to one
another, stormed the balcony where the protest leaders were speaking. While they were
detaining the CNH leadership, someone opened fire on the crowd below. The Batallón Olimpia
was then attacked by the heavy machine guns of the regular army, who, to their surprise,
seemed not to know they were fellow soldiers.81 González de Alba and others have drawn
conclusions from this miscommunication between units about who was responsible for
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ordering the attack.82 Poniatowska has Gamundi describe the scene, but in fact, Gamundi was
not there. He was nearby, “en el departamento de su novia (in his girlfriend’s apartment)”
(2016: 85). Such discrepancies make Poniatowska’s book problematic as historical testimony,
González de Alba suggests. Twenty-five years later, two governmental commissions would fail
to inculpate anyone. Writing the year before the second commission failed, González de Alba
points out that, should someone want to deny his narrative, a defense attorney could easily
reconstruct the sequence of events and show that Poniatowska puts him in two places at once.
The marks of Poniatowska’s literary style also make the testimonies of La noche less
credible as “oral history.” González de Alba singles out a diction that seems intended to imitate
popular speech. He claims never to have said or even to know the meaning of “la murria,” a
colloquial word for depression that Poniatowska quotes him saying (1971: 27). He decided to
write his first critique of La noche, in 1997, after discovering a passage quoting him in a work of
history proper, Enrique Krauze’s La presidencia imprescindible (The Essential President) (1997).
“Enrojecí de vergüenza. Así escribía yo? (I blushed for shame. Did I write like that?)” he thinks,
upon reading it (2016: 74). But the footnote at the back of Krauze’s work leads to
Poniatowksa’s book, not his. “Estoy traducido al poniatosko (I am translated into poniatosko),”
he says (2016: 74). González de Alba cautions readers to be skeptical of Poniatowska’s reliability
as a journalist:
Las citas de su narración a voces múltiples no se conservan tal y como fueron dichas,
sino que, de nuevo en dádiva al sonido de la obra, están traducidos, con grandes
licencias, a su lenguaje, esa mezcla de supuesta ingenuidad y sabor popular que es
creación exclusiva de Elena, pues las criadas verdaderas no hablan así, habla de esa
manera Elena cuando imita a las criadas.
The quotations in her many-voiced narrative are not conserved the way they were
spoken, but, to give the work its sound, they are translated, taking huge licenses, into
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her language, that mix of supposed ingenuousness and popular wisdom that is the
exclusive creation of Elena, because real domestic workers don’t talk that way, Elena
talks that way when she imitates domestic workers. (2016: 75)
Josefina Borquez, the laundry worker who became the inspiration for Jesusa Palancares,
narrator of Poniatowska’s first novel, Hasta no verte Jesús Mío (Until I See My Jesus) (1969),
might have agreed. González de Alba paints a picture of an author willing to take extraordinary
liberties with her material, misattributing extended quotations for the sake of balancing a
chorus of voices, distorting, rewriting and inventing whenever it suits her impulse. For
evidence, he supplies a number of examples, as well as a list of the passages in his book which
he claims found their way into hers, after being translated into “poniatosko.” When the two
sets of passages are read side by side, the story grows even more interesting.
The paragraph in La Noche in which Gonzalez de Alba says he feels himself possessed by
“la murria” (Poniatowska 1971:27) derives from the opening pages of the penultimate chapter
of The Days and the Years. In that version, he is passing the time before leaving for a student
meeting, the first meeting since military tanks and troops abandoned the campus of UNAM.
The government has finally agreed to a public dialogue, but he suddenly feels that it no longer
matters to him, and he begins thinking of a former lover who has moved overseas. His fantasy
is addressed to a specific person, far from the chaos, “Entonces te vi, lejos, en Inglaterra, dentro
de un aséptico laboratorio de química industrial, con tu bata azul o posiblemente blanca, y tus
cálculos anotados con letra firme (Then I saw you, far away, in England, in a sterile laboratory
for industrial chemicals, with your blue or possibly white lab coat, and your notes written in
clear handwriting)” (1971: 159). When González de Alba says ‘you,’ the reader understands that
he is addressing a specific individual whose calm, professional career he envies:
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Tú estás lejos y ni siquiera te habrás enterado bien de lo que aquí sucede; y yo podría
estar contigo, ser como tú, llevar una vida dedicada a mi profesión, a un área reducida
que conocería a fondo, me preocuparía por las ultimas investigaciones y
descubrimientos que se publican en las revistas especializadas. Sentí derrumbarse las
áreas de mi vida que en los últimos años habían sido más importantes.
You are far away and have not heard very much about what is happening here; and I
could be with you, I could live like you, carry on in a life dedicated to my profession, to a
specialty field that I would know in depth, I would keep myself busy with the latest
investigations and discoveries published in specialty journals. I felt those parts of my life
that in recent years had been the most important crumbling.
(González de Alba 1971: 158)
Poniatowska edits out this distant (male) lover entirely. She transforms the sentiment into a
simple wish to escape the chaos of the protests and the violence of government repression,
making the “tú” abstract, a general ‘you’ that refers to the outside world, to indifferent society,
and to the reader sitting at home with the book in her lap. She turns the sentiment into a
challenge, addressed to all those not brave enough to face the danger and violence themselves.
In her version, González de Alba is no longer sitting in a chair, staring at a French tapestry,
yearning for his former lover. He is now lying in bed, staring up at the ceiling and thinking over
“el choque más sangriento y más pavoroso antes de Tlatelolco (the bloodiest and most
terrifying clash before Tlatelolco)”:
De pronto pensé: y yo ¿qué estoy haciendo aquí? … Aquí estoy ahora, tirado en mi
cama, viendo hacia el techo y de pronto he decidido que no me importa si se inicia o no
el diálogo con el gobierno, si alguien llega a oponerse a él con argumentos absurdos, si
corren a Cueto o salen los presos; tú estás lejos y ni siquiera estarás enterada de lo que
aquí sucede; y yo podría estar contigo, ser como tú, llevar una vida dedicada a mi
profesión, concentrarme en un área reducida que conocería a fondo; me preocuparía
por las últimas investigaciones y descubrimientos que se publican en las revistas
especializadas … Ese día, sentí derrumbarse las áreas de mi vida que en los últimos años
habían sido más importantes.
All of a sudden I thought: and me, what am I doing here? … Here I am now, lying in bed,
looking up at the ceiling and all of a sudden I have decided that I don’t care if the
dialogue with the government is started or not, or if anyone tries to oppose it with
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absurd arguments, if they fire Cueto or if they release the political prisoners; you are far
away and you might not have heard very much about what is happening here; and I
could be with you, I could live like you, carry on in a life dedicated to my profession,
concentrating on a specialty field that I would know in depth; I would keep myself busy
with the latest investigations and discoveries published in specialty journals … That day,
I felt those parts of my life that in recent years had been the most important crumbling.
(not my ellipses, my translation 1971: 27)
Poniatowska exaggerates the sudden sense of pointlessness, the lost importance of the fight;
González de Alba’s yearning for peace and for his distant lover become the heroic doubts of a
soldier facing battle and likely death. Her version begins, “Durante el movimiento (During the
movement),” setting a chronological frame: the narrator is speaking after the movement, not
“before Tlatelolco.” The entire passage thus points toward the coming massacre. The sentiment
it expresses recalls a sentiment typical of epic. This González de Alba is like Prince Andrey on
the eve of the battle of Borodino, indifferent to whether Moscow is taken, horrified by the
barbarity of humankind and filled with grim certainty that on the morrow he will die.
Poniatowska’s brilliant technique dramatizes the tragic pause of the epic hero facing death in
just a half page of compelling monologue.
Nothing in the two passages corresponds except for the matching lines quoted above.
One might wonder, then, what exactly was the source of Poniatowska’s text? González de Alba
admitted to giving her a long interview, but is it possible he described this same moment with
such different details? The lines that are identical here suggest another possibility: that
González de Alba’s manuscript became the raw material for Poniatowska’s creative impulse.
The result is a fantastic piece of literary wizardry and a good example of why La noche became
“the great and definitive chronicle” of the events of 1968 – but it suggests González de Alba’s
warnings about Poniatowska may be valid. He mentions the thousands of pages of transcript
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that she would have had after all of her interviews, and perhaps, on one of those pages,
González de Alba narrates this scene in these or similar words. But if, as seems far more likely,
the source is in fact the passage in The Days and the Years, rewritten almost beyond
recognition, then how should an honest critic classify the passage and by extension the book?
The material has been entirely re-imagined; the speaking character, we might even argue,
verges on imaginary, completely distinct as he is from the narrator of González de Alba’s book,
except for the referential marker of a proper name. We might conclude that the passage
contains a number of fictional elements and by extension, if we assume the same liberty with
source material runs throughout Poniatowska’s book, it is fictionalized to a significant degree.
Or, to avoid suggesting it is an essentially compromised work, perhaps we should just call it a
member of the subgenre I have been referring to as literary journalism or the nonfiction novel,
which may be read as either fictional or nonfictional, depending on one’s interpretive stance,
understood according to my description of it above, in Chapter Two, Section Two.
Comparing La noche with González de Alba’s The days and the Years suggests that it
may be poor journalism, deserving of skepticism. The experiment can be extended to every one
of the passages González de Alba claims came from his book, with similar results every time.
One or two lines reveal the affinity of the two texts, but otherwise, Poniatowska’s version
seems to have been either entirely rewritten or drawn from some alternate yet bizarrely similar
source. Her description of returning home from the prison and writing up her interviews
without notes seems implausible, as she reproduced identical sentences. The version in La
noche is usually both more concise and more compelling as dramatic narrative. For example,
the entry of the protestors into the Zócalo, as described by the mysterious student Elena
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González, reveals the emotional power of the moment far more succinctly, especially in a final
line of dialogue, when she is told by her friends “¡No llores babosa! (Don’t cry, Silly!)”:
en cuanto doblamos la esquina para entrar a Cinco de Mayo, como que se me paró el
corazón; todas las campanas de Catedral echadas a vuelo y todas las luces de esta plaza
tan hermosa, esta plaza que es lo que más amo en mi ciudad, todas las luces
encendidas. ¡Esto es una quimera! Me decían: “¡No llores babosa!”,” pero me escurrían
lágrimas de felicidad.
as soon as we turned the corner onto Cinco de Mayo, how my heart stopped beating; all
the Cathedral bells ringing at once and all the lights in that beautiful square, the square
that is what I love most in my city, all the lights shining. This is a chimera! They told me,
“Don’t cry, silly!” but I broke into tears of joy. (Poniatowska 1971: 49)
In González de Alba’s version, the passage begins “Y en cuanto doblamos a la esquina para
entrar a Cinco de Mayo nos esperaba lo mejor (as soon as we turned the corner onto Cinco de
Mayo the best thing of all was waiting for us)” (1971: 98). Instead of a chimera, he says
“entramos al Zócalo como si fuera en un sueño (we went into the Zocalo as if it were a dream)”
(1971: 98). Several other details match, like seeing teachers crying with joy; but Poniatowska
makes those “lágrimas de felicidad” palpable by giving them to the (perhaps fictional) narrator
and then having the crowd tell her ¡No llores! Even more suspicious: the next voice in La noche
is that of González de Alba himself, and it clearly follows from the same paragraph in The Days
and the Years. His narrative of the March of Silence, the passage that Krauze quoted, is also
more dramatic in Poniatowska’s version. Again, it begins in both texts with exactly the same
line, “El helicóptero seguía volando casi al ras de las copas de los árboles (The helicopter kept
flying just above the tops of the trees)” (Poniatowska 1971:60; González de Alba 1971: 119).
The end of Poniatowska’s version clearly comes from González de Alba’s sentences describing
“la ‘V’ de ¡Venceremos! (the V for Victory!)” (González de Alba 1971: 119). But Poniatowska has
inserted several paragraphs of new material describing more concretely the sense of
251

exhilaration felt by the silent marchers raising their fingers in a V. The new material improves
the passage as dramatic narrative, but one begins to wonder if any of the testimonies in
Poniatowska’s book would match her original sources and interview transcripts, or if everything
has instead been “translated” into a more compelling, more poetic story.
The point of these textual considerations is not to prosecute Poniatowska, vindicate
González de Alba or to expose the classic book in any way. Rather, La noche de Tlatelolco serves
as a good example of the sort of problems that arise in works that cross thresholds between
literature and journalism. This is not to reduce the significance or validity of the book itself, but
only to explore the nature of its connection with empirical reality. Even were Poniatowska’s
book to contain her own creative inventions, it would nevertheless still have been written in
the service of the truth, as it helped to create a cultural awareness of crimes that had been
silenced and hidden, crimes that were real and that had certainly taken place. The book and the
more strictly historical work of establishing the facts of the case and crimes are thus
“complementary projects,” as John Beverley puts it (2004: 6). The problem of using the book as
historical testimony in itself is highlighted by González de Alba’s thought experiment, imagining
how a defense attorney might use Poniatowska’s mistakes to invalidate his story – but the
scenario was always to remain theoretical. None of the guilty parties were ever uncovered or
brought to justice, and had they been, it is unlikely that Poniatowska’s book would have been
the first exhibit against them. It was merely the shock of seeing it used as a source document in
a work of history proper that led González de Alba to first raise his red flag. He ends his first
article of 1997 lamenting its distortion of history, “Por el camino de Elena Poniatowska quizás el
2 de octubre no se olvida, pero se convierte en otra cosa (Following Elena Poniatowska’s lead
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maybe the 2nd of October won’t be forgotten, but it will be transformed into something
different)” (2016: 88). But González de Alba might as well admit that, without her book, the
memory of the student movement and the 2nd of October might not have persisted. Instead of
criticizing its literary merits, he praises them, merely suggesting that Poniatowska’s techniques
would be more appropriate in a staged performance of the narrative as a work of dramatic
choral poetry. His issue is not with her book’s literary value, which seems unquestionable and
which he accepts, perhaps begrudgingly, as more “simpática (appealing)” than his own
(González de Alba: 2016:74). The question is rather the genre of Poniatowska’s book, and
perhaps that question does deserve some consideration, if even readers as astute as Octavio
Paz and Enrique Krauze have taken it for a work of legitimate History.
Poniatowska is not the only author susceptible to this line of criticism. We might ask,
after all, exactly what type of book is The Days and the Years? In many ways, González de Alba’s
text is more like a novel than Poniatowska’s.83 It has a narrative chronology much more typical
of novels than of other genres: the story begins in 1969 in Lecumberri Prison, at the dramatic
moment when the student organizers find themselves attacked by other violent prisoners, sent
into their cell block by prison officials to steal and destroy their belongings and to end their
hunger strike. Long passages of dialogue and description precede any mention of their protest
movement, a subject not broached until the second chapter. It comes up first in dialogue, and
only gradually, with many temporal shifts between past and present, does it take precedence
over the prison story. The narrative concludes with Tlatelolco and imprisonment, thereby
closing the narrative circle. González de Alba has called it both “mi relato (my account)” and “mi
cronica (my chronicle),” though on a later book’s flyleaf, it is called his first novel (2016: 73,
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108). It makes sense to call it a testimonial novel or perhaps an autobiographical novel, neither
of which genre describes Poniatowksa’s La noche de Tlatelolco. González de Alba is explicit
about exactly what distinguishes his narrative from Poniatowska’s:
Aquí dicho de una vez y para siempre: Soy testigo presencial de los hechos que relato,
no así Elena. Por tanto los hechos ocurrieron como yo los relaté y en las voces de quien
ponga ciertas palabras, de allí las escuché.
Let me make it clear here once and for all: I am an eyewitness who was present for all
the events that I describe, Elena was not. For that reason, the events happened as I
relate them and when I put words into someone else’s mouth, that’s where I heard
them. (Ibid.: 77)
He does not say that her book is fiction while his is autobiography, or refer any of the other
genre designations that we use to classify literature: he describes a different relationship with
empirical information, a different connection to the world outside of the book. He was an
eyewitness, not so for her. But even a cursory reading of his book makes this neat distinction
seem dubious. Is every long scene of dramatic dialogue in his book, many of which extend for
pages, literal eyewitness testimony? It seems more likely that these are literary reconstructions
of the sort of debates that occupied the prisoners during their twenty-five-odd months spent
living in close proximity.84 Neither does his novel distinguish between these literary scenes,
reconstructed from actual ones, we can assume, and a strict narrative of the events of 1968.
The story of the student movement comes out in bits and pieces, in dialogues, arguments,
sudden flashbacks and long, narrated recollections. González de Alba also narrates his fellow
prisoners’ memories, so that his novel is also a sort of dramatic chorus. The days and the Years
is thus also an unreliable primary source for history, suffused as it is on every page with the
forms and tropes of novelistic representation. Things get even more murky when we consider
that there were perhaps two versions of the text, that it is unclear if the Garín-Poniatowska
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copy was the same as the text later published as Los días y los años, and we don’t know how
much any of the other prisoners may have contributed to the writing of either version.
The distinction between the two books can perhaps be better described as a question of
journalism versus autobiographical fiction.85 González de Alba’s artistic liberties can be judged
creative fictionalizations of his own experiences, while Poniatowska’s freedom with her
material seems far more like poor journalistic technique, as her material all derives from
reporting, eyewitness and other sources. She is perhaps not entirely to blame for her failings in
this respect. By the time she began to interview the young prisoners in 1969, they had already
spent months living in close proximity, with little to do but talk about their experiences and
memories of the year before. Of course, Eduardo el Búho Valle Espinoza knew that the out-ofuniform soldiers on third-floor balcony shouted in unison, “Battalón Olimpia,” to the soldiers
shooting at them, though he was on the fifth floor at the time. González de Alba explains,
“¿Cómo supimos luego todos que eso gritaban? Porque ya en Lecumberri, en largas tardes de
ocio, lo conté decenas, centenares de veces. Así construimos lo que se puede llamar una
‘versión coral’ de los hechos (How did we all know that they shouted that? Because in
Lecumberri, during long empty afternoons, I told the story dozens, hundreds of times. In that
way we constructed what might be called a ‘choral version’ of the events)” (2016: 60).
Poniatowska found that a “choral version” of the events had already been put together and
that everyone already knew everything. At the same time, she was given a text that, at least
one prisoner claimed, was the product of the whole group. It is easy to see why the stories
might have seemed interchangeable, essentially a collective story whose parts might be
assigned as necessary in order to create the strongest effect. But a competent journalist or
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professional investigator could have easily solved the problem of these overlapping and
identical testimonies. González de Alba told his story many times, he says:
Lo platiqué todas las tardes de cárcel, obsesivamente, a todos. Y así construimos un
relato coral, a muchas voces, donde todos estuvimos en todos lados y todos
escuchamos todo. Cuando Elena llegó a grabar los testimonios para su libro cometió el
error, inaudito en una entrevistadora experta, de no pedir: Dime lo que tu viste y oíste
desde donde tú estabas, y nada más … Todos le contaron lo mismo.
I told it every afternoon in prison, obsessively, to everyone. And in that way we
constructed a choral account, in many voices, in which everyone was everywhere and
we all heard everything. When Elena arrived to record the testimonies for her book she
made the mistake, outrageous for an expert interviewer, not to ask: Tell me what you
saw and heard from where you were, and nothing else … Everyone told her the same
thing. (not my ellipsis 2016: 104).
Poniatowska’s problem seems to arise from a simple journalistic oversight: instead of limiting
her interviewees to describing their own first-hand experiences, she let them give testimony
that incorporated details from the stories of their fellow prisoners. Those thousands of pages of
transcript of her interviews, if they existed, told the same stories many times in many voices.
Assigning the narratives as she saw fit probably seemed like an essential act of organization.
Poniatowska’s success as a literary artist is beyond doubt. She was awarded one of the most
prestigious prizes in Spanish literature, the Cervantes prize, in 2014. She was the first Mexican
woman ever to win it, and only the fourth female winner in the prize’s eighty-one-year history.
Publications in Spanish and English recounting the feat mentioned La noche de Tlatelolco first
among her works, referring to it as “testimonio (testimony)” (El País), “cronica periodística
(journalistic chronicle)” (El Universal), and “nonfiction” (Los Angeles Times). González de Alba’s
intervention seems not to have succeeded in changing public perceptions about the book’s
relationship with empirical truth, and it seems likely that it will be continue to be accepted as
“oral history,” despite some powerful evidence suggesting it is closer to fiction.
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In an essay on La noche, “A cinco años de Tlatelolco: entre el entusiasmo y la cólera,
(Five Years On from Tlatelolco: between Enthusiasm and Anger)” serialized in the newspaper
Excélsior beginning on October 1st, 1973, Octavio Paz emphasized the historical importance of
Poniatowska’s book. His essay would be translated and included as the foreword to the English
edition, Massacre in Mexico. Paz writes, in the English version:
Elena Poniatowska’s book Massacre in Mexico is not an interpretation of these events.
Far surpassing a theory or a hypothesis, it is an extraordinary piece of reporting or, as
she calls it, a “collage” of “voices bearing historical witness.” A historical chronicle – but
one that shows us history before it has congealed and before the spoken word has
become a written text. (qtd in Schuessler 2007: 171)
Paz’s notion of “history before it has congealed” recalls an old truism about journalism being
the first draft of history. But González de Alba’s skeptical view of La noche reveals that, like
much literary journalism, it is a dubious source for empirical data and an unreliable first draft.
The scholarship is extensive on Poniatowska, yet the status of La noche as historical testimony
has rarely been questioned, even though the author never denied that editing was involved.
She gave an interview, published in the magazine 7 Días on October 1st, 1971, in which she
described the extent of her handling of some of the testimonies. She was asked about the main
drawback of putting the “collage” together as she did:
Elena: Well, most of the people answered the same way: “We arrived at 5:30 in
the afternoon, a green flare was thrown from a helicopter, and then the army came in”
… Everybody repeated the same experience and I told myself: “If I repeat one hundred
times at 5:30 in the afternoon … etc., the effect will be lost.” Now, for instance, several
witnesses concurred in saying that they saw a soldier stick his bayonet into a boy’s back.
I decided to choose the most striking or the most significant part of each testimony.
That is why I say that my book is a sort of collage or montage, or what Americans would
call editing. All are oral histories. People speaking. From the account of a journalist –
José Antonio del Campo, of the newspaper El Día – who spoke to me for two hours, the
equivalent of twenty pages of testimony, I chose only one phrase: “They are corpses, sir
…” This was spoken to him by a corporal, and it seemed to me more eloquent than forty
pages describing horrors.
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7 Días: Was this the first time you used this technique?
Elena: Yes, and it came from the book itself, from seeing so many pages full of
repetition. (qtd in Schuessler my ellipsis 2007: 169).
Merely eliminating repetition and selecting details for their dramatic effect might not qualify as
an act of creative license worthy of being called fiction, but the shadings are important.
Recorded conversations must always be edited to become readable dialogue, for example, but
dialogue edited for concision can easily slip into dialogue edited for significance. Some of
Poniatowska’s claims seem inconsistent. Her material is much more varied than transcripts of
“people speaking.” In fact, her book is not at all composed entirely of “oral” histories, but also
contains news reports and headlines, public statements, text taken from protest flyers, excerpts
from editorials, contemporary poetry, classic Nahuatl poetry, as well as over two dozen
passages probably taken from González de Alba’s book. Neither is it the same thing to choose
the most “striking” details of a repetitive testimony, and to have those details confirmed by
multiple different testimonies, as in the example she gives of a soldier stabbing a boy with a
bayonet. Did she choose the detail because it was “striking” or because several witnesses
confirmed it? Her example conflates significance with verification. Likewise, should a moment
of “eloquence,” taken to mean both poetic and moral power, take precedence over twenty (or
is it forty?) pages of eyewitness testimony in a work of history? The dubious page-counts
remind us of the problem of the transcripts: was there ever an unedited version of these
interviews? Did Poniatowska use a tape-recorder? If she merely went straight home and wrote
down the testimonies as she remembered them, as she claims to have done, how could she
have reproduced lines nearly identical to those in González de Alba’s book? Poniatowska’s
editing process, González de Alba suggests, was closer to re-writing, to translating texts,
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testimonies and the world into her own artistic language, a technique she had certainly used in
turning the life-story of a laundry worker into the plot and voice of her previous novel.
Critics have rarely considered Poniatowska’s work from so skeptical a perspective as
González de Alba. It is natural to read works in which one’s own name appears less generously,
to be fussier over the details when it is one’s own story – or even one’s own writing! – in
someone else’s book. It also seems natural that other critics would not be so quick to doubt
Poniatowska; she is a wonderful writer, and her work, particularly La noche de Tlatelolco, has
had a tremendously important and positive impact in Mexico. There is no doubt about its
quality or value, when read as literature, but the same seems not be true when it is approached
as historical evidence or journalism. We might say La noche is at the center of a set of
concentric or overlapping formal rings, some of which demand different interpretive stances
than others; forms like the Latin American chronicle and the epic novel meet, in La noche, with
journalistic and historical imperatives, leaving readers stranded between mutually exclusive
interpretive tracks. González de Alba’s finger raised in the air in contention reminds us of the
validity and usefulness of alternative interpretive strategies that draw a sharper distinction
between literature and history than previous readers of La noche de Tlatelolco have done.
2. Critical Approaches to ’68 and its Legacy
One critical stance toward La noche de Tlatelolco is perhaps best symbolized by José
Emilio Pacheco’s entry in an anthology of criticism, La palabra contra el silencio: Elena
Poniatowska ante la crítica (The Word against Silence: Elena Poniatowska before the Critics)
(2013). Pacheco was a friend of Poniatowska’s who had helped her edit La noche before it was
published in 1971. He was also the editor of the cultural supplement in Siempre! in which the
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first review of La noche came out, helping introduce it to the public. Pacheco’s entry in the 2013
anthology of Poniatowska criticism is not like the other essays, reviews and interviews. It is two
poems – Pacheco was a celebrated poet – written years earlier, the second one using lines
taken from the second section of La noche, the part about the massacre. Pacheco’s first poem,
“Lectura de los ‘Cantares mexicanos (Reading of the Mexican Cantos),” is an excerpt from or a
composition using text taken from Visión de los vencidos (The Broken Spears) (1962), the Ángel
María Garibay and Miguel León-Portilla edition of Nahuatl texts. Pacheco’s “reading” includes
some of the same lines Poniatowska herself quotes, in a slightly different version, in La noche.
The poem was originally published on October 30th, 1968, and therefore stands as one of the
very first texts in the genre of Tlatelolco poetry. Pacheco’s uses the translated Nahuatl poetry
to describe a scene of violence, presumably the original massacre of Tlatelolco in which the
final Aztec tlatoani, Cuauhtémoc, was captured by the Spanish in 1521, or perhaps merely the
conquest in general. Pacheco then repeats the process in the second poem, “Las voces de
Tlatelolco (The Voices of Tlatelolco),” this time using, instead of four-century-old testimonial
songs by a people from a vastly different culture, some lines describing the massacre of
October 2nd taken from Poniatowska’s “oral history,” presumably spoken by eyewitnesses or
students. Though at first this seems a strange inclusion in an anthology intended to put
Poniatowska in front of “the critics,” the critical assumptions behind Pacheco’s poem-essay
make it the one of the book’s most revealing entries.
One of those critical assumptions authorizes the reconstituted use of testimony for
aesthetic purposes, here poetry. The assumption is that history can be excavated for its literary
significance, as a site for the production of texts, and that such literary productions will re260

animate the spirit of the past even though they may not reproduce all of its particulars. This
explains the commemorative significance of Pacheco’s second poem, written a decade after
Tlatelolco and subtitled “2 de octubre de 1978: diez años despues (2nd of October 1978: ten
years later)” (2013: 430).86 There seems to be nothing controversial about the idea; many of
our most cherished books make the same assumption, but we assume they should be
distinguished somehow from history itself. Pacheco does not need to call his poems poems –
his entry is oddly titled, “Manuscrito de Tlatelolco (2 de octubre de 1968) (Manuscript from
Tlatelolco – 2nd of October, 1968)” – because they are visually unmistakable and unlikely to be
confused for history writing. In Poniatowska’s case, the author has given no signal that her book
is anything other than an “oral history,” even while admitting in interviews to quite significant
aesthetic editorializing. We might say Pacheco rewrites Poniatowska’s text just as Poniatowska
rewrites González de Alba’s text, and take the story of these three versions as an example in
miniature of a semiotic chain of representations, in which sign becomes signified ad infinitum.
The question of their relation to the real lived events of October 2nd, 1968, then might seem
secondary, as all these representations merely seem to reconstitute other past representations.
But that would be to ignore the different sorts of truth claims that different genres of texts
make and their different connections with empirical reality. The assumption that literature can
engage with history does not require history to be subsumed or obliterated by it, if we recall
that the two genres can tell us different things even about the same stories.
Another assumption revealed by Pacheco’s creative use of Poniatowska’s text can be
seen in the juxtaposition of his two poems. Poniatowska includes some of the same verses from
the “cantares” in La noche that Pacheco uses here, including the famous line, “y era nuestra
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herencia una red de agujeros (and our inheritance was a net of holes)” (1971: 158).87
Poniatowska makes the same verses the conclusion to part one of La noche, and therefore the
final note struck before the section on the massacre itself. Pacheco has merely economized,
reducing his text to nothing but the Aztec cantares and some suggestive lines describing the 2nd
of October. Both he and Poniatowska suggest, with their allusions to the conquest, that this
historic – or rather, mythic – violence is the crucial lens through which the violence of the
government in 1971 must be viewed. Pacheco suggests that Poniatowska’s “oral history” is
something like a new version of the “cantos tristes (sad songs)” of the Aztecs, as though both
texts were merely examples of oral testimony.88 The gesture towards the mythic violence of the
ancient past is a common topos in Tlatelolco literature. Pacheco has merely emphasized it,
revealing, perhaps, the primary historical narrative underlying La noche. Rather than simply a
work of history-in-miniature, detailing, through the compilation of testimony, the events of a
summer and a day, La noche is history in the grander sense, telling the story of a nation by
finding the traces of its mythic foundation story in its problematic present. This view might be
summarized as the history-repeating-itself perspective on Tlatelolco.
Critics describing the importance of Poniatowska’s book have often made similar, if less
sweeping, narrative connections with Mexican history. La noche and the story of ’68 that it told
became a sort of template for understanding other clashes of Mexican civil society and
authority. Carlos Monsiváis, writing about Poniatowska’s book twenty years after 1968,
connects the loss of historical memory of the violence with government impunity, situating the
story of La noche alongside other episodes in the struggle for civil rights in the PRI’s Mexico:
El soporte de la impunidad es la amnesia, procedimiento al que se califica de
“automático”: se desvanecen los hechos en los periódicos y en las actas judiciales, y el
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tiempo se encargará del resto. Los ejemplos abundan desde los años cuarenta: la
matanza de los obreros de las fábricas de municiones en 1942, cerca de Los Pinos; la
matanza de los henriquistas el 7 de julio de 1952 en Avenida Juárez y la Alameda
Central; los encarcelamientos y los asesinatos de los comunistas; la represión de la
insurgencia ferrocarrilera en 1959 (diez mil detenidos en un solo día, varios asesinados,
y un grupo de presos políticos que permanece en la cárcel once años y medio). En cada
uno de los casos, el gobierno tiene éxito al convertir en nota roja el hecho político,
desvaneciéndolo o, si esto era imposible, relegándolo al capítulo de las curiosidades.
The pillar of impunity is amnesia, a process which is considered “automatic”: the facts in
the newspapers and the court records disappear, and time takes care of the rest.
Examples abound since the forties: the massacre of munitions-factory workers in 1942,
near [the Presidential Palace] Los Pinos; the massacre of the Henriquistas [followers of
Miguel Henríquez Guzmán] on the 7th of July, 1952, at Avenida Juarez and the Alameda
Central; the jailing and assassination of the communists; the repression of the railroad
workers insurgency (ten thousand detained in a single day, multiple assassinations, and
a group of political prisoners who remain in prison for eleven and a half years). In each
of these cases, the government is successful at turning a political event into tabloid
fodder, erasing it or, if that is impossible, relegating it to a chapter in the book of
curiosities. (2013: 439).
Monsiváis’s list of incidents of government violence and repression suggests that these were
cases of the same species as ’68, and that without works like Poniatowska’s, the Movement of
’68 would be in danger of being forgotten as quickly as they were, turned into “tabloid fodder”
without political significance. More recently, Poniatowska has connected the effort to bring to
light and narrate the government’s crimes in ’68 with the twenty-first-century struggle against
violence and impunity in Mexico, in a prologue to a collection of essays by journalists writing
about human rights abuses, La ira de México: Siete voces contra la impunidad (The Wrath of
Mexico: Seven Voices against Impunity) (2016). Poniatowska recalls an Octavio Paz poem from
1968, written the day after the massacre and sent to Mexico from his post as Mexico’s cultural
attaché to India. “Estos escritores son una ventana abierta a la limpieza, o mejor dicho, a la
limpidez como la llamó Octavio Paz (These writers are a window opening onto integrity, or
better put, what Octavio Paz called purity),” she wrote of the seven journalists (2016b: 27).
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Octavio Paz, writing five years after October 2nd, 1968, made a connection with an event
almost as distant in Mexican history as Poniatowska and Pacheco’s references to the conquest.
“Siempre he pensado que para entender al México contemporáneo, así sea parcialmente, hay
que volver a la historia de Nueva España (I have always thought that to understand
contemporary Mexico, even just partially, one must return to the history of New Spain),” Paz
wrote in the same essay that would become the prologue to Massacre in Mexico. Instead of the
incidents of government repression from the 1940s and ’50s that Monsiváis recalls, Paz evokes
the violence caused by corn shortages in 1692, when indigenous and creole groups rioted
against the Viceroy. “El testimonio de Sigüenza y Góngora, que presenció los desordenes, no es
menos impresionante que el de Elena Poniatowska (The testimony of Sigüenza y Gongora, who
witnessed the disorder, is no less impressive than that of Elena Poniatowska),” Paz writes
(2013: 453). The comparison is explicit, “Los tumultos de 1968 tienen, indudablemente,
analogía con los de 1692 (The turmoil of 1968 has, undoubtedly, an analogy in that of 1692)”
(ibid.: 455). Such use of historical reference as analogy is an essential component of the political
imagination in Mexico. In Paz’s case, the historical event referred to is less mythic than
Poniatowska and Pacheco’s poetic evocations of the conquest: not an ur-story of senseless
violence but the story of some social groups, including the not entirely marginalized creoles,
rebelling against the colonial authority. This sort of historical imagination, the argument runs, is
always a prescription against forgetfulness and the impunity that it supposedly makes possible.
“La regeneración intelectual de la izquierda sólo será posible si pone entre paréntesis muchas
de sus fórmulas y oye con humildad lo que dice realmente México – lo que dicen nuestra
historia y nuestro presente. Entonces recobrará la imaginación política. ¿O habrá que esperar,
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como en 1692, otro siglo? (The intellectual regeneration of the left will only be possible if it
puts many of its formulas in parenthesis and listens with humility to what Mexico is really
saying – what our history and our present are saying. Then the political imagination will be
recovered. Or must we wait, like in 1692, for another century to pass?)” Paz wrote, summing up
the causal connection this political view draws between forgetfulness and impunity (ibid.: 455).
La noche must have seemed crucial to Paz and to others in maintaining historical memory.
Some critics have begun to voice skepticism about the discourse around ’68 and
Tlatelolco, and the political imagination that the discourse expresses. Sergio Aguayo has made a
convincing, evidence-based historical argument that the current crisis of insecurity and violence
in Mexico is linked to the legacy of Tlatelolco and to the indifference of successive Mexican
governments. He thus places Tlatelolco within Mexican history not as a contemporary example
of some mythic, symbolic violence defining the nation, but as a sign of political strategies that
continue up to this day. “El Estado es el principal responsable de las perversiones que ha vivido
su monopolio legítimo de la violencia (The State is the principal actor responsible for the
perversions that its legitimate monopoly on the violence has undergone),” Aguayo has written,
“Tlatelolco y Ayotzinapa son parte de la misma historia (Tlatlelolco and Ayotzinapa are part of
the same history)” (2015:17). Aguayo, a political scientist at The College of Mexico and Harvard,
has spent decades investigating national security in Mexico and the U.S., as well as the social
and political causes of the spiraling violence. He argues that the reaction of the Díaz Ordaz
government to the student movement of 1968 and the strategies of more recent Mexican
governments confronting organized crime have followed a similar “logic” (ibid.: 63). In 1968 “el
régimen Mexicano llevó a la práctica una estrategia basada en una concepción de la seguridad,
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inspirada en Washington y el Cono sur (the Mexican regime put into practice a strategy based
on a conception of security, inspired by Washington and the Southern Cone),” he writes
(ibid.:64). He uses archived government documents to attempt to reconstruct the logic of the
Díaz Ordaz administration during the weeks leading up to and after the October 2nd massacre,
placing blame directly on the president himself:
Sostengo con base en un cable, una conferencia de prensa y una entrevista, que el
presidente tomó la decisión final en algún momento del 24 de septiembre y que a partir
del 25 empezó la implementación del plan que culminaría el 2 de octubre.
I maintain based on a cable, a news conference and an interview, that the president
made the final decision some time on September 24th, and that on the 25th the
implementation began of the plan that culminated on October 2 nd. (ibid.: 85)
Interestingly, when considering the logic on the opposite side of the escalating confrontation,
Aguayo refers to González de Alba’s The Days and the Years, as a historical document, along
with recollections written by Niebla and other CNH leaders (ibid.: 90). He historicizes Tlatelolco
by describing how the logic of national security that inspired that massacre transformed during
the course of several decades into a system that facilitated the rise of organized crime and
cycles of violence, leading to the disappearance of 43 young college students in Ayotzinapa,
Guerrero, in 2014, which for many in Mexico eerily recalled 1968.
Bruno Bosteels has described a discursive genre in Mexico that memorializes grievances
against the state. The category would include memorials to ’68 like the monument raised in
Tlatelolco 1993, perhaps also the museum exhibit opened in Tlatelolco in 2007, as well as books
like La noche.89 This genre of grievance memorial has its own discursive tropes, imperatives and
history. Bosteels argues that, in the case of 1968, it tends to “put its stamp retroactively on any
interpretation of the events leading up to the brutal repression,” emphasizing the violence at
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the expense of the Movement’s political aspirations, which are diminished in importance (qtd
in Draper 2018: 4). According to Juan J. Rojo, the Memorial del 68 (Memorial for 68) exhibit that
opened in the Tlatelolco Museum in 2007, nearly forty years after the massacre, had, at least
partially, a literary inspiration, “The manner in which the Memorial del 68 is organized reminds
the visitor of Poniatowska’s La noche de Tlatelolco. The images are reminiscent of the
photographs in the opening pages of her text, but more importantly, the audiovisual cacophony
mimics the textual polyphony” (2016: 153). Rojo argues that representations of the Student
Movement of ’68 have evolved over the decades to reflect developments in Mexican society.
“Inevitably, the changes in the student movement’s discourse can be connected to changes in
political, social, and historical landscapes,” he writes (ibid.: 149). The role of memorials like the
Tlatelolco exhibit in preserving memory and battling impunity is thus not quite so simple as is
sometimes argued. Rojo describes the confluence in this new museum-memorial of different
varieties of memory: the “memory of denunciation that was prevalent following the massacre”;
the “memory of praise that is ‘a celebration of the student movement’”; as well as a third
variety of memory, what Rojo calls metamemory, “the testimonios contained in the archive are
now recollections, not about the events of 1968, but of the recollections of 1968, which
continue to be negotiated” (ibid.: 155). This notion of metamemory seems to me to describe
something similar to what Bosteels thinks of as a genre of grievance memorial: that this
discourse refers to itself and draws on itself over time, becoming a unique tradition.
Interestingly, Rojo focuses on González de Alba’s The Days and the Years rather than on
Poniatowska, calling it “very much a metahistory of the student movement as articulated by the
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CNH” (ibid.: 171). His term “metahistory” suggests the book is a history that knowingly narrates
the production of history.
Rojo points out how González de Alba does not represent himself explicitly as a gay man
in The Days and the Years, and how he later claimed that the Student Movement itself was
repressive. This contradicts other depictions of the movement as an example of the politics of
liberation. The Movement itself as well as the early representations of it were perhaps as
hetero-normative as Mexican society in general, and only as homosexuality became a more
open subject in Mexican social discourse could an understanding of homosexuality and the
Movement become possible, Rojo argues. Likewise, representations of the Movement –
including if not especially in The Days and the Years, with its exclusive focus on the male prison
– diminished or completely ignored the role and the narratives of the women activists and
political prisoners of ‘68. Susana Draper takes up this subject in the final chapters of her 1968
Mexico: Constellations of Freedom and Democracy (2018). Draper considers:
the sentiments of many women who participated in ’68 and who remember it as a
moment of experimentation toward a sense of democratic equality. This liberatory
narrative contrasts greatly with the biases that seem to have denominated the process
of memorialization of the movement’s history through the frameworks of its male
leaders, generating an intriguing paradox in which the moment of emancipation is
followed by a fictional memory that is framed by invisible forms of inequality. (2018:
127)
Poniatowska’s La noche, foundational as it was for the creation of this “fictional memory,” was
not framed by inequality in the sense Draper describes. Rather, it contains the testimonies of
important female leaders in the movement, like Ana Ignacia “La Nacha” Rodríguez and Roberta
“La Tita” Avendaño Martinez, whose testimonio of life in the women’s prison, De la libertad y el
encierro (On Liberty and Imprisonment), would not be published until 1998. Draper considers a
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swath of new scholarship on the question of gender and ’68, in Mexico and around the world,
as well as the works of Avendaño Martinez and another text written by a female participant in
the student movement, Gladys López Hernández, whose Ovarimony (2013) told the story of the
Popular Preparatory’s involvement. The story of this “laboratory of popular education for
different social classes” has not often figured as part of the narrative of ‘68 (Draper ibid.:174).
López Hernández situates social class as a central component in her unique ovarimonio, or
testimony written from a gendered position. So Draper’s perspective on the early narratives of
the movement, with their male focus, appears decidedly skeptical. “The liberatory potential of
the moment was superseded by a memory that was consummated in reproducing the same
system of hierarchy that they had previously contested, in terms both of social class and sexual
difference,” Draper writes (ibid.: 128). Her notion of “constellations” of memory, rather than on
monumental, fixed memorials, “reconfigures 1968 as the name and place of an event that is
constantly reconstructed, debated, and re-created” (ibid.: xi). Her sort of historical study would
therefore remain open to new visions of the past, not prioritizing any particular narrative as
dominant, but merely radiating outwards from a shared center.
Perhaps the most thorough re-examination of the early narratives of Tlatelolco and how
these discourses produced an institutional memory of the events is Victoria Carpenter’s recent
The Tlatelolco Massacre, Mexico 1968 and the Emotional Triangle of Anger, Grief and Shame:
Discourses of Truth(s) (2018). Carpenter catalogs and then performs a comparative analysis of
many of the early texts about Tlatelolco, beginning in October of 1968 and ending with the
conclusion of Luis Echeverría Álvarez’s sexenio (presidential term) in 1976. Her focus is not to
determine which of these texts was most accurate or closest to the historical truth, but rather
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to investigate how they may instead express “the need for emotional reconciliation” (2018:10).
Her emphasis on affect rather than ideology or accuracy allows for a more open comparison of
the positions, and the inclusion of a variety of texts which are usually ignored by critics of ’68,
like the probably spurious, anonymous account of it in ¡El Móndrigo! (1969) and Sócrates
Campos Lemus’s novel,90 El otoño de la Revolución: Octubre (Autumn of the Revolution:
October) (1974). Rather than attempting to discover the final truth, Carpenter describes the
production of historical memory by means of an archive of texts, and shows how this
production responds to affective needs as much as to the desire for knowledge. “By 1976 the
Tlatelolco knowledge archive had been established and used across the public discourse to
construct a particular narrative of the massacre, imbued with a combination of facts and
emotions,” she writes, describing her reasons for concluding her study where she does
(ibid.:178). The Tlatelolco discourse has continued long past that date, of course. The portrayal
of the 1971 Halconazo massacre of student demonstrators at the hands of the paramilitary
group, Los Halcones (The Falcons), in Alfonso Cuarón’s recent film, Roma (2018), suggests that
the discourse is continuing and perhaps expanding to a more open discussion of the
government’s other human rights abuses during the so-called Dirty War of the 1970s. Perhaps
Carpenter’s most interesting discovery is in how the imperatives of this discourse changed over
time:
So, what is it that is being told in these texts? As we have seen, immediately after the
attack the questions asked most frequently were about who was responsible, how many
were killed, how many imprisoned; they demanded hard facts and figures, not an
emotional reaction. Truth was being sought – finite and accurate – so that the guilty
could be punished and the victims remembered … But then, as years passed, it was
agreed, albeit reluctantly and with many conditional asides, that ‘the whole truth’ would
never be found … The public discourse changed from seeking the truth to remembering
what happened (even though some details of what happened still remain unclear), and,
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more recently, to maintaining the event’s presence in the collective memory as a
symbol of the Mexican national identity (or, at least, its political character).
(my ellipses ibid.: 178).
She connects the changing function of the Tlatelolco discourse to the transition from a
hegemonic to a posthegemonic construct, that is, from the attempt to institute one narrative as
the truth, to a discourse in which the “shared emotional sphere” of a text will make it appear
trustworthy to readers, though the information in it may be exactly the same as texts “deemed
untruthful by the public” (ibid.:182). This shift in the function of the Tlatelolco discourse
perhaps makes it possible for us to value Poniatowska’s La noche for the seminal, brilliant work
of literature that it is, while also recognizing that its truth claims are less than convincing.
Carpenter includes a nuanced reading of La noche in her catalog of early texts on ’68.
She says she will not focus on the work, as it is, in her words, “arguably the most analysed
contribution to the Tlatelolco public discourse” (ibid.:20). But what she does say about it
reveals a decidedly skeptical position on its relation to historical truth. La noche might have
been a particularly productive work to consider in a study on the literary production of affect,
and it is a shame Carpenter does not consider the book more thoroughly. She points out what
from another perspective we might call its journalistic bias, “It ends up not telling the story.
Instead, it creates a complex affective atmosphere in which the narrative of the event is
constructed out of several themes,” she writes (ibid.: 20). Its content is not informational but
polemical, or “affective,” in her words. Carpenter describes Poniatowska’s principal ploy:
organizing the information to create sympathy for one side, before feigning a balanced analysis:
La noche is designed to rouse a unified emotional reaction: the government is evil, the
students are good and the massacre is a crime against humanity in every way. So the
quotations selected are chosen to build up the affective atmosphere to a crescendo of
the massacre and then lead into a more analytical area, where the readers are given a
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chance to choose the side to support. However, the choice is already made for them by
the preceding narrative. (ibid.:21)
What Carpenter’s excellent description of La noche’s narrative strategy lacks is any explanation
of why it is so dramatically effective. Readers have been responding to Poniatowska’s work with
that “unified emotional reaction” for decades, by the hundreds of thousands if not millions.
That sort of “unified emotional reaction” may be exactly what we seek in certain kinds of texts.
Carpenter does not develop her criticisms into an argument about the genre of Poniatowska’s
book, though she sees it as designed to arouse emotions rather than to impart information.
The relation of “emotional reaction” to discursive genre unfortunately goes unexplored.
Though her study covers a broad range of texts, from poetry, to novels, to testimonial accounts,
to news reports, to attempts at objective history, it says relatively little about the different sorts
of affective responses these different genres expect to inspire. If its goal is to inspire outrage,
can La noche still be classed as history? Certainly, some works of professional history are
written specifically to inspire outrage.91 Would readers have the same “emotional reaction” to
La noche if they believed many of its passages were fictionalized, as González de Alba suggests?
Carpenter briefly mentions some of Poniatowska’s factual errors (some of which even González
de Alba apparently did not catch), but these errors in reporting cannot be conflated with
creative inventions or fictionalizations. Carpenter approaches the subject of literary invention
but she does not pursue it, writing only that, in La noche:
Some quotations were heavily edited to deliver a more emotional message: the ones by
Margarita Nolasco and her friend might have been either re-written to resemble a story
or edited to make them more effective in inciting the readers’ emotional response.
(ibid.: 22).
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Later, she even makes a direct reference to González de Alba’s assertions in Nexos without
pursuing the theme further (ibid.:44). Certainly, Poniatowska “edited to deliver a more
emotional message”; but the problem seems to be distinguishing between this sort of editing
and “re-writ[ing]” and fictionalizing. As we have seen, the distinction between journalism and
less factually accurate forms of literary journalism, some of which may or may not be fiction,
often depends on the handling of evidentiary material, the scrupulousness in editing dialogue,
and an author’s willingness to edit for the sake of emotional effect at the expense of accuracy.
Carpenter’s study is broader, focused instead on “the creation of the knowledge archive and
emotional package of the Tlatelolco massacre as the simulacrum of historical truth in the
posthegemonic order” (2018: 179). Poniatowska’s text and its deviations from historical truth in
the interests of producing emotional resonance would seem to be a key part of this story,
which Carpenter unfortunately leaves mostly unexplored. But her description of the shifting
significance of the Tlatelolco discourse in general – especially the change in it from a demand
for the historical truth of the events to an appeal to maintaining historical memory of them –
may provide the best lens for understanding the continuing value of La noche today.
3. Rigoberta Menchú, David Stoll and Literary Authority
By distinguishing Latin American crónica from other forms of literary journalism,
especially those practiced in English in North America, I have attempted to respect the situation
and history of a unique discursive practice. This is perhaps little more than a gesture toward the
real complexity of the genre in Latin American literary history. But to group together works of
literature in terms of genre is a fundamentally reductive process, insisting on what those works
share at the expense of their idiosyncratic contexts and features. La noche de Tlatelolco would
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not fit the parameters of the crónica genre by most estimates, though it has been called one by
no less distinguished a reader than Carlos Fuentes. The Latin American chronicle is not usually
composed primarily of a chorus of eyewitness testimony, though it can include such passages.
But it seems that genre distinctions, reductive though they may be, are an essential critical tool
for engaging with texts. Though we might debate these distinctions ad infinitum, readers still
rely on them when they grapple with each new book, and authors rely on them while writing.
La noche has been sold as “oral history testimonies” and as a “choral chronicle.” Even if
we do not assume that such marketing tags are relevant, Poniatowska includes the former
genre description as the subtitle. Her brief introduction to the second section of the book
makes a claim for its veracity, again emphasizing its importance as testimony:
En su mayoría estos testimonios fueron recogidos en octubre y en noviembre de 1968.
Los estudiantes presos dieron los suyos en el curso de los dos años siguientes. Este
relato les pertenece. Está hecho con sus palabras, sus luchas, sus errores, su dolor y su
asombro … Aquí está el eco del grito de los que murieron y el grito de los que quedaron.
The majority of these testimonies were collected in October and November of 1968. The
imprisoned students gave me theirs during the course of the following two years. This
account belongs to them. It is made with their words, their struggles, their mistakes,
their pain and their astonishment … Here is the echo of the cry of those who died and
the cry of those who remained.
(my ellipsis 1971: 164)
Readers have often read the book as a historical document and historical studies like that of
Enrique Krauze have sometimes used it as a source, assuming it is composed of the accurately
recorded words of participants in the events it describes. Empirical veracity is a feature of
genres aligned with history, including the sort of oral history done by anthropologists, and also
of the central traditions of journalism. But Poniatowska’s claim for the veracity of La noche is
not so simple as an assertion of empirical truth. Her book, she says, is merely “the echo of the
274

cry of those who died and those who remained,” not the cry itself. How much room is there for
her own creativity, one wonders, between the cry and its echo?
If the genre of La noche has often been misunderstood, it is not the first book of its kind
to incite similar confusion. Another famous example of Latin American testimonio – the
definitive example, in fact – has also been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny and found
wanting. Poniatowska’s text does not match the criteria that John Beverley uses to define the
genre in Testimonio: On the Politics of Truth (2004), in that it is not “told in the first person by a
narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the events he or she recounts,” but it is
certainly what he calls a “testimonio-like text” and perhaps also a “polyphonic testimonio”
(2004: 31, 34). Interestingly, Beverley argues that the roots of the Latin American form include
“the reception in the late 1960s of Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood” (ibid.: 31). The testimonio
genre does not rely solely on first-hand eyewitness experience, however. Perhaps more
important is the narrator’s ability to speak for a larger group which, usually for political reasons,
has been mostly silenced. Testimonio is the echo of their cry, therefore we read its usually
autobiographical narrative as representative of all those who cannot speak for themselves.
Rigoberta Menchú begins her famous testimonio by claiming, “My story is the story of all poor
Guatemalans. My personal experience is the reality of a whole people” (1984: 1). Poniatowska’s
echo of the cry of the victims of Tlatelolco displays a similar metonymic logic: her book
attempts to speak for those who cannot speak for themselves.
La noche may not be testimonio but it is written from a similar position. The dedication
of the book, “A Jan, 1947-1968” is perhaps specious, meant to align the author more directly
with the student movement and hence with the silenced the victims. González de Alba writes:
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Jan fue el hermano menor de Elena. Yo no sabía que hubiera tenido uno. Pero me sonó
a campanazo el año de su muerte y con sólo 21 años: 1968. Tuve la convicción, por
años, y no pocos, de que Jan había muerto en alguno de los muchos enfrentamientos
con policías, no en Tlatelolco porque se habría sabido de su muerte entonces …
Durante nuestros años de amistad, nunca me atreví a preguntarle a Elena el
cómo y cuándo, ya que nomás da el año, el año mítico. Pero sí se lo pregunté a Carlos
Monsiváis. Me dijo que había muerto en un accidente de carretera … A eso se le llama
“mentir con la verdad.”
Jan was Elena’s younger brother. I didn’t know that she had had one. But the year of his
death – 1968 - and him being only 21 years old caught my attention like a ringing bell. I
was certain, for years, and not a few, that Jan had died in one of the many
confrontations with police, not in Tlatelolco because then we would have known about
his death …
During our years of friendship, I never dared to ask Elena the how and why of it,
nothing more than the year, the mythic year. But I did ask Carlos Monsiváis about it. He
told me that Jan had died in a highway accident … That’s what’s called “lying with the
truth.” (my ellipsis 2016: 42)
It is not just the dedication and the year of Jan’s death that might be construed as intentionally
misleading, as González de Alba suggests, but also: the appearance of Jan’s testimony at several
points in Poniatowska’s narrative alongside that of the other students (1971: 39); the testimony
of “Paula Amor de Poniatowski, madre de familia” alongside that of mothers of slain students
(ibid.: 61); and an entry by “E.P.” in the section on the massacre, relating how “El día 8 de
diciembre que llevamos a enterrar a Jan, mi madre, al salir, miró por la ventanilla del coche en
ese lento viaje de regreso que ya no la llevaba a ninguna parte y vio un helicóptero en el cielo
(On the 8th of December, the day we buried Jan, my mother, on leaving, looked out the
window of the car during that long journey back that already lead to nowhere and saw a
helicopter in the sky)” (ibid.:272). Judged cynically, these interventions appear to be a specious
attempt to convince readers to make the same mistake González de Alba describes making –
but perhaps we should not judge Poniatowska’s personal entries in the narrative so harshly. To
include memories of her family’s own tragedy, which occurred during the same months as the
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student movement, seems reasonable, though perhaps not entirely appropriate in a work of
strict history. Regardless of how we interpret her intention, the effect is to include Poniatowksa
herself in the story in a more direct fashion, as a vicarious participant. It puts Poniatowska in a
position similar to those parents whose testimony she quotes: she is a worried older sister. She
is perhaps even the first voice in the following dialogue attributed to “Jan Poniatowski”:
-

¿Por qué llegaste tan tarde anteanoche?
Porque hicimos una pinta.
¿En dónde pintaron?
En el Palacio …
¿En el Palacio de Hierro?
No, allí no.
Entonces, ¿en cuál palacio?
En Palacio.
¿En Palacio Nacional?
Sí.
¡Por Dios!, ¡están locos de remate! ¡Los pueden matar!

- Why did you get home so late last night?
- Because we did a painting.
- Where did you paint?
- The palace.
- On the Palace of Steel [an expensive department store]?
- No, not there.
- So, on what palace?
- The palace.
- On the National Palace?
- Yeah.
- Oh my god! You’ve all suddenly gone crazy! They could kill you!
(ibid.: 39)
The full dialogue is quite funny and witty, revealing the talents of the novelist at work. It comes
in a section describing the cultural and generational changes underlying the political unrest,
and manages to turn generational misunderstanding into a comic scene – probably between
parent and child, not brother and sister – in a brief, almost-theatrical exchange. But if we are to
accept it as a dialogue that was actually once spoken and not as a literary invention, then we
277

must suppose it was composed at least several months after the conversation itself took place.
These passages remind us that Poniatowska creates a narrative of her own role in the story,
both as a vicarious participant and as an author, in order to emphasize her authority.
When an anthropologist questioned the veridical accuracy of Rigoberta Menchú Tum’s
famous testimonio, first published as Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia
(1983), and then in English as I, Rigoberta Menchú (1984), the resulting controversy over its
veracity and her authority had broad implications in Guatemala and in humanities departments
around the world. Menchú Tum was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992, on the fivehundredth anniversary of the “discovery” of the Americas by Europeans, for her advocacy
against human-rights abuses against indigenous groups in Guatemala’s thirty-six-year civil war.
Her testimony had become part of the curriculum at many universities by 1992, including
Stanford’s year-long survey course on Western culture. David Stoll was a graduate student in
anthropology at Stanford working in indigenous villages in the Northern Guatemala highlands,
who, “while interviewing survivors of political violence in the late 1980s … began to come
across significant problems in the life story [Menchú Tum] told” (Stoll 1999: vii). He first spoke
about his findings in 1990 while sharing a paper at Berkeley, which was later widely quoted,
and went on to present versions of the talk for several years, but did not publish a full account
until his book, Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans (1999), appeared. His
critiques of Menchú Tum at first seem mostly reasonable. He claims residents of her village
disputed her version of the story of the death of her brother, which provides the emotional
climax of her testimonio, and that some details in her version of the death of her father in the
Spanish embassy in Guatemala City may also have been incorrect. But the details are not what
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matters. More important to Stoll are the implications of the fact that Menchú Tum could not
have witnessed the killing of her brother firsthand, as she claims to have done. He writes that:
the important point is not that what really happened differs somewhat from what
Rigoberta says happened. The important point is that her story, here and at other
critical junctures, is not the eyewitness account that it purports to be. (1999: 70)
Stoll’s book is a broad attack on the authority of Menchú Tum’s narrative, and a key point for
him is to disqualify it as an “eyewitness account,” by which he means a genre that is strictly
factual, bound to the standards of empirical journalism. Though Menchú Tum seems to finesse
the details of her life story for literary reasons, making her narrative more powerful and
convincing, Stoll worries this is part of an effort to make her life representative of “all poor
Guatemalans.” He condescendingly uses only her first name throughout, writing:
That Rigoberta turned herself into a composite Maya, with a wider range of experiences
than she actually had, is not a very serious problem. Certainly, it should be known that
her 1982 testimony is not a literal account of her life. … Rigoberta was dramatizing her
life like a Hollywood scriptwriter might, in order to have an impact. Still, factuality is a
legitimate issue for any narrative claiming to be an eyewitness account, especially one
that has been taken as seriously as Rigoberta’s. Even if she should not be held to the
same standard as a UN observer, this book has suggested the importance of comparison
with other forms of evidence. Where Rigoberta’s account is seriously misleading is in its
depiction of the social background of the killing, in particular. (my ellipsis ibid.:273)
By calling her “a composite Maya,” Stoll echoes the terminology of the veracity scandals that
roiled U.S. publishing and journalism during the 1970’s and 80s, in which the creation of
composite characters was a central issue. He was a journalist during the 1980s, before he
become an anthropologist, and so he certainly knew this meaning of the term “composite.”
Stoll’s argument exemplifies a fundamentalist position in regards to determining what
constitutes fact, what is “dramatizing” and the distinction between literary and factual genres,
a position typical to critics worrying about objectivity in journalism’s veracity scandals.
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But Stoll’s argument betrays a political perspective, which many critics would later argue
was his true motivation. His central point, following from the thesis of his previous book, was
that Menchú Tum misrepresented the roots of the leftist guerilla movement and the violence.
He said that his research told a different story about the indigenous communities in the
Guatemalan highlands: that they had not joined the guerrilla movement enthusiastically in
large numbers, but had been at least in part caught between armed rebels from outside their
community and the brutal national army. “If on the one hand they cooperated with the
guerrillas, the army would kill them. If on the other hand they cooperated with the army, the
guerrillas would kill them. ‘Estamos entre dos fuegos,’ they told me,” Stoll writes (ibid.:10). This
is the argument of his dissertation-turned-book, Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of
Guatemala (1994). His political analysis follows the same line, deflecting responsibility from
conservatives in Guatemala and the U.S. and placing it on guerrillas and leftists. “What reduced
[the Guatemalan army] to the fanatical anticommunism that allowed it to slaughter so many
men, women and children? The United States bears much of the responsibility for this tragedy,
but it could not have happened without the specter of foreign communism, as provided by the
revolutionary theatrics from Cuba. Insurgency would seem to be a remedy that prolonged the
illness,” Stoll writes (1999:278). What he conveniently ignores is that the mass indiscriminate
slaughter of civilians was official government policy in Guatemala in the 1980s, resulting in tens
of thousands of deaths.92 Stoll depicts General Efrain Rios Montt as “reign[ing] in the death
squads around the capital” (ibid.: 147). In fact, Rios Montt publicly announced a very different
policy, with his sinister promise to “dry up the human sea in which the guerilla fish swim” (qtd
in Balch-Lindsay et al 2004:399).93 In 1999, the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEC)
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would declare that “the army committed 93 percent of the violence, guerrillas 3 percent, and
the rest is unattributed” (qtd in Warren, Arias 2001: 211). But Menchú Tum’s depiction of
oppressed indigenous communities rising up in armed resistance against oppression seemed
too partisan to Stoll, too likely to inspire the problematic “remedy” he was attacking. The same
story resonated with an international audience, however, especially in U.S. universities that in
the late 1980s and 90s were intent on developing a more multicultural curriculum. Stoll is
decidedly skeptical about why Menchú Tum’s story was received so warmly:
Rigoberta’s narrative sets itself against Western civilization but reaches out to Western
audiences in their own terms … Here was a radically ‘other’ indigenous woman who had
opened up to the Western left, translating the exotic into the comprehensible and the
authentic into radical politics. (my ellipsis 1999:245)
Stoll describes this as appealing to Western readers’ “identity needs,” a phrase that makes
more sense when we remember that his book was written in the midst of a conservative
backlash against what is often called identity politics:
At this point, the identity needs of Rigoberta’s academic constituency play into the
weakness of rules of evidence in postmodern scholarship. Following the thinking of
literary theorists such as Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak, anthropologists have become
very interested in problems of narrative, voice, and representation, especially the
problem of how we misrepresent voices other than our own … If we focus on text,
narrative, or voice, it is not hard to find someone to say what we want to hear – just
what we need to firm up our sense of moral worth or our identity as intellectual rebels.
This is how critiques of Western forms of knowledge can degenerate into the
worship of symbols of rebellion like I, Rigoberta Menchú. (my ellipsis ibid.:247).
Stoll’s depiction of the quasi-religious “worship” of Menchú Tum by Western audiences and
academics is almost as unconvincing as his reductive caricature of what he calls “postmodern
scholarship.” He never really describes the “new standard of truth” he claims to be criticizing
(1999: xv). But his book was seized upon by conservative critics and political commentators like
Dinesh D’Souza who were eager for excuses to attack multicultural perspectives in higher
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education. They joined with conservative forces in Guatemala and elsewhere in a campaign to
equate Menchú Tum’s testimony with “lies,”94 a campaign in which Stoll’s book proved central.
The controversy was stoked by a front-page New York Times article, on December 15,
1998, by Larry Rohter, “Tarnished Laureate,” which misconstrued Stoll’s argument and claimed
to expose a number of even more significant falsehoods in Menchú Tum’s story, though
Rohter’s reporting seems to have been limited to a few days of telephone interviews with
Stoll’s own sources. Arturo Arias pointed out the odd prominence of Rohter’s article, published
on the front page of the Times when “the daily had downplayed other significant events that
took place in Central America during 1998, including the assassination in Guatemala of Bishop
Juan Gerardi, the head of the Recovery of Historical Memory commission (REMHI), forty-eight
hours after he presented the printed version of the commission’s human rights document,
Guatemala Never Again” (2001: 51). Eduardo Galeano made the same point, emphasizing that
there were more important facts95 than those in Rohter’s exposé, “It goes without saying that
the voluminous and well-documented report put together by the church, a committee presided
over by Bishop Gerardi and published just last year, two days before his murder, did not enjoy
the same publicity [as Rohters article]” (ibid.:100). Gerardi’s report was based on the testimony
of around 25,000 Guatemalans, Stoll seems to have spoken with around 100, but the
controversy his book incited received disproportionate media attention.
In the midst of the controversy, Arturo Taracena, a Guatemalan historian, gave an
interview describing his own role in the writing of Menchú Tum’s narrative. It turns out that the
problems with I, Rigoberta Menchú are not only in regards to the veracity of the narrative, but
also its production. In Taracena’s description, it was the collective work of four people: Menchú
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Tum herself; Elisabeth Burgos-Debray, credited in the first editions as the author and awarded
the Casas de las Americas prize for it in 1983; Taracena himself; and another Latin American,
Paquita Rivas, paid to transcribe and help edit the interviews. Taracena willingly took no credit
for his role, though he did part of the interview and participated in the crucial early stages of
organization, because of his public affiliation with the EGP (Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres).
Menchú Tum was staying with him while visiting Paris when Burgos-Debray contacted him in
search of an interview subject. None recognized at first that the interview would become a
book. Crucially, Menchú Tum left Paris after giving her twenty-three hours of interviews and
played no role in the editing or publishing process. Taracena later said, after the book’s success:
There was a lot of bitterness between Rigoberta and me. She didn’t understand why,
after she had trusted in me, I let her testimony be taken away from her. But the truth is
that I was as naïve as she was about these matters. Neither of us could foresee anything
like what happened. (Arias 2001:89)
Burgos-Debray would argue that she was the author, denying Taracena and Rivas had played
any role. She had signed the publishing contracts, she held the copyright, and, as so often,
there was something suspicious about money.96 According to Taracena, Burgos has continued
to offer differing descriptions of the book’s composition, always eliding two of the participants
and claiming to have been more central than she was, while diminishing what Taracena calls
Menchú Tum’s remarkable “narrative capacity” (ibid.: 84). In a chapter to which he gives the
suggestive title “The Construction of I, Rigoberta Menchú,” Stoll prefers to focus on Menchú
Tum’s shifting narratives about the book’s origins, which seem no more trustworthy (1999:
181). The production history here is as ambiguous as it was for La noche de Tlatelolco.
Regardless of Stoll’s intentions or the validity of his argument, his attack on the
authority of Menchú Tum’s testimony played right into the hands of conservative forces in
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Guatemala fighting (and killing) to repress the growing international recognition of their grave
crimes against humanity, and into the hands of conservatives in the U.S. media. Claudia Ferman
notes that Stoll’s more nuanced argument about the distinction between literary truth and the
factuality of legalistic human-rights texts did not translate into the mainstream news coverage.
“The argument unravels under the media rules of the global written and oral mass press,”
Ferman writes (Arias 2001:158). After eviscerating Stoll’s portrayal of the roots of the civil war
in Guatemala, Carol Smith describes his argument for factual truth as based on “spurious claims
of objectivity,” and says his polemic “comes less from scholarly conviction and more from
personal frustration about losing a monopoly on authority” (Arias 2001:153). She describes the
“postmodern scholarship” on factuality in terms that anyone could understand, “One reason
we now emphasize the complexity of truth and the need to hear many voices rather than a
single ‘objective’ source is that facts do not speak for themselves, they always have to be
interpreted” (ibid.: 153). Two historians, W. George Lovell and Christopher H. Lutz, point out
that Stoll’s fundamentalist interpretation of factuality is not appropriate in some cases, writing,
“Questions of authority and representation are difficult ones to resolve when dealing with most
texts, but more so with ones that have oral origins, as Menchú’s certainly does, or in all
likelihood are offshoots of an oral tradition” (ibid.: 177). Kay B. Warren describes Stoll’s
empiricist approach as an interpretive error, writing, “In effect, he refuses to read Menchú’s
autobiography as an instance of testimonial literature in which, by design, there is room for
maneuver between collective and individual veracities” (ibid.: 204). Warren is particularly
insightful on the question of genre:
Stoll appears less aware that his work is framed by its own genre – the exposé – and, as
a result, is also marked by a set of unspoken narrative conventions. The exposé has a
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singular goal of revealing truths that have been hidden from public view. It has the
excitement of a pursuit, a detective adventure of discovering something not yet
understood. The exposé focuses in a particularly interesting way on the exposer as well
as on the exposed. (ibid.:206)
Warren’s attack on Stoll is perhaps the subtlest of all. She begins by describing Stoll as merely
representative of changes in the discipline of cultural anthropology, once parochial but
increasingly in debate with public intellectuals. But by calling Stoll the “exposer” she reveals
how he used his attack on Menchú Tum for personal gain, “to discuss his own situation and to
position himself as someone who has been marginalized by postmodern trends in the
discipline” (231-247). His is the heroic marginalization of the whistle-blower, in this case
struggling against the political correctness of the postmodern and left-leaning academic
establishment” (Warren’s citation ibid.: 207). Warren offers us another reminder that the facts
don’t speak for themselves: that is, that the truth of a text can never be divorced from its
context, its author, and its history of production and reception. For all Stoll’s claims to
objectivity, his book, because it is written as exposé, reflects his personal ambition, just as
Menchú Tum’s testimony reflects both her life experience and a strategy for winning political
support for her cause.
The controversy around Rigoberta Menchú Tum’s life story and how the testimonio
recounting it should be understood and taught reveals that even college students, professors
and academics can be confused by ambiguous genres, especially when they contain elements of
fictionality. Deciding when a text deserves skepticism is complex and relies in part on a nuanced
understanding of context and readership; Stoll would like to convince us that the exaggerations
and literary devices used for effect in Menchú Tum’s narrative remove it from the genre of
eyewitness testimony and therefore demand fact-checking; other readers might argue that her
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work is something closer to creative autobiography, and that its real-world context and genre
demand another sort of appreciation. John Beverley was the key voice arguing that it should be
read in a genre of its own: testimonio. Beverley compares this genre with Barbara Foley’s
category of documentary novel and admits that elements of her work might be applicable to it,
especially to “its peculiar truth claim on the reader” (2004: 42). But the two genres are not
equivalent, he says, for that would be:
to make testimonio one of the mutations the novel has undergone in the course of its
(European) evolution from the Renaissance on, whereas I have wanted to suggest that it
implies a radical break (as in the structuralist notion of coupure) with the novel and with
literary fictionality as such. In other words, the testimonio is not a form of the novel …
If the novel is a closed and private form in the sense that both the story and the
subject end with the end of the text, defining that auto-referential self-sufficiency that is
the basis of formalist reading practices, the testimonio exhibits by contrast what René
Jara calls a “public intimacy” (intimidad pública) in which the boundary between public
and private spheres of life essential in all forms of bourgeois culture and law is
transgressed. The narrator in testimonio is a real person who continues living and acting
in a real social history that also continues. (my ellipsis ibid.: 42).
We have seen in examples of nonfiction novels that a literary character can have an embodied,
extratextual referent, “a real person who continues living and acting in a real social history,”
and nevertheless be interpreted by readers from an aesthetic stance. Beverley seems not to be
entirely correct in calling the novel “a closed and private form,” as though the mere fact of its
fictionality kept it hermetically sealed from all other factors. “Formalist reading practices” that
insist on the autonomy of art always seem to overlook or avoid the contextual features like
authorship and readership that help to determine a text. Bakhtin points out that the relation of
a text with the world that engendered it is ineluctable. In his essay on the chronotope, he
writes that “there is a sharp and categorical boundary line between the actual world as source
of representation and the world represented in the text,” but also that:
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however immutable the presence of that categorical boundary line between them, they
are nevertheless indissolubly tied up with each other and find themselves in continual
mutual interaction; uninterrupted exchange goes on between them, similar to the
uninterrupted exchange of matter between living organisms and the environment that
surrounds them. As long as the organism lives, it resists a fusion with the environment,
but if it is torn out of its environment, it dies. The work and the world represented in it
enter the real world and enrich it, and the real world enters the work and its world as
part of the process of its creation, as well as part of its subsequent life, in a continual
renewing of the work through the creative perception of listeners and readers.
(1981: 254)
Fictional novels are no less socially and historically informed than testimonios, though their
content may on the surface appear less socially inflected or partisan. Even strictly
autobiographical texts exist in a different chronotope than their living authors and subjects, as
they contain a conclusion, while the author lives in her own “unresolved and still evolving
contemporaneity” (ibid.:255). No text is more or less self-sufficient than a testimonio. No novel,
bourgeois or otherwise, is strictly private or entirely divorced from social history.
Menchú Tum’s creative distortions to her life story, which Stoll sets out to rigorously
inventory, may appear, from one perspective, to resemble exactly what Beverley claims they
are not, instances of “literary fictionality.” Though they might be construed as deceptions, they
serve to increase the emotional effect of her narrative, to depict the narrator as more
unambiguously heroic and to render the struggle of the leftist guerrillas in a mythic tone. Stoll’s
most dramatic discovery is that Menchú Tum’s brother was not burned alive, as she claims to
have witnessed, but probably merely shot and left in a ditch (1999: 69-70). Yet this was “the
climactic passage of her book,” Stoll insists (1999:2). As Stoll describes it, this is the chief
example of Menchú Tum “dramatizing her life like a Hollywood scriptwriter might,” in his chief
accusation of fictionalization. However, the confusion of different versions and the lack of clear
facts in this case, which even he admits, suggest another possible reading. In an interview soon
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after the scandal broke, Menchú Tum described her account of her brother’s death as more like
family lore, “My mother saw it. And she can no longer speak about it … That [account] is one
truth, my mother’s truth. And if you ask me if I believe Stoll or my mother, it is obvious that I
believe my mother” (Arias 2001:111). Stoll cannot argue that his account is the correct one,
because the remains were never identified, he only says that “as best as anyone can determine,
they included [Menchú Tum’s] brother” (1999: 70). But this sort of indeterminacy is typical to
war and conflict, a sort of impossibility of final knowledge that seems to be part of the strange
epistemology or “fog” of war. Families who have lived through war often never know exactly
what happened to their lost loved ones and end up with only conflicting, unverified accounts.97
Does Menchú Tum’s version, in this context, really deserve such rigorous skepticism? Does it
really discount the rest of her text as “eyewitness testimony?” In fact, calling her narrative
eyewitness testimony is inaccurate and misleading: the testimonio genre was never equivalent
to legal evidence. Rather, it was always a literary text in the form of a personal account
narrated in order to represent a wider social situation. “The presence of a ‘real’ popular voice in
the testimonio is at least in part an illusion. Obviously, we are dealing here, as in any discursive
medium, with an effect that has been produced,” Beverley writes, recognizing the problematic
factuality of Menchú Tum’s narrative (2004: 39). Beverley decides that Stoll’s approach would
amount to granting “testimonial narrators like Rigoberta Menchú only the possibility of being
witnesses, but not the power to create their own narrative authority and negotiate its
conditions of truth and representativity” (2004: 73). If not racism, then it is the perpetuation of
a long, problematic history of discounting alternative perspectives – exactly what
multiculturalism in higher education was meant to confront. Menchú Tum’s testimonio may not
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be eyewitness testimony in the strict legal sense that Stoll would like it to be, but that is only
because it has superseded the limits of that genre and become something more.
4. Conclusion: Responsible Skepticism
There is as obvious a difference between La noche de Tlatelolco and I, Rigoberta
Menchú as there is between the lives of the two women who wrote those books. La noche is
polyphonic and fragmented, while I, Rigoberta Menchú is an autobiographical narrative.
Poniatowska was born in Europe, descended from Polish nobility, while Menchú Tum’s family
and ancestors suffered some of the worst injustice and violence in the recent (and also distant)
history of the Americas. Poniatowska had a long literary career, while Menchú Tum was not
even credited as the author of her testimonio. Nevertheless, it may be worth posing the same
question in regards to Poniatowska’s book that Stoll forces us to ask about Menchú Tum’s: is
rigorous skepticism appropriate? Should we be fact-checking?
This decision is equivalent to determining the genre of the text, I would argue, but
making the appropriate choice may rely on extratextual factors. For example, it seems relevant
that Poniatowska produced a number of other fictions that approximate history or
autobiography, and also many works of crónica that hover somewhere between literature and
journalism. Poniatowska’s artistic trajectory aligns her with other literary figures from the
1960s, ’70s and ’80s who experimented with factual discourses for literary effect or attempted
to write in experimental new genres like the nonfiction novel. Judged on the basis of her long
career, Poniatowska may have more in common with Norman Mailer than with Menchú Tum.
Another question it might be appropriate to pose is in regards to the effects of rigorous scrutiny
outside the walls of the academy and the chances that a nuanced exposé might be
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appropriated by forces with their own motivations, as happened with Stoll’s work. However,
though the authors of the crime of October 2nd will never be held to account, cultural
awareness of the events are not likely to be diminished by skepticism of one of its key accounts.
Certainly, a horrendous crime was carried out in Tlatelolco on October 2nd, 1968, a crime which
has by now become firmly fixed in the Mexican historical memory. A new generation of critics
re-examining the cultural and literary history around Tlatelolco are not likely to dislodge it from
general consciousness. In fact, the search for a more rigorous accounting of the legacy of 1968
fifty years later is probably evidence that the memory is likely to persist.
As to Poniatowska’s version of that memory, three general points seem appropriate.
First, whatever the motivation behind Luis González de Alba’s criticisms of Poniatowska, and
whatever the personal history of amity or enmity between those two writers, the evidence
suggests that there may be some validity to his arguments. Side-by-side comparisons of their
two texts reveal some unexplained affinities, and the murky production history behind the
books also seems cause for raised eyebrows. Just how much one text owes to the other, we
can’t say without more evidence, evidence like the interview transcripts Poniatowska perhaps
used, though she denies recording or transcribing her interviews. Probably, we will never know.
Rather than making any definitive statements about La noche de Tlatelolco based on this
circumstantial evidence and the vague cloud of doubt that grows around it on closer inspection,
a more modest course seems correct: readers probably should not confuse Poniatowska’s work
with factual history, a first-draft of history, or with eyewitness testimony that can be taken as
equivalent to legal evidence. What we are dealing with clearly supersedes those genres, and
should be judged as literature of the first order, with its own unique relation to empirical truth.
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Secondly, reading La noche as literature rather than as history does not reduce its
cultural importance. Carpenter shows that the function of the Tlatelolco discourse – that
continuously growing body of cultural productions on the subject of ’68 – has changed over
time. What began as an urgent demand for the truth about the massacre and its aftermath has
transformed over the decades into an argument for cultural acceptance and understanding.
Ensuring the persistence of historical memory is, as Carpenter sees it, a sort of reconciliation,
the creation of what she calls a “shared emotional sphere.” Poniatowska’s text remains central
in that process, regardless of its failures in answering more strictly factual historical questions.
Perhaps some of the effect of the text will be diminished by a wider awareness of its ambiguous
genre and murky production history, thanks to the so-called reality effect Tom Wolfe described
as the reader’s awareness that all this actually happened. But the literary quality of a narrative
is more determinative of its success with readers than any outside considerations, and the story
Poniatowska tells did actually happen, even if it did not happen exactly as she describes it.
Lastly, the history of David Stoll’s attempts to expose Menchú Tum suggest that rigorous
journalistic scrutiny is not appropriate for every text. To insist on fact-checking is not always the
right choice, and reference should be made to genre and context. It seems the testimonio genre
in Latin American literature, to which La noche may or may not belong, is not strictly factual in
any legalistic sense and should be read instead as a form of autobiographical literature.
Eyewitness testimony equivalent to legal evidence was always a different discursive genre.
Stoll’s obstinate and self-serving insistence on rigorous skepticism seems to have been an error,
motivated by personal needs more than by professional responsibility. John Hersey’s attack on
Norman Mailer, we recall, was also motivated by personal needs: in his case, to atone for or
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bury the memory of his own role as an innovator of literary journalism and the nonfiction novel.
Some skepticism of Poniatowska’s journalistic practices is clearly desirable, but not an exposé.
La noche de Tlatelolco is not a fraud or a lie, it is excellent literature, very much like a novel in
many respects. There seems no good reason to discount the significance or validity of the book
as a whole, crucial as its story was and remains in the cultural and political history of Mexico,
meaningful as it has been to so many thousands of people. Just because the words on the page
are not always the words of those who lived through the events does not mean we must
discount the story. Novels can tell us just as much about real lived experience as histories can.
They might not tell us exactly what happened, but they can tell us how it was.
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Conclusion
Contemporary readers will find no shortage of ambiguous narratives asking to be
believed, from poorly researched reporting to editorializing-in-disguise, from political
propaganda to conspiracy theories, from corporate disinformation to entertainment news.
Skepticism is an essential skill when navigating a world of dubious stories. Journalists see
themselves as the gate-keepers of information, the professionals responsible for determining if
the empirical evidence makes a strong enough case for a narrative to be credible. But the
changing media landscape and a worsening crisis in journalism98 have left the gates unguarded,
and journalists are often fooled themselves, though they should be first among the skeptics.
This study has, I hope, revealed some of the nuances between discursive genres and
exposed some of the complicated terrain along the border between forms of writing that
connect with empirical fact in quite different manners. That there exist different forms of
writing about reality, the world, lived experience, etc., seems indisputable. Nevertheless,
determining the exact differentiating markers that separate and define those forms appears
altogether more complicated, if not impossible. This study has pointed toward the reader’s role
in making those determinations for herself. I have argued for the appropriateness of employing
one’s powers of skepticism while reading works that make empirical or factual truth claims, and
suggested that such powers may need to be learned.
The examples from Latin America investigated in Part Two have suggested, however,
that rigorous skepticism may not be appropriate for some genres. A literary tradition like the
sort of chronicle considered in Section Three responds to imperatives very unlike journalistic
objectivity, and so might be better judged using different criteria. The case of Stoll and Menchú
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Tum – and also of González de Alba and Poniatowska – suggests rigorous skepticism equating
literary forms like testimonio with eyewitness testimony can be inappropriate. Without a subtle
appreciation for literary genre and cultural context, skeptical critics can easily miss the point.
The same might be said for nonfiction novels written in the U.S. context: that they should be
appreciated, admired, but not necessarily believed.
In short, this dissertation suggests readers be careful about knowing the difference
between texts that deserve skepticism and texts that deserve admiration. There is nothing very
new in such a suggestion. In fact, literature presents us with a model for exactly the sort of bad
reader who never learned that lesson, an example meant to warn us against confusing varieties
of truth, mixing up poetry with history and believing all the wrong stories.
I am talking of course about Don Quixote. Midway through his third sally, in Part Two of
Miguel de Cervantes’s famous novel, Quixote watches a puppet show. It is a simple production,
meant for children, a story of knights and their valiant exploits. Don Gaiferos rides south from
the court of Charlemagne to rescue his wife, Melisendra, held captive in Spain by the moors.
Melisendra appears at the top of a tower, climbs down, and they ride off together. But soon a
Moorish puppet army appears and gives chase, and Don Quixote draws his sword and hacks the
wooden figurines to bits. The episode dramatizes in miniature the mistake Quixote makes
throughout the novel. He is exactly the sort of dupe that Socrates worried would be fooled by
the sorcery of mimetic artists. It is the puppet-show narrator’s crude style that confounds him.
“This figure you see here on horseback, clad in a Gascon cloak, is Don Gaiferos himself,” he says
(2001: 714). After the battle, the puppeteer asks Quixote for restitution. Looking at the
massacred wooden “corpses,” Quixote recognizes his mistake and blames evil “enchanters”:
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Truly I declare to you, gentlemen who hear me, that all that has taken place here seemed to
me to happen really: that Melisendra was Melisendra, Don Gaiferos Don Gaiferos, Marsilio
Marsilio, and Charlemagne Charlemagne (ibid.: 718).
Don Quixote’s madness is a failure to discern fiction from reality, an act of artistic identification
gone wrong. Cervantes even employs what Danto calls “the is of artistic identification” (1964:
577). Melisendra is Melisendra, Don Gaiferos is Don Gaiferos, and Quijana is Don Quixote.
Cervantes’s hero seems meant to teach us Socrates’s lesson about the dangers of art.
But it is possible to find in Don Quixote a lesson about reading more complex than just
an attack on the poor verisimilitude of the books of chivalry. Quixote is a foolish reader driven
mad by foolish books, a lunatic who believes in fictions, but Cervantes encourages his readers
to make a similar mistake. He creates a character so dynamic and original that we feel he is real.
Two characters, in fact, for we must also count Sancho. We are meant to laugh at them, but
also to suffer with them. The illusions are brought to life. Don Quixote has been considered the
first modern novel exactly because it is the first instance in which we see an author achieve this
new artistic criterion: to make a character come to life – Janet Malcolm’s crucial point in the
transfiguration of journalism into art. Describing Cervantes’s literary devices, E.C. Riley writes:
It is impossible to doubt Cervantes’s single minded purposefulness behind these tricks. He
practically succeeds in making the reader say of Don Quixote what Don Quixote said of the
hero who was so vividly real to him: ‘I can almost say that I have seen Amadis of Gaul with
my own two eyes.’ (1962: 43)
Quixote and Sancho, two literary characters who somehow rise above being mere
representations and seem to have their own interior selves, psychologies and lives, stand at the
distant origins of the tradition of contemporary fiction. Riley explains how Cervantes’s formal
discovery arose from previous Renaissance critics’ investigation of Aristotelian verisimilitude:
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There is in the Quixote a practical solution to the problem which taxed the wits of the Italian
theorists of the Counter-Reformation: how to bring the universal and the particular into
harmony. Here, for the first time, the novel triumphantly shows its range. It is not history
and not poetry: its centre is somewhere in between and it includes both of them.
(1962: 177)
Cervantes’s name for this “solution” is especially interesting. “Enchantment”99 is not only the
perfect excuse for why windmills appear to be giants, why flocks of sheep seem to be armies,
why puppets become the thing itself. “You may be sure, Sancho, that the author of our history
is some wise enchanter, for nothing can be hidden from them,” Quixote says (2001: 543).
Enchantment becomes synonymous with fiction, or perhaps with verisimilitude. Cervantes
might have begun by parodying the books in which some Wise Urganda, Alquife or Merlin
always seems to be casting a spell, but his parody becomes more than an attack. Enchantment
is not the crude charm of the puppet show narrator – it is a name for Cervantes’s own art.
In his satirical poem A Voyage to Parnassus (1614), Cervantes defended enchantment.
“How can an absurdity [un desatino] please, unless it is committed deliberately, guided by a
seemly humour [el donaire]?” he wrote (qtd in Riley 1962: 21). The argument implies that even
fictions that seem ridiculous may be valuable, when we recognize them for what they are.
When Cervantes’s story ends, when we read what Quixote said on his deathbed, we are meant
to have tears in our eyes. Absurd or not, Cervantes means it when on the very last page he calls
his book “this tale of my true Don Quixote” (2001: 1050). But what kind of truth is this?
Certainly, we are not meant to imagine Don Quixote once rode the plains of La Mancha, or to
take to the streets in imitation. We are meant to feel he is true, but not to think it and confuse
representation for reality. Cervantes never stops ridiculing the madman who did exactly that.
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Interviewing would not become standard practice in the European press until much later,
after the turn of the century. In Latin America, the figure of the professional reporter also
appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century; however, the Modernist crónica was the
preferred genre of many seminal ninteenth century writers, including Rubén Darío, José Martí
and Manuel Gutiérrez Nájera and the tradition of crónica would remain largely immune from
objectivity as a moral “norm.” I consider the parallel history of Mexican literary journalism in
Chapters 3 and 4. For more, see Blanca Estela Treviño’s La vida en México (1849 - 1909)
(México, D.F.: CONACULTA, 2010); also, Aníbal González’s La crónica modernista
hispanoamericana (Madrid: Ediciones José Porrúa Turanzas, S.A. 1983).
2 Schudson debunks several myths about the origins of contemporary journalistic style in the
American press, among them, the idea that its rise was connected with the telegraph, with
“stringers” reporting from farther afield, with the increasing geographical range of circulations,
and with increased competition. For more on the telegraph hypothesis, see Carey’s
“Technology and Ideology” in Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (New
York: Routledge, 2009).
3 For more on journalistic objectivity, see James S. Ettema and Theodore L. Glasser, Custodians
of Conscience: Investigative Journalism and Public Virtue, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1998). For more on scientific objectivity, see Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity
(New York: Zone Books, 2010); and Hans-Jörg Rheinberg, An Epistemology of the Concrete,
(Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2010).
4 It is possible this was at least in part a result of translation, in the term’s broadest sense.
Hersey’s survivors are not representative of the average citizen of Hiroshima; two are clergy,
two are doctors, and all spoke English. Hersey justified his decision to tell their stories for a
practical reason: the lack of a language barrier facilitated easier understanding. The point
suggests the possibility of mis-understanding, especially considering the profound cultural
barriers between an American and Japanese atomic-bomb victims who were interviewed
during the U.S. military occupation of the island. For more on the problem of “the
anthropologist’s impress on the material he collects,” see Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami: Portrait
of a Moroccan (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980); or consider Crapanzano’s notion of the
“plays of power” involved in translation, in his “Translation: Truth or Metaphor,” RES
Anthropology and Aesthetics, No. 32 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 45-51.
5 James Conant described the Trinity test explosion as “a cosmic phenomena like an eclipse. The
whole sky suddenly full of white light like the end of the world” (Lifton and Mitchell 1995): 226.
6 For the story of the U.S. military’s attempts to cover up the history of these radiological
illnesses, see Lifton and Mitchell (1995): 51-55.
7 For more, see Lifton and Mitchell (1995): 251-53; see also, Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday
Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017).
8 For example, see Dwight MacDonald, “The Bomb,” Politics (September, 1946): 257-263.
9 See Lifton and Mitchell (1995): 207-209; see also Michael J. Yavenditti, “John Hersey and the
American Conscience: The Reception of ‘Hiroshima’” Pacific Historical Review 43, No. 1
(February, 1974): 24-49.
10 See “The Beginning or the End: Original Trailer” Turner Classic Movies, Web Source: Accessed
12/18/2017
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Writing her autobiography years later, Shirley Temple Black would recall how, upon her first
visit to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studios, at twelve years old, Arthur Freed had dropped his pants
and exposed himself to her. See Aljean Harmetz, “Shirley Temple Black, Hollywood’s Biggest
Little Star, Dies at 85,” New York Times, 2/11/2014.
12 For a thorough explication of this argument, see Carroll (1998): 89.
13 Selznick had originally hired Carson McCullers to write the script. After firing her, Selznick
hired, along with Capote and several others, Alberto Moravia.
14 For more, see Truman Capote’s profile of Brando, “The Duke in his Domain,” New Yorker,
11/9/57, and also Clarke (1988): 303.
15 See Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth
Century,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, Craig Calhoun, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1992): 289-339; Mary P. Ryan, “Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in NineteenthCentury America,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, Craig Calhoun, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press, 1992): 259-288; Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the
Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1990), “The Mass Public and the Mass Subject,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, Craig
Calhoun, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992): 377-401, Publics and Counterpublics
(New York: Zone, 2002).
16 Ben Yagoda writes of the veracity scandals suffered by Alastair Reid and Janet Malcolm in the
1970s and 80s, in a perhaps ironic appropriation of moralistic language, “Irrespective of any
journalistic sins they may have committed, Reid and Malcolm were victims of historical
circumstances. At the New Yorker, and in nonfiction writing in general, the lines between fact
and invention had traditionally been quite blurry … By the time of Reid’s and Malcolm’s
problems, the vocation of journalism had somehow turned into a profession, with rather rigid
standards. Composite characters and quote-doctoring were not among them” (my ellipsis 2000:
401-402).
17 See Naomi Munson, “The Case of Janet Cooke,” Commentary (August, 1981), Web Access:
09/30/18.
18 See also James Markham, “Writer Admits He Fabricated an Article in Times Magazine,” New
York Times, (February, 22, 1982), Web Access: 09/30/18.
19 See Elizabeth Fakazis, “Policing the Boundaries of Truth in Narratives,” in Moral Imperialism:
A Critical Anthology, Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, ed., (New York: NYU Press, 2002).
20 See Schudson (1978): 151; Hartsock (2000): 229; Frus (1994): 90.
21 For more on Malcolm’s case, see Kathy Roberts Forde, Literary Journalism on Trial: Masson v.
New Yorker and the First Amendment, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008).
22 For more, see Yagoda (2000: 401-402). Yagoda contradicts himself somewhat, however, by
also arguing that in the 1960s the New Yorker was in fact growing more politically subjective.
“In another sense the magazine’s fact writing was moving decisively away from traditional
objectivity and impartiality,” he writes (2000: 357).
23 See Jon Michaud, “Eighty-Five from the Archive: John Hersey,” New Yorker (June 8th, 2010),
Web Access: 12/30/18.
24
For a basic critical bibliography of the New Journalism, see Tom Wolfe and E.W. Johnson, The
New Journalism (New York: Picador, 1975); Mas’ud Zavarzedeh, The Mythopoeic Reality: The
Postwar American Nonfiction Novel (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976); Ronald Weber,
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The Literature of Fact: Literary Nonfiction in American Writing (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1980);
John Hellman, Fables of Fact: The New Journalism as New Fiction (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press,
1981); Phyllis Frus, The Politics and Poetics of Journalistic Narrative: The Timely and Timeless
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994); John Hartsock, Literary Journalism and the
Aesthetics of Experience (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016); Marc Weingarten,
The Gang That Wouldn’t Write Straight: Wolfe, Thompson, Didion and the New Journalism
Revolution (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006).
25 See Thomas Kunkel, Man In Profile: Joseph Mitchell of the New Yorker, (New York: Random
House, 2015): 150.
26 For more, see Michael Brüggerman, “Post-Normal Journalism: Climate Journalism and Its
Changing Contribution to an Unsustainable Debate,” from P. Berglez, U. Olausson, & M. Ots,
eds. What Is Sustainable Journalism? Integrating the Environmental, Economic and Social
Challenges of Journalism, (New York: Peter Lang, 2017); “Beyond False Balance: How
Interpretive Journalism Shapes Media Coverage of Climate Change,” Global Environmental
Change, Vol. 42, 2017, pp. 58-67; “Shifting Roles of Science Journalists Covering Climate
Change,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016).
27 For more descriptions of the role of journalism in democratic society, see Christopher
Connell, Journalism in the Service of Democracy: A Summit of Deans, Faculty, Students and
Journalists, (New York: Carnegie Corp. of New York, 2008); Margaret Scammell and Holli
Semetko, eds. The Media, Journalism and Democracy, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000).
28 For an astute investigation of the role of mendacity in political life, see Martin Jay, The Virtue
of Mendacity: On Lying In Politics, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010).
29 For more, see Mari Fitzduff, ed. Why Irrational Politics Appeals: Understanding the Allure of
Trump (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2017); and also George Saunders, “Who Are All These Trump
Supporters?” New Yorker, (July 11 and 18, 2016).
30 I withhold the equally plausible interpretation that there is not so much a worsening crisis of
public ‘trust’ in journalism as an underlying instability in our general grasp of ‘reality’ – that is,
that these discourses lamenting such a crisis are founded upon assumptions about human
belief structures that emphasize empiricism and reason over other factors. See Steven Sloman
and Philip Fernbach, The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone (New York: Riverhead,
2017); Jan-Willem van Proojen, The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (Oxon, UK: Routledge,
2018); Julian Baggini, The Edge of Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016); Jason
Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2016).
31 See for example Núria Almiron, Journalism in Crisis: Corporate Media and Financialization,
trans. William McGrath (New York: Hampton Press, 2010); and also Jeffrey C. Alexander, E.
Breese, M. Luengo, eds. The Crisis of Journalism Reconsidered: Democratic Culture, Professional
Codes, Digital Future, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
32 See also John Fiske, “Culture, Ideology, Interpellation,” from Literary Theory: An Anthology,
Julie Rivken and Michael Ryan, eds. (Malden: Blackwell, 1998): 1268.
33 He writes, “The similarity between the early days of the novel and the early days of the New
Journalism is not merely coincidental. (Appendix I.) In both cases we are watching the same
process. We are watching a group of writers coming along, working in a genre regarded as
Lower Class (the novel before the 1850’s, slick magazine journalism before the 1960’s), who
discover the joys of detailed realism and its strange powers” (Wolfe 1973: 28).
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Janet Malcolm has called the relation of fiction with fact a sort of “mediation” (1990: 154)
She describes it thus: “Of course there is no such thing as a work of pure factuality, any more
than there is one of pure fictitiousness. As every work of fiction draws on life, so every work of
nonfiction draws on art. As the novelist must curb his imagination in order to keep his text
grounded in the common experience of man (dreams exemplify the uncurbed imagination –
thus their uninterestingness to everyone but their author) – so the journalist must temper his
literal-mindedness with the narrative devices of imaginative literature” (1990: 154).
35 See for example John Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse” New Literary History
6, no. 2 (1975: 326).
36 See Tobias Klauk and Tilmann Köppe, eds. Fiktionalitat: Ein interdisziplinares Handbuch
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014); Matías Martínez, Erzählen: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch
(Stuttgart, Germany: Metzler, 2017); Francoise Lavocat, Fait et fiction: Pour une frontière (Paris:
Seuil, 2016); Simona Zetterberg Gjerlevsen, 2016 “A Novel History of Fictionality” Narrative 24,
no.2 (May): 174-189.
37 For more of the pragmatist argument, see Siegfried Schmidt “Fictionality in Literary and Nonliterary Discourse (Poetics 9, no. 5, 525-546, 1980); Ada Wildekamp, Ineke Van Montfoort and
Willem van Ruiswijk, “Fictionality and Convention” (Poetics 9, no.5-6: 547,67, 1980); and also
Gerard Genette “The Pragmatic Status of Narrative Fiction” (Style 24, no. 1, Tel Aviv Poetics:
Language and the Reader: 59-72, Spring 1990). Genette also attempted to adjudicate between
the pragmatic and semantic positions in “Fictional Narrative, Factual Narrative” (Poetics Today
11, no. 4 Narratology Revisited: 755-774 (Winter 1990); and Klaus W. Hempfer outlined similar
debates in the context of a tradition of German scholarship, in “Problems Concerning a Theory
of Fiction(ality)” (Style 38, no. 3 German Narratology II: 302-323, Fall, 2004).
38 Phelan himself has also made important contributions to this theory of the reading audience,
in Narrative as Rhetoric: Technique, Audiences, Ethics, Ideology (1996: 135-53); and in Narrative
Theory: Core Concepts and Critical Debates (Herman et al. 2012), at times drawing upon the
formalist theories of Ralph Rader. See for example Rader’s Fact, Fiction and Form: Selected
Essays, David. H. Richter & James Phelan, eds. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2011).
39 In Rabinowitz’s original formulation, as well as that of a chapter co-written with Phelan in
Narrative Theory (Herman et al. 2012), there is a third position, the “actual” reading audience,
which may be very different from the one intended (e.g. contemporary readers are not the
audience whom Shakespeare wrote for) (Herman et al. 2012: 140).
40 Another paradox: the bizarre regularity with which critics use the example of Tolstoy’s
heroine in discussions of sympathetic fictions and readerly empathy. Why always this fiction?
For an example, see Colin Radford, “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplemental volume 69 (1975).
41 Ruth Ronen explores the “incompleteness of fictional entities” in a 1988 essay in Poetics
Today, in which she outlines a position very similar to that of Phelan. Ronen argues that the
inclusion of some details at the expense of the exclusion of others in literary texts activates
“shared frames of reference” mingling elements of the fictional world with aspects of external
reality (1988: 511). She calls these processes “actional” strategies, in a move that recalls
Phelan’s notion of the authorial audience’s awareness of the author’s intentions (1988: 511).
See also John Frow’s critique of structuralist and post-structuralist accounts of literary character
in “Spectable Binding: On Character” Poetics Today 7, no. 2: 227-250 (1986
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This is not to suggest that I find the “make believe” theorists especially convincing or that my
argument follows theirs, though it may overlap in some particulars. For more examples of this
sort of argument, see J. Alexander Bareis and Lene Nordrum, eds. How to Make Believe: The
Fictional Truths of the Representational Arts (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), and especially, Peter
Lamarque “Thought, Make-Believe and the Opacity of Narrative” (Bareis et al 2015): 41-59.
43 See also Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
44 Wolfgang Iser is an important precedent, however, particularly an argument he makes that
distinguishes “fictionalizing” from lying, which he calls a duality. He writes that “the nature of
this doubleness will depend upon the context: lies and literature are the different end products
of the process of doubling” (1990: 939). Iser’s argument for why we need to create fictions also
bears some relation with mine. Fictionalizing, he says, “spotlights that in-between state whose
indelible traces mark the structure of double meaning, that of the doppelgänger as well as that
of the boundless options for self-fashioning” (1990: 953). The importance of context and of
mirroring will be important for my argument as well.
45 Again, the traditions are not as entirely separated as this makes it sound. A number of critics
have been studied on both sides of the divide, for example Searle (1975) and Pavel (1986).
46 See also Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A
Philosophical Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
47 It is no accident historicist debates have also centered on the importance of literary
characters in readerly appreciation of fictionality. I will also offer a tentative argument for why
fictional characters are so important in the experience of reading fiction later in this section.
48 For example, see Kathleen Stock, “Fictive Utterance and Imagining,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 85 (2011): 145.
49 My argument does not preclude the possibility that a reader might choose incorrectly.
Deciding to read Ulysses as a true historical account of some events that took place in Dublin on
June 16th, 1904, or attempting to interpret the encyclopedia as some massive satirical novel,
would certainly be to miss the point of those texts.
50 As Danto puts it, Truman Capote’s nonfiction novel, In Cold Blood, was “a philosophically
innovative creation in that it demonstrated by counterexample that ‘All novels are fiction’ is
nonanalytical” (1981: 144).
51 Noël Carroll makes a powerful argument against this notion of choosing, in an objection to
Walton’s make-believe theory of fiction (Carroll 1990: 74). Carroll’s example is that of the
horror film, in which the experience of art-horror elicited by the fictional entity on screen
hardly seems voluntary. Some horror films fail to produce truly horrifying monsters, while the
monsters of others seem to frighten even the most skeptical audience members, implying that
the reaction probably cannot relate to a choice made by the audience member. However, one
can easily imagine other factors typical of the genre, like heightened suspense, playing a role in
inducing an emotional response in an otherwise skeptical viewer.
52 The suggestion that journalism and biography are linked genres is supported by the book that
Malcolm wrote immediately after her investigation into the dubious ethics of journalism, The
Silent Woman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1994), in which Malcolm extended her critique of
journalism to the field of Sylvia Plath’s biographers. Very roughly, her argument suggests that
the biographer does to the dead what the journalist does to the living.
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These different imperatives seem to me to be the boundary markers between different
genres of journalism. I borrow the distinction, in part, from Monsiváis’s definition of crónica,
taken from the preface to A ustedes les consta (1980), which I will discuss in Section Three.
54 Malcolm may not be referring to the variety of art objects that Danto used as a starting point
for elaborating his philosophy of art, but her writing is so erudite it seems very likely she is.
55 The conclusion of Beat the Devil, the film Capote wrote with John Huston, also turned on a
dramatic interrogation scene.
56 Janet Malcolm sees things exactly opposite. According to her, uncertainty and ambiguity are
elements of nonfiction. Readers of nonfiction must therefore remain skeptical, while readers of
fiction can be certain. In The Silent Woman, Malcolm writes of an ambiguous moment in a Plath
biography that “the questions raised by the passage only underscore the epistemological
insecurity by which the reader of biography and autobiography (and history and journalism) is
always and everywhere dogged. In a work of nonfiction we almost never know the truth of
what happened … [while] the facts of imaginative literature are as hard as the stone that Dr.
Johnson kicked. We must always take the novelist’s and the playwright’s and the poet’s word,
just as we are almost always free to doubt the biographer’s or the autobiographer’s or the
historian’s or the journalist’s. In imaginative literature we are constrained from considering
alternative scenarios – there are none” (1994: 154).
57 This is not to suggest readers shouldn’t trust Boo. As far as I know, she is an excellent
reporter. But certain aspects of her narrative may be problematic, like the cultural and linguistic
barrier between her and her subjects – the language with which they express their thoughts
often seems jarringly American, for example – and there are moments in her story in which
sensationalist portrayals of poverty verge on the editorial. Likewise, her narrative’s structure
relies on sympathy for a problematic protagonist faced with adversity and a sympathetic villain.
58 For other critics whose theories of literary genre who have focused on readerly reception,
see Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. by Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis:
University of Minneapolis Press, 1982); Peter Seitel, “Theorizing Genres – Interpreting Works”
New Literary History 34, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 275-297; Friend (2012).
59 I am following, of course, the supposition that the Greeks took the characters of myth to be
historical figures.
60 Some have argued that Aristotle does not describe history and poetry as contradictory, but
rather as alternate versions of the same enterprise. “Literature was what poets made of the
gaps in history, and conversely, as Lionel Grossman has emphatically put it, ‘History was a
branch of literature,” Nicholas Paige writes in Before Fiction (2011): 27.
61 I see Tom Wolfe’s assertion – that “all this actually happened” – as roughly equivalent to the
arguments made by those Danto describes as “Reality Theory” artists. Robert Rauschenberg
could claim his work “Bed” (1955) was just a real bed; Capote could insist that In Cold Blood was
“one-hundred percent accurate.” Claes Oldenburg could call his “Bedroom Ensemble” (1963)
just a bedroom set, and an unsympathetic museum-goer could climb under the sheets, rather
than accept it as art. “It is but a matter of choice,” Danto says (1964: 582).
62 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
63 I am referring here to Angel Rama’s seminal La ciudad letrada (The Lettered City) (1984),
which argues that literature in Latin America has always been intimately connected with
organizations of state power and social control.
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Transportation’s role in urban life and in contemporary Mexico City is one of Monsiváis’s
subjects. See, “La hora del transporte: El Metro: Viaje hacia el fin del apretujón,” from Los
Rituales del caos (México, D.F.: Era, 1995). But there is no double-portrait merging the
narrator/protagonist and the urban space around him in it, and it does not, as far as I can tell,
intentionally subvert nationalist discourses of the typical Mexican or of typical Mexicanness.
65 The draining and paving of Texcoco was begun in 1866 and not concluded until 1900. See
Francisco de Garay’s El Valle de México: Apuntes históricos sobre su hidrografia desde los
tiempos más remotos hasta nuestros dias (México, D.F: Oficina tip. de la Secretaría de Fomento,
1888):71. See also, Johns (1997: 43-45). The lake is again the site of controversial construction,
with the Peña Nieto administration’s now-aborted plan to build an international airport there.
66 “At the end of Díaz’s reign, Mexico City’s mortality rate (42.3 per 1,000) was higher than all
but one of its provinces, more than twice as high as those of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro,
and higher even than those of Cairo, Saint Petersburg and Madras,” Johns writes (1997: 43).
67 See Exhibit a) above.
68 The passage perhaps also refers to the first chapter of Eugène Sue’s Les mystères de Paris
(1842), which compares the inhabitants of Paris’s more dangerous neighborhoods to “savages”
from the fiction of James Fenimore Cooper. The genre of urban mystery begun with Sue’s work
would seem to share some points in common with Gutiérrez Nájera’s urban chronicle.
69 Gutiérrez Nájera would represent the citizens of “barrios extravagantes” beyond the limits of
the capital city in a quite different way, when he became a diputado for the Estado de México in
1886, a position which he would hold until his death in 1895.
70 Unless otherwise stated, I will refer to the version of the text published in 1946, considering it
Novo’s preferred, completed version. When published as an appendix, it included the subtitle,
“Ensayo previo sobre la ciudad escrito en 1928 (Previous Essay on the City Written in 1928)”
(1996: 238).
71 See Marguerite Feitlowitz’s excellent recent translation of it, and of a number of Novo’s
fantastically ribald sonnets, Pillar of Salt: An Autobiography with 19 Erotic Sonnets, Salvador
Novo, trans. by Marguerite Feitlowitz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014).
72 See “Elogio de la transa,” in Función de medianoche, José Joaquín Blanco (México: Ediciones
Era, 1981).
73 Though this “tradition” recalls the arguments of Monsiváis’s two critical essays on the crónica
form, Blanco published his text before either of Monsiváis’s anthologies or criticism about
crónica had appeared. However, Monsiváis does thank Blanco among the early readers whose
input helped to shape A Ustedes les consta.
74 “Un pequeño sismo en el cogollo” (qtd in González de Alba 2016: 98).
75 Despite Ruisánchez Serra’s assertions, other books might have played an equally important
role in the debunking of the official narrative of the Student Movement. For example, the
imprisoned leaders of the movement released two books themselves, written and edited in
Corridor C of Lecumberri prison. Los procesos de 68 (1970) was a five-hundred-page collection
of legal documents outlining the extremely spurious government case against them and their
defense, with a long narrative of the events of 1968 for an introduction. Tiempo de Hablar: Los
Procesos de México 68 (1970) was a shorter text on the Movement and the government
response, with essays by José Revueltas, Raúl Alvarez Garín and Eduardo Valle Espinoza.
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During his first week in office, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico’s first liberal president
in decades, fulfilled the third of the Student Movement of 1968’s six demands: the disbanding
of the heavily armed urban riot police, or granaderos. See Sara Pantoja, “Cuerpo de granaderos
desaperecerá definitivamente, afirma la jefa de gobierno” Proceso (12/5/2018) Web Access:
12/5/2018.
77 Both two would publish political reflections in the two works mentioned above in footnote 73
above. For Guevara Niebla, see La democracia en la calle: crónica del movimiento estudiantil
mexicano (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores 1988), and 1968: Largo camino a la
democracia (México, D.F.: Cal y Arena 2008). For Garín, see 1968, más alla del mito (México,
D.F.: Ediciones del Milenio, 1998), and La estela de Tlatelolco: una reconstrucción histórica del
movimiento estudiantil del 68 (México, D.F.: Editorial Ítaca, 2002).
78 In the same interview, Poniatowska tells a different story about how she began to be
interested in the student movement also. In this version, María Luisa Martínez Medrano does
not arrive at her home on the night of October the 2nd, in shock from witnessing the attack in
Tlatelolco, but instead sometime later, after her investigation had already begun (1988: 248).
79 Illustrated dedications seem to have been a practice of Poniatowska’s. I found a similar one in
an early edition of the library copy I used for this research. See exhibit b) above.
80 See Los procesos de Mexico 68 and also Tiempo de Hablar: Los procesos de Mexico 68.
81 The existence and location of the “francotiradores (snipers)” who opened fire on the crowd
and military is controversial. González de Alba suggests it was the Batallón Olimpia that began
the firing. Sergio Aguayo finds “incontrovertible” evidence that the snipers were officials sent
by General Luis Gutiérrez Oropeza on behalf of the president (2015:102).
82 For example, Sergio Aguayo argues that Díaz Ordaz hid from his minister of Defense and
others in his cabinet the plan to use snipers on the crowd as a pretext for the apprehension of
the leaders of the Student Movement and for an act of violence that would frighten the rest of
the demonstrators and end their protests, “Sostengo, como hipótesis, que Gustavo Díaz Ordaz
elaboró su plan con el jefe del Estado Mayor, General Luiz Gutiérrez Oropeza, y ocultó al
secretario de Defensa, Marcelino García Barragán, al de Gobernación, Luis Echeverría Álvarez y
al director de la Federal de Seguridad capitán Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios que había
francotiradores con órdenes de disparar a matar o herir” (2015: 94).
83 Juan J. Rojo compares González de Alba’s claims in 1971 that his book was testimonio with
the testimony González de Alba gave for the Memorial del 68 museum, opened in 2006, in
which he called the book his “first novel” (Rojo 2016: 20). Rojo decides to treat Los días y los
años as a testimonio according to the definition John Beverley gives to the genre, while also
affirming that the book is both a novel and that the characters in it have extratextual,
embodied equivalents. Interestingly, he does not claim to resolve the debate, but says “the
work can be read within the framework of both genres” (ibid.: 22).
84 Rojo gives an interesting account of how these passages of dialogue strategically validate the
movement, its internal structure and emphasis on open dialogue, while preemptively
discounting the government’s accusations that the students were either cynical political agents
or criminal delinquents (2016: 30-33).
85 I leave aside the question of the distinction between autobiography proper and
autobiographical fiction and the autobiographical novel. The problematic factuality of
autobiographical writing is clearly a subject related to the theme of this dissertation, but I have
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avoided it throughout so as to narrow my focus and, hopefully, to make this study a little more
reasonable in scope. I will approach it later in this section, however, in regards to the debate
over the factuality of the testimonio genre in Latin American literature and David Stoll’s case
against Rigoberta Menchú and the resulting controversy. See Stoll (1999), Arias (2001), and
especially John Beverley’s response (2004: 79).
86 The editors of the collection of criticism took the poem from a collection of Pacheco’s poetry,
No me preguntes cómo pasa el tiempo (México: Era, 1998). For a more detailed examination of
the two poems and their affective use of the source material, see Carpenter (2018: 125-7).
87 Carlos Monsiváis uses the same line as the title of a chronicle written in 1968, and later
published in Días de Guardar (1970): 295, where it stands as his most direct approach to writing
about the massacre in a book focused on the Student Movement of 1968.
88 For the history of the Nahuatl texts and their translations, see Miguel Leon Portilla, Vision de
los Vencidos: Relaciones Indígenas de la Conquista (México: UNAM, 1962), especially the
introduction and notes. The book has been translated into English as Broken Spears: The Aztec
Account of the Conquest of Mexico, trans. by Lysander Kemp (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).
89 Bosteels made this argument in a presentation at the University of California, Berkeley, in
another sort of memorial to the events of 1968, a pair of lectures commemorating the 50 th
anniversary of the massacre, on October 5th, 2018. His talk was titled, “From Ayotzinapa to
Tlatelolco: A Memorial of Grievances against the State?”
90 Lemus became infamous for identifying fellow leaders of the CNH in the days following the
massacre and their arrest. He was imprisoned with them and interviewd by Poniatowska, but
Lemus was probably a government informant even before October 2nd. Documents reviewed by
Sergio Aguayo reveal that the Batallón Olimpia unit expected to find Lemus at the microphone
when they stormed the third-floor balcony in Tlatelolco; several eyewitnesses describe him
suspiciously taking the microphone to ask for calm as soon as the firing broke out. Likewise, the
strange note, “19,000 pesos,” appears beside Lemus’s name in the daily agenda sent between
Echeverría and Díaz Ordaz on the day of the massacre. See Aguayo (2015: 94).
91 Adam Hochschild’s history of the Congo, King Leopold’s Ghost, comes to mind (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1999).
92 For more on the violence of the guerrillas, which was not at all equivalent statistically to
government violence, see Timothy P. Wickham-Crawley, Exploring Revolution: Essays in Latin
American Insurgency and Revolution (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), and Guerrillas and
Revolution in Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), and also Mario Payeras,
Days of the Jungle (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983).
93 According to Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Benjamin Valentino and Paul Huth, campaigns of mass
slaughter became the official policy of a number of regimes faced with guerilla insurgencies in
the twentieth century, born “out of frustration with conventional tactics in an effort to stave off
defeat” (2004: 377). These counter-insurgency strategies usually echoed Rios Montt’s sinister
pronouncement. To what degree this makes the guerrillas or their supporters culpable, for
inciting the government’s abuses, I leave up to conservative commentators like Stoll, who
always seem ready to blame the victims. For a thorough evisceration of Stoll’s arguments about
the roots of the crisis in Guatemala, see Carol Smith’s “Why Write an Exposé of Rigoberta
Menchú?” (Arias 2001:141).
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See Danilo Rodiguez, “About Rigoberta’s Lies,” first published in Siglo XXI, in Guatemala City,
Guatemala, 12/20/98, trans. Arturo Arias, in The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy: 70; Jorge
Palmieri, “Lies by the Nobel Prize Winner,” first published in El Periódico de Guatemala,
Guatemala City, 12/21/98, trans. Arturo Arias, in The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy: 73;
Octavio Martí, “The Pitiful Lies of Rigoberta Menchú,” first published in El País, in Madrid,
Spain, 1/3/99, trans. Arturo Arias, in The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy: 78.
95 For example, that one of the officers convicted of killing Gerardi, Colonel Byran Disrael Lima
Estrada, had trained in the U.S. at the School of the Americas. The documents revealing his
training are available thanks to the National Security Archive’s use of the Freedom of
Information Act and can be accessed online under their “Guatemala Project” page, at
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB25/index.htm. Web access: 12/18/18. Lima
Estrada was released after serving only eleven years. See “Guatemala frees ex-colonel who
killed campaigning bishop” Associated Press, 7/14/12.
96 “It is my understanding that, over all these years, Elisabeth has never given Rigoberta the
royalties for the different editions. This quantity has kept growing, and Elisabeth has always
kept the author’s royalties. What she has done is to make certain donations to Rigoberta, but I
am not familiar with the quantities or details,” Taracena said (2001:88). On the other hand, Stoll
includes an endnote with transcriptions of receipts he claims to have seen, written by Menchú
Tum to Burgos-Debray, acknowledging the receipt of several sums of money (2001:303).
97 For example, see Jesse Alejandro Cottrell’s radio program investigating the versions of family
lore surrounding the murder of his uncle in Guatemala in the 1980s, “Who was Tío Alejandro?”
from Latino USA, 28 September, 2018, https://latinousa.org/2018/09/28/tioalejandro/
98 See Brian McNair, Fake News: Falsehood, Fabrication and Fantasy in Journalism (New York:
Routledge 2018); Núria Almiron, Journalism in Crisis: Corporate Media and Financialization,
trans. William McGrath, Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2010); Jeffrey C. Alexander, E. Breese, M.
Luengo, eds. The Crisis of Journalism Reconsidered: Democratic Culture, Professional Codes,
Digital Future, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2016); The Editors, N+1, “The New Reading
Environment,” Vol. 32: Bad Faith, Web Access Date: 08/28/18; Christopher Connell, Journalism
in the Service of Democracy: A Summit of Deans, Faculty, Students and Journalists, (New York:
Carnegie Corp. of New York, 2008); Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko, eds. The Media,
Journalism and Democracy, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000).
99 There is a tradition in the humanities of describing particularly elusive objects of study with
the metaphor of “enchantment,” a tradition I hope to avoid. For more, see Mark. A Schneider’s
Culture and Enchantment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
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